"Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"

[sandeepmukherjee196]

If Hitler was so right, why did he refuse to release the reserves until it was too late?
'

I think the answer to that has been provided in my posts a little earlier? Hitler definitely wasn't "so right" any more by this time of the war. This entire thread was spun off from the original, on the single premise that Hitler's instinct had come right about the Normandy landings but he didn't follow through on his own instinct with conviction.

[ljadw]

Proof that Hitler refused to release the reserves?

Proof that when the reserves were released,it was too late ?

Proof that if the reserves were released earlie,it would have made a difference ?

[Boby]

If Hitler was so right, why did he refuse to release the reserves until it was too late?
'

Can you present, using archival evidence (war diaries and high level directives) Hitler, Rundstedt and Rommel decisions starting on June 6, 1944?

Hour by hour.

[doogal]

While we tend to talk more about reserves and beaches, I do believe that having armour closer to the coast would have a least facilitated early attacks on the Allied Airborne forces protecting the flanks and shoulders of the initial landings. To much time is spent on the question of German forces perhaps defeating the Allies on the beaches, when if more mobile reserves had been closer to the beach a shallower bridgehead would have formed: I do not believe in any case that the lodgement would have been prevented: only its depth would have changed leaving the Allies in a tactically inferior position but attempting to achieve the same ends.
What ever Hitler may have divinated he did not go with his instinct in the West this time so he got it wrong: partly right is just not good enough:

[sandeepmukherjee196]

While we tend to talk more about reserves and beaches, I do believe that having armour closer to the coast would have a least facilitated early attacks on the Allied Airborne forces protecting the flanks and shoulders of the initial landings. To much time is spent on the question of German forces perhaps defeating the Allies on the beaches, when if more mobile reserves had been closer to the beach a shallower bridgehead would have formed: I do not believe in any case that the lodgement would have been prevented: only its depth would have changed leaving the Allies in a tactically inferior position but attempting to achieve the same ends.
What ever Hitler may have divinated he did not go with his instinct in the West this time so he got it wrong: partly right is just not good enough:

Hi doogal,

You are largely correct. However, one must realise that the allied toehold on the beaches was rather tenuous initially. The extent of their vulnerability perhaps is not fully understood since the allied victory ultimately was so comprehensive. Supplies were being unloaded using artificial facilities, Dumps were being created per force in areas which would come under gun range very easily.

If the Germans really squeezed the beaches...well..the mess could have been real jolly

[steverodgers801]

Hitler was convinced by the allied deception that Patton would land with his mythical army in the PAs De Calais. maybe some one can help on the dates they were released. but the15th army in the Pas De Calais, of 18 inf div 7 were released in july and august. There were 6 Pz div, 5 were released, but not as one full corps. 7th army had 15 inf div, 5 were released in June and July, 7 were sent to Italy. Hitler also could not woken up on the morning and thus valuable hours were lost waiting for him to wake and even then he hesitated in releasing more then some units.

[ljadw]

Hitler also could not woken up on the morning and thus valuable hours were lost waiting for him to wake and even then he hesitated in releasing more then some units.

This is not correct : Hitler was early up and no hours were lost ,besides,OBW was not convinced (till in the morning) that there was something serious on .

[Sheldrake]

Proof that Hitler refused to release the reserves?

Proof that when the reserves were released,it was too late ?

Proof that if the reserves were released earlie,it would have made a difference ?

This sounds like the preliminaries to the arguments of the "Durchstoss" apologists!

The answers to your questions are:-

1. Yes - either by commission or omission. The initial request for the reserves was refused by Jodl CoS OKW. There is no evidence of Hitler's involvement in any decision until PM 6 June. This has been explained by 1) reluctance to wake Jodl, then 2) a delay while Keitel, Jodl's boss considered the problem, then 3) a reluctance by the pair of them to wake Hitler on the basis of unclear information and a standing order not to disturb Hitler's rest. There is a statement of one of Hitler's SS staff quoted by Hubert Meyer (an unrepentent Nazi) that Hitler was awake and had been informed. Around this some of the old Nazis claimed that a conspiricy of traitors misrepresented the situation to OKW and deliberately misdirected the 12 SS. This does not fit the facts. In any event this version has Hitlker aware of the invasion but not taking any action.

2. Yes. The OKW reserves were not released for 12 hours after first requested by OB West.

3. No can be certain that an earlier release of the Panzer reserves would have reversed the results of the day. However German tactis were based on achieving a decision on D Day and delay cannot have helped

Allied historians interviewed many of the participants shortly after the war.

Here is the Canadian analysis of the German actions, written by Col Stacey
http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp ... ahq050.pdf

Here are the US interviews and commentry
https://server16040.contentdm.oclc.org/ ... 2754&REC=1

[paspartoo]

Hitler was convinced by the allied deception that Patton would land with his mythical army in the PAs De Calais. maybe some one can help on the dates they were released. but the15th army in the Pas De Calais, of 18 inf div 7 were released in july and august. There were 6 Pz div, 5 were released, but not as one full corps. 7th army had 15 inf div, 5 were released in June and July, 7 were sent to Italy. Hitler also could not woken up on the morning and thus valuable hours were lost waiting for him to wake and even then he hesitated in releasing more then some units.

