questions on the battle of Kiev 1941

[harry6116]

hey all,
first time i have been on in a long time.
tonight i got to wondering about the battle of Kiev in 1941.
I am no tactician but i think Hitler could have used his forces better than surrounding Kiev.
should he have tried to go around Kiev and on to Moscow? Was this even possible?
i know something like 5000000 soviet troops got taken at Kiev but it didn't change all that much in my mind.
I hope I am making some sort of sense
Michael

[Erwinn]

Wait, some people will come and tell you that you can't run a campaign with an enemy of 500.000 on your southern flank and they will also debate that Russians could cut AGC and South from each other by reaching the Baltics.

[ChrisDR68]

With hindsight Hitler probably should have told AGN to give them their panzer group to strengthen AGC (not the other way around as in the OTL) and not send one of their panzer groups to AGS.

AGS's task would have been to guard AGC's southern flank (as best it could) while AGC made a powerful central thrust using three panzer groups towards Moscow. From what I've read there weren't huge Soviet armies in front of Moscow in late August and early September so if the Germans had broken through at Smolensk Moscow could have fallen in fairly short order.

Once AGC captures Moscow in late September / early October what then? They would be in a vulnerable salient with substantial Soviet forces to the south in the Ukraine.

Could they have swung south to Astrakhan to cut off all these Soviet armies knowing that without supplies they would likely be forced to surrender after two or three weeks?

[BDV]

Even if Russia (temporarily) loses Moscow as a center, but without losing Leningrad, it's a draw. If Russians also keep Kharkov (and north of it Kursk), they're better than historical. If they keep Kiev, they are far ahead of the historical situation.

In any case, we'd learn the left tributaries of Dniepr (and if Russians are really lucky, some of the right ones) rather than the details of Don Bend and Don-Volga isthmus. Leningrad won't be cut off until Vologda (500 km through the tundra, straight north) is captured.

[steverodgers801]

The reason for the turn north and south was AGN was also having severe problems with securing the border between AGN and AGC. There simply were not enough men to do everything. What Guderian and some of his cohorts fail to acknowledge is that even if they had taken Moscow, the flanks of AGC would be so long and with the coming of winter there would have been the real possibility of a massive pocket from the Soviet counter attack

[ChrisDR68]

Here is a situation map from 25th August 1941.

As you can see AGC is not actually that far from Moscow at this time. Perhaps with three panzer groups they could capture Moscow then advance around 100 miles beyond the city to create a buffer and dig in to guard against Soviet counter attacks. Once established there they could transfer one of the panzer groups south to help deal with the Soviet forces in the Kiev area.

A very high risk strategy for sure and it's interesting to think that Hitler the gambler took the cautious and conservative option of securing AGC's flanks at this point during Barborossa.

[Cult Icon]

^^
The result of taking Moscow first would lead a situation where there is an enormously long front line frontage, absorbing so many units that a final operation to clear up south & straighten up the front may run into troubles. Then the massive salient around moscow would have to be defended in the winter, also absorbing many units..AGN may not even be able to attack towards Tikhvin.

[BDV]

The panzers might have been 250 miles or so from Moscow (Google reports a distance of 400 km between Moscow and Smolensk). However, getting to Moscow is not everything, they got to Moscow historically. OTOH the panzers were only 20 miles or so away from Leningrad, which was as big a production center as Moscow (and maybe a bigger symbol of Bolshevismus and Russian nationalistic pride - Moscow had been the capital for a mere 23 years).

Historically, Germans did bag Kiev, did successfully blockade Leningrad, and took a number of secondary industrial centers (Kharkov, Kursk, Rostov-on-Don). All of this to be thrown away for a cockamamie shot at Moscow?!??

When Bolshevik Russia did not falter at the first rush (obvious by mid-July), methodically slow and steady was the only option.

[harry6116]

it sounds to me from all the posts i have read today going straight for Moscow does not sound like the be all and end all. As a blind person it is hard for me to imagine just how big Russia is. it is a place where i would not like to fight if i could help it.

[ChrisDR68]

Historically, Germans did bag Kiev, did successfully blockade Leningrad, and took a number of secondary industrial centers (Kharkov, Kursk, Rostov-on-Don). All of this to be thrown away for a cockamamie shot at Moscow?!??

When Bolshevik Russia did not falter at the first rush (obvious by mid-July), methodically slow and steady was the only option.

One of the main reasons I think Moscow was of central importance to Germany's chances on the eastern front was the Soviet rail network. All the maps I've seen of the USSR from this period have most of the main railways centering on Moscow as a hub. Capture the city and a good deal of the network becomes unusable to the Soviets.

Wouldn't this have impaired their war effort quite a bit given the fact most their road network was very poor?

[ChrisDR68]

This map gives a good idea of what I mean:

[BDV]

This leaves the

Yaroslav-Bologoye-Leningrad, Vologda-Tikhvin-Leningrad lines opened, and the Leningrad-Murmansk and Leningrad Archangelsk linkages opened.