Would a smaller barbarossa work?

[BDV]

causing the game-changing Siberian troop from engaging in the eastern front.

The "Siberian" troops were peasants who could be inducted after harvest.

[ljadw]

The role of the Siberian divisions was negligible .

[BDV]

A smaller Barbarossa could have started earlier, and that has the most significant implications on whether it was advisable or not (whether it would work or not is more of a WHATIF issue).

The key issue is what was the dynamic of mobilization of human and industrial resources for the opposing sides (Germany and auxiliaries and Bolshevik Russia). If Germany et Co that was at a kind of plateau while for the SU it was still ramping up, it may make sense to attack sooner, even if with a smaller force, as to disrupt enemy build-up before it takes off.

[steverodgers801]

Why do people keep repeating the idea that Barbarossa could start earlier, the spring thaw was going later then normal and the Germans could not cross the Bub river until June. The Pz corps that invaded Yugoslavia were back in Poland in May and were available.

[BDV]

A smaller Barbarossa could:
-have smaller elements required to cross the Bug River,
-have moved the third panzer group and the supporting infantry to attack into the Dvina Prypiat gap,
-have the annihilation/ encirclement battles around the Stalin line.

[detaf]

This could have worked with shorter supply lines, and later better tanks

[LWD]

The role of the Siberian divisions was negligible .

Probably not but they their importance is often overstated especially in the defense of Moscow or course that means it's probably understated elsewhere.

[ljadw]

That the role of the Siberian divisions in the battle of Moscow was overstated (it was zero) does not mean that the role of the Siberian divisions afterwards was understated.

[BDV]

At a planning military level, the Wehrmacht can take French trophy military hardware (and new builds) into account in planning and preparing for Barbarossa. As such, the smaller Barbarossa attack can occur as early as first week of May.

The speculation as why Wehrmacht honchos did not do so historically is IMO the result of a combination of subjective factors (perception of German hardware as superior, lack of foresight for designing ersatz tactics, and reluctance to assist unreliable/untested Auxilliaries) and objective factors (logistic limitations, physical limitations of French hardware for tactical Wehrmacht use, lack of time for designing ersatz tactics, and reluctance to assist unreliable/untested Auxilliaries).

[Alixanther]

The Wehrmacht already had logistical nightmares using too a diverse equipment and vehicles. Adding French paraphernalia to these would only have increased the burden, not appease it. If you ask me, they should have used auxiliary troops (Finns, Spanish, Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Croatians, Letts, Estonians, Lithuanians, French, Danish, etc.) more instead of less. However they should have integrated them into the Wehrmacht battle order, give them AT and flak equipment and use them as defensive forces, at the same time using regular Wehrmacht for shock divisions. Look at how Russians did. They did not put every division to do everything. They had divisions for defense (most of them) and some for attack (shock troops).

If you strip Wehrmacht of their defensive power and give it to the auxiliaries, then you can reliably use them as the Wehrmacht did, while Wehrmacht could be used for offensive operations only. Using less logistics, too.

[BDV]

Well, it does not have to be sprinkled across the entire front. Certain corps/armies/army groups can be furnished with French weapons for a specific role (e.g. all scout cars being Panhards, or heavy AT guns being Puteaux), so they have dedicated logistic lines.

Another thing that could have been done is to use all Stug hulls to build Panzer IIIs, and to use the upgraded versions of the French infantry tanks (R40s and H39s) for infantry support, and/or have more than a few more independent tank regimens with S35s. Likewise, Potez transports could have been used in larger number. But ersatz tactics would have been a must.

Alternatively, the French equipment can be used to bring the auxilliaries to more appropriate level (IIRC Romanians whined till 1943 about the need for 47 mm gun-armed tanks, while S35s were rusting in the depots, and the S35 production line was gathering dust, while the Gyorshadtest got shot up in their CV33s).

Seriously, though, the konzept that German quartermasters would suffer from the paralysis of choice downright ridiculous. But if the WM personnel were so confused by such tasks, maybe they could have reinstated the likes of former Deutsches Heer Leutenant Otto Frank to help them, maybe? :roll:

[thaddeus_c]

think the critical point was one BDV has made several times, neglect of naval arena.

total superiority in the Baltic and Black Seas, not just bottling up the Soviet fleets.

have a purpose-built monitor(s) to bombard Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol, etc and smaller(?) u-boats en masse (earlier Seehund?)

send the Bismarck and Tirpitz to Murmansk

[Alixanther]

send the Bismarck and Tirpitz to Murmansk

I'm not sure their draught would've allowed them to. Maybe someone could shed a light on this matter. I agree on your other points, though.

[ljadw]

We know that in the OTL a Barbarossa of 150 divisions failed,now some people are wasting their time (since 4 november) by discuting if a smaller Barbarossa would work.Maybe a Barbarossa of 50 divisions.? Or one of 10 divisions ?
A lot of people are thinking that surrealism is limited to Belgium,but this thread is proving that they are wrong .

Maybe we could also discuss if the Germans could not have won the Battle of Britain with less aircraft,or the Battle of the Atlantic with less submarines,or that Market Garden would have been a success,if only one airborne was dropped?

[Graeme Sydney]

Well, it does not have to be sprinkled across the entire front. Certain corps/armies/army groups can be furnished with French weapons for a specific role (e.g. all scout cars being Panhards, or heavy AT guns being Puteaux), so they have dedicated logistic lines.

Another thing that could have been done is to use all Stug hulls to build Panzer IIIs, and to use the upgraded versions of the French infantry tanks (R40s and H39s) for infantry support, and/or have more than a few more independent tank regimens with S35s. Likewise, Potez transports could have been used in larger number.

They could also have used the French oil fields and refineries to fuel all these extra vehicles. :roll: