"Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"

[RichTO90]

As you have yourself posted this, you would know that they were out of reckoning for the beach MLR.

Of course they were. 1. and 2. Kompanie were tasked to KG Meyer as part of the mobile counterattack reserve mandated by Rommel.

[Sheldrake]

I rather thought as much, but to be precise, all of Grenadier Regiment 915., along with the Fusilier Abteilung, were in corps reserve and not at the disposal of the division commander. Another battalion, I./914. was attached to 716. Inf.-Div. and also not available to Kraiss. Theoretically, the Pionier Abteilung would function as infantry, just as in many other armies, but it was a secondary role and only as a last resort. Battalion headquarters was near division headquarters on 6 June, but best evidence is that most, or all, of the three companies were in the various regimental sectors acting as engineers like they were supposed to. So four infantry battalions organizational to 352. Inf.-Div. were available.

This is a bit of a digression from the topic description, but I want to ask about a matter of detail.

You have twice posted that a battalion of 914 was under command 716 ID, which does to seem to fit the evidence.

My understanding is that 352 ID took over responsibility for the Bayeux sector from Carenten to Asnelles inclusive, and took 726 GR (HQ Chateau de Sully) under command. This is based on the inter-divisional boundary on the OB West situation maps, the post war interviews with 1) Richter and 2) Ziegelmann, and the signals log of 352 ID which includes reports from and orders to 726 GR. This is also the conclusion of the RMAS war studies department (Trew, Badsey et al)

This gives the 352 Div sub sectors as
Coastal defence Sector 1 Carentan -Grandcamp: 914 GR (I & II/914 + 439 Ost Bn) with II/352 AR
Coastal Defence Sector 2 Grandcamp - Colleville: 916 GR (II/916 + III/726) with I/352 & IV/352AR
Coastal Defence Sector 3 Colleville - Asnelles: 716 GR (I/726 + I/916) with III/352 AR

I am not aware of a battalion from GR 914 attached to ID716 and would be interested to know where they were and what they did.

Have I missed something or have or had you misplaced the divisional boundary?

Not quite sure what the infantry affiliations were for the two batteries of AR 1716 in the sector. For what its worth, I suspect the division may have identified the Vire estuary as their defensive priority and needed to address the threat of a seaborne coup de main using the techniques of St Nazaire to infiltrate the base of the Cotentin peninsular.

[RichTO90]

This is a bit of a digression from the topic description, but I want to ask about a matter of detail.

Good question and I will try to answer it, but may not be able to completely. Our house is in the process of painting and re-carpeting in preparation for sale and moving, so my entire reference library is packed up and I do not have access to it. So this is memory.

You have twice posted that a battalion of 914 was under command 716 ID, which does to seem to fit the evidence.

IIRC, this is part of the late May realignments that resulted in quite a few problems for the Allies. In this case, IIRC on 13 May, II./GR 726. shifted east, and Ost-Btl. 439. west to take its place. At about the same time, I./GR 916., was placed under the operational control of 716. Inf.-Div. to stiffen the defenses east of the Arromanches escarpment near Le Hamel, but without a change in the divisional boundary. However, since the German control designations are slightly different than the American, I translate that is being "attached" even though it remained under the administrative control - for rations, medical, personnel, and so forth - of the 352. Inf.-Div.

It's a fine point, but a fair one I think. In any case, the issue is "did the battalion deployments fulfill Rommel's intent"? I think they did and that the actual control issues are separate. I./916. remained sensibly deployed and fit into the overall scheme, being able to bring its firepower onto the beaches in support of the defenses in the 716. Inf.-Div. sector.

Unfortunately, I cannot give you a reference to the Anlagen since they are now packed away.

My understanding is that 352 ID took over responsibility for the Bayeux sector from Carenten to Asnelles inclusive, and took 726 GR (HQ Chateau de Sully) under command. This is based on the inter-divisional boundary on the OB West situation maps, the post war interviews with 1) Richter and 2) Ziegelmann, and the signals log of 352 ID which includes reports from and orders to 726 GR. This is also the conclusion of the RMAS war studies department (Trew, Badsey et al)

Yes indeed, but as I mentioned, II./726. had moved east.

