Strategic Options After Kursk

[ljadw]

If Overlord had failed on 15 june,Bagration still would start a week later,I do not see that in one week time, the Germans could gather sufficient forces and send them to the east to stop Bagration .

And yet 19. Inf.Div. (LW) moved to Italy and 19. Panzer to the Osfront without problems.

I said : sufficient forces : one PzD and one ID would not be sufficient: a minimum of 20 divisions would be necessary to prevent the disaster of Bagration,and, I do not see how Germany could gather 20 divisions and send them to the East,in one week .

[BDV]

Out of the 60 german divisions, 20 would be pretty shot up in the defensive effort. Something like 20 good divisions would have to be further left in place. So maybe 15-20 divisions would become available for deployment East, mid-July. The advantage for Germans is that it would be probably enough to shore up the front in Byelorussia and Lithiania, without weakening the AGS areas.

[RichTO90]

From what I remember , Nutter reviewed a book the author of which claimed (for obvious reasons : the stronger the Westheer was,the bigger the performances of the US army) that the Westheer was very strong in 1944 (the autor was talking about seasonned Germans),and the judgement of Nutter was slashing.

I don't know if the review is still available .

Thank you. No one should have any trouble finding that source for sure... :roll:

[BDV]

From what I remember , Nutter reviewed a book the author of which claimed (for obvious reasons : the stronger the Westheer was,the bigger the performances of the US army) that the Westheer was very strong in 1944 (the autor was talking about seasonned Germans),and the judgement of Nutter was slashing.

I don't know if the review is still available .

Thank you. No one should have any trouble finding that source for sure... :roll:

Would you be so kind as to clue us in?

[ljadw]

It was a review of a book by Peter Mansoor,who said that in 1944 the US Army was faced by a strong Westheer with advanced weapons,on which Thomas Nutter replied that the Westheer was very weak.

[ljadw]

Out of the 60 german divisions, 20 would be pretty shot up in the defensive effort. Something like 20 good divisions would have to be further left in place. So maybe 15-20 divisions would become available for deployment East, mid-July. The advantage for Germans is that it would be probably enough to shore up the front in Byelorussia and Lithiania, without weakening the AGS areas.

I don't think that the Germans could transfer very quickly 20 divisions from France to the East .

Besides,in post 20,it is claimed that with those divisions,the Germans could start (on the front of AGS) a big armoured offensive and drive back the Soviets .

IMO,both (an offensive or stop a Soviet attack) would be impossible .

[AJFFM]

Somehow it seems that the more critical (in my opinion at least) Lviv-Sandomierz offensive is been neglected here. Even if Bagration was by some magic stopped or the level of its destruction was reduced and a defensive line was established well beyond Warsaw (where the offensive effectively stopped) the Red army would have still attacked the AG North Ukraine which deployed much of its armour to save AGC which would have meant the second offensive would have achieved success regardless of how good defences against Bagration were.

The Germans in the summer of 44 were screwed everywhere regardless of what they did and only abandoning East Prussia and making use of 16th and 18th armies would have mitigated the situation (and even this would have delayed eventual defeat by probably 6 months more) in the east while the west nothing would have stopped the Anglo-American war machine.

[RichTO90]

It was a review of a book by Peter Mansoor,who said that in 1944 the US Army was faced by a strong Westheer with advanced weapons,on which Thomas Nutter replied that the Westheer was very weak.

No, it wasn't...his review of Mansoor's work The GI Offensive in Europe is contained in Mythos Revisited. I suggest you reread it.

[RichTO90]

I don't think that the Germans could transfer very quickly 20 divisions from France to the East .

Probably not...but sometimes it helps to think through a problem rather than engage in a knee-jerk reaction, which, BTW, is the typical reaction of those who Nutter criticizes.

To start with, the parameters need to be set a bit more closely than "the Allies fail at Normandy". And ask a few questions such as exactly when?

So, depending on when, then two divisions and a corps headquarters would already be there. Also depending on when, different conditions exist - what is the state of SNCF for example? Depending on when, 12. SS, 2.Panzer, and Lehr are well-placed to rapidly entrain and move east (21. Panzer and 17. SS probably less so). So that is potentially five of the seven Schnell divisionen, but only a quarter of the 20, so the remainder would need to come from the 14 "mobile" infantry divisions in the West, which would mean that the 20th would have to be 19. Inf.Div. (LW). That would be fine, except it was slated for Italy...which takes us to another problem.

