"Hitler got it right for Normandy 1944"

[RichTO90]

This is your misunderstanding of what I wrote.. I made a statement of facts.. not a value judgment. They stood by as per orders.. That part is natural and fine.. Its the latter part of what I said thats the operative phrase.

Okay, thanks for explaining what you meant exactly.

Where exactly did they get sent back and forth? Ok read on :

21st Panzer had been put on alert by Gen Feuchtinger at 0100 hrs on the night of 5 - 6 June. This Division, though an OKW reserve, was to come under the command and use of the 716 Infantry Div ( Gen Richter), in the contingency of the invasion coming in the latter's operational zone ( the British landing areas). This was a standing order. The landings of the British 6th Airborne in the 716 th's area ( e.g., Benouville) activated this clause.

A couple of points about that which effect the way the division responded. For one thing, Feuchtinger didn't do anything, since he wasn't there. He was in Paris, having used the excuse of the Rennes exercise to leave early in order to dally a bit with his Schwartze Madel. That left the senior officer at division HQ a captain IIRC, who did admirably in the circumstances.

Second, 21. Panzer was not - say again - not part of the OKW reserve. It was administratively part of XVII Panzer Korps of Panzergruppe West, which technically was a training command until the invasion, but was operationally subordinated directly to HG-B as part of the army group reserve. The division was subordinated for subsistence to 7. Armee. Its contingency support of LXXXIV A.K. and 716. Inf'-Div was contingent on its release from reserve by HG-B.

At 0120 hrs , as per the 716 Div''s operations logs, Richter ordered Feuchtinger by phone to use some of his units located conveniently to attack the British paras inland. At 0200 hrs The order was amended to the intent that the the entire 21st Pz should move against the paras landed east of the Orne.

Richter didn't order Feuchtinger, who wasn't there, to do anything. Richter made a request to the ranking staff officer, who authorized Luck to investigate what was going on east of the Orne.

However Feuchtinger didn't make a single move since he still considered himself to be formally under the direct disposal of the OKW... and there was no word from Rastenburg. He waited throughout the night and in the meantime the 716th's bataillons got mauled at will by the highly trained paras.

Since he was in Paris being a naughty boy, Feuchtinger was making a lot of moves that night...meanwhile, the division still was part of HG-B reserve and were not released until 0645 when HG-B released 21.Pz.Div. to 7.-Armee, which at 0700 attached the division operationally to LXXXIV Armee Korps and Marcks immediately subordinated it to Richter.

Finally at 0630 hrs Feuchtinger ordered the 22 Pz Rgmnt (Obrst Oppeln Bronikowski) to move.. by this time it was daylight and the paras had done their damage. Ironically it was also at 0630, by the minute, when the British 8th armoured brig waded ashore at Gold beach But at that moment the 22 Pz Rgmnt was ordered to move against targets inland.. away from the beaches ! Another Interesting feature of this melee was that all orders were being sent through despatch riders to the moving units.. theoretically correct but adding to the delay and mess at every stage.

Again, not Feuchtinger, and the movement order wasn't formalized until the release of the division. I. Abteilung jumped the gun and set off at 0630, but then they had been on standby since midnight. II. Abteilung was a bit more complicated. They had been on a night exercise, until 0200 when a dispatch rider recalled them when they were about ten kilometers east of Falaise. They then had to RTB to exchange their practice rounds for live ammo...they didn't start out until 0900. The mission they were all given was to destroy the paratroopers east of the Orne, but Marcks intervened and pulled them back to Colombelles where they crossed to the west bank and the attack on SWORD and JUNO.

All the movements, east and west of the Orne, were towards the coast, but it was the amended movement ordered by Marcks that directed them twoard the beaces. It is difficult to see how the movements could be described as "away from the beaches"?

BTW, 2 CAB was also wading ashore at JUNO and 27 AB ashore at SWORD at the same time 8 AB was wading ashore at GOLD...each brigade with more and better tanks than was held by Panzer Regiment 22.

