Sorry, I called it a "Polish" vessel for some reason, but it isn't "another".sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:There was another Allied Vessel lost on D Day off Normandy....
"Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
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Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
RichTO90 wrote:24 RN warships are accounted for as lost in the month of June. Warship losses on D-Day were DD Svenner (Polish) and Corry (US), and PC 1261 (US). US tank losses on D-Day were 18 M4 from the 70th Tk Bn, 22 from the 73d, and 54 from the 741st. That includes losses to all causes, including when their LCT were sunk by mines. I'll see if I can get back to you with the British and Canadian tank losses.sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:I am told that the allies lost 24 warships in the invasion endeavour. 127 aircrafts lost on D Day. Any ideas of actual allied tank losses on D Day?
Ciao
Sandeep
Hi Richard,
There was another Allied Vessel lost on D Day off Normandy....by E Boat attack. At dawn on 6 June, the Norwegian Destroyer HNoMS Svenner, off Sword beach, was struck amidships by torpedoes from the 5th Schnellboote Flotilla under Lt Commander Heinrich Hoffmann, broke in two and went under.
She was originally a Royal Navy vessel, HMS Shark (G03), commissioned in 1943. But was handed over to the Norwegian navy in 1944 and rechristened. She went down with 219 hands, of whom 185 were rescued, including 15 wounded. 33 Norwegian and 1 British personnel were lost.
This was the only optimum response from the German military on D Day. While the Heer people f...'d around ( some literally) and tied themselves in knots, the Kriegsmarine correctly interpreted and used the intelligence coup and radar blips. They alerted all installations and units at their bases. They had paltry resources to play with. The 5th S Boote Flotilla based at Le Havre went out on a patrol at the approach of dawn and emerged through the RN smokescreen off the invasion beach(es).
D-day: The Invasion of Normandy, June 6, 1944; By Randy Holderfield, Michael Varhola, makes for a fascinating reading. The S Boote were involved in another coup involving the invasion, though prior to D Day. On 27 April, E Boats sank 2 LSTs off the Slapton sands, killing 700 odd personnel on a practice mission for D Day landings. The nature of that beach was so similar to the Cotentin peninsula landing areas that Hitler's fingerspitzengefuhl about Normandy got strengthened. But that is another story...
Ciao
Sandeep
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Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
sorry it got reposted
Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
There, I corrected it in my original post.sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:sorry it got reposted
24 RN warships are accounted for as lost in the month of June. Warship losses on D-Day were DD Svenner (Norwegian) and Corry (US), and PC 1261 (US).
Still only three warships lost.
Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
That is an interesting definition of "optimum response" An optimum response might have been to find the invasion fleet en route in the middle of the channel, or laid some acoustic mines after the allies had swept a channel. It was a little late to wait until dawn after the assault troops were already ashore!sandeepmukherjee196 wrote: This was the only optimum response from the German military on D Day. While the Heer people f...'d around ( some literally) and tied themselves in knots, the Kriegsmarine correctly interpreted and used the intelligence coup and radar blips. They alerted all installations and units at their bases. They had paltry resources to play with.
By and large the Kriegsmarine did not cover itself in much glory over D Day, starting with the advice that the reefs off shore meant that the allies would not be likely to land on what the allies named "Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword" beaches.
Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
?Sheldrake wrote:By and large the Kriegsmarine did not cover itself in much glory over D Day, starting with the advice that the reefs off shore meant that the allies would not be likely to land on what the allies named "Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword" beaches.
... and still Germans took the threat seriously; well about as seriously as their available military resources allowed...
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
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Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
Hi...Sheldrake wrote:That is an interesting definition of "optimum response" An optimum response might have been to find the invasion fleet en route in the middle of the channel, or laid some acoustic mines after the allies had swept a channel. It was a little late to wait until dawn after the assault troops were already ashore!sandeepmukherjee196 wrote: This was the only optimum response from the German military on D Day. While the Heer people f...'d around ( some literally) and tied themselves in knots, the Kriegsmarine correctly interpreted and used the intelligence coup and radar blips. They alerted all installations and units at their bases. They had paltry resources to play with.
By and large the Kriegsmarine did not cover itself in much glory over D Day, starting with the advice that the reefs off shore meant that the allies would not be likely to land on what the allies named "Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword" beaches.
The KM didn't have the time required to do anything substantial in the Atlantic / Channel on the night of 5 / 6 June once it got the alert.