The Germans weren't only facing problems on the Ostfront.

Besides,in post 20,it is claimed that with those divisions,the Germans could start (on the front of AGS) a big armoured offensive and drive back the Soviets .

Post 20 says nothing of the sort.

I think Hitler's idea was to stop the Allied invasion on the beaches of northern France (in either 1943 or 1944) then transfer the best of the 60 divisions stationed there to the eastern front.

Then they could contribute to another large scale Kursk style armoured offensive (probably in the Ukraine) to push the Russians back east once more (perhaps aimed at getting to the Dneiper river and trapping as much Soviet armour west of that barrier as possible).

Had Rommel indead succeeded in pushing the Allies back into the sea in June 1944 was this a realistic strategy?

It is your penchant for hyperbole and reading things into posts that aren't there there that gets you into trouble with other posters. Where does the "20 divisions come from"? Why don't you argue what was actually said in that post rather than what you think was in that post? You could, for example, argue that "no it wasn't a realistic strategy".

IMO,both (an offensive or stop a Soviet attack) would be impossible .

Either is well possible as a German course of action, since it had happened before and it was in fact what was being planned for, but whether or not either would be successful is another matter.

[RichTO90]

The Germans in the summer of 44 were screwed everywhere regardless of what they did and only abandoning East Prussia and making use of 16th and 18th armies would have mitigated the situation (and even this would have delayed eventual defeat by probably 6 months more) in the east while the west nothing would have stopped the Anglo-American war machine.

Exactly. By June 1944 there were no good strategic options. It is questionable too if taking the better strategic options "after Kursk" (I know, back on topic, quelle horreur!) would have made much difference.

[AJFFM]

It would make a difference depending on who will end up conquering Germany. As I said the Germans (Wehrmacht that is) preferred the US over the USSR and in an election year (assuming that the Germans after adjusting their strategic situation in the east still kept Belorussia in Nov. 44 and Paris has already fallen to the US) I very much doubt the US will let Berlin go out of its grasp which indeed might actually result in the scenario Hitler always wanted, and Anglo-American/Soviet clash over conquered territory.

Maps would have been very different looking by now.

[ljadw]

Where does the "20 divisions come from"?.

Post 32 : So maybe 15/20 divisions would become available for deployment East mid july .

[RichTO90]

Post 32 : So maybe 15/20 divisions would become available for deployment East mid july .

the actual statement made was:

So maybe 15-20 divisions would become available for deployment East, mid-July. The advantage for Germans is that it would be probably enough to shore up the front in Byelorussia and Lithiania, without weakening the AGS areas.

Again, where was the claim made by anyone, other than you,

that with those divisions,the Germans could start (on the front of AGS) a big armoured offensive and drive back the Soviets ."

?

If 15-20 divisions could be provided, then it very likely could have been enough "to shore up the front in Byelorussia and Lithiania [sic], without weakening the AGS areas". Not that it would have availed much in the long run, since it doesn't resolve the problems in Italy or the likely possibility of a stronger Allied amphibious assault on France either through southern France or early in 1945 in Northern France. At best, Germany would still be robbing Peter to pay Paul.

[steverodgers801]

The US did let Berlin out of its grasp, it was decided it was not worth the 100k losses or so to turn half of the city over to the Russians.

[ljadw]

Post 32 : So maybe 15/20 divisions would become available for deployment East mid july .

the actual statement made was:

So maybe 15-20 divisions would become available for deployment East, mid-July. The advantage for Germans is that it would be probably enough to shore up the front in Byelorussia and Lithiania, without weakening the AGS areas.

Again, where was the claim made by anyone, other than you,

that with those divisions,the Germans could start (on the front of AGS) a big armoured offensive and drive back the Soviets ."

?

Post 20 : Then they could contribute to another large scale Kursk style offensive(probably in the Ukraine)to push the Russians back east once more .

Post 32 is talking about 20 divisions available for the east .

Post 20 is talking about about a large offensive in the Ukraine to push the Soviets back .