"Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"

[Graeme Sydney]

A lot was done to neutralize Britain : BoB ,Blitz, BoA...

Anything other : WHAT ?

Nothing effective was done and what was done was too little, too late and improvised - a direct result of poor strategy, poor strategical thinking and planning, all of which were Hitler's responsibility.

Notwithstanding Hitler should not have start the campaign in the east until GB WAS neutralized - it was so predictably and evidently a major war losing failure.

[Graeme Sydney]

I miss your point - I didn't mention "DOW by France and England and FDR ultimatum of 1939".

My point being : these were where Adolf failed, and these are political. On the field of battle his forces performed beyond all expectation (compare Italians in Egypt, or RKKA in Finland for example).

I still can't see what you are driving at. My critique of Hitler's Normandy and general military incompetency is at the strategic and Geo-political level. At the tactical and operational level the Germany performed "beyond all expectation". The Heer failed because of the strategic position (lack of strategic resources and too many. too powerful and too united enemies) it was in and not its Operational and Tactical performance.

[Graeme Sydney]

. He had a good grasp of grand strategy and he had the backing of his fingerspitzengefuhl.

That is an utterly laughable and baseless assertion and flies in the face of all historical evidence and military science. If you want to discuss it make an argument, not an assertion.

[Boby]

A lot was done to neutralize Britain : BoB ,Blitz, BoA...

Anything other : WHAT ?

Nothing effective was done and what was done was too little, too late and improvised - a direct result of poor strategy, poor strategical thinking and planning, all of which were Hitler's responsibility.

Notwithstanding Hitler should not have start the campaign in the east until GB WAS neutralized - it was so predictably and evidently a major war losing failure.

Germany have not the means to neutralize GB in the short-medium-Long term. Nothing that Germany can done would force GB to give up.

Barbarossa was planned because this. It has been repeated again and again by ljadw that it is a waste of time to repeat it one more time. You guys are only repeating nonsense. Stop making ridiculous claims and familiarize yourself with primary sources, for gods sake.

[Richard Anderson]

As a lot of people you have a wrong idea of the Ardennes : they are a small geographical region south of the Meus, much south. They include the southern part of the province of Liège,the major part (not all ) of the province of Luxembourg and a part of the Duchy of Luxembourg.

While the width at the German border was some 100 km, it was at the French border less than 25 km ;this means that there was no road space enough to deploy at the French border 9 PzD . There is also the fact that there were no railroads going from Germany to France through the Ardennes and good roads were almost inexistant ;when I visited in 1961 the Mardasson at Bastogne ,we were driving at 20 km per hour through roads who had not changed since the 19th century .

That's why the forces of AGA and a part of AGB were advancing to a line between Charleroi and the city of Luxembourg( 210 km );big armies need a lot of road space and adequate railroads which were not available in the Ardennes .

A better military definition of what comprises the Ardennes.

The Ardennes, like the Eifel, is not a single and well-defined bloc. The general area may be defined as a wedge with the point between Aachen and Düren. The northern edge is a diagonal: Aachen, Liège, Maubeuge, Landrecis. The southern edge (much debated by geologists) is a more pronounced diagonal running from Aachen southwest to Arlon. The base, formed by the Forêt des Ardennes or French Ardennes, roughly coincides with the Franco-Belgian frontier and the Semois River. The Ardennes has three recognized subdepartments: the High Ardennes in the south, the Famenne Depression in the middle, and the Low Ardennes in the north. The Low Ardennes tends to be open and rolling, but includes two plateaus: that of Herve, between Liège and Aachen, and Condroz, between the lower Ourthe and the Meuse in the vicinity of Dinant. This sector is more readily traversed than is the High Ardennes, but it is relatively narrow, maneuver is constricted by the flanking line of the Meuse River, and entrance from the east presupposes that the invader has possession of Aachen and the roads circling north or south of the Hohes Venn.

The Famenne Depression is only a thin sliver of the Ardennes wedge. The Famenne is free from tree cover except for the characteristic buttes which dot the depression. Scooped out of the Ardennes massif, this long, narrow depression originates at the upper Ourthe and extends westward through Marche and Rochefort. It reaches the Meuse between Givet and Dinant, offering a good crossing site which often has been employed by European armies operating on the Meuse. But an invader from the German frontier must traverse much difficult terrain before debouching into this "march through" depression.

