"Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"

[Nickdfresh]

Other point : the French ( the French decided the Allied strategy, the British followed ) had determined their strategy and elaborated their plans already BEFORE the war, long before some one was talking about Sichelschnitt. They were convinced that the main German attack would come from the north of the Ardennes ,and they were right . The same for the Belgians : the Belgians expected the Germans to come from the Netherlands, that's why they built fortifications along the Albert canal ,behind the border with the Netherlands .

....

There was NO waving of the cape : the waving of the cape is a post war invention : already before the war,before Fall Gelb, the French expected a German attack on the Netherlands and Belgium, and they planned to go north ,to stop the Germans.

The Dyle plan (with the Breda variant ) dated from years before the war .

Both are false assertions and I sense an engagement in sophism here. The "Dyle Plan" was nothing new indeed, but it changed in tenor radically under Gamelin. The intical plan was very conservative and called for 10 infantry divisions as a sort of doorstop. By 1940, the plan was full on 30 divisions with many of them mechanized and the bulk of the best French DCR armored divisions...

After the war, the panzer lobby has created the myth that the advance through the Ardennes was decisive and that Bock was sitting by,doing nothing : this is totally wrong ;without the successful advance of AGB, the PzG Kleist was doomed to fail .

And your source for this? Because you've contradicted every historian ever...

No one said "Bock was sitting by doing nothing". He did enter Belgium and engaged in several battles against French forces that matched or bettered him. He was holding them down and part of an elaborate deception! That's not doing "nothing!"

[doogal]

.ljadw wrote - What the Germans planned had no influence on what the French did . And this was also so later in the war . The Barbarossa planning was determined by what the Germans could do , not by what the Soviets would do . It was also the same for Overlord: the German dislocation was determined by the German possibilities,the Allied disposition by the Allied possibilities . Both did not determine each other . The theory that the French fell in a German trap is wrong . It caresses the German ego, but it remains wrong .

What the Germans planned determined where and when they would engage the French and with what forces they would engage them with.
If the Germans did this in line with a pre-determined plan then it influenced French decision making once and only once that an invasion was under way.
So once the Germans attacked a response was illicited. Planning influnces nothing unless acted upon in the real world.

1. So are you are saying ljadw that what the Germans did (not planned)influenced the French / Russians /Alllies, in respect to there opening response.
2. If so you must show that there actions bore no resemblance to there plans.
3. Because if you cannot then the plan set the action in motion which illicited the response.

I agree that the Barbarossa planning was determined by what the Germans thought they could techinically and victually achieve. But all plans are as such mediated by what they believed the were capable of achieving. This though if ACTED upon (which it was) ilicits a real world response which is then inexorably linked to the planning of the original instigation.
You cannot ljadw remove the intellectual foundation of a military operation, plans while made in isolation from an enemy are when acted upon intimately connected.

I agree the French did not fall into a trap but when they "acted" upon Germanys military move they "acted" in the predicted manner, and this in itself links the intellectual to the actual.

[Richard Anderson]

The Germans had 136 divisions,the PzG Kleist 8.How can 5% be the Schwerpunkt ?

I am honestly surprised you are trying to recycle this idiocy.

HG-A - 45 divisions
HG-B - 29 divisions
HG-C - 18 divisions
Luftwaffe - 1 division
Denmark - 2 divisions
Norway - 7 divisions
Ostfront - 8 divisions
Reserves - 25 divisions (7 released)
Forming - 16 divisions

Panzergruppe Kleist with 8 divisions was the schwerpunkt of HG-A.

The French had not 136 divisions,thus the Germans had a quantitative superiority .

So what? The German offensive was conducted primarily by HG-A and B...and mostly by about two-thirds of its 74 divisions.

On the North eastern front 29 French divisions faced 74 German divisions : who had the superiority ?

Nonsense. Please define the "North eastern front". Approximately 68 divisions of the French 1eme GA, the BEF, and Belgian Army faced 74 divisions of the HG-A and B.

Even with the aid of the Belgians (22) and the BEF (11 ) there was still a German superiority and this is without counting the 42 German reserve divisions ;the French had only 17 reserve divisions .

No, the Germans had 25 reserve divisions and released 7 of them...the rest, 16 and not 17, were forming and never committed.

Snip incoherent bafflegabble...

[sandeepmukherjee196]

..................................

After the war, the panzer lobby has created the myth that the advance through the Ardennes was decisive and that Bock was sitting by,doing nothing : this is totally wrong ;without the successful advance of AGB, the PzG Kleist was doomed to fail .