This gives the 352 Div sub sectors as
Coastal defence Sector 1 Carentan -Grandcamp: 914 GR (I & II/914 + 439 Ost Bn) with II/352 AR
Coastal Defence Sector 2 Grandcamp - Colleville: 916 GR (II/916 + III/726) with I/352 & IV/352AR
Coastal Defence Sector 3 Colleville - Asnelles: 716 GR (I/726 + I/916) with III/352 AR

I am not aware of a battalion from GR 914 attached to ID716 and would be interested to know where they were and what they did.

Have I missed something or have or had you misplaced the divisional boundary?

No that is just what I have and the only difference is the fine point regarding I./916. In the event, in typical German fashion, when the balloon went up Kraiss essentially assumed responsibility for the west end of the 716. sector when KG Meyer was released. Then of course the situation unraveled as it began its peregrinations back and forth a la d'Erlon between Quatre Bras and Ligny.

Not quite sure what the infantry affiliations were for the two batteries of AR 1716 in the sector. For what its worth, I suspect the division may have identified the Vire estuary as their defensive priority and needed to address the threat of a seaborne coup de main using the techniques of St Nazaire to infiltrate the base of the Cotentin peninsular.

Yeah. From the placement they were in support of the Grandcamp sector, but they could also have fired in support of the Colleville sector.

EDITED to correct designation. I./916. was OPCON to 716. Inf.-Div. and not I./914.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

This is a bit of a digression from the topic description, but I want to ask about a matter of detail.

Good question and I will try to answer it, but may not be able to completely. Our house is in the process of painting and re-carpeting in preparation for sale and moving, so my entire reference library is packed up and I do not have access to it. So this is memory.

You have twice posted that a battalion of 914 was under command 716 ID, which does to seem to fit the evidence.

IIRC, this is part of the late May realignments that resulted in quite a few problems for the Allies. In this case, IIRC on 13 May, II./GR 726. shifted east, and Ost-Btl. 439. west to take its place. At about the same time, I./GR 916., was placed under the operational control of 716. Inf.-Div. to stiffen the defenses east of the Arromanches escarpment near Le Hamel, but without a change in the divisional boundary. However, since the German control designations are slightly different than the American, I translate that is being "attached" even though it remained under the administrative control - for rations, medical, personnel, and so forth - of the 352. Inf.-Div.

It's a fine point, but a fair one I think. In any case, the issue is "did the battalion deployments fulfill Rommel's intent"? I think they did and that the actual control issues are separate. I./916. remained sensibly deployed and fit into the overall scheme, being able to bring its firepower onto the beaches in support of the defenses in the 716. Inf.-Div. sector.

Unfortunately, I cannot give you a reference to the Anlagen since they are now packed away.

My understanding is that 352 ID took over responsibility for the Bayeux sector from Carenten to Asnelles inclusive, and took 726 GR (HQ Chateau de Sully) under command. This is based on the inter-divisional boundary on the OB West situation maps, the post war interviews with 1) Richter and 2) Ziegelmann, and the signals log of 352 ID which includes reports from and orders to 726 GR. This is also the conclusion of the RMAS war studies department (Trew, Badsey et al)

Yes indeed, but as I mentioned, II./726. had moved east.

This gives the 352 Div sub sectors as
Coastal defence Sector 1 Carentan -Grandcamp: 914 GR (I & II/914 + 439 Ost Bn) with II/352 AR
Coastal Defence Sector 2 Grandcamp - Colleville: 916 GR (II/916 + III/726) with I/352 & IV/352AR
Coastal Defence Sector 3 Colleville - Asnelles: 716 GR (I/726 + I/916) with III/352 AR

I am not aware of a battalion from GR 914 attached to ID716 and would be interested to know where they were and what they did.

Have I missed something or have or had you misplaced the divisional boundary?

No that is just what I have and the only difference is the fine point regarding I./916. In the event, in typical German fashion, when the balloon went up Kraiss essentially assumed responsibility for the west end of the 716. sector when KG Meyer was released. Then of course the situation unraveled as it began its peregrinations back and forth a la d'Erlon between Quatre Bras and Ligny.



