Army Organization for Barbarossa

[Urmel]

As with the Army General Staff and the Chief of the General staff the removal of co-responsibility by Hitler limited any theatre commanders (not that he would want to appoint one) influence on theatre wide multiple AG strategies.
As such the arrangements of AG commanders speaking directly to Hitler complimented the inability of German forces to truly mount cross AG operations on a theatre wide scale after 1941. In the Polish and French campaigns terrain, geography the constraints of continental Europe the forces deployed, allowed Germany to have mutually supporting roles for the AG formations, by 1941 they would fight primarily separate battles.

Actually this is the best reason Hitler wanted to subordinate OKW to his will. I remember reading Warlimont saying that Hitler accused the AG leaders being "cowards, not helping each other". He pretended that, left alone, each and every AG commander would stay passive and contemplate the destruction of a neighbouring Army Group. That's why, he argued, wanted to take control.

Let's look at Hitler's orders then, shall we?

Directive 33 objectives, around 20 July 1941:

The Ukraine because of its natural resources and industry.

Supplement to Directive 33:

South.
All enemy forces remaining west of the Dnepr were to be defeated and destroyed. As soon as circumstances permitted, First and Second Panzer Groups were to be put under the command of Fourth Army and assembled west of the Dnepr. Reinforced by infantry and mountain divisions, this army was to seize the industrial region of Kharkov, cross the Don, and drive into the Caucasus.
North.
Receiving the support of Third Panzer Group, Army Group North would be able to commit its infantry in a direct assault on Leningrad while the mobile units would attempt enveloping maneuvers.

if those are a divergent objectives, what are?

p. 52 of 'The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations'.

And then the meeting on 4 August:

Hitler thereupon quickly changed the subject to the future conduct of operations. Going into great detail, he reemphasized how important it would be to capture Leningrad, the Donets Basin, and the Crimea. To him, all these objectives had priority over Moscow.

So yes, he probably said how it was all the fault of the AG Commanders to Warlimont at some point, but it is obviously hardly something he can blame the AG commanders for. And note the follow-on discussion of the protest by the army command against this directive, which was exactly making the point that the Directive led to dissipation of force, rather than the concentration needed.

[Alixanther]

So yes, he probably said how it was all the fault of the AG Commanders to Warlimont at some point, but it is obviously hardly something he can blame the AG commanders for. And note the follow-on discussion of the protest by the army command against this directive, which was exactly making the point that the Directive led to dissipation of force, rather than the concentration needed.

I personally said that Hitler seconded his accusation with contradictory measures: making the Army Groups even more divergent than they were. It's obvious that he's the one to blame for this decision, but the fact still stands: the ineffectiveness of Army operations was because of not enough (or not relevant enough) inter-theater cooperation. So, first he says something sound then he does something totally opposite.

[Urmel]

The point is that given the objectives, there was little to no potential for co-operation. At least one of the three AGs had to give up its objectives to effectively co-operate with another, or two if the aim was to co-operate in the move on Moscow. Pursuing the objectives and increased co-operation could not be done at the same time, which is the point doogal and I have been making.

[doogal]

I think Halder should shoulder some responsibility:

When given the amendments to the original study from Hitler he failed to change the premise upon which the eventual Barbarossa plan rested.
That was as such.

Marcks original study:

" Objective was the defeat of the Soviet Armed forces. From the military-economic viewpoint Russia's most valuable regions were the food and raw-material producing areas of the Ukraine and the Donets Basin as well as the armament-production centers around Moscow and Leningrad. The industrial areas of Asiatic Russia were not greatly developed. The principal objective was Moscow, the nerve center of Soviet military, political, and economic power; its capture would lead to the disintegration of Soviet resistance".

"2. The Main Effort. The main effort was to lead to the destruction of the Russian forces west of Moscow by a direct thrust on the capital. Once in possession of Moscow and northern Russia, elements of the main-attack force would turn south and seize the Ukraine in conjunction with the southern groups.

