Reasons germany lost the war

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michael mills
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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#451

Post by michael mills » 17 Nov 2015, 13:17

NO : the essential factor that kept the war going until Europe was nearly destroyed was the unwillingness of Germany to surrender :if in november 1941 (when Wagner said that Barbarossa had failed definitively) Germany had surrendered, the lives of millions of people would have been saved (including Germans).
Of course Germany was unwilling to surrender. Britain under Churchill was equally unwilling to surrender.

The difference is that in 1940, Hitler was willing to negotiate peace with Britain, a peace that would have left the latter an independent country still in possession of all its assets.

It was the unwillingness of Churchill to negotiate a peace with Germany that kept the war going. That unwillingness was cemented into Allied policy with the demand for unconditional surrender issued at Casablanca early in 1943.

Of course Germany was not going to accede to a demand for unconditional surrender as long as it was able to go on fighting, just as Britain would never have acceded to such a demand. But the fact is that Germany never demanded unconditional surrender from Britain, just as it had not demanded unconditional surrender from France.
also to stress that distinction:
point 6 of the atlantic charter: 'Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;'
Irrelevant. It was specifically stated by the Allied Governments that the terms of the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Germany.

The policy of the Western Allies toward a defeated Germany was developed by the US Department of Treasury, oddly enough, and was accepted de facto by both Churchill and Roosevelt and incorporated in Allied control orders, although never officially proclaimed. That policy was to abolish the German State and to divide its territory into three small zones, with the German population being expelled from the western zone containing the Ruhrgebiet, Germany's industrial heartland, which was to be resettled with non-Germans brought in from other European countries. Apart from the partition of the country, all industry was to be dismantled so that the territory of the former Germany would become a purely agricultural area with a greatly reduced population living at a subsistence level, essentially an undeveloped country.

The only thing that prevented that policy being implemented was the start of the Cold War. In the British and US zones of occupation, massive resistance was organised by Communist activists, in the form of large-scale strikes that greatly hampered the extraction of coal and other assets. Coupled with that resistance by the German labour force was the fact that the local native administrations set up by the occupation authorities were all dominated by Communists and other Leftists, who also controlled the press.

Such was the scale of Communist influence in the Western Zones that the US Government feared that there might be a Communist-led uprising in those zones, leading to their joining the Soviet Zone to create a Communist German state under Soviet control, which would pose an existential threat to the rest of Western Europe. It was that fear that led to the abandonment of the policy of destruction of Germany as an industrial power, and its replacement by the policy of rebuilding a German State out of the three Western Zones, with a puppet government headed by the British creation, Adenauer.

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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#452

Post by Michael Kenny » 17 Nov 2015, 15:15

michael mills wrote:
Of course Germany was not going to accede to a demand for unconditional surrender as long as it was able to go on fighting.
This is incorrect. In May 1945 a huge number of German Divisions were in southern Germany. Norway was untouched and several large pockets were still resisting in the east and the west. . All of those units had the option to continue the war 'to the last bullet' Instead they meekly laid down their arms. The decisive factor was the removal of the head lunatic. The fear of being hung from the nearest lampost kept the war going. After the summer 1944 defeats there never was the slightest doubt about the final outcome and the German Generals knew this.


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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#453

Post by becktelj » 18 Nov 2015, 00:17

michael mills wrote:
also to stress that distinction:
point 6 of the atlantic charter: 'Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;'
Irrelevant. It was specifically stated by the Allied Governments that the terms of the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Germany.
if by irrelevant you mean that this is off topic to this thread then, yeh, perhaps, but that seems rather restrictive. if you mean that somehow the atlantic charter didn't apply to germany, then - wow. i never heard of this before. can you please tell me specifically who said it, in what context and when? the only problem i've ever heard about is points 4 and 7. 4 because of the empire preference and 7 because of a perceived lack of interest by the soviets in religion. i offered it originally only as an illustration of the distinction between germany and the nazis that allied leadership made. please say more about this lack of application to germany.


