Army Organization for Barbarossa

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AJFFM
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#16

Post by AJFFM » 26 Feb 2015, 20:38

The role of theatre command is not as much interfere in the direction of Operations as manage the meagre resources, reserves and logistics behind the Operation. Theatre command can see what individual overwhelmed AG staffs can't. The Germans clearly had a logistical and troop allocation problem during the 2nd stage of Barbarossa. There was no threat to the German forces after Kiev was taken and Kharkov already lost its importance after the factories were relocated. The Germans could have moved considerable number of troops from there up to fill gaps between AGC and AGN and prop up AGN's 16th Army.

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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#17

Post by steverodgers801 » 26 Feb 2015, 23:55

Hitler wanted the Donbass region and at least Rostov. The issue with your approach is that would leave huge gaps in the German line in the south. Even if you moved troops north its still the mud season when they arrive. There were no rail line open that far east, so troops would have to march


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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#18

Post by Alixanther » 05 Mar 2015, 21:35

doogal wrote:
Urmel wrote: Given the objectives at each AG, what was the potential benefit of the co-operation? It is hard to see.
Completely: The Barbarossa plan which incorporated those objectives as equally important was flawed in its conception, it created the conditions where by three AG`s fought towards three distinct and separate operational objectives which precluded fighting in a co-ordinated manner.
Then again very large T.O.O with industrial, economic and military targets, its a tough nut to crack.
Hard to see? It's their mutual cooperation which ensured the victorious campaign of '41. Ever since they got further from each other they faced bleaker prospects, as they could not carry the classic "hammer and anvil" type of campaign.

If you look on the map, Voronezh could be the chokepoint of such a move (no surprise that Soviets marshalled most of their assets there): let's suppose that more than 1/2 (if not more) of the strength of the AGS comes over there and (as in OTL, after crushing their corresponding opponents which retreated big time) then they swing North, falling on the back of the Soviet troops facing AGC while advancing towards Moscow (as a direction, not as an objective). The objective is simply the destruction of the Soviet counterpart of AGC. After that Soviets need to retreat further (or be destroyed where they stay) and possibly (due to further logistical strains) give up Leningrad too.
Rostov does not need to be taken, it will simply be evacuated because Soviet troops are needed elsewhere.

Now, can you really not see the benefits of the cooperation between the 3 Army Groups?

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Urmel
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#19

Post by Urmel » 05 Mar 2015, 22:26

You really do't get my point, at all. Each AG had its objectives. For your scenario to work, AGS has to give up its objectives, because if the striking force of AGS is in Voronezh, it's not going after the oil in the Caucasus, and it's not going after the industrial heartland and mines of the Donbass. Furthermore, the Soviets managed to hit AGS hard first, and force it to retreat - and that was against its main force element. Just imagine for a moment what that will look like against a weaker infantry screen. So no, I cannot really see it.

If you want to move into an alternate reality where the objectives are altered to enable co-operation, be my guest, but that's not what I like to deal in.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#20

Post by Alixanther » 06 Mar 2015, 08:59

Urmel wrote:You really do't get my point, at all. Each AG had its objectives. For your scenario to work, AGS has to give up its objectives, because if the striking force of AGS is in Voronezh, it's not going after the oil in the Caucasus, and it's not going after the industrial heartland and mines of the Donbass. Furthermore, the Soviets managed to hit AGS hard first, and force it to retreat - and that was against its main force element. Just imagine for a moment what that will look like against a weaker infantry screen. So no, I cannot really see it.

If you want to move into an alternate reality where the objectives are altered to enable co-operation, be my guest, but that's not what I like to deal in.
Sorry to burst your bubble, but prior to Blue, AGS objectives were only to mop up Crimeea and get some bridgeheads.
"Industrial heartland"??? I'm laughing, because after getting Donbass and most of Caucasus, I haven't seen the Reich getting stronger - while the Soviets weaker - industrially. No, there was no Soviet "industrial heartland" - like the Ruhr. They had their factories scattered all over the place. Not to mention it would have been impossible to pin up that much working power so close to the front line. It's like leaving a ripe fruit to be picked. Soviets were not idiots.
The clash in Voronezh is practically the big decisive battle of AGS. Also, taking into account that - at that particular time - AGS was so close of AGC (in terms of immediate objectives) you could use them jointly.
The cooperation I'm talking about is no "alternate history", is Hitler demanding it and historically real figures witnessing that fact. However, there's little you can do when the same Hitler who asked for "cooperation" moved the Army Groups even further away.
The only issue with original timeline is Hitler sticking to his own words (putting the hand where the mouth is).

