Why take Sevastopol in 1942?

[stg 44]

What threat did the fortress present in 1942 that required such a large effort to attack it? AFAIK it actually cost the Axis significant time in being able to launch Case Blue, as well as significant aerial losses in storming the fort. Why was it necessary and was the capture really worth the effort put into it? How long could it have held out without being stormed?

[BDV]

The Soviet Navy had shot the Romanian Navy out of the water in Summer of 1941, the Uboats would take until October 1942 (!) to make it to Black Sea. So the Russians could just waltz supplies in and out of Sevastopol.

What you propose would make strategic sense, however the root-cause mistake was the intitial 1941 attack through the Perekop isthmus, instead of marching on Rostov-on-Don. At that juncture, Erich "100 wistwatches" Manstein's actions commited the Axis to conquering Crimea. With Rostov as starting point, AGS might have been able to make it to Tuapse, thus isolating Sevalstopol, and taking Crimea from behind (Kerch) - if need be. Conquering Crimea OTOH was a waste, as long as the Soviet Black Sea Fleet ruled the waves.

[Art]

What threat did the fortress present in 1942 that required such a large effort to attack it?

The most obvious "pro" was a release of Axis forces present in Crimea.

How long could it have held out without being stormed?

Provided that communications with Caucasus ports remain intact - practically indefinitely, I believe.

[stg 44]

What threat did the fortress present in 1942 that required such a large effort to attack it?

The most obvious "pro" was a release of Axis forces present in Crimea.

How long could it have held out without being stormed?

Provided that communications with Caucasus ports remain intact - practically indefinitely, I believe.

Couldn't a limited force be left to screen them, mainly of the less useful Romanians and Italians, while the Germans conducted Case Blue? Also how much naval communication did Sevastapol still have with the Caucasus? I thought it was navally quite isolated by 1942.

[stg 44]

The Soviet Navy had shot the Romanian Navy out of the water in Summer of 1941, the Uboats would take until October 1942 (!) to make it to Black Sea. So the Russians could just waltz supplies in and out of Sevastopol.

What you propose would make strategic sense, however the root-cause mistake was the intitial 1941 attack through the Perekop isthmus, instead of marching on Rostov-on-Don. At that juncture, Erich "100 wistwatches" Manstein's actions commited the Axis to conquering Crimea. With Rostov as starting point, AGS might have been able to make it to Tuapse, thus isolating Sevalstopol, and taking Crimea from behind (Kerch) - if need be. Conquering Crimea OTOH was a waste, as long as the Soviet Black Sea Fleet ruled the waves.

I thought Crimea was being used as an airbase to bomb Romania oil in 1941, so had to be neutralized to stop that threat, which AFAIK was stopped by 1942.

[Cult Icon]

A major incentive to clean up the Crimea was the fear that the area would be used as an 'aircraft carrier' to threaten oil infrastructure in Rumania and other places through the use of long-range bombing. The high command was afraid of the initiation of an oil campaign.

This is covered in the terrific book 'Stopped at Stalingrad'.

[BDV]

Of course if the Axis does the due naval diligence to Black Sea in 1941, and follows up in 1942, shipping stuff from Batumi to Sevastopol/Crimea may turn out somewhat difficult, much less a (materially intensive) bombing campaign.

[steverodgers801]

With the Soviet naval capacity, there was the danger of them using the city as a counter attack base

[Art]

Couldn't a limited force be left to screen them, mainly of the less useful Romanians and Italians, while the Germans conducted Case Blue?

I would suggest that forces they had historically in January-April 1942, i.e. 2-3 German divisions with Romanian support would suffice. Plus a strong enough screening force at Kerch and a guard on the Crimean coast. Given that 8 German divisions were in Crimea during the assault on Sevastopol, that would release 5 divisions and many reinforcing units.

I thought it was navally quite isolated by 1942.

Before May 1942 communication were ok. By then end of June the Soviet Navy due to losses caused by German aircraft the Soviet Navy resorted to desperate measures such as sending to Sevastopol submarines filled with fuel. However it find it unlikely that German would be able to permanently station in Crimea an air force necessary to sever communications. They had a need in aircraft elsewhere especially when their general offensive "Blau" began.

[Art]

A major incentive to clean up the Crimea was the fear that the area would be used as an 'aircraft carrier' to threaten oil infrastructure in Rumania and other places through the use of long-range bombing. The high command was afraid of the initiation of an oil campaign.

I find it curious that rather modest bombing effort against Romania caused such a huge strategic consequences. It must be added that after Sevastopol was isolated there was no strong bomber force stationed there, from memory there was a dozen or may be two of bombers. A couple of airfields available near Sevastopol were close to the frontline and vulnerable. Theoretically they could be used as a forward refueling base for bombers. Anyway the fears of bomber offensive against Romania seem to be strongly exaggerated judging by actual events.
Of course, in case the planned advance on Caucasus had been successful Sevastopol would fall without a direct assault. However it hadn't, and from the Axis perspective it was better to have it captured than have not.

[Art]

What threat did the fortress present in 1942 that required such a large effort to attack it?

It must be added that the bulk of the garrison could be evacuated and deployed elsewhere just like it happened in Odessa. It was more than 100 000 men - an appreciable reinforcement for Caucasus.