michael mills wrote:
The policy of the Western Allies toward a defeated Germany was developed by the US Department of Treasury, oddly enough, and was accepted de facto by both Churchill and Roosevelt and incorporated in Allied control orders, although never officially proclaimed. That policy was to abolish the German State and to divide its territory into three small zones, with the German population being expelled from the western zone containing the Ruhrgebiet, Germany's industrial heartland, which was to be resettled with non-Germans brought in from other European countries. Apart from the partition of the country, all industry was to be dismantled so that the territory of the former Germany would become a purely agricultural area with a greatly reduced population living at a subsistence level, essentially an undeveloped country.

The only thing that prevented that policy being implemented was the start of the Cold War. In the British and US zones of occupation, massive resistance was organised by Communist activists, in the form of large-scale strikes that greatly hampered the extraction of coal and other assets. Coupled with that resistance by the German labour force was the fact that the local native administrations set up by the occupation authorities were all dominated by Communists and other Leftists, who also controlled the press.

Such was the scale of Communist influence in the Western Zones that the US Government feared that there might be a Communist-led uprising in those zones, leading to their joining the Soviet Zone to create a Communist German state under Soviet control, which would pose an existential threat to the rest of Western Europe. It was that fear that led to the abandonment of the policy of destruction of Germany as an industrial power, and its replacement by the policy of rebuilding a German State out of the three Western Zones, with a puppet government headed by the British creation, Adenauer.
this is off topic so i will simply say that the plan was not the policy of the western allies, neither was it the policy of the us government nor was it the policy of the us treasury department. it was the plan of henry morgenthau, jr. the secretary of the us treasury department. morgenthau was the money man behind the us war effort. he did a magnificient job at that but to quote dear & foot in the oxford companion to world was II, ' . . . but his plan should never have seen the light of day."

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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#454

Post by Jim_R » 18 Nov 2015, 07:21

michael mills wrote:

Of course Germany was unwilling to surrender. Britain under Churchill was equally unwilling to surrender.

The difference is that in 1940, Hitler was willing to negotiate peace with Britain, a peace that would have left the latter an independent country still in possession of all its assets.

It was the unwillingness of Churchill to negotiate a peace with Germany that kept the war going. That unwillingness was cemented into Allied policy with the demand for unconditional surrender issued at Casablanca early in 1943.
Hopefully a newbie's first post is relevant and on topic, but I don't think we can give all the credit to Churchill. Neville Chamberlain said:

"We have a clear conscience; we have done all that any country could do to establish peace. The situation in which no word given by Germany's ruler could be trusted, and no people or country could feel itself safe had become intolerable ... Now may God bless you all."

Britain had tried peaceful negotiations during the late 1930s and found that Hitler's word could not be trusted. Britain would not make that same mistake again. Possibly a new German government with a new leader may have been able to negotiate, otherwise it was never going to happen.

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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#455

Post by michael mills » 18 Nov 2015, 08:07

Re non-applicability of the Atlantic Charter to Germany, see page 163 of this book:

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=ue ... er&f=false

And page 152 of this book:

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=6r ... ny&f=false

michael mills
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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#456

Post by michael mills » 18 Nov 2015, 08:13

See also note 88 on page 255 of this book:

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=zy ... ny&f=false

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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#457

Post by michael mills » 18 Nov 2015, 08:21


becktelj
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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#458

Post by becktelj » 19 Nov 2015, 01:41

michael mills wrote:Re non-applicability of the Atlantic Charter to Germany, see page 163 of this book:

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=ue ... er&f=false

And page 152 of this book:

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=6r ... ny&f=false
page 163

'the right of conquest: the acquisition of territory by force in international law and practice' sharon korman 1996 .

neither the subject matter of the book nor the point of the specific reference have to do with the statement 'It was specifically stated by the Allied Governments that the terms of the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Germany.'