No. That was no myth. No one said that "Bock was sitting by, doing nothing" either. The classical Panzer Doctrine was like a dance of the Matador...the cape being waved somewhere to engage the enemy and the spear going in elsewhere to quickly penetrate, disrupt and envelop. Bock's successful "waving of the cape" in the North was essential for the "spear" to effectively go through Ardennes and across the Meuse.

If the bulk of the allied forces could engage the Schwerpunkt coming through the Ardennes then the German plan would have failed. Like I said earlier, the Germans had absolutely no material superiority over the allies.

There was NO waving of the cape : the waving of the cape is a post war invention : already before the war,before Fall Gelb, the French expected a German attack on the Netherlands and Belgium, and they planned to go north ,to stop the Germans.

If they planned to go North and if the Germans further reinforced that premise by actually waving the cape North..where is the contradiction?
It's another matter that the cape itself appeared to smother the poor bull!

Fall Gelb succeeded because the Germans had a manpower and material superiority .

Completely fallacious. Please provide the stats here that proves any superiority whatsoever in numbers and quality.

If the allied forces in the north would engage the PzG Kleist (which was not the Schwerpunkt), the Germans would have been very quickly at the Somme and no one would have prevented them to enter Paris . The great danger for the allies was in the north,that's why they went north : plan Dyle with the Breda variant .

Huh ! You have completely lost me here ! And by stating that Pz Grp Kleist was not the Schwerpunkt you have outdone yourself on AHF !

The Germans had 136 divisions,the PzG Kleist 8.How can 5% be the Schwerpunkt ?

Should I grin or guffaw? Do you seriously want me to address this? The Schwerpunkt,,the point of the speer...ipso facto has a small, sharp and penetrating surface, wielded with great force. It is not a bludgeon for God's sake! What was the composition of Pz Gr Kleist? How many of the total Pz Divs available to the Heer in the west were deployed in Pz Grp Kleist? What was the LW (Stuka et al) commitment to support this formation?

The French had not 136 divisions,thus the Germans had a quantitative superiority .

On the North eastern front 29 French divisions faced 74 German divisions : who had the superiority ?

Very very interesting ! HG B had a total of 29 1/2 Divs ... So....

Even with the aid of the Belgians (22) and the BEF (11 ) there was still a German superiority and this is without counting the 42 German reserve divisions ;the French had only 17 reserve divisions .

The facts are : Total Allied forces contained - 117 French (97 actually in France), 13 British, 22 Belgian, 10 Dutch and 2 Polish... . How they were deployed is not the problem of the Heer ! When the chips were down the allies had 144 divs opposing 141 German Divs (136 deployed). The German strategy only called for 18 Divs in HG C (von Leeb) facing the formidable allied build up (2 Army grps - 39 Divs) on the Maginot line.

On their own,the French could not hold the frontline between the Channel and Luxemburg ;they needed desperatedly the 22 Belgian divisions ;thus they were condemned to go to the north ,while hoping that the Ardennes could hold without reinforcements;if they reinforced the Ardennes, the 22 Belgian divisions were lost and no one could stop the German advance to Paris .

Waving of the cape had no influence on the French strategy which was founded on facts ,which were : a shortage of manpower and a too long border . There was only one possibility to do something on this .What the Germans planned had no influence on what the French did . And this was also so later in the war . The Barbarossa planning was determined by what the Germans could do , not by what the Soviets would do . It was also the same for Overlord: the German dislocation was determined by the German possibilities,the Allied disposition by the Allied possibilities . Both did not determine each other . The theory that the French fell in a German trap is wrong . It caresses the German ego, but it remains wrong .

The waving of the cape, kept the allies focused in the NE and then confused. Gamelin (for sometime operating from a radio less HQ !!) was still planning redeployment logistics like in the WWI days..talking of weeks rather than days and hours ! Thats where their goose was cooked That was the beauty of the Panzer doctrine.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Hi Doogal...

Terms like Blitzkrieg and Panzer Doctrine were "sexy" terms (according to a poster on AHF ) coined later ..more as journalistic gimmicks. However in real time, the essence of what the Panzer Doctrine claims for itself, was actually seen in operation from the earliest campaigns of WWII.

The post WW I German Reichswehr and then the Wehrmacht, consciously developed a combat doctrine that took into consideration certain vital factors arising out of the nightmarish experiences of WW I and Germany's geostrategic situation post the Great War.