EDITED to correct designation. I./916. was OPCON to 716. Inf.-Div. and not I./914.

...............................

Another battalion, I./914. was attached to 716. Inf.-Div. and also not available to Kraiss.

......................................

Cheers!

[edited for clarity]

Hi RichTO90...


My sympathies for your troubles over house shifting et al...

Coming back to the subject at hand. Our debate was triggered by your disputing my post about force dispositions of 352 GD on D Day. You had asked for details of which battalions were available in an infantry capacity to this Div. Upon my naming the battalions, you said that a battalion from the 914 GR was attached to the 716 GD and hence was unavailable to Kraiss (Commander 352 GD).

Responding to Sheldrake's objections to your statement on 914, you held your ground and then added another unit viz., I / 916 to your list of supposed attachments to 716 GD.

At the end of your post, you write that it was only I / 916 which was attached to 716. You do understand all this has left me a little confused ?

You further contribute to the obfuscation of the issue by bringing in "Rommel's intent" and separating that from " control issues" and whether I / 916 "could bring in firepower on the beaches...in the 716 ID Sector " or not.

Then you add the rather disingenuous statement to the effect : " However, since the German control designations are slightly different than the American, I translate that is being "attached" even though it remained under the administrative control - for rations, medical, personnel, and so forth - of the 352. Inf.-Div. ".... Which is neither here nor there

If you have belatedly accepted that 914 GR was left intact ( on either side of Isigny), under 352 GD with its 2 battalions, then lets come to the (non) issue of I / 916. Was it , or , was it not under the overall command of 352 GD, under direct operational control of 726 GR ( which was under the operational control of 352 GD) on D Day?

As to the "intent" of placing I / 916 east of Arromanches, I am quoting Stewart Bryant again who references Ziegalman ( rather authentic according to me) : " The GR916 command now had the Center Regimental Sector but had relinquished its' 1st Battalion (abv. I/GR916) to the right GR726's Sector, to serve as reserves under GR726's command.”

This was purely an intra division arrangement to compensate 726 GR for relinquishing some forces to other sectors.

Ciao
Sandeep

[doogal]

Any suggestions on how re-organising the 352nd infantry divisions battalions (which it had available) could have aided its defence in front of Omaha ???

[Sheldrake]

Any suggestions on how re-organising the 352nd infantry divisions battalions (which it had available) could have aided its defence in front of Omaha ???

Every account seems to suggest that the 352 ID did pretty well for itself on D Day. Its soldiered caused more casualties per MG deployed than anywhere else on D Day. Clearly, with the aid of a chrystal ball, the divisional commander could have ignored every sector except sector 2 Grandcamp - Colleville and deployed three times as many troops on Omaha Beach. The Germans could have ignored the dummy paratroops and SAS men and committed the Corps reserve against Omaha Beach too.

However, the Bayeux Sector covered more than Omaha Beach. On D-Day, the collapse of the German defences on Gold beach posed a serious threat to the Right wing of 352 ID, and it was there that the Corps reserve was ultimately deployed. focuing even more troops on Ohama would have left the formation very vulnerable to being rolled up from the East. (That is also the weakness of the what iof scenarios that position the 12 SS near St Lo instead of Lesieux. The bigest threat was from Gold beach not Omaha and that is where the armoured reserved would have been deployed. (I doubt there would have been any serious difference in the result.)

[RichTO90]

My sympathies for your troubles over house shifting et al...

Why thank you.

Coming back to the subject at hand. Our debate was triggered by your disputing my post about force dispositions of 352 GD on D Day. You had asked for details of which battalions were available in an infantry capacity to this Div. Upon my naming the battalions, you said that a battalion from the 914 GR was attached to the 716 GD and hence was unavailable to Kraiss (Commander 352 GD).

No, our debate was triggered over you claiming that Kraiss had "ten infantry battalions" at hand and intimating that under Rommel's scheme they should have all been lined up along the coast. I said that Kraiss didn't have ten battalions and that wasn't what Rommel's plan required.