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Urmel
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#21

Post by Urmel » 06 Mar 2015, 09:37

"Industrial heartland"??? I'm laughing, because after getting Donbass and most of Caucasus, I haven't seen the Reich getting stronger - while the Soviets weaker - industrially. No, there was no Soviet "industrial heartland" - like the Ruhr. They had their factories scattered all over the place.
Okay, have it your way, laughing boy. Meanwhile, those of us interested in facts may want to read this:

http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/di ... sBasin.htm
Up to the Second World War the Donbas remained the leading industrial region in Ukraine and the entire USSR.
http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pi ... Table1.jpg

Image

I also note you conveniently ignored the issue of oil in the Caucasus.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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doogal
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#22

Post by doogal » 06 Mar 2015, 09:50

Alixanther wrote: Sorry to burst your bubble, but prior to Blue, AGS objectives were only to mop up Crimea and get some bridgeheads.
"Industrial heartland"??? I'm laughing, because after getting Donbass and most of Caucasus, I haven't seen the Reich getting stronger
11th Army doing (only mopping up!! in the crim ????) .... AGS believed until shown otherwise that the donbass and its coal was the engine of the industrial heartland of the SU just as they believed that the Ukraine was the bread basket of the SU... They were wrong just as they were wrong about the importance of Maikop Grozny etc, it doesn't change the validity in there own premise at the time that these were important material resources to be denied to the SU.
Alixanther wrote:
The cooperation I'm talking about is no "alternate history", is Hitler demanding it and historically real figures witnessing that fact. However, there's little you can do when the same Hitler who asked for "cooperation" moved the Army Groups even further away.
ok so show when there was a clear refusal to co-operate btwn AG`s ... and please show me where Hitler demanded it !!! There was an inherent problem when it came to inter army group operations and supporting operations.
Only during Barbarossa was one AG able to facilitate the advance of another by advancing so that it was astride and past the flanks of SU forces, the Panzer Groups were the only thing that made this possible owing to there tempo of operations. In real terms you can co-operate with at best one army close to an army group boundary or switch that formation for the time being and re-designate it part of a new army group. At AG level, they need to be moving forward or backwards for real AG level co-operation. Fairly Static fronts like AGN could be used in a joint AG operation as an anvil for the hammer of AGC to press SU forces against but owing to SU strength this kind of co-operation at the strategic operation level was impractical. And it never really helped that from 1941 the Germans were mounting mobile attacks over three AG`s with what was essentially a panzer force which would be required for one army group (considering the size of the SU forces)
But I genuinely am interested in when and where Hitler asked ordered expected co-operation please........

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Urmel
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#23

Post by Urmel » 06 Mar 2015, 11:04

Quite so doogal.

Anyone interested in facts can simply read this:

http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/ ... 104-21.pdf
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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doogal
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#24

Post by doogal » 06 Mar 2015, 12:14

It strikes me that the original premise and its intention was Moscow as a Strategic Objective: If that had remained true we may have seen more AG level co-operation in the early fall of 1941.

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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#25

Post by Alixanther » 06 Mar 2015, 16:23

doogal wrote:
ok so show when there was a clear refusal to co-operate btwn AG`s ... and please show me where Hitler demanded it !!! There was an inherent problem when it came to inter army group operations and supporting operations.
Check Warlimont's works. He states that Hitler declared the ineffectiveness of the combat operations was due to lack of cooperation of AG leaders. Hitler also said that "they acted like cowards". I'm unsure about the moment of it. It may be 42 or 43.
I also know that the dismissal of Halder was due to Hitler's suspicion of insubordination, alleged treachery and contradictory opinions at the staff level. He argued that he must step up and grab the Army' command because that way there will be no more voices of protest. (= he believed Halder either did not or wanted not to impose his will unto his subordinates)
doogal wrote: In real terms you can co-operate with at best one army close to an army group boundary or switch that formation for the time being and re-designate it part of a new army group. At AG level, they need to be moving forward or backwards for real AG level co-operation. Fairly Static fronts like AGN could be used in a joint AG operation as an anvil for the hammer of AGC to press SU forces against but owing to SU strength this kind of co-operation at the strategic operation level was impractical. And it never really helped that from 1941 the Germans were mounting mobile attacks over three AG`s with what was essentially a panzer force which would be required for one army group (considering the size of the SU forces)
How about Kiev operation? Was that "only one army close to an army group boundary"??? How about... you know, there are lots of '41 operations which involved multiple theater command (Finland + Norway + AGN for instance) and so?

Who is to say that is "impractical"? It pushed the Soviets back, did it not? And you never should compare the enemy's forces in regard to what is needed for a succesful operation. That's the hallmark of a bad commander: putting the blame on "too many enemy forces". If there are too much enemy forces where you attacked then you attacked at the wrong spot, and the wrong time.

The particular caracteristic of the Eastern Front was that the frontline was enormous in such a way that not even the Soviets were able to man it in all sectors to be impenetrable. None was. It had to be fluid and comprising attacks and counterattacks and counterstrokes - that's why Hitler and OKW did not want (at least at first) to build strongpoints on the Soviet soil (only using those already in place on the Stalin line and other Soviet fortification counterparts).
If you look at the effectiveness of Soviet fortifications manned by Germans against the Soviet attacks, you can tell there's a difference. There was no such leisure on the AGS front. They should either beat the Soviet or Soviets should beat them in the open. OKW was right that the vast open spaces in the South were the right place for such a decisive operation.