The term optimum presumes that it was the best possible under the circumstances. The KM had no offensive strength off Normandy in terms of vessels. They did what they could. Their coastal batteries did well.Unlike the Heer which had much stronger forces but frittered away any possible defensive opportunities through neglect, delayed and bad decisions ...inept executions. Of course there were individual commanders like Von Salmuth and Marcks who rose to the occasion.
Ciao
Sandeep
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Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
Hi Everybody..
In his book, "The Hitler Youth, Gristle for the Reich's Mill" ; David Williams states that the German weather forecasts for 5th June had only indicated light winds and scattered showers and had categorically stated that allied aircraft would be able to operate without any major problems. Apparently the forecasts for the 1st week of June indicated that an invasion was possible.
The Germans had abandoned their weather stations in Greenland? What made Rommel come to his conclusion that the tides wont be right between 5th and 8th June ? On what basis was Rommel told that an invasion wasn't possible between 4th and 10th June? Note that the Germans had only 3 operational "Weather U boats" in the relevant seas at that time : Wetter Boote ...U 534, 853, 857.
The D-day forecast symposium; London 17 May 2014, studied the known and lesser known aspects of the "weather-forecast war" and made some interesting revelations about certain cliches firmly embedded in public perception. They summed it up as :
". . .from good German weather forecasts, with no “break” in the bad weather, Rommel drew the wrong conclusion;
… and from poor Allied forecasts, promising a “break” in the bad weather, Eisenhower drew the right conclusion.."
( http://www.rmets.org/sites/rmets.org/fi ... ersson.pdf )
Other sources talk about the crucial role played by the Norwegian meteorologist Sverre Petterssen .
But still beats me how the Germans could have got this one so wrong !
Ciao
Sandeep
In his book, "The Hitler Youth, Gristle for the Reich's Mill" ; David Williams states that the German weather forecasts for 5th June had only indicated light winds and scattered showers and had categorically stated that allied aircraft would be able to operate without any major problems. Apparently the forecasts for the 1st week of June indicated that an invasion was possible.
The Germans had abandoned their weather stations in Greenland? What made Rommel come to his conclusion that the tides wont be right between 5th and 8th June ? On what basis was Rommel told that an invasion wasn't possible between 4th and 10th June? Note that the Germans had only 3 operational "Weather U boats" in the relevant seas at that time : Wetter Boote ...U 534, 853, 857.
The D-day forecast symposium; London 17 May 2014, studied the known and lesser known aspects of the "weather-forecast war" and made some interesting revelations about certain cliches firmly embedded in public perception. They summed it up as :
". . .from good German weather forecasts, with no “break” in the bad weather, Rommel drew the wrong conclusion;
… and from poor Allied forecasts, promising a “break” in the bad weather, Eisenhower drew the right conclusion.."
( http://www.rmets.org/sites/rmets.org/fi ... ersson.pdf )
Other sources talk about the crucial role played by the Norwegian meteorologist Sverre Petterssen .
But still beats me how the Germans could have got this one so wrong !
Ciao
Sandeep
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Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
Hi Sandeep,
What a brilliant link!
Cheers,
Sid.
What a brilliant link!
Cheers,
Sid.
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Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
Thanks Sid....Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Sandeep,
What a brilliant link!
Cheers,
Sid.
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Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
Hi Everybody...
What was Hitler's culpability on Normandy? Who takes the rap for Normandy?
From my studies of Rommel's biography, WW II and my natural predilections I have a deep respect for Rommel as a soldier, General and human being. However for sometime now, I am veering to the viewpoint that after Africa, since he was back in the continent in 1943, he was a changed man.
His USP as a military man had always been his total focus on soldiering and total disconnect from politics (and even general socialising / fraternising). However after mid 1943, he was evolving into a persona that was less and less a soldier and more and more a politician .....a power savouring Prima Donna with strong philosophical and political views !
Why did he replace Gen Gausse with Gen Speidel at a time when his and his Nation's destiny was at a crossroads? Was that dictated by Hitler or Rommel's detractors in the Wehrmacht? No.. it was dictated by his dear wife Lucy. That kinda thing happens with tin pot dictators and in banana republics we thought. But with the ace professional Rommel?
Rommel's diary entry on 3rd June shows he had already made up his mind to call on Hitler...so he had planned to leave his command even before those much talked about weather forecasts ! Wasnt it since 1st June that 15th Army intelligence started receiving the first part of the Verlaine verse? It is not that Rommel was a non believer in special ops and intelligence coups like some traditional military men. In North Africa he made extensive use of special agents and unconventional warfare.