While operations are fluid in both directions there can be a certain amount of co-operation, maybe Hitler had a point, maybe he didn't, I am as always undecided

[doogal]

On 31 July, toward the end of a conference at Berchtesgaden that was mainly concerned with Operation SEELOEWE, Hitler declared that a showdown with Russia would have to take place the following spring. The quicker the USSR was defeated, the better. The entire campaign made sense only if the Soviet Union was smashed in one fell swoop: territorial gains alone would prove unsatisfactory, and stopping the offensive during the winter months might be dangerous. Therefore, it was best to wait until May 1941 and then bring the campaign to a successful conclusion within five months. It would have been preferable to conduct the operation during the current year, but that solution did not seem practicable. Two converging thrusts were envisaged: page (5):The German Campaign in Russia Planning and Operations (1940-42)Pamphlet no: 20-261a

Urmel wrote:

Let's look at Hitler's orders then, shall we?

Directive 33 objectives, around 20 July 1941:



The Ukraine because of its natural resources and industry.


Supplement to Directive 33:



South.
All enemy forces remaining west of the Dnepr were to be defeated and destroyed. As soon as circumstances permitted, First and Second Panzer Groups were to be put under the command of Fourth Army and assembled west of the Dnepr. Reinforced by infantry and mountain divisions, this army was to seize the industrial region of Kharkov, cross the Don, and drive into the Caucasus.
North.
Receiving the support of Third Panzer Group, Army Group North would be able to commit its infantry in a direct assault on Leningrad while the mobile units would attempt enveloping maneuvers.


if those are a divergent objectives, what are?

p. 52 of 'The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations'.

And then the meeting on 4 August:



Hitler thereupon quickly changed the subject to the future conduct of operations. Going into great detail, he reemphasized how important it would be to capture Leningrad, the Donets Basin, and the Crimea. To him, all these objectives had priority over Moscow.

Personally I believe that Hitlers decision to highlight the Northern and Southern axis as priority military economic objectives, removed the only slim possibility of a successful (and by this I do not mean war winning) outcome to Barbarossa, which would have been victory in the battle outside of Moscow owing to it being initiated earlier in the campaign,
If there was a lack of co-operation then it was due to the idea in the minds of all Senior Officers that Moscow was the objective as laid out in Marcks original study, it is possible to attribute this as a cause for AGC reticence in using its armour or infantry in conjunction with AGS & AGN on what it considered non-decisive axis of advance. Directive 33 is dated July 20 while AGC is in the midst of the battle of Smolensk which would last until September imposing a considerable brake on the offensive. Both Hitlers decision and Smolensk took the wheels off Barbarossa:

[doogal]

I think Halder should shoulder some responsibility:

When given the amendments to the original study from Hitler he failed to change the premise upon which the eventual Barbarossa plan rested.
That was as such.

Marcks original study:

" Objective was the defeat of the Soviet Armed forces. From the military-economic viewpoint Russia's most valuable regions were the food and raw-material producing areas of the Ukraine and the Donets Basin as well as the armament-production centers around Moscow and Leningrad. The industrial areas of Asiatic Russia were not greatly developed. The principal objective was Moscow, the nerve center of Soviet military, political, and economic power; its capture would lead to the disintegration of Soviet resistance".

"2. The Main Effort. The main effort was to lead to the destruction of the Russian forces west of Moscow by a direct thrust on the capital. Once in possession of Moscow and northern Russia, elements of the main-attack force would turn south and seize the Ukraine in conjunction with the southern groups.

While operations are fluid in both directions there can be a certain amount of co-operation, maybe Hitler had a point, maybe he didn't, I am as always undecided

For ex. page 201, ch 9, Shattered Genius: David Stones interpretation:

"The General staffs final plan for Barbarossa still maintained wherever possible those key aspects of the overall concept that Halder had presented to Hitler on 5 December the previous year,(this being as Marcks original study with Moscow as the focal point) but now Leningrad rather than Moscow was a priority objective, in accordance with Hitlers direction on the 18th December"

Hence I think Halder should shoulder some responsibility for its failure:

Although Glantz believes that had Taifun been launched earlier it would have met greater resistance due to Soviet forces not being weakened by there offensives east of Smolensk. The offensive would have been launched with an extended right flank. Regardless of the final position of German troops they would still have to face 10 reserve armies. And that had not Kiev been taken before the Battle of Moscow the whole operations would have ended in utter disaster for the Germans.

Glantz, David, The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, October 2001, page 23
Glantz, David M., Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), volume I:The Summer-Fall Campaign (22 June-4 December 1941). Carlisle, PA: Selfpublished, 1999.
Glantz, David M., Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945), volume II: The Winter Campaign (5 December 1941-April 1942). Carlisle, PA: Selfpublished, 1999.
Bibliography