Responding to Sheldrake's objections to your statement on 914, you held your ground and then added another unit viz., I / 916 to your list of supposed attachments to 716 GD.

Not at all, you simply misunderstand. Again. I realized that I had been saying that I./GR 914. was the battalion in question. It wasn't. It was I./916. So the only thing "added" was in your imagination.

At the end of your post, you write that it was only I / 916 which was attached to 716. You do understand all this has left me a little confused ?

Oh dear, my apologies. I thought that when I wrote "EDITED to correct designation. I./916. was OPCON to 716. Inf.-Div. and not I./914." you would understand that I was correcting myself and that I had meant I./916. when I had said I./914. No addition, just an incorrect designation. Are you clear on that now?

You further contribute to the obfuscation of the issue by bringing in "Rommel's intent" and separating that from " control issues" and whether I / 916 "could bring in firepower on the beaches...in the 716 ID Sector " or not.

How does elucidating what I consider Rommel's intent was serve to "obfuscate" the issue of Rommel's intent was? It certainly wasn't, as you seem to infer, to line up the infantry battalions of all the divisions in Ob. West like a string of perals along the coast. Rommel clearly stated what his intent was. Kraiss, within the limitations of manpower, length of front, and good sense, did so.

Then you add the rather disingenuous statement to the effect : " However, since the German control designations are slightly different than the American, I translate that is being "attached" even though it remained under the administrative control - for rations, medical, personnel, and so forth - of the 352. Inf.-Div. ".... Which is neither here nor there

It isn't "disingenuous" if they are in fact different, which they are. The American Army recognized units as either attached or organic in terms of operations, sometimes with time and or operational limitations. The Germans recognized a distinction between administrative attachment, operational attachment, and tactical attachment. As in 21. Panzer was in HG-B reserve operationally, but attached to 7. A.O.K. for administration and provisional tactical control in the event of invasion.

It is neither "here nor there" because it doesn't change the simple fact that Kraiss didn't have ten infantry battalions at his beck and call on 6 June.

If you have belatedly accepted that 914 GR was left intact ( on either side of Isigny), under 352 GD with its 2 battalions, then lets come to the (non) issue of I / 916. Was it , or , was it not under the overall command of 352 GD, under direct operational control of 726 GR ( which was under the operational control of 352 GD) on D Day?

Yes, the two battalions of 914 were on either side of Isigny. I. at Osmanville and II. at Catz. However, those units were not under operational control of GR 726. That regiment was split up under the operational control of 352. Inf.-Div. I. and III./726. was attached to GR 916., and IV . (Ost 439) to GR 914.

As to the "intent" of placing I / 916 east of Arromanches, I am quoting Stewart Bryant again who references Ziegalman ( rather authentic according to me) : " The GR916 command now had the Center Regimental Sector but had relinquished its' 1st Battalion (abv. I/GR916) to the right GR726's Sector, to serve as reserves under GR726's command.”

This was purely an intra division arrangement to compensate 726 GR for relinquishing some forces to other sectors.

Yes that is the way it is usually viewed, but it remains neither here nor there...there were no "ten battalions". At the most, there were seven, with one designated as division reserve...to provide the mobile force within the 10 kilometer zone of the division as mandated by Rommel's scheme. Which left six, one of which responsibilities were anchored in the 716. Inf.-Div. sector.

Cheers!

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Hi RichTO90..


Ok .. Lets take this one at a time because your post, its logic and the way you have presented your information are like the polderland on both sides of the Eindhoven - Arnhem road where XXX corps came to grief

.......Which left six, one of which responsibilities were anchored in the 716. Inf.-Div. sector.

Cheers!

Which one ( battalion) was that? Whose responsibilities were anchored in the 716 inf. - Div. sector? To save you time, to save me time and to save the other readers' eye ball fatigue..let me categorically add there was no such battalion coming under 352 GD, on D Day, Normandy. If you are again referring to I / 916 GR ..please please allow me to repeat that it was under the operational and administrative command of 726 GR, which in turn was under the operational and administrative command of 352 GR on D Day.