[*]Germany couldn't afford to get bogged down in attritional trench warfare in France and Belgium again. Future wars should be based on movement and speed across country.

[*]To the above end, the role of new technology viz., Panzers and other cross country armoured vehicles (with caterpillar tracks), radio and the Luftwaffe (particularly tactical ground support aircraft as flying artillery) were to be used. The Spanish Civil War was the incubator for these theories, particularly the role of close support ground attack aircraft.

[*]There was another factor emerging from WW I that influenced German thinking to the point of obsession. It was the traumatic and frustrating experience of being thwarted at the Marne ! The German High Command had developed an ide'e fixe on crossing the Marne. But...after that what?
Like all fetishes this one too came home to roost when in real terms it fructified! The German armour crossed the Marne in style but the sordid drama that unfolded after that, owes it's origin to the fact that the Truppenamt and the Generalstab fantasised about it but didn't really internalise it!
Hitler downwards, the Generals weren't prepared for the magnitude and the speed of their own success in May'40. In terms of capabilities on paper vs reality on the ground, at that time Hitler believed of his enemies what he later demanded of his own side !
He was looking at maps and remembering the Flanders of his time ! He was looking at the notional strength of the allied formations and couldn't visualise the reality of Blitzkrieg on the ground. He didn't see the panic in the French troops, the confusion in the Belgians and the inadequacy in the British. He didn't see the refugee clogged roads, the disintegration of the allied "lines" with German armour often far behind the allied forward units. The fact that there were no allied 'lines' any more eluded him.
Later he would make the same mistake with his own formations on all fronts. Success is a lousy teacher. The early successes of the Panzer Doctrine developed new obsessions and orthodoxies amongst the German top brass later. The guys who were most uncomfortable with the panzer doctrine in 1940 became the most fanatical votaries of this in 1944 when the realities had made it irrelevant!

Cheers
Sandeep

[doogal]

However in real time, the essence of what the Panzer Doctrine claims for itself, was actually seen in operation from the earliest campaigns of WWII.

I see nothing which suggest a theory of armoured manouvere warfare in the Polish Campaign... Rather Armour being used to facilitate the manouvere of infantry formations rather than as the executor of operational threat.

The post WW I German Reichswehr and then the Wehrmacht, consciously developed a combat doctrine that took into consideration certain vital factors arising out of the nightmarish experiences of WW I and Germany's geostrategic situation post the Great War.

Agreed sandeep but this was an all arms approach, which was developed while Germany concentrated on defensive strategies which were created throught neccessity due to the limits of the versailles treaty, there was no special emphasis on "Panzers" as of yet.

[*]Germany couldn't afford to get bogged down in attritional trench warfare in France and Belgium again. Future wars should be based on movement and speed across country.

[*]To the above end, the role of new technology viz., Panzers and other cross country armoured vehicles (with caterpillar tracks), radio and the Luftwaffe (particularly tactical ground support aircraft as flying artillery) were to be used. The Spanish Civil War was the incubator for these theories, particularly the role of close support ground attack aircraft.

1, Agreed but btwn 1918 - 1932 there was no emphasis on offensive mobile operations. After 1932 i admit with the expansion of German forces the emphasis changed but again only in the context of all arms warfare rather any specific "Panzer doctrine"

2, Again i agree, but this is again an all armed operational theory, i.e close air support is just as usefull for infantry as it is for armour.

*]There was another factor emerging from WW I that influenced German thinking to the point of obsession. It was the traumatic and frustrating experience of being thwarted at the Marne ! The German High Command had developed an ide'e fixe on crossing the Marne. But...after that what?
Like all fetishes this one too came home to roost when in real terms it fructified! The German armour crossed the Marne in style but the sordid drama that unfolded after that, owes it's origin to the fact that the Truppenamt and the Generalstab fantasised about it but didn't really internalise it!
Hitler downwards, the Generals weren't prepared for the magnitude and the speed of their own success in May'40. In terms of capabilities on paper vs reality on the ground, at that time Hitler believed of his enemies what he later demanded of his own side !
He was looking at maps and remembering the Flanders of his time ! He was looking at the notional strength of the allied formations and couldn't visualise the reality of Blitzkrieg on the ground. He didn't see the panic in the French troops, the confusion in the Belgians and the inadequacy in the British. He didn't see the refugee clogged roads, the disintegration of the allied "lines" with German armour often far behind the allied forward units. The fact that there were no allied 'lines' any more eluded him.
Later he would make the same mistake with his own formations on all fronts. Success is a lousy teacher. The early successes of the Panzer Doctrine developed new obsessions and orthodoxies amongst the German top brass later. The guys who were most uncomfortable with the panzer doctrine in 1940 became the most fanatical votaries of this in 1944 when the realities had made it irrelevant!

