Would a smaller barbarossa work?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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steverodgers801
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#61

Post by steverodgers801 » 15 Nov 2014, 00:23

As far as attrition, who lost the greater percentage of troops? In Bagration alone, the Germans lost about a third of their army which they could not replace. The Germans love to claim it was all Hitler's fault and we were too badly outnumbered. The Soviets completely out classed the Germans as far as strategic thinking. German tactical ability clouded their judgment as far as what the Soviets could do strategically.

Alixanther
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#62

Post by Alixanther » 20 Nov 2014, 19:01

ljadw wrote:
Alixanther wrote:
@ljawd: the argument "the RKKA was stronger" has no validation for "soviets in Berlin" conclusion. Please have in mind the Finnish - Soviet war and the HUUUUUGE disparity in size, yet the losses were in favor of the defender (Finnish forces). The Wehrmacht - RKKA disparity, although relevant enough, is not that big so there are numerous other factors to take into account before saying "RKKA was stronger". If that was the case then all the battles in the world would have always been won by the bigger army. Luckily for the Finns, Mannerheim would have disagreed with you.
And,who won in the Winter war ? The Finns ? Who was giving up ? The Soviets ?


In a war of attrition,the man who has more batallions will win .
First, the Finnish-Soviet War was NOT a war of attrition. So it has nothing to do with it.

Second, I expect from someone with an ounce of common sense to understand the EXTREMELY HUGE disparity between Soviet troops and Finnish troops. Even if hypothetically the RKKA would have been dead drunk 24/7 and led by monkeys instead of generals, the Finns could not have won. They simply couldn't.
Yet, they still fought. That's the reason the result of a war is not known in advance. They lost a war but they won Finland (the Soviets did not have the guts to make Finland a Soviet Republic). So yeah, in that particular point, it was the Soviets who were giving up.
steverodgers801 wrote: The Germans love to claim it was all Hitler's fault and we were too badly outnumbered. The Soviets completely out classed the Germans as far as strategic thinking. German tactical ability clouded their judgment as far as what the Soviets could do strategically.
Completely agree. German military high command was appalling. The soviet one, although affected by purges, was sound. What Soviets did not have was the tactical initiative, where Germans were still better. On grand strategic scale, OKW and Army Command was catastrophic.


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BDV
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#63

Post by BDV » 20 Nov 2014, 19:55

steverodgers801 wrote:As far as attrition, who lost the greater percentage of troops? ... The Germans love to claim it was all Hitler's fault and we were too badly outnumbered. The Soviets completely out classed the Germans as far as strategic thinking. German tactical ability clouded their judgment as far as what the Soviets could do strategically.
The Wehrmacht took lost 200,000 (veteran, combat) casualties in July and repeated the "performance" in August. That's dumbfounding. It mainly relates, IMO, to the German Leadership (Grofaz and his Generals-cum-Exterminateurs) trading bodies (which Germany also did not have) for speed of advance, because Germany also did not have time.

So a smaller Barbarossa would have addressed the dearth of able-bodied Germans, but not the time pressures imposed by the Anglo-American mobilization.


Except that it might have had - but that is a speculative WHIF issue, unlike the actual strategic options (of which a smaller Barbarossa is one maybe not so impractical) and choices, and the outcome of those choices.

P.S. If we can project that far, how would a smaller Barbarossa affect Japanese war making decisions?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

steverodgers801
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#64

Post by steverodgers801 » 21 Nov 2014, 01:41

So how much better would the Soviets had been better off if say they had not lost the Donets Basin

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victor82
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#65

Post by victor82 » 21 Nov 2014, 06:32

Barbarossa, small or large, begs the question of German production decisions made early in the war that doomed the Ostheer.

They were starting to run out of the basics in early August. The regime's unwillingness to commit to Total War after 1939 sealed its doom.

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BDV
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#66

Post by BDV » 21 Nov 2014, 18:13

steverodgers801 wrote:So how much better would the Soviets had been better off if say they had not lost the Donets Basin
But that happened only in July 1942, and Soviets had ramped up the Caspian/Baku production, significantly easing the energy strain on their war economy that resulted from the loss of Donbass. Also, a lot of the energy intensive stuff (e.g aluminum) was provided to some extent by Lend-Lease in 1942 and after. A smaller Barbarossa would not cut into the Soviet energy balance sheet, unless accompanied by a strategic bombing campaign and markedly different actions prior and during Barbarossa.

The path chosen historically was to force a victory, for Germany to impose her will on Bolshevik Russia; but historically Germany lacked the military resources to "shock and awe" the Soviet Union. I am with the OP in the question of there being less reckless ways of threading down the path of war, although that, obviously, is the big recklessness.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

ljadw
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#67

Post by ljadw » 21 Nov 2014, 21:01

That's not correct : already in 1942,the Soviet oil production was going down .

