Strategic Options After Kursk

[ljadw]

In the East the Germans fought every encirclement and pocket as a matter of life and death.

This is not correct : at Stalingrad,more Germans became POW than were killed .

[BDV]

In the East the Germans fought every encirclement and pocket as a matter of life and death.

This is not correct : at Stalingrad,more Germans became POW than were killed .

Off the top of my head 330k pocketed - 40k evacuated - 90k POW = 200k KIA. What am I missing.

[RichTO90]

As for German surrender, not so much. Records show that Germans surrendered en masse in Cotentin, Brittany, South of France and other areas when they realised their situation was hopeless. In the East the Germans fought every encirclement and pocket as a matter of life and death. So the Germans while knowing POW was not good in general it was better to be in American or British camps than a French or the most horrible Soviet option.

Sorry, but no, the records show something a bit more nuanced.

In 1944 Soviets/Western Allies (NWE) captured:
1st QTR - 40,000/0
2nd QTR - 130,000/29,700
3rd QTR - 190,000/539,705
4th QTR - effectively 0/236,463
In 1945:
1st QTR - 540,000/486,623
2nd QTR (to 8 May) - 900,000/2,231,265

Much of the difference in the last quarter was caused by the Ruhr Pocket (c. 325,000) and the fact as the endgame became obvious in the last weeks indeed many sought to surrender, specifically to the Americans. Between 30 April and 7 May alone, i.e., before the formal capitulation of Nazi Germany, 561,169 German PW were recorded by 12th Army Group alone. However, the data simply doesn't indicate that the Germans happily surrendered in droves to the Western Allies while fighting on to the death for the Führer in the East before that.

But if you have some evidence to support your opinion I would be happy to see it.

[BDV]

The morale of the troops taking part was astonishingly high at the start of the [WachtAmRhein] offensive. They really believed victory was possible - unlike the higher commanders, who knew the facts.
G vRundstedt

So morale throughout late 1943 early 1944 can scarcely be a problem.

[ljadw]

In the East the Germans fought every encirclement and pocket as a matter of life and death.

This is not correct : at Stalingrad,more Germans became POW than were killed .

Off the top of my head 330k pocketed - 40k evacuated - 90k POW = 200k KIA. What am I missing.

The top of your head is wrong


From WW2stats.(abwicklungssstab Stalingr

[ljadw]

In the East the Germans fought every encirclement and pocket as a matter of life and death.

This is not correct : at Stalingrad,more Germans became POW than were killed .

Off the top of my head 330k pocketed - 40k evacuated - 90k POW = 200k KIA. What am I missing.

The top of your head is wrong


From WW2stats.(abwicklungssstab Stalingrad)

In the pocket :174.975,of which 16345 were transported out of the pocket.Remained:158630,of which 91000 became POW at the capitulation (31/1-2/2).

Number of KIA,DOW,died of sickness:67630,minus an unknown number of men who became POW before the capitulation .

[BDV]

So after taking a detour in later matters that (IMO) point out that Wehrmacht German troops would fight tough under all imaginable post-Kursk scenarios, but not necessarily to the death, returning to the original question.

What is the goal of 3rd Reich's struggle? The rational goal at this point is survival. I think that a good point can be made that the approach with the faintest chance of survival is multi-faceted. Military has to complement the political. Ukrainean-Galician Republic, restoration of the Baltics, lendlease-style know-how support to Japan, these all have to go in high gear in August-September '43. A special interest in maneuvers to maximize civilian casualties inflicted by Wally actions (think the Le Havre propaganda debacle) can also add to Wallies' political headaches.

Militarily, a slow withdrawal from the Norwegian outpost, in the style of Crete (if allies can be drawn into a 2nd Italy there, even better, IMO) is sensible. But the thinking about the defense doctrine is probably the most sensitive area. The main line of defense should probably be not on a big natural obstacle, but behind it.

[ChrisDR68]

The morale of the troops taking part was astonishingly high at the start of the [WachtAmRhein] offensive. They really believed victory was possible - unlike the higher commanders, who knew the facts.
G vRundstedt

So morale throughout late 1943 early 1944 can scarcely be a problem.

Wasn't WachtAmRhein the Ardennes offensive in December 1944?

I've read German morale recovered remarkably quickly after the collapse in Normandy and the Allies' rapid advance to the German border in September and October 1944.

Once The Battle Of The Bulge ended in January 1945 though German morale in the west collapsed and never recovered.

[AJFFM]

As for German surrender, not so much. Records show that Germans surrendered en masse in Cotentin, Brittany, South of France and other areas when they realised their situation was hopeless. In the East the Germans fought every encirclement and pocket as a matter of life and death. So the Germans while knowing POW was not good in general it was better to be in American or British camps than a French or the most horrible Soviet option.

Sorry, but no, the records show something a bit more nuanced.

In 1944 Soviets/Western Allies (NWE) captured:
1st QTR - 40,000/0
2nd QTR - 130,000/29,700
3rd QTR - 190,000/539,705
4th QTR - effectively 0/236,463
In 1945:
1st QTR - 540,000/486,623
2nd QTR (to 8 May) - 900,000/2,231,265

Much of the difference in the last quarter was caused by the Ruhr Pocket (c. 325,000) and the fact as the endgame became obvious in the last weeks indeed many sought to surrender, specifically to the Americans. Between 30 April and 7 May alone, i.e., before the formal capitulation of Nazi Germany, 561,169 German PW were recorded by 12th Army Group alone. However, the data simply doesn't indicate that the Germans happily surrendered in droves to the Western Allies while fighting on to the death for the Führer in the East before that.