As far as i am aware the timetable in 1940 for crossing the meuse was based on infantry formations closing up and crossing, that Guderian /Reihardt /Rommel etc took there opportunity and barreled on regardless does not change the fact that a "Panzer Doctrine" did not exist. You can take Guderians ideas and call them the theory for a doctrine an i agree that he and others applied them at times but it was ad hoc based on the commanders attitude on operational warfare, rather than doctrine it was a group of local expedients. f it was doctrine it would have been applied across the breadth of German operations but it wasnt.
The all arms theory encompassed every weapon at Germanys armies disposal but still highlighted infantry and artillery as the parent arms.

Ciao

[doogal]

But again i am just being picky:

You could have called it an all arms concept based around the armoured vehicle as the decisive battlefield weapon, but i would probably argue that that even this was developmental in nature and that armoured motorised mobility was the essential ingredient rather than the tank in of itself.



Right of topic are we not .. lol

Hitler got it right for the Allies in Normandy.....

[sandeepmukherjee196]

But again i am just being picky:

You could have called it an all arms concept based around the armoured vehicle as the decisive battlefield weapon, but i would probably argue that that even this was developmental in nature and that armoured motorised mobility was the essential ingredient rather than the tank in of itself.



Right of topic are we not .. lol

Hitler got it right for the Allies in Normandy.....

Doogal..you are right. Panzer Doctrine wasn't about only Panzers as in tanks. A Pz div was an all arms formation unlike a British tank formation of WW I. The Germans were at the receiving end of British tank attacks in WW I and knew the limitations of tanks operating alone against built up defences...or otherwise.

The term "Panzer Doctrine" is open to misconstrusion... to mean that it is about the primacy of tanks. Without the other supporting ground and air assets, the panzer doctrine was a non-starter. Imagine tanks alone trying those stunts at the Meuse front..or later in the cross country dashes across Northern France and Belgium! Imagine what would have happened at Arras !

Cheers
Sandeep

[ljadw]

Sandeep : your figures are wrong : the first French army group with 34 divisions,was faced by 2 German Army Groups with 75 divisions . Reserves are not includedd on both sides . Even with the 11 divisions of the BEF, the French were still in minority .

That's why the French were condemned to advance in Belgium : they could not defend the border with Belgium with 45 divisions against 75 divisions .

About the Polish divisions : one of them belonged to the 4th army and was not stationed on the border with Belgium .

A German advance through Belgium was a given, the only way to prevent the Germans to advance to Paris was to stop them in Belgium,and specifically on the Dyle line . When the Dyle line was broken, the war was lost .

The main part of the German army advanced north of the Ardennes,because it was and still is impossible to advance through the Ardennes with a big army : you never have traversed the Ardennes, I do and several times : even today (76 years after the facts) there are still no decent roads traversing the Ardennes from the east to the west :there is a highway going from the north (Brussels) to the south (Luxemburg ) .

The big fighting happened north of the Ardennes, the big casualties happened north of the Ardennes, thus, the decision took place north of the Ardennes .

[Richard Anderson]

Sandeep : your figures are wrong : the first French army group with 34 divisions,was faced by 2 German Army Groups with 75 divisions . Reserves are not includedd on both sides . Even with the 11 divisions of the BEF, the French were still in minority .

Sigh...

Denmark - occupied by two German divisions
Norway - occupied by seven German divisions
HG-B with nominally 28 divisions (one, 526. was comprised of Grenztruppen and solely concerned with POW management) and 22. Luftlande. It faced the Dutch Army (9 divisions), Belgian Army (22 divisions), French 7e Armee (6 divisions), BEF (effectively 9 divisions), and French 1er Armee (10 divisions). Thus, it was 28 German versus 56 Allied divisions.
HG-A with 45 divisions faced French 9e Armee (8 divisions), 2e Armee (8 divisions), and roughly half of 3e Armee (7 divisions). Thus 45 German versus 23 French.
HG-C with 18 divisions faced roughly half of 3e Armee (7 divisions, including 51. Highland), 4e Armee (6 divisions), 5e Armee (8 divisions), and 8e Armee (5 divisions). Thus 18 German divisions versus 26 Franco-British divisions.