Around 0800 hrs the 1st Battailon of the 22 Pz rgmnt ( Von Gottberg), moving north east, by passed Caen and its 4th company encountered the paras. They were then subordinated to the KG Von Luck.

The 2nd Bataillon ( Vierzig) had moved off to an exercise east of Falaise at 0100. They were called back at 0220 to their stations which they reached at 0400. Vierzig confirms that he got to know around 0600 that the Allies had started landing through his own sources. However at 0900 they were ordered to move off north east to engage the paras .. away from the beach !

While cruising inland. a despatch rider rode up and reversed the earlier order and they were asked to turn back ! By this time OKW had given operational control of 21 st Pz to 84 Korps and Gen Marcks finally had his way and reversed the earlier nonsensical moves of Gen Richter and Feuchtinger.

General Marcks had his way at 0700 hours, after the I. Abteilung had begun moving north, however friction is a reality in warfare and it isn't unusual that it took an hour or more to get those orders to the battalions as they were moving. In any case, they had to move to Colombelles to cross the river.

On those roads, under fighter bomber attacks , the columns had to about turn and manoeuvre back towards Caen ! It was around 1400 that they reached their jump off areas! In the process they hadnt eliminated the paras and they hadn't attacked the beaches !

But Hitler of course was to blame for all this : I will address your mistakes about the 12 SS later.. gotta go off to work now.

Ciao
Sandeep

If you look at a map, you'll note that the turnaround isn't that big a deal...but the Orne is. It's just one of those factors that have to be counted in. I'm not convinced the "delay" was all that significant when compared to other similar delays...by both Axis and Allies. It's simply a fact of life in warfare, recognized by Clausewitz a long time ago.

Cheers!

[sandeepmukherjee196]

A couple of points about that which effect the way the division responded. For one thing, Feuchtinger didn't do anything, since he wasn't there. He was in Paris, having used the excuse of the Rennes exercise to leave early in order to dally a bit with his Schwartze Madel. That left the senior officer at division HQ a captain IIRC, who did admirably in the circumstances.

However Feuchtinger didn't make a single move since he still considered himself to be formally under the direct disposal of the OKW... and there was no word from Rastenburg. He waited throughout the night and in the meantime the 716th's bataillons got mauled at will by the highly trained paras.

Since he was in Paris being a naughty boy, Feuchtinger was making a lot of moves that night...

So did he make moves or did he not? I am getting confused by your two contradictory statements ! :roll: Ok perhaps I am taking your naughty irony, on the side ,seriously ?
But Feuchtinger was making war moves too. Nothing stopped him from intervening over the phone. Imagine him in command of 120 tanks and thousands of men and other substantial equipment, his formation sitting in a troubled zone.; he is away on a naughty liaison and then making himself unavailable over phone too while things are happening in his sector and his units are getting moved around !! Forget Hitler..even Rommel would take his hide and stretch it up for drying on the salty beaches !

When he subsequently was court martialled in January '45 ( for his night out on 5-6 June) and imprisoned at Torgau.. he scraped through with a demotion to Kanonier. If he had kept away from the phone when his staff tied to reach him ( or his superiors in Normandy) that night, I wonder if he could have avoided a firing squad. More so because when his court martial order came to his formation HQ, the 21st Pz being locked in a grim battle for survival on Christmas eve at the Ardennes, Feuchtinger was again away for conjugal comforts at home ( albeit this time with his own haus frau )

This is the kind of man who had command of the formation which could have made a difference at that hour of Germany's struggle for survival ! And then Hitler is blamed all around for not delegating to his Generals and not trusting them !

What is " Schwartze Madel " ? My German is pathetic but are you referring to süßes Mädchen ? His love shack would have had a phone..it wouldn't have been a back alley..and calls can be patched through when required. For some strange and inexplicable reason he was promoted to Genrl Ltnt on 1 August and given the RK on 6th !!

