RichTO90 wrote:sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:I have no clue ! I didnt suggest that they would or should have chosen Belgium. This discussion is following a post by ljadw to the effect that the entire Franco - Belgian coast line presented an invasion probability ( I think Zeebrugge was specifically mentioned) and hence it was impossible for the Germans to mount any kind of credible defence.
Er, yes, the entire Franco-Belgian coastline did present the possibility of invasion, but it was you who reduced that to the absurdity of the specific mention of "maybe OOstende or Zeebrugge
" on Sat May 02, 2015 3:41 am. Please try to avoid dodging responsibility for your own posts.
Er, no, Someone else suggested Zeebrugge in the context of a Belgian landing. I added OOstende graciously. The post in question was implying a trade off between the east and west Belgian coast areas as possible landing propositions. Either the eastern Zeebrugge area of the western part adjoining France. Its not my prerogative to make someone else's proposition more plausible by converting a 21 mile stretch to a 42 mile pan Belgian coastline. Please try to stop casting aspersions on folks based on your shallow quickie perusals
In the actual event, the nearest scenario to the above hypotheses, was the front in the Dutch - Belgian sector that saw action in Sept - Oct 44. And the "German Armies to the west..." in this case, would be Von Zangen's 15 Armee.
RichTO90 wrote: Er, no, the "front in the Dutch - Belgian sector that saw action in Sept - Oct 44" were the isolated German outposts at Boulogne, Calais, Cap Griz Nez, and Dunkirk...but the operations you keep referring to are the defense of the "Breskens Pocket", Albert Canal-Scheldt line, and MARKET-GARDEN, which have nothing to do with a defense of a coastline versus amphibious invasion.
Er, yes, you are again off the mark, consistently, on this theatre of WW II. The "front in the Dutch - Belgian sector that saw action in Sept - Oct 44" included the Neerpelt - Meuse - Escaut canal area where the British 2nd Army (XXX corps) attacked in the afternoon of 17 September 44. And the Scheldt operations by the Canadians.
Nowhere did I imply that this discussion is limited to the coastline operations alone. Again shallow ..quickie reading? It is patently absurd to even suggest that a discussion on the viability of a Belgian coastal amphibious landing can exclude the follow up break out battles, to follow !! I find it incredible that you are even bringing this up..shallow reading or not !
sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:ljadw wrote:
It was not a question of Calais or Normandy :it was not a question of north of the Seine or south of the Seine:the Germans would have been faced by the same problems if the Allies were landing north of the Seine .
Only a part of the region Rouen-Bruges (325 km !) was heavily defended:if the 3 PzD (21 Pz,PL,12 SS ) were located at the Pas de Calais (2 Pz in Normandy) and the Allies landed on the Belgian coast,the Germans also would be outmanoeuvred:the PzD would be to late to intervene .If the PzD were located at the Belgian coast(which is 70 km!) the same would happen:if they were at the east coast (Zeebrugge) they could not intervene at the west coast (border with France) and the opposite.And the Rommel option would here also fail,as would the Rundstedt option .
It would have been an extremely interesting operation to watch if the allies crossed the North Sea from the South of England and landed somewhere along the 42 mile Belgian Coast..wow..maybe OOstende or Zeebrugge
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Finally, if the allied managed to land in Belgium without getting clobbered..and succeeded in establishing beachheads ..what next? Go South west to liberate Paris ..no? Maybe go hell for leather at the German borders to the south east? Both?
sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:steverodgers801 wrote:The German armies to the west of the salient were given a miserable time when they did try to move to the front
Well.. not exactly. In September, it was time for the allies to attack Germany proper..only the route of the main attack was being debated. Von Zangen's 15th Army, at the Pas de Calais, had a choice to wade into the avalanche of British armour to their south and south east. But they quietly crossed the Schelde ..night after night by ferry... into south Beveland and finally they contributed around 85000 troops to the German defences in Holland before Horrocks attacked and breached Student's defences near Neerpelt.