The French also had 17 divisions in reserve that they committed. The Germans had 25 and committed 7.

That's why the French were condemned to advance in Belgium : they could not defend the border with Belgium with 45 divisions against 75 divisions .

No. They could also have left the Dutch and Belgians to their fate, acting as a speed bump to attrit the German forces, while concentrating there mobile forces between Montmedy and the Channel Coast. Thus, 73 German divisions would have faced 48 Allied divisions. All 17 reserve divisions and the excess mobile divisions facing the quiescent HG-C could also have been committed, creating effective parity, especially assuming the Allies would have prepared positions.

About the Polish divisions : one of them belonged to the 4th army and was not stationed on the border with Belgium .

Are you grasping at straws or trying to divert attention from the paucity of your argument?

A German advance through Belgium was a given, the only way to prevent the Germans to advance to Paris was to stop them in Belgium,and specifically on the Dyle line . When the Dyle line was broken, the war was lost .

Nonsense. There was nothing special about the "Dyle line". It could have as easily been the Lys-Oise-Meuse line, or any other of a number of defensible positions not requiring the Allies to pick up and advance into Belgian territory.

The main part of the German army advanced north of the Ardennes,because it was and still is impossible to advance through the Ardennes with a big army : you never have traversed the Ardennes, I do and several times : even today (76 years after the facts) there are still no decent roads traversing the Ardennes from the east to the west :there is a highway going from the north (Brussels) to the south (Luxemburg ) .

Still back to this crap I see. No, the "main part of the German army" did not advance "north of the Ardennes". We went over that last summer. As I said then, "The forces "north of the Ardennes were Hoth's Panzerkorps - part of HG-A - and 6. Armee of HG-B, which advanced into Belgium. It had 12 divisions - not 70 (more falsification on your part) - and 18. Armee, which advanced into Holland. It had 13 divisions."

The big fighting happened north of the Ardennes, the big casualties happened north of the Ardennes, thus, the decision took place north of the Ardennes .

Utter crap, without a bit of evidence to support it.

[ljadw]

No : you can't add the Dutch and Belgian divisions to the Allied divisions ,which were : the French and the BEF .

The 34 French divisions + the 11 /9 BEF divisions faced some 75 German divisions .Thus a German superiority .

And NO : the French could NOT leave the Belgians to their fate (the Dutch were left to their fate,because the French could not help them ),because without the Belgians, it was 45 against 75.

And NO : the Dyle Line was essential for the French and for the Belgians : it was essential for the Belgians because the loss of the Dyle Line meant the loss of Belgium ,and it was essential for the French because there was nothing behind the Dyle Line to stop the Germans : the border with Belgium was undefended .

Notwithstanding the intervention by the French and the BEF, the Belgians were forced to capitulate after 18 days;without this intervention, they would not have lasted 18 days .

There were also no excess mobile divisions behind the Maginot line :these divisions were needed where they were and could not go to the north .

All your replies indicate that you have no notion of the French difficult situation, because, as most US historians, you are giving too much importance on the biased German version .

Take Frieser : he exaggerates the German weaknesses,while hiding the Allied ones :he speaks of 22 Belgian divisions, not knowing that at least 4 of them were not operational .And his conclusions are that the German success was caused by the genius of a Prussian officer (Manstein ) ,something one can expect from an officer of the Bundeswehr and that the success was squandered by the intervention of an Austrian civilian ,Hitler .

76 years after the facts, it is more than time to throw overboard the old myths :the waving of the cape, Manstein's backhand (Manstein is not Agassi ),etc,etc

If the Germans did not win because they were intellectually superior, the conclusion is that they won because they were stronger .

The Belgians expected correctly that the Germans would mostly come from the north : that's why long before the war they built Eben-Emael and the fortifications behind the Albert canal ;they knew that they could not stop the Germans at the Albert canal and that the fighting there had as aim only to delay the Germans til the French and the BEF arrived at the Dyle line (called also the KW line ) .On 15 may, before Kleist was advancing to the French coast, the Dyle line was broken and Bock and the northern part of the forces of Rundstedt were already closer to Dunkirk than was Kleist .

At that day, the Allies had already lost .

[ljadw]

3 armies with 5 PzD advanced on 10 may north of the Ardennes, 2 other armies with 5 PzD advanced south of the Ardennes .

[Richard Anderson]

No : you can't add the Dutch and Belgian divisions to the Allied divisions ,which were : the French and the BEF .

