Taifun Stratigery

[BDV]

Given the assets in the theater, the logistical constraints, would third week of Taifun been beeter served by a different approach (e.g. like shown by the crimson/maroon lines):

?

The reasoning for my question is that rail support was tedious and it was not going to catch up during the operation, the coming rains would tax an already strained park of transport vehicles.

Most importantly, there were only 3 campaign-weary german infantry armies (with 9 corps between them) to deal with the (true, smaller, but mostly fresh) 15 Soviet armies on the battlefield. Even if a Soviet Army would be a german corps equivalent, it's still 1:2 for the defender. Given these constraints, a greater role for eliminating the Soviet forces should not have fallen on the shoulders of the armor? One way I see this achieved is by using armor's tactical mobility and firepower to cast a second line of encirclements beyond the first one at Briansk and Vyazma, namely at Rzhev, Gzhask, and Sukhinichi (as per map). But there might have been even better options. Still the disparity of infantry forces involved would represent, IMO, that german infantry should not be expected to finish the pockets alone.

[Appleknocker27]

I agree to the concept, assuming that major offensive operations were finished for that campaign year. A swift elimination of the pockets, withdrawl of the mobile units for rehab and a winterline established on the most favorable ground.

[steinmetz]

Taifun was simply started too late and PGR2 was too far south. The PZ armies needed to be closer to each other to be able to work together. .

[ChrisDR68]

After the 600,000 Soviet troops had been surrounded and forced to surrender at Bryansk could the Germans have concentrated their forces and aimed directly for Moscow instead of trying two separate advances either side of the city in the hope of capturing it in a pincer movement?

Given the weather conditions and the state of the Ostheer at this point this seems to me to be the only possible way they could have reached Moscow before the temperatures plunged way down making further offensive operations impossible.

[Appleknocker27]

After the 600,000 Soviet troops had been surrounded and forced to surrender at Bryansk could the Germans have concentrated their forces and aimed directly for Moscow instead of trying two separate advances either side of the city in the hope of capturing it in a pincer movement?

Given the weather conditions and the state of the Ostheer at this point this seems to me to be the only possible way they could have reached Moscow before the temperatures plunged way down making further offensive operations impossible.

I think the best option was to hurt the Red Army as much as possible within the parameters of protecting the Wehrmacht once the pockets around Vyazma and Bryansk were closed. The idea is to destroy the Red Army as economically as possible and protect the Wehrmacht's fighting quality for 1942. I believe this is best accomplished by what BDV layed out in the OP and then digging in on the most favorable ground in order to efficiently destroy the Soviet counter-offensive. This would leave Moscow less than 100 miles away when late spring came in 1942 and set up perhaps the decisive battle of that year. Outcome uncertain, but the Wehrmacht would be in better shape than in the OTL and the Soviets about the same if not slightly weaker.

[hms2011]

Given the assets in the theater, the logistical constraints, would third week of Taifun been beeter served by a different approach

Given the state of the opposing forces at the start of October, I find it unlikely that the Germans would be able to capture Moscow before New Year. With that in mind, I agree that focusing on destroying as many Soviets units as possible would be a better option.

Another benefit of this approach would be the cancellation of AGN push southwards (to link up with AGC advancing through Kalinin/Torzhok). Allowing AGN to focus on the capture of Tikhvin/Volkhov from the outset, and perhaps even send a few additional reinforcements north, might just be enough to put the Leningrad struggle to an end.

The combination of those two events would at least place the Germans in a much better situation come winter than what historically occurred.

[ViKinG]

We have to keep in mind that German panzer strength in Typhoon was quite misleading on paper. Even though Army group centre fielded more panzer divisions than ever before, each division was woefully understrength. WHen you look at the total number of panzers available for the campaign most of them belonged to the newly arrived 2nd and 5th panzer divisions. German strength in general was greatly reduced and to quote David Stahel won itself to death during the summer months. Your alternatives may have destroyed more Red Army units, that I agree with. but in my mind would not have gained a victory at Moscow either way. There was simply too much to do with too little left.

Luc

[BDV]

Kalinin and Torzhok, by consequence Leningrad, may be achievable if, 3rd Panzer supports 4th Panzer's swing north to Rzhev (instead of charging East) - or swinging itself north behind the 4th panzer closing the trap at Rzhev on the Soviet 22nd and 29th. Also the LW units directed to helping Manstein's poorly though out dash into Crimea are kept in theater.