Please also note that there was NO overlapping of any kind of control, EITHER "..ration.. leave...medical..personnel and so forth" OR combat operations command and control, between the 352 GD and its eastern neighbour the 716 GD, where the I / 916 was concerned on D Day. It was put under the 726 GR as its regimental reserve.. period.

If you have any evidence to the contrary, i.e., if you have any document or authoritative comment from a relevant source, saying that the I / 916 played any role whatsoever in the 716 area on D Day..received any operational directive / command from the 716, please do provide us with the same. That will open up the debate in useful terms on this otherwise non issue

Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

If you have belatedly accepted that 914 GR was left intact ( on either side of Isigny), under 352 GD with its 2 battalions, then lets come to the (non) issue of I / 916. Was it , or , was it not under the overall command of 352 GD, under direct operational control of 726 GR ( which was under the operational control of 352 GD) on D Day?

Yes, the two battalions of 914 were on either side of Isigny. I. at Osmanville and II. at Catz. However, those units were not under operational control of GR 726.

..............

Cheers!

What on earth are you talking about, my dear RichTO90 !? Whosoever said that 726 GR had operational control over the 914 GR units? Why have you gone out of your way to mention this at all !?

Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

..............................


...there were no "ten battalions". At the most, there were seven, with one designated as division reserve...to provide the mobile force within the 10 kilometer zone of the division as mandated by Rommel's scheme. Which left six,............

Cheers!

Which one was designated as division reserve please ? II / 916 GR ..right? So according to you this unit wasn't part of the MRL deployment pool for 352 GD.. hence the number of units available to 352 comes down to six..right?

Well lets look at the facts..where was this unit placed as div reserve ? Bang on, and near, the Omaha Beach .. around St Laurent right? So in actual reckoning on D Day, how was this " Division Reserve" i.e., II / 916 off the effective deployment pool of available units for 352 GD? For God's sake RichTO90 ! You have really outdone yourself here dear

The one unit, whose kompanies saw action on Omaha in static positions, you are discounting from this role with all this talk of a "mobile force within the 10 Km zone of the Div.. etc etc " !?

Btw where did you get this "10 KM zone of the division ( 352 GD ) from?

Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Responding to Sheldrake's objections to your statement on 914, you held your ground and then added another unit viz., I / 916 to your list of supposed attachments to 716 GD.

Not at all, you simply misunderstand. Again. I realized that I had been saying that I./GR 914. was the battalion in question. It wasn't. It was I./916. So the only thing "added" was in your imagination.

At the end of your post, you write that it was only I / 916 which was attached to 716. You do understand all this has left me a little confused ?

Oh dear, my apologies. I thought that when I wrote "EDITED to correct designation. I./916. was OPCON to 716. Inf.-Div. and not I./914." you would understand that I was correcting myself and that I had meant I./916. when I had said I./914. No addition, just an incorrect designation. Are you clear on that now?



Cheers!

Ok lets reconcile the three highlighted and underscored statements please.

This is a bit of a digression from the topic description, but I want to ask about a matter of detail.

...........................

You have twice posted that a battalion of 914 was under command 716 ID, which does to seem to fit the evidence.

IIRC, this is part of the late May realignments that resulted in quite a few problems for the Allies. In this case, IIRC on 13 May, II./GR 726. shifted east, and Ost-Btl. 439. west to take its place. At about the same time, I./GR 916., was placed under the operational control of 716. Inf.-Div.

Sheldrake is referring to 914 unambiguously. You are responding to his query on 914 and saying that " this is part of the late May realignments.....".

Then you are adding separately (in this context of units from 352 GD being attached to 716 GD) that : " At about the same time, I./GR 916., was placed under the operational control of 716. Inf.-"

You are talking about 914 and 916 separately ain't you? Would you still say: " So the only thing "added" was in your imagination" !?

Ciao
Sandeep

[doogal]

thanks Sheldrake:

So essentially the 352nd was in an unnecessary bind due to the poor quality divisions it had on either flank..?? these being 709ID +919GR(left) and 716ID(right).. cant of helped that a battalion of GR916 & 352AR were covering the most western part of Gold Beach.
Considering the 716ID was understrength and only a percentage of the 316ID were experienced troops I would agree that they were in an unfortunate position. But the lack of Allied support fire seemed to have greatly aided the 352nd ID on Omaha:

I also wonder what would have happened if the Germans had swopped the 706ID for the 91ID which was inland..? and the 6th FRegiment......