Ciao
Sandeep

[ljadw]

A schwartze Madel = a boom-boom girl

[Sheldrake]

What is " Schwartze Madel " ? My German is pathetic but are you referring to süßes Mädchen ? His love shack would have had a phone..it wouldn't have been a back alley..and calls can be patched through when required. For some strange and inexplicable reason he was promoted to Genrl Ltnt on 1 August and given the RK on 6th !!

Ciao
Sandeep

The key is in the word "Schwartze" = black. According to von Luck's memoirs she was a South American dancer a la Josephine Baker and hence an politically inappropriate companion for a panzer General.

It is easy to sneer at Feuchtinger but the answer to why he was in command of a Panzer Division is simple. Feuchtinger commanded the 21st Panzer Divison because he built it as his private army, using every political lever he had at his possession. It would not have existed for the genius of his protégé, Major Becker for improvising self propelled guns from scrap French army AFVs, and for Feuchtinger's skills in playing the system. Feuchtinger developed an organisation to man these weapons in OB West, scrounging manpower from the static formations in France. First as a Schnelle Brigade West of two regiments of mobile artillery. Then in 1943 half of these were parcelled among the static divisions, while the remainder were the artillery group for 21st Panzer Division, which Feuchtinger was uniquely placed to command.

21st Panzer Division emerged having been constructed like the tramp's stone soup.(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stone_Soup) It had its own organisation table which reflected the equipment Becker had built. It was lavishly equipped with SP guns and APCs and a range of unique SP multiple rocket launchers and mortars . It was weak in armour, lacking a Panther battalion and less than the full establishment of two Pz IV Bns. Much of the manpower was from the cast offs from the static artillery formations and lacked the desirable martial qualities. All in all a formation better suited to defending Caen than driving anyone into the sea.

Feuchtinger was a sleazy individual who could have been from Catch 22 or one of Karst's Gunner Asch Books. When the police eventually turned up on News Years day 1945 to arrest him for absence from duty on 5/6th June he was again absent - with his girlfriend in Celle, near Hannover. He was an East German spy and died "of a heart attack" at a meeting with his handler.

However, for all the multitude of his faults Feuchtinger picked some good, if flawed, subordinates. He used his connections to obtain von Luck, whose less than perfect Nazi credentials included his own half Jewish mistress, and von Oppeln-Bronikowski to command his Panzer Regiment. (Though he had a reputation for drunkeness) Division. He commanded the Division from some distance in the rear (possibly with female company) and let his subordinates get on with it.

Why was Feuchtinger decorated for his actions? That is because Feuchtinger played the system well. (He was also in command of a formation which had been in continuous action tenaciously keeping the allies out of Caen against overwhelming firepower.) He was effusive in praising his subordinates and recommended them for decorations. von Oppeln-Bronikowski received the Oak leaves (28/7/44); v. Luck the Ritterkreutz (8/8/44) How could the modest divisional commander in whose regime these men had flourished not be awarded some decoration himself? If you want a mention in the honours list - write up your subordinates and get them a gong!

For all of Feuchtinger's personal failings as a commander or officer, it is not easy to see where he could be blamed for taking the wrong action or failing to make a decision, or where another commander could have played a decisive role.

1. A slice of the division was quartered in 716 Division's area and in varying degrees under its command. 7./192 seems to have been under 716 Div command, while the anti tank battalion and one battalion from PGR 125 and PGR 192 were deployed so far into the 716 Div area that it was almost inevitable that they would be caught up in any landing on either side of the Orne Estuary. One artillery battalion I/155 was also deployed in support fo 716 Infantry division. (Source: Ethint interviews with Feuchtinger and Richter).