page 152

'the morganthau plan' john dietrich - the reference is to a speech given by the earl of mansfield on the floor of the house of lords seemingly to give some license to those who might feel bad over the suffering of minority germans who are moved as a result of the morganthau plan. he does say the words 'the atlantic charter will not apply to germany . . . ' but this is hardly a spokesman for 'the allied governments'.

michael mills wrote:See also note 88 on page 255 of this https://books.google.com.au/books?id=zy ... ny&f=false
page 255

'german resistance against hitler: the search for allies abroad, 1938-1945' footnote 88. - ' . . . after the adoption of the 'unconditional surrender' formula in casablanca in january 1943, the prime minister stressed before the house of commons that there was no question of the atlantic charter applying to germany; it in no way bound great britain about the future of germany as it was no 'bargain or contract' with the enemy. . . '

i think this is churchill assuring the house that gb could and would 'lean' on its eneny . . . ' see also footnote 92
michael mills wrote:

And page 145 of this book:
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=Q6 ... ny&f=false

page 145

'austria in world war II: an anglo american dilemma'

this appears to be an attempt by the soviet foreign office to reference the atlantic charter in 'moscow declaration on austria' to curry favor and gain support of the us in some eastern european diplomacy.

i see nothing that convinces me 'it was specifically stated by the Allied Governments that the terms of the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Germany.'
this search started after i suggested that the allies leaders were indeed seeking the destruction of nazism but not necessarily the destruction of germany.

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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#459

Post by michael mills » 19 Nov 2015, 11:24

i see nothing that convinces me 'it was specifically stated by the Allied Governments that the terms of the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Germany.'
Then you are simply shutting your eyes to documented facts. The source linked by me specifically states that in 1944, Churchill confirmed that "there was no question of the Atlantic Charter applying to Germany".

That sounds to me like a specific statement by an Allied Government that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Germany, as I claimed.

I am confident that Churchill would not have made that specific statement unless he knew that that was also the view of Roosevelt.

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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#460

Post by michael mills » 19 Nov 2015, 12:05

this is off topic so i will simply say that the plan was not the policy of the western allies, neither was it the policy of the us government nor was it the policy of the us treasury department. it was the plan of henry morgenthau, jr. the secretary of the us treasury department. morgenthau was the money man behind the us war effort. he did a magnificient job at that but to quote dear & foot in the oxford companion to world was II, ' . . . but his plan should never have seen the light of day."
The essence of Morgenthau's plan was indeed adopted by both Churchill and Roosevelt at Quebec, if not in every detail, and formed the basis for Anglo-American planning for the post-war treatment of a defeated Germany. Its ideas formed the basis of JCS 1067, the initial policy document for the administration of the US Zone of Occupation in Germany.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morgenthau_Plan#JCS_1067

A Handbook for Military Government in Germany was ready in August 1944: it advocated a quick restoration of normal life for the German people and reconstruction of Germany. Henry Morgenthau, Jr. brought it to the attention of President Franklin D. Roosevelt who, after reading it, rejected it with the words:


"Too many people here and in England hold the view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place – that only a few Nazis are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization."



A new document was drafted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067 (JCS 1067). Here the US military government of occupation in Germany was ordered to "...take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany [or] designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy" and it was also ordered that starvation, disease and civil unrest were to be kept below such levels where they would pose a danger to the troops of occupation.

The directive was formally issued to Eisenhower in the spring of 1945, and it applied only to the US zone (although attempts had been made to get the other Allies to accept it). The occupation directive remained secret until October 17, 1945. It was made known to the public two months after the US had succeeded in incorporating much of it into the Potsdam Agreement.[50]

On May 10, 1945 Truman signed the JCS 1067.[51] Ignoring the amendments to JCS 1067 that had been inserted by McCloy of the War Department, Morgenthau told his staff that it was a big day for the Treasury, and that he hoped that "someone doesn't recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan."[2]

In occupied Germany Morgenthau left a direct legacy through what in OMGUS commonly were called "Morgenthau boys". These were U.S. Treasury officials whom Dwight D. Eisenhower had "loaned" in to the Army of occupation. These people ensured that the JCS 1067 was interpreted as strictly as possible. They were most active in the first crucial months of the occupation, but continued their activities for almost two years following the resignation of Morgenthau in mid-1945 and some time later also of their leader Colonel Bernard Bernstein, who was "the repository of the Morgenthau spirit in the army of occupation".[52]

Morgenthau had been able to wield considerable influence over Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067. JCS 1067 was a basis for U.S. occupation policy until July 1947, and like the Morgenthau Plan, was intended to reduce German living standards. The production of oil, rubber, merchant ships, and aircraft were prohibited. Occupation forces were not to assist with economic development apart from the agricultural sector.

In his 1950 book Decision in Germany, Clay wrote, "It seemed obvious to us even then that Germany would starve unless it could produce for export and that immediate steps would have to be taken to revive industrial production".[53] Lewis Douglas, chief adviser to General Lucius Clay, U.S. High Commissioner, denounced JCS Directive 1067 saying, "This thing was assembled by economic idiots. It makes no sense to forbid the most skilled workers in Europe from producing as much as they can in a continent that is desperately short of everything" [54] Douglas went to Washington in the hopes of having the directive revised but was unable to do so.

In July 1947 JCS 1067, which had directed the U.S. forces of occupation in Germany to "...take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany [or] designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy", was replaced by JCS 1779 which instead stated that "An orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany."[16]

It took over two months for General Clay to overcome continued resistance to the new directive JCS 1779, but on July 10, 1947, it was approved at a meeting of the SWNCC (State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee). The final version of the document "was purged of the most important elements of the Morgenthau plan."[55]

In view of increased concerns by General Lucius D. Clay and the Joint Chiefs of Staff over communist influence in Germany, as well as of the failure of the rest of the European economy to recover without the German industrial base on which it was dependent, in the summer of 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall, citing "national security grounds," was able to convince President Harry S. Truman to remove JCS 1067, and replace it with JCS 1779.[48] JCS 1067 had then been in effect for over two years.

The "Morgenthau boys" resigned en masse when the JCS 1779 was approved, but before they went, the Morgenthau followers in the decartelization division of OMGUS accomplished one last task in the spring of 1947: the destruction of the old German banking system.[56] By breaking the relationships between German banks, they cut off the flow of credit between them, limiting them to short-term financing only, thus preventing the rehabilitation of German industry and with immediate adverse effects on the economy in the U.S. occupation zone.[56]

With the change of occupation policy, most significantly thanks to the currency reform of 1948, Germany eventually made an impressive recovery, later known as the Wirtschaftswunder ("economic miracle").
Morgenthau himself believed that the Allied policy being implemented in occupied Germany in 1945 was based on his plan, and said as much in his book published in that year, "Germany Is Our Problem", in which he gave a full description of it, including a map of his proposal for dividing Germany.

It is noteworthy that in his book, Morgenthau fiercely denounced the criticism of his plan being made by US administrators on the ground in occupied Germany, to the effect that the implementation of his plan, through JCS 1067, was causing the German population to turn to Communism in despair.

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Re: Reasons germany lost the war

#461

Post by Gorque » 20 Nov 2015, 15:38

becktelj wrote:This is off topic so i will simply say that the plan was not the policy of the western allies, neither was it the policy of the us government nor was it the policy of the us treasury department. it was the plan of henry morgenthau, jr. the secretary of the us treasury department. morgenthau was the money man behind the us war effort. he did a magnificient job at that but to quote dear & foot in the oxford companion to world was II, ' . . . but his plan should never have seen the light of day."
From the May 10th 1945 entry of the Morgenthau Diaries:
H.M. jr.: Fussell, if somebody doesn't recognize it as the Morgenthau Plan, just rub his nose. Mr Luxford: The Hearald Tribune recognized it this morning as the Morgenthau Plan. Mr. Coe: A portion of it is also in the Wall Street Journal
See page 18: http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resou ... md1152.pdf

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