Army Organization for Barbarossa

[BDV]

I was wondering whether the organization of Wehrmacht into two groupings with only two leaders was more of a logical option for Barbarossa. Of course this is a bit of rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, and Germany did operate with three groupings before.

The main focus of the AGC was taking Moscow, but in cooperation with the other two groupings (AGN and AGS) things were to be accomplished before such time as the Fall of Moscow (e.g. taking Leningrad). AGC honchos appear to have paid at most lip service to cooperation with the neighboring groupings. This leads to multiple episodes of poor cooperation/coordination between AGC and AGN (Velikiye Luki, Kalinin), goofy behavior on the part of AGC honchos (the porous and sausage-shaped Smolensk pocket, Yelnyia), and the need for personal intervention of Adolf for the switching panzer groupings around.

Barbarossa directive does talk about two areas of operation north and south of Pripet Marshes, so two leaders would seem the most reasonable option. Assuming Rundstedt remains with AGS, who would be the leader for AGC+N?

[Cult Icon]

AGC + AGN:... Kleist, maybe Guderian

Bock- Effective, but by the books but may have been somewhat out of touch with mobile warfare and front line conditions-overall, likely better than Leeb. He did not handle the relationship between 2 of his subordinates well (Kluge, Guderian)

Kleist- Good performer as PzG1 and as commander of AGA in 1942. Comes across as more balanced than Guderian

Guderian- Comes across as difficult to control, maverick...doesn't seem to be concerned with non-motorized elements or closing pockets enough. Barbarossa may have needed a maverick to do better than it did.

[doogal]

you should take a look at the planning of Barbarossa, im sure in working it up Gen Marcks covered the scenario of 2 AGroups: I cannot for the life of me remember where I read about the scenarios considered before settling on 3AGroups:

[ChrisDR68]

I actually like the idea of 4 army groups for the invasion of the USSR rather than 2 or 3.

Army Group North and Centre to the north of the Pripyat Marshes and Army Group North Ukraine and South Ukraine to the south of it.

Having 2 army groups in the south may have made the surrounding of large Soviet forces easier to accomplish as the double envelopment was a favourite strategy of the Germans in WWII. Having 4 army groups in general could also have made closing any gaps inbetween each of them easier to do as well as making co-operation with their next door neighbour less difficult than in the otl.

The other thing Hitler should have accepted from the outset imo was a theatre commander to co-ordinate general strategy between each army group with a clear strategic goal assigned to each of them. In a way of course Hitler was the theatre commander in the east given the way he tried to micro manage operations there.

The Ostheer though probably would have operated in a more effective way had there been a staff trained theatre commander who could then communicate directly with Hitler about grand strategy.

[AJFFM]

As I said in the other thread on the opening days of Barbarossa 4 AGs was the best option but unlike Chris, the Germans start with three and after the marshes insert a fourth between AGN and AGC to be used as flank cover for both AGs especially AGN.

AGS was big but not unwieldy or un-manageable because the Germans had the staff and logistics structure to support them and in any case after the marshes AGC had to shift lower towards the Ukraine to give space to the added AG and better coverage for its advance on Moscow.

What I am wondering about is what was the theatre command structure the Germans had above AG level and how the decision for 3 not 2 or 4 AGs?

People mistakenly think the OKH was the theatre command for the eastern front but that is not true, it had more control than OKW but not the same powers as OB West or OB Sud.

[doogal]

Above AG level: if you mean active field headquarters you have the forward Fuhrer headquarters with the field headquarters of the OKW and OKH.
There were no higher HQ in the sense of the command of Multiple Army Group field operations other than Hitler who was advised by all the relevant bodies best they could considering the problems in the chain of command he had caused.
Problem being a theatre commander would only be another executive body carrying out Hitlers directives rather than helping to formulate or being involved in the strategic direction of the campaign. As with the Army General Staff and the Chief of the General staff the removal of co-responsibility by Hitler limited any theatre commanders (not that he would want to appoint one) influence on theatre wide multiple AG strategies. As such the arrangements of AG commanders speaking directly to Hitler complimented the inability of German forces to truly mount cross AG operations on a theatre wide scale after 1941. In the Polish and French campaigns terrain, geography the constraints of continental Europe the forces deployed, allowed Germany to have mutually supporting roles for the AG formations, by 1941 they would fight primarily separate battles.