The High Ardennes is often called the "True Ardennes." It is not properly mountainous, nor yet a forest; rather it is a wide plateau or high plain out of which rise elevations in the form of ridges or higher plateaus erupting from the main mass. These elevations generally are unrelated to one another and combine with large forests to form isolated and independent compartments in which tactical domination of one hill mass seldom provides domination of another. The mass structure extends on a northeast-southwest axis, forming a watershed which drains away to the Meuse in the north and the Moselle in the southeast. Perhaps a third of the area is covered with forest, much of which is coniferous. This timber, however, is scattered all over the High Ardennes and presents a patchwork picture rather than a series of large forested preserves. The main mass is cut in zigzag patterns by winding, deeply eroded rivers and streams, some flowing parallel to the higher ridges, others crossing so as to chop the ridges and the welts on the plateau into separate sections. In some places the watercourses run through narrow, almost canyonlike depressions with steep walls rising from a hundred to three hundred feet. Even the wider valleys are narrow when compared with the western European norm.

Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History U.S. Army, 1963), pp. 41-42.

[Richard Anderson]

Gamelin was right and you are wrong : the French were condemned to advance in Belgium,because with their available forces,they could not protect the border with Belgium . If they remained idle when the Germans liquidated Belgium, they would have to defend a front of 400 km, if they intervened, their frontline would be 100 km (Wavre-Givet ).

The line Wavre-Givet is 72 kilometers, not 100. Defending it presumes the route Antwerp-Ghent-Lille is defended by someone, as is the route Brussels-Ghent-Lille, and et cetera. Blocking the Gembloux "Gap" did not solve anything militarily for the Allies. Occupying that line presumed Belgian acquiescence and capability to hold a defensive line well east of it for sufficient time. Meanwhile, the defensible line of the Franco-Belgian border from the coast to Sedan is 220 kilometers, not 400, and it features narrow communications corridors, which would be choke points for a German advance.

[ljadw]

220 km is without the salients ;the French source I have given mentions 400 km .

Today ,using the roads of today , the distance between Dunkirk and Sedan is 287 km ;

There is also the point that,when the French were looking to advance in Belgium (before the war ),a British presence was uncertain :if there had been no German attack on Poland in 1939, but a sudden German invasion of Belgium in 1940, there would be no BEF in France and the French would be on their ownand the importance of the Belgian divisions would be much bigger .

[Nickdfresh]

As a lot of people you have a wrong idea of the Ardennes : they are a small geographical region south of the Meus, much south. They include the southern part of the province of Liège,the major part (not all ) of the province of Luxembourg and a part of the Duchy of Luxembourg.

While the width at the German border was some 100 km, it was at the French border less than 25 km ;this means that there was no road space enough to deploy at the French border 9 PzD . There is also the fact that there were no railroads going from Germany to France through the Ardennes and good roads were almost inexistant ;when I visited in 1961 the Mardasson at Bastogne ,we were driving at 20 km per hour through roads who had not changed since the 19th century .

That's why the forces of AGA and a part of AGB were advancing to a line between Charleroi and the city of Luxembourg( 210 km );big armies need a lot of road space and adequate railroads which were not available in the Ardennes .

You should have been on the French general staff with this idiocy. The Heer had nearly 40,000 vehicles in the Ardennes on four roads They did it,albiet shouldn't have and if the French were at all competent they would have made them pay for it. But the Germans had the largest traffic jam in European history in the Aredennes...

[Richard Anderson]

There is also the point that,when the French were looking to advance in Belgium (before the war ),a British presence was uncertain :if there had been no German attack on Poland in 1939, but a sudden German invasion of Belgium in 1940, there would be no BEF in France and the French would be on their ownand the importance of the Belgian divisions would be much bigger .

So let's see, so you're saying prewar anticipation of something that didn't actually happen, drove the French to do the same thing they were planning to do anyway, because it didn't happen?

That's idiotic even by your standards.

[Graeme Sydney]

Germany have not the means to neutralize GB in the short-medium-Long term. Nothing that Germany can done would force GB to give up.

Barbarossa was planned because this.

"Nothing that Germany can done would force GB to give up." so that a reason to attack Russia???

It has been repeated again and again by ljadw that it is a waste of time to repeat it one more time. You guys are only repeating nonsense. Stop making ridiculous claims and familiarize yourself with primary sources, for gods sake.

What is been repeated, that Hitler was a military incompetent?

[ljadw]

There is also the point that,when the French were looking to advance in Belgium (before the war ),a British presence was uncertain :if there had been no German attack on Poland in 1939, but a sudden German invasion of Belgium in 1940, there would be no BEF in France and the French would be on their ownand the importance of the Belgian divisions would be much bigger .

