Hitler and Brauchitsch's meeting, July, 21st 1940

[CNE503]

Hello there,

Has anyone a short account of this meeting?
I only read something about it in Halder's War Diaries (entry July, 22nd 1940) which summed up what was said. But is there somewhere an analysis or a detailed account that emphasizes the role of this meeting in German war planning against USSR?

Thanks for any help provided,
Cheers,

CNE EMB

[Linden Lyons]

Here is an excerpt from my translation of Hermann Hoth's Panzer Operations, which will be published by Casemate in March (http://www.amazon.com/Panzer-Operations ... gw_p_img_1). In this excerpt, Hoth says little about the meeting between Hitler and Brauchitsch, although he does discuss the planning that took place in the following days.

The commander in chief of the army, Field-Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, had learnt in a meeting with Hitler on 21 July 1940 that the latter was toying with the idea of attacking Russia. Brauchitsch had been instructed ‘to tackle the Russian problem and to make theoretical preparations’.[1] Quite unexpectedly, the German general staff was confronted with a task of the kind that it had not dealt with for 25 years. Without even knowing the objective of such a war, Brauchitsch began preparations. By as early as 26 July 1940 the head of Foreign Armies East (FHO), Lieutenant-Colonel Eberhard Kinzel, reported to the chief of staff of the army, Colonel-General Franz Halder, the basic principles for such an operation. Kinzel concluded that ‘the best operational option is to head along the Baltic Sea, veer towards Moscow, and then, from the north, compel Russian forces in the Ukraine and by the Black Sea into battle with a reversed front’.[2] The next day the chief of the operations branch of the general staff, Colonel Hans von Greiffenberg, suggested a strong southern army group. In contrast to both, Halder preferred a strong northern group which would advance directly towards and take Moscow before confronting enemy forces in the south.[3] On 29 July Halder summoned Major-General Erich Marcks, the chief of staff of the Eighteenth Army (the formation with the most troops then stationed in the east), to Berlin and assigned him the task of designing an operational plan against Russia. Meanwhile Hitler, who had originally intended to attack Russia in the autumn, had been notified by Brauchitsch that the deployment of troops on the eastern border would take four to six weeks, and that the aim of the operation would be ‘to defeat the Russian army or at least to occupy enough Russian territory to prevent enemy bombers from reaching Berlin and the Silesian industrial area’.[4]

On 31 July Hitler spoke about his intentions in more detail, as recorded by Halder: 'He still would have preferred to attack Russia this year. But this would be impossible, as the campaign would continue into the winter. A standstill would be cause for concern. The operation only makes sense if we crush the Russian state in one go. The objective is the destruction of the vitality of Russia. Gaining territory alone is insufficient. The operations must be divided into two parts: (1) Thrust along the Dnieper towards Kiev. (2) Attack through the Baltic states towards Moscow. Finally, conduct a pincer operation from north and south.' Hitler thought 120 German divisions sufficient for the campaign, leaving 60 divisions for occupied Norway, France, Belgium, and Holland.[5]

On 1 August 1940 the highly regarded Marcks presented to Halder the result of his study, which was written up on 5 August 1940 as ‘Operation East’.[6] It served as the preliminary basis for the campaign plan against Russia, though would be altered by further considerations, changes in the political situation, and Hitler’s interventions. Marcks’s central idea remained: the army would launch the main attack from northern Poland and East Prussia against Moscow in order to destroy the opposing Russian northern group. 18 mobile units and 50 infantry divisions were earmarked for this attack, including an attached army of three armoured divisions and twelve infantry divisions to cover the northern flank between Pskov and Leningrad. An attack against Russian forces in the Ukraine was already ‘unavoidable’ due to the need to protect the Romanian oilfields. Because of the then still unclear political situation in Romania as well as the few deployment opportunities in southern Poland, only limited forces could be assembled south of the Pripet Marshes. 11 mobile and 24 infantry divisions were allocated in ‘Operation East’. Their main objective was Kiev. A strong army reserve of 8 mobile and 36 infantry divisions would primarily support the German northern group.

Once in possession of Moscow and northern Russia, the German northern group would turn southwards and, in a second combat operation alongside the southern group, conquer the Ukraine and ultimately reach the desired Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line.

In response to Marcks’s plan, Halder emphasised that the use of Romanian territory was still uncertain (although an army initially stationed in Germany was transferred to Romania after the start of the campaign), and that the Moscow group would have to treat the seizure of the Baltic states as only a secondary operation.[7] Marcks was instructed to deal with the organisational implications of the proposed plan.

[1] Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Der deutsche Entschluß zum Angriff auf die Sowjetunion’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 1, issue 4 (1953).
[2] Documents for the Nuremberg Trials 1946-48, Halder’s diary, 26 July 1940.
[3] Halder’s diary, 27 July 1940.
[4] Weinberg.
[5] Halder’s diary, 31 July 1940, 1 August 1940, and 29 October 1940.
[6] Alfred Philippi, ‘Das Pripjetproblem’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, supplement no. 2 (March 1956). This insightful study, which mainly deals with the operations of Army Group South, publishes an excerpt from the so-called ‘Marcks Plan’ and refutes the opinion given in foreign works (e.g. J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War: A Strategical and Tactical History, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948) that General Marcks advocated ‘offense with all available forces south of the Pripet Marshes over the Dnieper to Rostov-on-Don’ and ‘defence between Pinsk and Riga’. Unfortunately, details of the study concerning Army Group Centre cannot be covered here.
[7] Halder’s diary, 31 July 1940, 1 August 1940, and 29 October 1940.

Hermann Hoth, Panzer Operations: Germany's Panzer Group 3 during the Invasion of Russia, 1941, trans. Linden Lyons, Philadelphia & Oxford: Casemate, 2015, pp. 21-3.