Reasons germany lost the war

[ML59]

Japan did not betray the Deutsches Reich, but Hitler imo should not have felt obliged to declare anything. Japan divisions couldn't do jack against Soviet forces, the Chinese were already too much for Japan Army. The only timeframe where they could have achieved anything against Soviet Russia would be in december '41 when all Soviet troops went West to fix the breach. That was the only time when a Japanese adventure would reap positive results. (= forcing Stalin to ask for a stalemate, that is)

And achieving what? To occupy some tens of thousand of square km in one of the most inhospitable area on earth could have hardly changed anything. Without considering that Japan was simply already too much over-committed in China where it was not able to achieve any strategic victory or durable stalemate.
The heart of Russia was not in Siberia but in the European part of this immense country, where lived more than 90% of its population and were there were all the agricultural and industrial resources that kept the country alive even in the most difficult situations that followed Barbarossa.

I don't see any way the Japanese could have forced the collapse of Russia by military means.

[LWD]

...The only timeframe where they could have achieved anything against Soviet Russia would be in december '41 when all Soviet troops went West to fix the breach. T...

"All Soviet troops" never went West. If fact the Soviets maintained a significant force in the East all the way through the war.

1) Maybe right, maybe wrong. Japanese could do okay with Caucasus oil.
....

If they could get it. On other threads it's been question as to whether or not even the Germans could have managed to get any significant amount to Germany by the mid 40's.

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You said that without PH,there would be no LL to the SU : I asked : why ?
...

Considering LL to the Soviets predated PH this is a question that I'd like to hear answered as well.

German DOW was made as a result of PH. And Hitlers pledge to Matsuoka on March 27,1941

When this has been discussed previously on this board it has been indicated that Hitler was by no means obligated to declare war following PH. Nor was he all that big on living up to his obligations in any case if he didn't feel like it.

we cannot tell if there would have been one without PH as this event assured it would indeed be declared. A possible what if thread.

German DOW was made as a result of PH.

This is more than questionable .

PH certainly set the stage for the declaration of war. However it was quite clear that the US and Germany would officially be at war in the not too distant future (almost certainly by mid 42). Furthermore the "shoot on sight" order meant that practically they already were at war.

[Alixanther]

...The only timeframe where they could have achieved anything against Soviet Russia would be in december '41 when all Soviet troops went West to fix the breach. T...

"All Soviet troops" never went West. If fact the Soviets maintained a significant force in the East all the way through the war.

I said "in december '41" - you say "all the way through the war". I could agree with you that - considering "all the way through the war", there was a balance of Soviet forces between West and East. However, after their disastruous defeat in October, the Soviets were marshalling some of their Eastern assets to the West. If you plan to rebuke me using data about divisions and commanders, you may be right. Keep in mind, though, that - on paper - the divisions might stay where they were settled, while their artillery, tanks and other means of fighting could be brought to other formations, either depleted or newly formed, to be used whenever they're better than nothing. I insist that there was a steady stream of military assets coming from the East to fill the gap in the West, during the aforementioned period. After German winter crisis, well, there was no more incentive to do that anymore.

[Niklas68]

Id say there are many reasons why Germany lost the war, amongst those imo most of all because they couldn't sustain a prolonged war of attrition against powers with a much larger industrial production rate than their own.

But the most crucial reason for losing in the long run imo was not being prepared to fight england, at the time. England was the country they should have known would be an enemy right from the start. Hitler tried to avoid fighting england almost at all costs and when the war did break out he seemed almost surprised, bad judgement, I guess. He should have prepared german industries appropriately to produce weapons in sufficient quantities to fight an island nation with all that this might entail, but that wasn't the case. When France was taken and England rejected the peace offer from summer 1940 he found himself at war with a power he had never had the intention to fight and the german military wasn't prepared for it. Had he listened to Donitz he'd at least have a much larger submarine fleet than he actually had, though the war in the atlantic IMO was always going to be a side show. To take england out of the war he would have needed to invade and conquer it. This had never been on his radar up to then and in summer of 1940 it was too late. He seemed almost grateful to cancel it when air superiority over southern england couldn't be accomplished / or maintained for a sufficiently long period. Not wanting to fight "a germanic brother nation" in england or his unwillingness to properly prepare germany for such a war was the wrong thing to do imo, it was a huge mistake on his part, imo maybe even the single most crucial miscalculation of them all. Not the only miscalculation, surely.

[ML59]

The point is interesting and not devoid of good sense. The problem lies in the fact that Nazi Germany was never willing to compete with the British Empire on a world-wide basis, it focused only in expanding to the east, following geo-political priorities already developed after WW1 by many think-tank bodies, not necessarily nazi.
As a consequence, it lacked the means to fight and win over GB on their terms: a powerful deep sea war fleet, a powerful strategic air force, ample and easy access to oil resources to feed them.

[Niklas68]

Just to make it clear I'm not saying they should have built a surface fleet to compete with britian on a world wide scale similar to their effort before the first ww, Imo hitler was right in discarting any such move, imo the building of vessels such as bismarck and tirpitz was a waste of resources. They should have focused on building a strategic air force with long range fighters and bombers and a landing fleet to conduct an invasion and possibly a naval air force of the Beaufort or swordfish type that would have to deal with the Royal navy in case they d arrive at site to interrupt the supply chain to the landing bridgehead. Their goal should have been to prepare their forces for an invasion to - if possible - eliminate a major enemy player, not becoming a sea power along the lines the British Empire had been. Hitler never thought along those lines because he considered the BE to be a stabilizing factor he did not have the wish to bring down. But the Brits in their turn were adamant to bring him down. See the problem? If you enter the ring to face an adversary you do not wish to face and don't even prepare for his particular style and/or moves because deep down for whatever ideological reasons you don't really want to beat him, while he's intent on defeating you, you re doomed.