About the Don Basin :

although the coal production of the Donets Basin was going down from 85.5 million ton in 1940 to 36.9 million ton in 1945 (a loss of 48.6 million ton),the total coal production was going up from 147 million ton in 1940 to 149 million ton in 1945.

The explanation was simple: the SU won the war with less oil than before the war and with the same amount of coal as brfore the war(although more coal was needed),because the shortage of coal was catched by a bigger use of wood .

steverodgers801
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#68

Post by steverodgers801 » 21 Nov 2014, 21:56

So you are saying having more available would not make a difference?? Especially in 1942

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BDV
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#69

Post by BDV » 21 Nov 2014, 22:57

In 1941 only the production in Ukrainian Galicia was lost and only in late 1942 Donbass and Kuban/Maikop (third quarter) and Groznyi (forth quarter) were lost. But Soviets bolstered Baku as much as possible, and together with the LL shipments, and with wise use of their well distributed rail-network, weathered the storm.

In fact, the big Barbarossa hit to the Soviet energy balance sheet was the loss of the Zaporozhye Dam.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

ljadw
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#70

Post by ljadw » 21 Nov 2014, 23:04

I am saying that the SU won the war with 60 % of the pre war oil production and with the same coal production as in 1940.I am also saying that it is hazardous,questionable and speculative to claim that with more oil and coal,the SU could be in Berlin a year earlier .More coal and oil could result in a bigger tank/artillery/truck production,but,on itself,this would not help the SU : more drivers,crew,etc ....also would be needed .

About the oil (and also coal) : we have production figures (for oil :100 million ton between 1/1/1941 and 1/1 1946),but we have no consumption figures ,all we know is that before the war,the SU was producing more oil than it was using (I would not be surprised if it was the same for coal) and maybe it was also the same during the war .
It is not because more would be available in 1942 that more would be used in 1942 .

Last point :
Soviet energy mix:

1940 : oil :18.7 %/ wood :20 % /rest (mainly coal) : 61 %

1945 : oil : 15 %/ wood : 50 % / coal : 35 %

steverodgers801
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#71

Post by steverodgers801 » 22 Nov 2014, 08:27

It sounded like the Germans not expanding into Kharkov and such, which also had important resources

Alixanther
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#72

Post by Alixanther » 22 Nov 2014, 17:07

This whole discussion about resources and percentages does not take into account the manpower shift needed for labor. You know, there were no robots or automatized factories at that time. Even if the whole SU shifts from coal to wood, you need huge, inhabited areas for forestry. Having huge forested areas with low or too little population would not be enough.

The real factor not taken into account about the LL is the fact that, even low as a percentage, it enabled the dramatic shift of manpower from food foraging to forestry. In woodland areas, you cannot have both. You're either deforesting the zone, leaving it a wasteland in terms of food production, or you're foraging for food, leaving the forest as it is. And if your zone is a food wasteland, you then need 1) infrastructure to transport goods to and fro (food into the area, wood out of area) and 2) huge supplies of food to feed the army of workers needed to put that wood into coal (pyrolisis) on a significant scale to trump the lost resources.

Leutnant Von Historian
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#73

Post by Leutnant Von Historian » 25 Nov 2014, 14:19

Hitler's strategies of conquering resourceful region was very understandable. However the fact that he keep changing his mind on what go first cause a lot of disaster.
By the way, what if the Germans managed to bolstered a lot of Soviet citizen who really want to fight communism( although this as had been discussed before required different policy). Also what if the Japanese invade USSR from the east, causing the game-changing Siberian troop from engaging in the eastern front. And lastly, what if Mussolini don't invade Greek? It would allow Hitler to invade 6 weeks earlier which although most probably destroyed Russia allow the Germans to have a lot more advantages and preparations during the winter.

steverodgers801
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Re: Would a smaller barbarossa work?

#74

Post by steverodgers801 » 25 Nov 2014, 17:55

The weather kept the invasion from happening earlier. The thaw was late that year and the Germans could not cross the Bug until June. Most of the forces that invaded Yugoslavia were back in Poland before the original May date, the ones that invaded Greece were of 2nd army which was not scheduled to be active until later

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BDV
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Bug and General Mud?

#75

Post by BDV » 26 Nov 2014, 15:13

Germans forced the Dniepr in 41 and the Don at multiple points in 1942. The contention that the "mighty" Bug (tributary of a tributary of Vistula, itself no Volga or Danube) thwarted Wehrmacht schedule is risible on its face.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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