[Alixanther]

As with the Army General Staff and the Chief of the General staff the removal of co-responsibility by Hitler limited any theatre commanders (not that he would want to appoint one) influence on theatre wide multiple AG strategies.
As such the arrangements of AG commanders speaking directly to Hitler complimented the inability of German forces to truly mount cross AG operations on a theatre wide scale after 1941. In the Polish and French campaigns terrain, geography the constraints of continental Europe the forces deployed, allowed Germany to have mutually supporting roles for the AG formations, by 1941 they would fight primarily separate battles.

Actually this is the best reason Hitler wanted to subordinate OKW to his will. I remember reading Warlimont saying that Hitler accused the AG leaders being "cowards, not helping each other". He pretended that, left alone, each and every AG commander would stay passive and contemplate the destruction of a neighbouring Army Group. That's why, he argued, wanted to take control.

[BDV]

Actually this is the best reason Hitler wanted to subordinate OKW to his will. I remember reading Warlimont saying that Hitler accused the AG leaders being "cowards, not helping each other". He pretended that, left alone, each and every AG commander would stay passive and contemplate the destruction of a neighbouring Army Group. That's why, he argued, wanted to take control.

He was correct and not right at the same time.

Yes, AG honchos focused on their part, but that was their duty, that he, Fuhrer GROFAZ, had assigned them. When it turned out to be too few people for too many objectives, there should have been someone in position to prioritize.

[Urmel]

As with the Army General Staff and the Chief of the General staff the removal of co-responsibility by Hitler limited any theatre commanders (not that he would want to appoint one) influence on theatre wide multiple AG strategies.
As such the arrangements of AG commanders speaking directly to Hitler complimented the inability of German forces to truly mount cross AG operations on a theatre wide scale after 1941. In the Polish and French campaigns terrain, geography the constraints of continental Europe the forces deployed, allowed Germany to have mutually supporting roles for the AG formations, by 1941 they would fight primarily separate battles.

Actually this is the best reason Hitler wanted to subordinate OKW to his will. I remember reading Warlimont saying that Hitler accused the AG leaders being "cowards, not helping each other". He pretended that, left alone, each and every AG commander would stay passive and contemplate the destruction of a neighbouring Army Group. That's why, he argued, wanted to take control.

Have you had a look at a map? How was the AG which was stuck at Tikhvin help the AG which got bogged down in an encirclement attempt of Moscow and how was that AG in turn help the one who was fighting to reach and hold Rostov and then the Mius line?

The argument makes no sense.

[doogal]

Alixanther wrote: I remember reading Warlimont saying that Hitler accused the AG leaders being "cowards, not helping each other".

each AG had huge areas of responsibility, with more than one always in constant combat operations, both on a micro and macro level.
For a commander in chief to even contemplate saying such a thing (If he said it IMO) IS TO DIVORCE HIMSELF FROM REALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY.!!!

URMEL WROTE: Have you had a look at a map? How was the AG which was stuck at Tikhvin help the AG which got bogged down in an encirclement attempt of Moscow and how was that AG in turn help the one who was fighting to reach and hold Rostov and then the Mius line?

Its a very simple and good point. Simply not enough men and material to mount such mutually supporting operations other than limited offensives after 1941.

[BDV]

Actually this is the best reason Hitler wanted to subordinate OKW to his will. I remember reading Warlimont saying that Hitler accused the AG leaders being "cowards, not helping each other". He pretended that, left alone, each and every AG commander would stay passive and contemplate the destruction of a neighbouring Army Group. That's why, he argued, wanted to take control.