[ChrisDR68]

They should have focused on building a strategic air force with long range fighters and bombers and a landing fleet to conduct an invasion and possibly a naval air force of the Beaufort or swordfish type that would have to deal with the Royal navy in case they d arrive at site to interrupt the supply chain to the landing bridgehead. Their goal should have been to prepare their forces for an invasion to - if possible - eliminate a major enemy player, not becoming a sea power along the lines the British Empire had been.

I agree with this

Hitler had the time to do it too... from mid 1940 to mid 1941 when Germany was only at war with Britain and her empire. Instead he was already obsessed with the invasion of the USSR. Possibly the biggest grand strategic error he made during the entire war.

[Erwinn]

And when they decided to invade Vichy France, they shouldn't have tried an half assed seizure operation and give the French the time to scuttle their ships. Make a plan for it and go for ships with a secret operation.

[ljadw]

And when they decided to invade Vichy France, they shouldn't have tried an half assed seizure operation and give the French the time to scuttle their ships. Make a plan for it and go for ships with a secret operation.

They did not give the French the time to scuttle their ships .

Besides,these ships were irrelevant for Germany .

[Graeme Sydney]

He should have prepared german industries appropriately to produce weapons in sufficient quantities to fight an island nation with all that this might entail, but that wasn't the case.

I think you're right, but the problem is that Germany had limited resources; time, manpower, industrial capacity and material. Germany didn't have the capacity to achieve all the strategic objectives. IOW put time, manpower, industrial capacity and material, steel and design into subs, destroyers and landing craft then Germany doesn't have the tanks, artillery and trucks to win the Battle of France.

The other problem is counter measures. If Germany is seen or suspected by GB of increasing the sub fleet that would be seen as strategically aggressive and as a warning, and GB would respond with increased awareness and countermeasures. i.e. an arms race. And it is an arms race where Germany doesn't just need to have 'its nose in front' but has to get a substantial advantage - and that when its starting from well behind.

This had never been on his radar up to then and in summer of 1940 it was too late. He seemed almost grateful to cancel it when air superiority over southern england couldn't be accomplished / or maintained for a sufficiently long period.

I think you are right, but hey, Hitler was a corporal not a geo-political thinker. And there were very few others in the Germany military leadership that thought at this level. Germany had been a Continental power for 100 years and thought and prepared at that level. Their confidence at the Continental level was well placed but it blindsided them to their Geo-political weakness.

Not wanting to fight "a germanic brother nation" in england or his unwillingness to properly prepare germany for such a war was the wrong thing to do imo, it was a huge mistake on his part, imo maybe even the single most crucial miscalculation of them all. Not the only miscalculation, surely.

I think you are right, but classic Hitler (and human) thinking; using rational thought to justify an emotional need. Hitler wanted to believe it (and convinced himself and Germany). It fitted so well with his theories of Master Race and Aryan Superiority and it fitted in so well with his plans of eastern expansion at the expense of the Slavs, it just had to be true. But completely contradicted by Clausewitz' theory of nations acting in their national interests.

You'll notice these are almost exactly the same mistakes that were made in 1914. :roll:

[Erwinn]

And when they decided to invade Vichy France, they shouldn't have tried an half assed seizure operation and give the French the time to scuttle their ships. Make a plan for it and go for ships with a secret operation.

They did not give the French the time to scuttle their ships .

Besides,these ships were irrelevant for Germany .

3 battleships (scuttled)
7 cruisers (scuttled)
15 destroyers (scuttled)

Well this is a considerable force. It could turn the tide in Mediterranean.

And how these were irrelevant? Considering Germans had 2 Battleships and several cruisers and how well they used them, why would this fleet is irrelevenat for their efforts?

And wasting an hour before finding the base?!

I don't know much about this. Perhaps shed some light on it?

[BDV]

Those ships were not battle worthy. They did not have crews. And the joint Free French + UN Italy naval forces (assume Germans take the ships over, fix them, train crews, and try to use them, by which time it's late 1943) were larger.

There's a reason why Adolf was happy the French ships were out of the way.

[ljadw]

If the Germans captured these ships,they could not use them : there were no German crew available that could handle French ships ,besides,where would the Germans get the fuel ?

The Germans also did not wast time to go to Toulon ,but,immediately they invaded Vichy France,Toulon was alarmed and measures were taken to scuttle (if needed) the ships .There was nothing the Germans could do .

[Niklas68]

Seeing that Germany, in dire need of surface raiders, manned freighters and used them as commerce raiders such as Penguin and Komet, I tend to think germany could have made use of these ships, under the condition they were still based in the eastern Med, not in the North Sea. And if not maybe hand them over to italy, italy actually had quite a decent mediterranean fleet to boost themselves. Im not sure they had the manpower to man any additional large units but are inclined to believe they might have had. But it would have been difficult to get the french to hand them over to italy, musssolini did nothing to defeat france to earn any sort of thing like it, but regardless, it would ve aided the axis case, imo

With regards to the french and the peace terms of 1940, again hitler was showing he lacked the global perspective, he shouldn't have left them in possession of the north african coast. A different topic, I know, but when thinking of taking control of the french fleet, their bases in North Africa have to be mentioned, too. Had he occupied Tunis in the east through to casablanca in the west (and imo he wouldnt have needed to man it densily, just at a few key points such as tunis, oran, algiers and casablance) a) the allies would have had a problem launching torch and b) allied convoys through the street of gibraltar could have been attacked with much better results, what with possible axis air fields and submarine basis in northern morrocco etc. Hitler wasn't yet thinking in World war terms at the time, I know, but it cost him, same as his inability to get rid of Britain for good.

[ljadw]

How could Hitler have occupied in 1940 North Africa?