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The ramshackle German defences at Holland had appeared to be a pushover in early September. It seemed that any decent Anglo - Canadian formation could just walk in and take over.The allies, much in line with the sweepingly dismissive mood and tone visible on this thread, wrote off " The German armies to the west of this salient".
Dempsey's 2nd Army's Intelligence summary to 2400 hr 7 September, said gleefully :
"The doom of 15 Army is already sealed .."
And we all know who gave whom a miserable time in Holland thenceforth !
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steverodgers801 wrote:... and the supply lines were not intact. The allies made a concerted effort of dropping every bridge they could and were hitting trains every chance possible
Well here the hypotheses provided by me was about an imagined scenario where the allies landed in Belgium. And created a hanging-in-the-air-salient with its base on the north sea coast and facing every which way east, west and south. With enemy formations present in strength in all 3 directions. German supply and troop movement lines through Central france would have been largely unthreatened by ground forces.
Even in the actual scenario, post Normandy disaster, with allied ground forces on the rampage and new forward airstrips on the mainland under Allied control,
Colonel Oscar Koch, G 2-1, US 3 Army (Intel Chief), had this to say on 28 August :
" ...numerous new identifications in contact in recent days have demonstrated clearly that although he is operating under enormous difficulties, the enemy is still capable of bringing new elements into the battle area and transferring some from other fronts.."
Ciao
Sandeep
The above 2 relevant re-posts / quotes should bring in focus the context of this discussion and debate. Or else its like one guy talking about a vehicle's cross country performance / endurance while the other person is giving a critique, thinking that it is about off the mark speed
What was my "fantastic supposition"? If an entire intact army had attacked XXX corps on their left flank.. Horrock's formation would have been history! I have specifically mentioned elements of 15 Armee.. without any heavy weapons and equipment which had to be left behind on the western side of the Scheldt. And no "decision had already been reached" please. It was a closely fought campaign. With both sides straining at their seams till the end.
RichTO90 wrote:Your "fantastic supposition"? How about the one that could be inferred from your previous posts that you now make explicit? Just what "entire intact army" are you babbling about? 15. Armee was stripped to support 7. Armee and 5. Panzerarmee throughout June, July, and August, just as 7. Armee would have had to be stripped out to support 15. Armee. 13 of the 17 divisions of 15. Armee were static, so could only contribute the small mobile KG they were able to form to adjacent sectors. But in 7. Armee, only 8 of its 14 divisions were static. IOW, 15. Armee was less capable of mobile defense than its neighbor.
Sighhh ...You cant get over your babbling based on quickie reading habits can you!? Of course 15 Armee wasnt an "entire intact armee ", the way things turned out in the actual scenario! It had been stripped piecemeal first then had to abandon the heavy stuff west of the Scheldt when escaping in early Sept.
That was exactly my point ! If there had been a Belgian landing at OOstende / Zeebrugge ( as per the original proposition) then large sections of the 15 Armee would have been to the west of this zone and would have fought as an intact formation..squeezing the bridgehead.
RichTO90 wrote: In any case, while 15. Armee started its escape - according to van Zangen - on 4 September, it was c. 19 September before any of those evacuees were committed into battle as formations. They were not part of those "1st Para Armee" scratch formations "being assembled around that time"................................................................................................................................................................
Sorry, but yes, MARKET-GARDEN's outcome was decided by 19 September. The supporting XII Corps attack on XXX Corps left (where most of the 15. Armee rescuees went) was already over, Frost's men were isolated, the Nijmegan bridge hadn't been captured, and stronger forces were intervening from the east to cut the corridor.
** ( highlightings by me).....
Sighhh again ! Demonstrably, you do have very little clue about Market Garden I must say
Mind you, you may have data, info and references..but little understanding of the dynamics of this operation. Market Garden was a failure, in the ultimate analysis, since the bridge over the lower Rhine couldnt be captured at Arnhem and 2 nd Army couldnt gain their entry on the Ruhr through the backdoor... thereby shortening the war ( by 4 odd months maybe).