Could there not though have been a better tactical plan for defending the coast that did not need a MLR on the beachfront nor did it require substantial armour as a counter attack force.. (Learn from the S/U at Kursk etc.. with an in depth armour and infantry position I only ask as Eberbach and Rommel seemed to manage this against Goodwood so why not against the immediate areas behind the beaches) or did the manpower not exist for an in-depth defense.
The Wehrmacht seems to have got caught between two schools of thought btwn which they compromised, rather than re-think there defensive plans??

Pockets of German resistance remained throughout the beachhead area and the British were stopped about 3.7 miles (6.0 km) short of their D-Day objectives

Trew, Simon (2004). Gold Beach. Battle Zone Normandy. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton. ISBN 0-7509-3011-X.

ps keep it up Rich n Sandeep..... learning lots of stuff from your discussion

[sandeepmukherjee196]

No, our debate was triggered over you claiming that Kraiss had "ten infantry battalions" at hand and intimating that under Rommel's scheme they should have all been lined up along the coast. I said that Kraiss didn't have ten battalions and that wasn't what Rommel's plan required.


Cheers!

352 GD potentially had 10 battalions available in the infantry role. Of these the 2 battalions of 915 GR and the div's recce battalion was taken off by Gen Marks as Korps reserve. This is what I had been getting at at the very beginning of the debate, when I said that Rommel's strategy of maximum force deploymet on the MRL ( beach front) was subverted by his subordinates :

Hi everyone..

...................


I am referring to the perfectly logical and possible, under the circumstances, proposition that Rommel's own subordinates would listen to his instructions and advice on force disposition !!


................................


Firstly a Division''s COS and its Commander are seen to be contradicting the much superior wisdom, born out of actual warfare under similar constraints, of a brilliant tactician like Rommel. Moreover their action does seem further curious when it is apparent that two-thirds of the remaining force is deployed either as reserve or in areas on the western sector of the Div's zone, where no landings from the sea could effectively take place.


"

General Marks was also Rommel's subordinate. About Gen Marks I have already written my views when responding to doogal in an earlier post pl.

Ciao
Sandeep

[RichTO90]

Which one ( battalion) was that? Whose responsibilities were anchored in the 716 inf. - Div. sector? To save you time, to save me time and to save the other readers' eye ball fatigue..let me categorically add there was no such battalion coming under 352 GD, on D Day, Normandy. If you are again referring to I / 916 GR ..please please allow me to repeat that it was under the operational and administrative command of 726 GR, which in turn was under the operational and administrative command of 352 GR on D Day.

You seem to be succumbing to the same eyeball fatigue...it was 352. Inf.-Div. and not Grenadier Regiment.

Please also note that there was NO overlapping of any kind of control, EITHER "..ration.. leave...medical..personnel and so forth" OR combat operations command and control, between the 352 GD and its eastern neighbour the 716 GD, where the I / 916 was concerned on D Day. It was put under the 726 GR as its regimental reserve.. period.

Two companies of I./916. were in reserve, west of Meuvaines, and two companies were on the coast from Arromanches to le Hamel. They fought the British landing on GOLD beach, east of the interdivision boundary.

If you have any evidence to the contrary, i.e., if you have any document or authoritative comment from a relevant source, saying that the I / 916 played any role whatsoever in the 716 area on D Day..received any operational directive / command from the 716, please do provide us with the same. That will open up the debate in useful terms on this otherwise non issue

Aside from the simple fact that they only engaged British forces coming from the east?

[RichTO90]

What on earth are you talking about, my dear RichTO90 !? Whosoever said that 726 GR had operational control over the 914 GR units? Why have you gone out of your way to mention this at all !?

Sorry, I plead fatigue; I see what you were saying now. Yes, I./GR 726 and I./GR 916 were in the Grenadier-Regiment 726 sector.