2. The German defensive doctrine, based on the WW1 techniques, placed counter attaching forces under command of the formation responsible for the defence of that sector. The thinking being that the local sector command would know the ground and the current situation. Thus any troops committed to the Orne sector would be under command 716 Division and not 21 Pz Div Command. The counter-attack on D Day was planned at HQ 716 Div (now Caen memorial museum), by the Corps Commander and with Richter GOC 716 and Feuchtinger GOC 21 Pz Div. The 1A of the division was the panzer trained officer and he remained in HC 21 Pz Div, all of which made it harder to cplan the counter attack on D Day. (Source Geyr Ethint B466)

3. The decision to deploy the 21 Pz Div against 6 AB Division and against their orders to wait for release by Rommel, was taken on the accepted German -principle that action is better than inaction. No one seems to have been blamed when this made it harder to concentrate most of the Division on the West of the Orne. Returning to the thread topic. This was Hitler's fault for instituting a Byzantine command structure and failing to rehearse commanders and staffs and wargame how the system should respond to the reports of a landing to ensure that the xcorrect actions were taken on the "Longest day".

It may be that Feuchtinger was so utterly useless, and self centred that everyone just compensated. Feuchtinger may have been sufficiently self aware that he was never tempted to be that most dangerous of men: driven by ego to be "stupid and active." As long as he was left along with his mistress and no none bothered him, he did not feel any urge to exert his ego and screw up the plans of those better fitted for command....

Feuchtinger could not have existed in the British or US Armies. He would have been rumbled. That he did, is evidence of the ramshackle reality of the Nazi regime which was at odds with the impression given that in Germany "Alles in Ordenung". This is a consequence of Hitler's corrupt regime, where someone with no talent but party connections could build themselves a secure position for their own personal convenience.

[RichTO90]

The key is in the word "Schwartze" = black. According to von Luck's memoirs she was a South American dancer a la Josephine Baker and hence an politically inappropriate companion for a panzer General.

It is easy to sneer at Feuchtinger but the answer to why he was in command of a Panzer Division is simple. (snip)

Thank you for saving me the time Sheldrake. Spot on.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Hi....

Actually according to Liddell Hart ( History of the Second World War), Hitler was telling his Generals since March 44 that the invasion would come somewhere between Caen and Cherbourg.

He based his gut feel on :

The disposition of the American forces in South West England.

The fact that the allies would need to have a major port pretty fast....so Cherbourg.

Intel about Allied landing exercises in Devon...flat sandy beaches..like in Normandy.

Liddell Hart quotes Warlimont on this.

I would say this for Hitler....The man sure had more uncanny military sense than many of his Generals put together

Ciao
Sandeep

[doogal]

What BLH says is as follows: " Hitler however had a hunch about Normandy " " he sent his generals repeated warnings about the possibility of a landing btwn Caen and Cherbourg" its page 698:History of the Second World War:

He doesn't say when Warlimont said this, or where or if it is from Warlimonts diary or another source:
Did BHL speak with Warlimont after the War?? I take it he may have interviewed him

But on having this hunch Hitler failed to follow up with decisive action:

[ljadw]

I would not trust BLH if he tried to sell me a used car .

[doogal]

BLH always getting his point of view in lol

[Erwinn]

What BLH says is as follows: " Hitler however had a hunch about Normandy " " he sent his generals repeated warnings about the possibility of a landing btwn Caen and Cherbourg" its page 698:History of the Second World War:

He doesn't say when Warlimont said this, or where or if it is from Warlimonts diary or another source:
Did BHL speak with Warlimont after the War?? I take it he may have interviewed him

But on having this hunch Hitler failed to follow up with decisive action:

Did Hitler even had decisive actions while choosing a meal?

[Sheldrake]

What BLH says is as follows: " Hitler however had a hunch about Normandy " " he sent his generals repeated warnings about the possibility of a landing btwn Caen and Cherbourg" its page 698:History of the Second World War:

He doesn't say when Warlimont said this, or where or if it is from Warlimonts diary or another source:
Did BHL speak with Warlimont after the War?? I take it he may have interviewed him

But on having this hunch Hitler failed to follow up with decisive action:

The key may be in another quote in another BLH book. "The Other side of the Hill" (1948) In chapter XXI "Paralysis on Normandy" under the subsection "1943 the year of uncertainty" BLH quotes Blumentritt as describing Hitler having hunches all over Europe. One moment it might be Norway, then on another occasion, Holland. Then further west either side of the Somme, or Normandy and Brittany, or Spain, Portugal, the Adriatic coast to the South of France.

