BDV wrote:steverodgers801 wrote:
uhu wrote:Mid july 1941 was the turning point in the war, decisions made then doomed Germany to defeat. It could have been different because the highway from Smolensk to Moscow lay open with nothing but unorganized troop formation in the way.
Stolfi is so very wrong. The Soviets had plenty of troops available and had already set up a defense line east of Smolensk. After that there was another line before Moscow. Its simple math, due to the weakness of German supply lines it would be October before the Germans would be ready to attack Moscow and that is the start of mud season. After that is the snow. Stolfi completely ignores any Soviet sources and relies only of vey biased German accounts.
"Plenty of troops". Yes, but those troops were worse led and trained than those on the border in June. One cannot dismiss the German views either.
Same "unorganized troop formation" confabulation was issued by Manstein about the Pskov-Leningrad axis. He got his ass handed to him by these "unorganized" units a mere 7 days after the fall of Pskov.
However, a successfull Taifun-like action, starting from Rzhev-Vyazma line on October 1st would likely net Moscow (whether for good or just for a Mega-Stalingrad is a different question).
OTOH for such thing to be feasible, the 3rd and 4th Panzer groups and the remainder of the AGN need to be attacking East during August, not trodding through the Luga basin marshes like they did from mid-July to mid-September.
One straightforward way to achieve this can be (as far as this map taken from the "operationbarbarossa.net" website is accurate):
After fall of Pskov, the 41st corps attacks towards north, in conjunction with the 50th Corps in a northern direction, on the WEST side of Lake Peipus, while the 26th corps keep attacking along the Riga Gulf coastline. Meanwhile 1st and 38th infantry corps advance eastward south of Pskov, fanning out to cover the space between Pskov and M9 highway (Riga-Moskow line). The 2nd, 10th and 28th infantry corps never swing northeast, but keep compass straight East, but more battle damaged/slower elements may remain behind to help the 1st and the 38th, as the arc connecting Pskov and the 56th motorized and the 16th Army expands.
In early August, 41st may also be able to join the 56th in the attack East, and mid-August, one of the two infantry corps in Estonia (either the 26th or the 50th). Ideally both, as security of the Narva line and Baltic would be ensured by troops leeched from the Western defenses, as the threat of a British surprise, once August 1941 was entered, become vanishingly small. And by Spring 1942, Baltic country military units should be starting to provide their own defense against the Bolshevik Horde.