Is there a rule book demanding that? Meanwhile, the Allies did and the Germans counted them that way...they just anticipated - correctly - being able to defeat them in detail.

The 34 French divisions + the 11 /9 BEF divisions faced some 75 German divisions .Thus a German superiority .

Repeating stupidity doesn't lessen its stupidity.

And NO : the French could NOT leave the Belgians to their fate (the Dutch were left to their fate,because the French could not help them ),because without the Belgians, it was 45 against 75.

Yes, they could have, since as I pointed out, it was effectively 73 to 48, then 80 to 65, and eventually near parity...it required time.

And NO : the Dyle Line was essential for the French and for the Belgians : it was essential for the Belgians because the loss of the Dyle Line meant the loss of Belgium ,and it was essential for the French because there was nothing behind the Dyle Line to stop the Germans : the border with Belgium was undefended .

Yes, it was essential to Belgium...but that does not make it essential for France and Britain. Meanwhile, you may want to look at the "New Fronts" or Maginot Line Extension built during the 1930s. While not as strong as the main line, the fixed fortifications built could have been a basis for a prepared defense.

Notwithstanding the intervention by the French and the BEF, the Belgians were forced to capitulate after 18 days;without this intervention, they would not have lasted 18 days .

False syllogism.

There were also no excess mobile divisions behind the Maginot line :these divisions were needed where they were and could not go to the north .

Nonsense. They were needed if HG-C attacked with greater strength than they had. If they did then that would have to be by drawing divisions from HG-A or B or from the OKW reserves over and above what were used...all of which would be good for the Allies and bad for the Germans.

All your replies indicate that you have no notion of the French difficult situation, because, as most US historians, you are giving too much importance on the biased German version .

And your replies indicate you cannot reason logically or coherently and that you are no historian of any sort.

Take Frieser : he exaggerates the German weaknesses,while hiding the Allied ones :he speaks of 22 Belgian divisions, not knowing that at least 4 of them were not operational .And his conclusions are that the German success was caused by the genius of a Prussian officer (Manstein ) ,something one can expect from an officer of the Bundeswehr and that the success was squandered by the intervention of an Austrian civilian ,Hitler .

As usual, you denigrate a source when it benefits your argument and then use the source when it benefits your argument. And fail to even notice the logical disconnect and dishonesty that exhibits.

76 years after the facts, it is more than time to throw overboard the old myths :the waving of the cape, Manstein's backhand (Manstein is not Agassi ),etc,etc

If the Germans did not win because they were intellectually superior, the conclusion is that they won because they were stronger .

You have done nothing to demonstrate that the German planning was not superior to that of the Allies...the rest is your usual bafflegab.

The Belgians expected correctly that the Germans would mostly come from the north : that's why long before the war they built Eben-Emael and the fortifications behind the Albert canal ;they knew that they could not stop the Germans at the Albert canal and that the fighting there had as aim only to delay the Germans til the French and the BEF arrived at the Dyle line (called also the KW line ) .On 15 may, before Kleist was advancing to the French coast, the Dyle line was broken and Bock and the northern part of the forces of Rundstedt were already closer to Dunkirk than was Kleist .

At that day, the Allies had already lost .

Nonsense.

[ljadw]

As a lot of people you have a wrong idea of the Ardennes : they are a small geographical region south of the Meus, much south. They include the southern part of the province of Liège,the major part (not all ) of the province of Luxembourg and a part of the Duchy of Luxembourg.

While the width at the German border was some 100 km, it was at the French border less than 25 km ;this means that there was no road space enough to deploy at the French border 9 PzD . There is also the fact that there were no railroads going from Germany to France through the Ardennes and good roads were almost inexistant ;when I visited in 1961 the Mardasson at Bastogne ,we were driving at 20 km per hour through roads who had not changed since the 19th century .

That's why the forces of AGA and a part of AGB were advancing to a line between Charleroi and the city of Luxembourg( 210 km );big armies need a lot of road space and adequate railroads which were not available in the Ardennes .

[ljadw]

Gamelin was right and you are wrong : the French were condemned to advance in Belgium,because with their available forces,they could not protect the border with Belgium . If they remained idle when the Germans liquidated Belgium, they would have to defend a front of 400 km, if they intervened, their frontline would be 100 km (Wavre-Givet ).

And there are also the political imperatives .

This was the French strategy after WWI and all French chiefs of staff stuck to it ,not only Gamelin but also Weygand .

A good source, not without faults, but better than Frieser,is :

La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la septième armée française .