Yeah, yeah and also Hitler expected help from the aliens in planet Mars... we've gone through the German units, their strength and operational status before: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=179393

My advise is to check the official history 'British intelligence in the Second world war'. You'll see that it doesn't repeat the bullshit about German armies waiting at Calais. It's 'authors' and 'historians' that are guilty of that. Well not all authors. Check Normandy '1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness', the author answers all your questions.
http://www.amazon.com/Normandy-1944-Org ... 0921991568

Also wanted to add the information i've discovered since then:

http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2 ... s-and.html
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2 ... es-of.html
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.gr/2 ... ation.html

[ljadw]

No : 6 june 02.40h :von Rundstedt transmits to 7th Army that HE DOES NOT BELIEVE IN A GREAT SCALE LANDING .

:10.30 :21 Pz is ordered to move to the west of the Orne canal and to the north of the Bayeux-Caen line .

:16 h :Rundstedt is authorized to engage his 2 Pz

Source :Tuesday june 6 1944 minute per minute


Other points :

1)The German tactics were not based on achieving a decision on D-Day : this was what proposed Rommel,but what was objected by Rundstedt,etc.


2)Allied historians interviewed many of the participants shortly after the war: why should we believe ANY word of the Germans ? They were defeated and as usual blamed Hitler,as they did for Dunkirk .


3)That Hitler was awake is a FACT : he was awake because he had to leave Berchtesgaden for a meeting with the Hungarians in Schloss Klessheim

If I am not wrong,it has been confirmed by Hitler's LW adjudant von Below (not a nazi)

[sandeepmukherjee196]

If Hitler was so right, why did he refuse to release the reserves until it was too late?
'

Can you present, using archival evidence (war diaries and high level directives) Hitler, Rundstedt and Rommel decisions starting on June 6, 1944?

Hour by hour.

[*] The war diary of the 15th Army contains five entries for 5th June. The first entry mentions that the first part of Paul Verlaine's tell tale verse was intercepted by the signals centre on 1,2 and 3 June. The second entry at 2115 hrs ( 5 June) mentions interception of the clinching second part of the verse. The 3rd, 4th and 5th entries at 2120, 2200 and 2215 hrs mentions that the decisive intelligence coup has been passed on to the Commander 15th Army, OB West , all General HQs, the 16th AA Div, Wehrmacht commanders of France and Belgium, HQ Army Group B and OKW ( Rastenburg).

[*] Out of the above who were alerted, who did what exactly with this critical piece of information that could potentially be a game changer? Please note that till now not a single bomb had dropped in Normandy, no landing vessels were in sight, no gliders carrying airborne troops had taken off. It was only Gen Salmuth (15th Army) who immediately put his forces on alert. But that was futile of course since the allies were not coming to the Pas de Calais that day.

[*] OKW not doing anything maybe excused since there were so many theatre commands and formation commands in the hierarchy below. OB West ( FeldMrschll Rundstedt) did nothing and his staff members are quoted as saying " .. as if Gen Eisenhower is going to announce the invasion over BBC !"

[*] Heeresgruppe B ( COS Gen Speidel) did nothing. He didnt alert 7th Army or 84th Koprs, leaving them to be taken by surprise when the airborne landings came followed by the beach landings. He didnt inform Rommel at his home, as a result of which this vital command was left without its commander for 14 vital hours ( the golden hours !).

[*] He didnt inform the radar stations. He didnt alert Admiral Hennecke, Naval Commander Normandy, who in turn couldnt alert his coastal batteries.

[*] At 0111 hrs Gen Marcks, commander 84th Korps ( the actual formation in the invasion area), was informed by the Chief of Operations 716 Div about the para landings near the Orne estuary. At 0145 hrs, the acting commander 709 Div informed 84 Korps about para landings in its area.

[*] At 0150 hrs, at Naval Group West HQ, Paris, The Chief of Ops announced the invasion officially. Its Chief of Staff, on phone, was informed by the radar stations that were a large number of blips on their screens.

[*] Upon being informed by the Navy, the Chief of Staff of OB West, casually remarked "..maybe a flock of seagulls!? " But Gen Marcks, 84 Korps, took things seriously, as they should have been taken, and gave out the code : "Alarm Kueste"..signifying the invasion had started.

[*] Upon receiving this alert, the 21st Panzer Div fell in by the road sides, with all 120 panzers of the 22nd Pz Regiment revved up.

I think a picture is emerging from the above? I will come back with the rest soon.

Ciao
Sandeep

[Boby]

3)That Hitler was awake is a FACT : he was awake because he had to leave Berchtesgaden for a meeting with the Hungarians in Schloss Klessheim

Hitler spent the night talking with Eva Braun and Goebbels to about 2-3.00 AM. Speer wrote that he was still sleeping at 10.00 AM when he arrived at Berghof.

[ljadw]

I don't trust Speer :he lied from the day he was born to the day he died .

[ljadw]

Besides,the question is not if Hitler was sleeping the night of 5/6 june: he was sleeping ,as were Rundstedt,etc.

The question is : was there any reason to wake up Hitler and would this have made any difference .

The answer is : NO

The whole story of the sleeping Hitler (parotted and embellished by countless "historians" has as much value as the story of the stupid Stalin who refused to believe the informations of the brilliant Sorge in june 1941,and who after 22 june 1941 had locked up himself in his dacha,drinking vodka .

Both stories are myths propagated by the generals to saddle up some one else for the defeats .

[Boby]

I don't trust Speer :he lied from the day he was born to the day he died .

There is contradictory evidence. According to Günsche (see Beevor, D-Day) he was up at 8.00 Uhr.

The meeting you referred with Hungarian leaders was held the following day it seems (Domarus; bpk pictures marked "7 juni")