However Monty called Market Garden " a 90% success " ! I dont agree with this..but thats not the point. XXX corps reached the southern approaches to the Lower Rhine. Lt Col Frost's unit stayed put at the northern side of the bridge till the night of 20 - 21 Sept. The OOsterbeek bridgehead wasnt abandoned till the night of 25-26 Sept. The Germans appeared to be so thick that they didnt realise this till noon 26th !
On the evening of 20 Sept, when the Wall bridge was crossed by the British Guards Armoured Div and US 82 paras, the Germans had next to nothing at Elst! A few rifle pickets .. that all ! The reinforcements came later. One rush could have taken the tanks and accompanying paras / infantry to the lower Rhine !
Next day ( 21st ) when the Poles parachuted in at Driel ( on the southern bank) the German forces became even more stretched. They had to send troops over from the norther side to protect the southern approaches from the Poles. This released pressure on the OOsterbeek perimeter as well as showed the sheer precariousness of the German position !
Imagine on the evening of the 20th, Frost was still holding out north of the bridge. If only the Guards Armoured tanks had bulldozed their way to the southern end of the bridge !?
Coming to the issue of the 15 Armee elements contributing to the defeat of Market Garden. The Irish Guards war diary ( 17 Sept) mentions their surprise when they interrogated POWs from units who were not supposed to be there when they breached Student's defences near Neerpelt ( Meuse Escaut canal sector) viz....15 Armee evacuees supposed to have been west of the Scheldt ( among others like those belonging to the 2 SS Pz Kr KG).
I repeat, it is not my case that 15 Armee splinter groups played a decisive or individually critical role. But in those desperate days of crisis for the 1 FJ Armee at the border, any body of trained infantry men made a difference. And the 15 Armee definitely did pitch in. Their escape made a difference.
Never said early September ! I said 15 Armee started escaping in early Sept. Student's 1st Para Armee too was being assembled around that time as a scratch formation.
RichTO90 wrote:No, you said "Gave a costly battle to the Canadians trying to clear the Antwerp port approaches", which is the battle of October-November. Please try for some logic in your response.
Are you sure you are quite Ok ?..you know where ! How does the date when 15 Armee started their escape across the Scheldt ( early Sept) define the time when the subsequent Scheldt battle occurred? This was not a war game for God's sake ! the Germans didnt have to coordinate and time their moves in sync with the Canadian battle plans ! Just because the Germans started getting troops over from the west of Scheldt to south Beveland in early Sept doesnt mean that the Canadians would have to commence their attacks at the same time !!
If only you remembered well.. or maybe interpreted well from your vast repertoire of data. Student's 1st parachute army was a joke to start with. Apart from the regiment strength FJ..he had a disparate grab bag of Luftwaffe personnel and make shift units and KGs. Totaling about a Div size formation. Any addition to its strength by regular ID elements was a vast improvement.
RichTO90 wrote: So it was a "joke to start with", but managed to stall along the Albert Canal long enough to impose a pause on the British advance? Interesting joke. What it was were the remnants of 719 and 85 Inf.-Div., Division Walther, and Division Erdmann. None of which were those units evacuated across the Scheldt.
No..they didnt " stall long enough " ...since the British didnt seriously attack in this period. Monty was waiting to build up his forces for the set piece offensive to come.
When British field intel started checking on the POWs after the Neerpelt - Valkenswaard attack, they did a double take! Personnel from Divs started showing up who had no business being there ! They were supposed to be on the other side of the Scheldt.
RichTO90 wrote: After the battle of "Joe's Bridge"? I.e., after 10 September? Sure, because the British were being opposed by the remnants of formations they had smashed in the Mons Pocket the week before that continued to flee in front of them. They weren't those troops of 15. Armee that evacuated across the Scheldt.
No 15 Armee evacuees were part of the German line up on the Meuse Escaut canal pl.
Ciao
Sandeep