Have you had a look at a map? How was the AG which was stuck at Tikhvin help the AG which got bogged down in an encirclement attempt of Moscow and how was that AG in turn help the one who was fighting to reach and hold Rostov and then the Mius line?

The argument makes no sense.

And AGN would not be stuck at Tikhvin if its leadership would not have abandoned the concept of an attack towards Bologoye-Torzhok. And of course OTOH AGC should have diverted more strength towards Kalinin than one measly reinforced panzer division (same old tune as the dash to Velikiye Luki 1941).

And both groups could point to the diversion of Luftwaffe assets for the benefit of Fuhrer's favourite F2B*, Erich "120 wristwatches" Manstein's silly Crimea adventure (talking about Rostov :roll:).

Problem is that a lack of direct leadership. Directing the cooperation between the 3rd Panzer Army and the 16th Infantry Army is one that could/should be taken locally, by a theater commander, not by Adolf from all the way from the top.


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* F2B = Forward Falling Bootlicker

[Urmel]

Given the objectives at each AG, what was the potential benefit of the co-operation? It is hard to see. The actual co-operation was rather achieved by diverting substantial assets (Panzergruppe 4 to AGC for Taifun, Panzergruppe 2 to AGS for the Kiev encirclement). What would a theatre commander have achieved that was different?

If you consider the reason for the attack on Tikhvin (ensuring that Leningrad is cut off), and the geography and supply routes, pushing on to Bologoye - Torzhok does not make a lot of sense to me. You do not achieve the cutting off of Leningrad and end up with a severely exposed northern flank.

[doogal]

Urmel wrote: Given the objectives at each AG, what was the potential benefit of the co-operation? It is hard to see.

Completely: The Barbarossa plan which incorporated those objectives as equally important was flawed in its conception, it created the conditions where by three AG`s fought towards three distinct and separate operational objectives which precluded fighting in a co-ordinated manner.
Then again very large T.O.O with industrial, economic and military targets, its a tough nut to crack.

[BDV]

If you consider the reason for the attack on Tikhvin (ensuring that Leningrad is cut off), and the geography and supply routes, pushing on to Bologoye - Torzhok does not make a lot of sense to me. You do not achieve the cutting off of Leningrad and end up with a severely exposed northern flank.

The attack on Kalinin, in some authors' opinion (J. Radey and C. Sharp. The Defense of Moscow, 1941. The Northern Flank.), had a much bigger goal than simply taking Kalinin. Should the operation succeed, a glaring hole would be opened in the Soviet NorthWest line, and Leningrad would pretty much fall like an apple in Germans' lap. In addition Germans would end up in control of the Chudovo-Kalinin double tracked railway, which was directly connected with the Reich's railsystem.

Such ambitious goal should have been supported by adequate force allocation, from both AG groups and from the center (LW assets). One panzer and one motorized unit from the NorthWest and one reinforced panzer division from the south were not going to cut it, in hindsight.

A theater commander may decide whether his plan is "nach Moscau" OR collapse the Soviet northwest forces. Because if the collapse isn't in the cards, the attack towards Malaya Vishera and the dash to Kalinin are a waste. Instead, the trap can be closed at Rzhev, pocketing "only" soviet units south of the Volga bend (IIRC 29nd army and the 31st remnants), and even the 8th and the 18th can be moved to the south for the final attack on Moscow.

Or, earlier, whether the plan is to achieve the jumpoff points for attack on Moscow, or to assist neighboring AGs (or assists one neighbor and get one jumpoff point on the other side), etc etc etc.

[Urmel]

I think 'hindsight' is the operative word here. Also, if you look at p.209 of the book you cite, you will note that the supply situation may have been the cause of the sparing force allocation. I just googled it, I will get the book and have a closer look.

But fundamentally, what Doogal said.