So let's see, so you're saying prewar anticipation of something that didn't actually happen, drove the French to do the same thing they were planning to do anyway, because it didn't happen?

That's idiotic even by your standards.

When the French elaborated their plans before the war, the BEF did not exist, this increased the importance of the Belgian divisions .In may 1940 there was a BEF in France,but still it was not sufficient ;maybe that with a BEF of 70 divisions, the French could have done without the Belgians, but there were no 70 British divisions in France in may 1940 .

And, the shortening of the front would have made available additional divisions to defend the Sedan sector .

[ljadw]

As a lot of people you have a wrong idea of the Ardennes : they are a small geographical region south of the Meus, much south. They include the southern part of the province of Liège,the major part (not all ) of the province of Luxembourg and a part of the Duchy of Luxembourg.

While the width at the German border was some 100 km, it was at the French border less than 25 km ;this means that there was no road space enough to deploy at the French border 9 PzD . There is also the fact that there were no railroads going from Germany to France through the Ardennes and good roads were almost inexistant ;when I visited in 1961 the Mardasson at Bastogne ,we were driving at 20 km per hour through roads who had not changed since the 19th century .

That's why the forces of AGA and a part of AGB were advancing to a line between Charleroi and the city of Luxembourg( 210 km );big armies need a lot of road space and adequate railroads which were not available in the Ardennes .

You should have been on the French general staff with this idiocy. The Heer had nearly 40,000 vehicles in the Ardennes on four roads They did it,albiet shouldn't have and if the French were at all competent they would have made them pay for it. But the Germans had the largest traffic jam in European history in the Aredennes...

You start from the unproved claim that there were 40000 German vehicles in the Ardennes = that the PzG leist was following the Ardennes .

FYI :

6 + 8 PzD started at the German-Belgian border and one can assume that they were crossing the Ardennes (mostly ? )

but,Guderian ? his 3 PzD (2, 1 , 10 ) started at the border of Germany and the Duchy Luxembourg ,and the duchy of Luxembourg is mostly outside the Ardennes .And,from what I have read, he advanced on the axis Arlon-Sedan .Arlon is not the Ardennes . If that is true, Guderian was avoiding the Ardennes as mostly as he could .

Two other questionable points :

4 roads for 8 divisions ?

40000 wheeled vehicles for 8 divisions ?

[Boby]

Germany have not the means to neutralize GB in the short-medium-Long term. Nothing that Germany can done would force GB to give up.

Barbarossa was planned because this.

"Nothing that Germany can done would force GB to give up." so that a reason to attack Russia???

Hitler and the OKH agree on the View that it was the hope of GB drawing the SU on his side that was the reason they continue the war. Knocking-out the SU would end the war in the West = no more allies.

But that was wishful thinking, because GB would never give up even with a sucessful Barbarossa if the US continue as the "arsenal of democracy".

Alternative for germany? Surrender.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

This was a repeat post.sorry.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

................................................................

You start from the unproved claim that there were 40000 German vehicles in the Ardennes = that the PzG leist was following the Ardennes .

FYI :

6 + 8 PzD started at the German-Belgian border and one can assume that they were crossing the Ardennes (mostly ? )

but,Guderian ? his 3 PzD (2, 1 , 10 ) started at the border of Germany and the Duchy Luxembourg ,and the duchy of Luxembourg is mostly outside the Ardennes .And,from what I have read, he advanced on the axis Arlon-Sedan .Arlon is not the Ardennes . If that is true, Guderian was avoiding the Ardennes as mostly as he could .

Two other questionable points :

4 roads for 8 divisions ?

40000 wheeled vehicles for 8 divisions ?

.........................................................

And nothing of the type you are implying was proved about Pz gp Kleist ! If anything it supports the thesis being put forward by me here. Pz group Kleist had to negotiate the Ardennes logistic nightmare .. 41,445 vehicles including 1,225 panzers and 545 half tracks over 4 narrow winding mountain roads. On the right flank Pz Grp Kleist stretched for 155 miles from the Meuse to beyond the Rhine. Yes the Allied air forces were ineffective over the Ardennes..so also would the LW have been over Holland.

Inspite of the logistic difficulties what did the Pz Grp Kleist achieve? And that against the combined might of the French, Belgian and British forces.. as yet undefeated? And what was the 2nd Army being asked to achieve against an enemy who was all but beaten?

I had posted this in response to a post from you on another thread in the past. A 155 miles long vehicle que was the result of road space paucity in the Ardennes ! So the incredulity you show is misplaced.