This paints a picture of someone with a lot of hunches, but without the firmness of conviction to set a constant course. In this Hitler was not unlike the Churchill described in Alanbrooke's Diaries. Churchill shared Hitler's obsession with Norway and the Balkans, and fluttered around the map issuing instructions for fantasy operations to be considered in the Bay of Biscay or Northern Sumatra. Both were amateur strategists convinced of their own genius, untrammelled by practical experience implementing large scale operations.

However, Churchill worked within a Cabinet government and picked a strong CIGS who would would stand up to him and argue the case against Churchill's flights of fantasy. Allied strategy was agreed by the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee after rigorous debate by the leaders of the British and US war effort. Hitler surrounded himself with yes men and a web of politicised subordinates with overlapping and competing areas of responsibility. The results are shown in Normandy - which is a refutation of the hypothesis postulated in the topic title.

[Graeme Sydney]

Hi....

Actually according to Liddell Hart ( History of the Second World War), Hitler was telling his Generals since March 44 that the invasion would come somewhere between Caen and Cherbourg.

He based his gut feel on :

The disposition of the American forces in South West England.

The fact that the allies would need to have a major port pretty fast....so Cherbourg.

Intel about Allied landing exercises in Devon...flat sandy beaches..like in Normandy.

Liddell Hart quotes Warlimont on this.

I would say this for Hitler....The man sure had more uncanny military sense than many of his Generals put together

Ciao
Sandeep

Of course he did - and yesterday Hitler said it was definitely Calais, last month it the south of France and six months ago it was Norway.

Predictions are like a/holes - everyone has one - and they all become clearer and more certain with 20/20 hindsight.

Show me he acted on his predictions and I'll concede the point.

[ljadw]

The key may be in another quote in another BLH book. "The Other side of the Hill" (1948) In chapter XXI "Paralysis on Normandy" under the subsection "1943 the year of uncertainty" BLH quotes Blumentritt as describing Hitler having hunches all over Europe. One moment it might be Norway, then on another occasion, Holland. Then further west either side of the Somme, or Normandy and Brittany, or Spain, Portugal, the Adriatic coast to the South of .

BLH quotes Blumentritt

Blumentritt was a born liar,and BLH an imposter.

[Sheldrake]

The key may be in another quote in another BLH book. "The Other side of the Hill" (1948) In chapter XXI "Paralysis on Normandy" under the subsection "1943 the year of uncertainty" BLH quotes Blumentritt as describing Hitler having hunches all over Europe. One moment it might be Norway, then on another occasion, Holland. Then further west either side of the Somme, or Normandy and Brittany, or Spain, Portugal, the Adriatic coast to the South of .

BLH quotes Blumentritt

Blumentritt was a born liar,and BLH an imposter.

Looks a decent explanation of the facts to me.

So let me get this straight. You appear to be arguing that Hitler knew it would be Normandy but was prevented from taking the appropriate action by some form of conspiracy? Contradictory testimony is all lies or fabrication?

I have heard this proposed before. A few years ago German language professor reported the results of his interview with a surviving senior German officer, Hubert Meyer 1A of 12 SS, to the collected ranks of the Guild of Battlefield Guides and the RUSI Military history circle. First there was a stunned silence. Then some eminent historian , I think it was Anthony Beevoir , commented that tyhe professor had been Had and swallowed the neo Nazi - or in Meyer's case, unrepentant Nazi version of the WW2 "dolchstoss".

I hesitate to write further without invoking a well know internet forum law, which might for once be literally the next logical step!

[sandeepmukherjee196]

HI Sheldrake..

What you write is a little confusing to me. Maybe there are typos? Can you please explain what this was all about? Appears to be interesting and relevant but would like to fully understand please.

Ciao
Sandeep