Did Rommel take up with Hitler the matter of Verlaine's verse? He could be extremely persuasive and persistent when he wanted to. Did Rommel take on board the Slapton sands incident ? Did he apply his mind to the implications for anticipating the possible allied landing areas ?? Should he have teamed up with his Fuehrer in May to reassess the Pas de Calais hypothesis? Hitler was an extremely lonely man by this time...could he have expected that his most favoured Feldmarschall would intellectually stand by him for an optimum diagnosis and prognosis?
On the matter of forward deployment of battalions on the beach line MLR ..did Rommel give up too easily when confronted with conventional wisdom? Would the old Rommel have done that? If he found reasonable military rationale in the protestations of the 352nd ID's officers about MLR deployment then should he have gone the extra mile to provide them with extra battalions as reserves behind the beaches....while forcing them to deploy all hands on the MLR? He couldnt have coaxed someone to spare him 3 / 4 infantry battalions for this purpose ?
Would Model have been more suitable as head of HG B instead of Rommel when it mattered ? Would the Kesselring + Model combination have fetched different results in France in June '44 in place of the Rundstedt + Rommel combo?
In my professional work on behavioural issues with individuals, groups and organisations...I have found that for human beings, the "core issue" the actual emotional driver is often not visible or audible to others. A person channelises his / her core emotions through various socially / environmentally appropriate logic systems. A husband, insecure about his relationship with his partner, jealous of other men, resentful of his deficiencies, may channelise his powerful negative feelings through channels which make sense to his environment...viz., he may resort to religious sermons on morality; HIV scare mongering; sociological discourse on the virtues of stable homes et al.
Rommel's defeat in North Africa rankled deep in his heart. This was the high noon of his life. The ever loner had found his glory in the isolated posting on another continent. The defeat and its aftermath brought out his worst and suppressed his best virtues. The meanness, the defensiveness, the resentment against his benefactor(s). Being proved wrong about Italy didnt help matters. He got busy with anti - Hitler plots, group intrigues, moral posturing on the regime's crimes....
Maybe thats why Cricket Australia never cuts slack to defeated heroes of yesterday!
Ciao
Sandeep
What was Hitler's culpability on Normandy? Who takes the rap for Normandy?
From my studies of Rommel's biography, WW II and my natural predilections I have a deep respect for Rommel as a soldier, General and human being. However for sometime now, I am veering to the viewpoint that after Africa, since he was back in the continent in 1943, he was a changed man.
His USP as a military man had always been his total focus on soldiering and total disconnect from politics (and even general socialising / fraternising). However after mid 1943, he was evolving into a persona that was less and less a soldier and more and more a politician .....a power savouring Prima Donna with strong philosophical and political views !
Why did he replace Gen Gausse with Gen Speidel at a time when his and his Nation's destiny was at a crossroads? Was that dictated by Hitler or Rommel's detractors in the Wehrmacht? No.. it was dictated by his dear wife Lucy. That kinda thing happens with tin pot dictators and in banana republics we thought. But with the ace professional Rommel?
Rommel's diary entry on 3rd June shows he had already made up his mind to call on Hitler...so he had planned to leave his command even before those much talked about weather forecasts ! Wasnt it since 1st June that 15th Army intelligence started receiving the first part of the Verlaine verse? It is not that Rommel was a non believer in special ops and intelligence coups like some traditional military men. In North Africa he made extensive use of special agents and unconventional warfare.
Did Rommel take up with Hitler the matter of Verlaine's verse? He could be extremely persuasive and persistent when he wanted to. Did Rommel take on board the Slapton sands incident ? Did he apply his mind to the implications for anticipating the possible allied landing areas ?? Should he have teamed up with his Fuehrer in May to reassess the Pas de Calais hypothesis? Hitler was an extremely lonely man by this time...could he have expected that his most favoured Feldmarschall would intellectually stand by him for an optimum diagnosis and prognosis?
On the matter of forward deployment of battalions on the beach line MLR ..did Rommel give up too easily when confronted with conventional wisdom? Would the old Rommel have done that? If he found reasonable military rationale in the protestations of the 352nd ID's officers about MLR deployment then should he have gone the extra mile to provide them with extra battalions as reserves behind the beaches....while forcing them to deploy all hands on the MLR? He couldnt have coaxed someone to spare him 3 / 4 infantry battalions for this purpose ?
Would Model have been more suitable as head of HG B instead of Rommel when it mattered ? Would the Kesselring + Model combination have fetched different results in France in June '44 in place of the Rundstedt + Rommel combo?