But if you have some evidence to support your opinion I would be happy to see it.

I think you just proved my case for me. In Q3 of 44 (Bagration, Lviv-Sandomierz, Jassy, Karelia etc.) less men surrendered in the east than in the west despite a slight edge to the east in numbers for German troops (I think 45/55) yet more surrendered in the west than in the east which proves my case. In Q1 of 45 despite majority of German troops still fought in the east the numbers were nearly identical and ratio is clearly in favour of surrendering to the west.

[AJFFM]

The morale of the troops taking part was astonishingly high at the start of the [WachtAmRhein] offensive. They really believed victory was possible - unlike the higher commanders, who knew the facts.
G vRundstedt

So morale throughout late 1943 early 1944 can scarcely be a problem.

Wasn't WachtAmRhein the Ardennes offensive in December 1944?

I've read German morale recovered remarkably quickly after the collapse in Normandy and the Allies' rapid advance to the German border in September and October 1944.

Once The Battle Of The Bulge ended in January 1945 though German morale in the west collapsed and never recovered.

German moral recovered largely due to relative successes after the fall of Paris including Market-Garden and NE of France not to mention some successes in the east too. It was winter, a condition all German units were used to after a gruelling 3 years in the east, there was much less air activity than before and the new American units were not up to par with the older more experienced ones.

[RichTO90]

I think you just proved my case for me.

No, fraid not.

In Q3 of 44 (Bagration, Lviv-Sandomierz, Jassy, Karelia etc.) less men surrendered in the east than in the west despite a slight edge to the east in numbers for German troops (I think 45/55) yet more surrendered in the west than in the east which proves my case.

No. Ostfront strength:

1 July 3.13 million
1 September 2.542 million

Strength for Ob. West during this period hovered around 1.4-1.6 million. Furthermore, there is a minor problem with the PW figures for the West...it includes an unknown number of Freiwilleger, almost all of whom were either in Ob. West or Südwest at this time and accounted for a large proportion of the personnel strength. Of course there are also problems with the eastern figure. The figures for 4th QTR 44 are inexplicable really and they also include a proportion of non-German allies. Furthermore, we really don't know for sure how many were captured but never made it to the GUPVI camps, but instead died en route of hunger or disease (or both).

In Q1 of 45 despite majority of German troops still fought in the east the numbers were nearly identical and ratio is clearly in favour of surrendering to the west.

Or not...

BTW, still waiting for your "evidence" that the Western Allies faced little or no combat after crossing the Rhine.

[ChrisDR68]

What is the goal of 3rd Reich's struggle? The rational goal at this point is survival. I think that a good point can be made that the approach with the faintest chance of survival is multi-faceted. Military has to complement the political. Ukrainean-Galician Republic, restoration of the Baltics, lendlease-style know-how support to Japan, these all have to go in high gear in August-September '43. A special interest in maneuvers to maximize civilian casualties inflicted by Wally actions (think the Le Havre propaganda debacle) can also add to Wallies' political headaches.

Militarily, a slow withdrawal from the Norwegian outpost, in the style of Crete (if allies can be drawn into a 2nd Italy there, even better, IMO) is sensible. But the thinking about the defense doctrine is probably the most sensitive area. The main line of defense should probably be not on a big natural obstacle, but behind it.

A lot of this makes sense... but none were ever likely to happen so long as Hitler was still alive. The paradox was that Hitler imbued the German people with the will to fight. In the BBC documentary series The Dark Charisma Of Adolf Hitler it's stated that his hold over his nation was akin to casting a spell. That spell was only broken when he shot himself.

Without their Fuhrer would they still have fought to the end?

[AJFFM]

Or not...

BTW, still waiting for your "evidence" that the Western Allies faced little or no combat after crossing the Rhine.

Out of a simple research I made:

The drive from Paris to the Rhine took 5 months in which the US took something like 50k KIA alone. The drive from the Rhine to the Czech borders took 50 days in which American troops took over all in all of the NWTO (which include combat in Northern Germany too) the total casualties of April and May of 45 (including KIA and backdate reporting) was 53k men which was less than the total for March alone for the whole Atlantic theatre (Adj. Report p.6, summary).

So I think gross numbers speak for themselves.

[ljadw]

No ,that's not so

1)The question was : the Western Allies and you are giving figures about the Americans only

2) The fact that the post Ardennes Western Allied losses were lower than the losses between Overlord and the end of the Ardennes does not prove that the Western Allies faced little or no fighting after crossing the Rhine,it only proves that the 1945 losses were lower than the 1944 losses .

3) Even if the 1945 losses were minimal,that does not prove that there was little or no fighting :in the 1940/1941 winter, the British losses in NA were minimal,the Italian losses were high,but that does not prove that there was little or no fighting .

[AJFFM]

Since the Americans faced the majority of resistance and had over two thirds of all combat troops (probably more, I need to check) I think it is safe to assume they were a representative sample of the western allies.

As for numbers, the western allies had more front line troops in April 45 than June 44 (almost double) and still the average monthly casualty numbers were higher before April 45 than April. Same can be said of German troops. More Germans were stationed in Germany in April 44 opposed to the western allies than any time since Aug. of 44 and still casualties were higher before April than during it.