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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#26

Post by Alixanther » 06 Mar 2015, 16:41

Urmel wrote:
"Industrial heartland"??? I'm laughing, because after getting Donbass and most of Caucasus, I haven't seen the Reich getting stronger - while the Soviets weaker - industrially. No, there was no Soviet "industrial heartland" - like the Ruhr. They had their factories scattered all over the place.
Okay, have it your way, laughing boy. Meanwhile, those of us interested in facts may want to read this:

http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/di ... sBasin.htm
Up to the Second World War the Donbas remained the leading industrial region in Ukraine and the entire USSR.
http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pi ... Table1.jpg

Image

I also note you conveniently ignored the issue of oil in the Caucasus.
It seems you're not replying to what you're quoting. I said, quote "I haven't seen the Reich getting stronger". What has Ukraine' resources to do with that? What happened to the "leading industrial region of the Soviets" while they were occupied by the Reich?
Just two questions. Answer these, then we could play.

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Urmel
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#27

Post by Urmel » 06 Mar 2015, 16:54

Alixanther wrote:
Urmel wrote:
"Industrial heartland"??? I'm laughing, because after getting Donbass and most of Caucasus, I haven't seen the Reich getting stronger - while the Soviets weaker - industrially. No, there was no Soviet "industrial heartland" - like the Ruhr. They had their factories scattered all over the place.
Okay, have it your way, laughing boy. Meanwhile, those of us interested in facts may want to read this:

http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/di ... sBasin.htm
Up to the Second World War the Donbas remained the leading industrial region in Ukraine and the entire USSR.
http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pi ... Table1.jpg

Image

I also note you conveniently ignored the issue of oil in the Caucasus.
It seems you're not replying to what you're quoting. I said, quote "I haven't seen the Reich getting stronger". What has Ukraine' resources to do with that? What happened to the "leading industrial region of the Soviets" while they were occupied by the Reich?
Just two questions. Answer these, then we could play.
They are irrelevant questions. What you don't get is that taking Donbass was important as denial of coal/steel/heavy manufacturing to the Soviet war effort. Adding to the German war effort was a bonus, but the denial bit was a sufficient reason to go for it.

But I am glad you now agree with me that Donbass was industrial heartland.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

Alixanther
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#28

Post by Alixanther » 06 Mar 2015, 17:03

Urmel wrote:
Alixanther wrote:
Urmel wrote:
"Industrial heartland"??? I'm laughing, because after getting Donbass and most of Caucasus, I haven't seen the Reich getting stronger - while the Soviets weaker - industrially. No, there was no Soviet "industrial heartland" - like the Ruhr. They had their factories scattered all over the place.
Okay, have it your way, laughing boy. Meanwhile, those of us interested in facts may want to read this:

http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/di ... sBasin.htm
Up to the Second World War the Donbas remained the leading industrial region in Ukraine and the entire USSR.
http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/pi ... Table1.jpg

Image

I also note you conveniently ignored the issue of oil in the Caucasus.
It seems you're not replying to what you're quoting. I said, quote "I haven't seen the Reich getting stronger". What has Ukraine' resources to do with that? What happened to the "leading industrial region of the Soviets" while they were occupied by the Reich?
Just two questions. Answer these, then we could play.
They are irrelevant questions. What you don't get is that taking Donbass was important as denial of coal/steel/heavy manufacturing to the Soviet war effort. Adding to the German war effort was a bonus, but the denial bit was a sufficient reason to go for it.

But I am glad you now agree with me that Donbass was industrial heartland.
Sorry again, but your assertion is irrelevant. Donbass was denied to the Soviets and brought to German side, yet German side does not seem to have benefited (don't see any production spikes) and the Soviet side also doesn't seem to have received much damage production-wise. So much for a "industrial heartland" lost. I still laugh.

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Urmel
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#29

Post by Urmel » 06 Mar 2015, 17:19

Well you obviously are an expert in applying 20-20 Hindsight, that most difficult of all analytical tools. If only Hitler and Keitel could have benefitted from your insight, or at least be better at accurately foretelling the future, they would never have been as foolish as to assume that it would damage the Soviet war effort, and therefore make it an objective.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

Alixanther
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Re: Army Organization for Barbarossa

#30

Post by Alixanther » 06 Mar 2015, 17:43

Urmel wrote:Well you obviously are an expert in applying 20-20 Hindsight, that most difficult of all analytical tools. If only Hitler and Keitel could have benefitted from your insight, or at least be better at accurately foretelling the future, they would never have been as foolish as to assume that it would damage the Soviet war effort, and therefore make it an objective.
Oh, my, an ironic post without no contribution to the thread! What would the moderators think? But thanks anyway! It clearly shows you have nothing objectively to add.

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