In my professional work on behavioural issues with individuals, groups and organisations...I have found that for human beings, the "core issue" the actual emotional driver is often not visible or audible to others. A person channelises his / her core emotions through various socially / environmentally appropriate logic systems. A husband, insecure about his relationship with his partner, jealous of other men, resentful of his deficiencies, may channelise his powerful negative feelings through channels which make sense to his environment...viz., he may resort to religious sermons on morality; HIV scare mongering; sociological discourse on the virtues of stable homes et al.
Rommel's defeat in North Africa rankled deep in his heart. This was the high noon of his life. The ever loner had found his glory in the isolated posting on another continent. The defeat and its aftermath brought out his worst and suppressed his best virtues. The meanness, the defensiveness, the resentment against his benefactor(s). Being proved wrong about Italy didnt help matters. He got busy with anti - Hitler plots, group intrigues, moral posturing on the regime's crimes....
Maybe thats why Cricket Australia never cuts slack to defeated heroes of yesterday!
Ciao
Sandeep
Last edited by sandeepmukherjee196 on 24 Apr 2015, 19:03, edited 1 time in total.
Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
This is a lot on nonsens .
Why would Rommel take up with Hitler the matter of the verse of Verlaine ,which was something totally insignifiant ?
What is your proof that it was Lucie who decided that Gausse should go and that Speidel should come ?
Where is your proof that Rommel was busy with anti-Hitler plots ?
Where is your proof that the defeat in NA changed Rommel in negative sense ?
Why would Rommel take up with Hitler the matter of the verse of Verlaine ,which was something totally insignifiant ?
What is your proof that it was Lucie who decided that Gausse should go and that Speidel should come ?
Where is your proof that Rommel was busy with anti-Hitler plots ?
Where is your proof that the defeat in NA changed Rommel in negative sense ?
Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
No. not completely.ljadw wrote:This is a lot on nonsens .
More importantly, it is unlikely that sources and methods would be part of the FINTEL product delivered to Rommel. It's significance or insignificance would be part of the assessment. A better question is how much trust Rommel placed in the 15. Armee Ic.Why would Rommel take up with Hitler the matter of the verse of Verlaine ,which was something totally insignifiant ?
Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
The first 3 lines of the poem (broadcasted on 1 june) meant that Overlord would start within 2 weeks;the following 3 lines (broadcasted on 5 june) meant that Overlord would start within 2 days;but there was no indication of the place where the Allies would execute Overlord,as such the Normandy landing could be Overlord or a feint.Such messages were intercepted regularly by the Germans.
Re: "Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"
Hitler - for starting the war in the first place?sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:What was Hitler's culpability on Normandy? Who takes the rap for Normandy?
Okay...from where? How does the presence of 3 / 4 (is that three-quarters or three or four?) additional battalions defeat the invasion? How does he have the prescience to know where they need to be placed? What "protestations" and from which "352nd ID's officers"?(snip)On the matter of forward deployment of battalions on the beach line MLR ..did Rommel give up too easily when confronted with conventional wisdom? Would the old Rommel have done that? If he found reasonable military rationale in the protestations of the 352nd ID's officers about MLR deployment then should he have gone the extra mile to provide them with extra battalions as reserves behind the beaches....while forcing them to deploy all hands on the MLR? He couldnt have coaxed someone too spare him 3 / 4 infantry battalions for this purpose ?
Why would either be "more suitable"? What could they do that Rommel didn't? Did they have some magical way to solve the C3 issues faced by Ob.West? Oh, wait, no, they didn't since they were HG-B.Would Model have been more suitable as head of HG B instead of Rommel when it mattered ? Would the Kesselring + Model combination have fetched different results in France in June '44 in place of the Rundstedt + Rommel combo?
(snip fascinating discursus )
Er, how do you know that it wasn't instead the "glory in the isolated posting on another continent" that actually "brought out his worst and suppressed his best virtues"? The sleight of hand in his initial operations, the "Race for the Wire", and his relationship with his nominal superiors in Italy are all hardly glowing indicators of "best virtues" I would think?Rommel's defeat in North Africa rankled deep in his heart. This was the high noon of his life. The ever loner had found his glory in the isolated posting on another continent. The defeat and its aftermath brought out his worst and suppressed his best virtues. The meanness, the defensiveness, the resentment against his benefactor(s). Being proved wrong about Italy didnt help matters. He got busy with anti - Hitler plots, group intrigues, moral posturing on the regime's crimes....