German pockets in 1945

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Sure coming up with some sort of evacuation solution would have been nice. Possibly using modified UBoats, especially as the withdrawn soldiers don't have to be shipped to Germany, the Norway coast can function as a drop-off.

Again, much planning and preparation are needed, not Nazi Germany's forte.

Evacuate tens of thousands of troops by modified U Boats ? If that was an option then am sure operation Sea Lion itself would have succeeded in '40

[durb]

When it comes to all these isolated garrisons and "pockets" up to 1945, I wonder how was the supply situation in them and if there were starvation cases among soldiers like there must have been among civilian population living still under German occupation. I have read that it was rather grim with food scarcity at the Canal Islands during the winter 1944/1945. I wonder how it was at other "pockets" like those places in France, Greek islands etc.?

From the Allied perspective these "pockets" were more or less harmless and uncapable to take any significant active action against surrounding Allied forces - therefore it probably made sense to let them just surrounded and isolated than to make frontal attacks on them.

In hindsight this simple isolation strategy probably saved lifes of many soldiers of both sides who otherwise would have fallen in very secondary operations. For example about the Peleliu island operation (1944) at the Pacific I have read that Peleliu could well have been left in peace as a completely isolated and rather harmless Japanese "pocket" with starving garrison instead of all bitter fighting there.

[Art]

For instance, I know that there were around 330 000 German troops stationed in Norway until the very end of the war. I think similar number of men were also kept in Italy and Courland peninsula, so that might be as much as 1 million fighting men kept on the periphery of the Germany, while Berlin and Ruhr itself were threatened

Troops were withdrawn on a massive scale from Norway and Finland beginning from the end of 1944. Among defending approaches to Berlin in April 1945 were Nordland and Nederland divisions that arrived from Kurland and 169 Division from Norway, just to quote an example.

[BDV]

"BDV":Sure coming up with some sort of evacuation solution would have been nice. Possibly using modified UBoats, especially as the withdrawn soldiers don't have to be shipped to Germany, the Norway coast can function as a drop-off.


Evacuate tens of thousands of troops by modified U Boats ? If that was an option then am sure operation Sea Lion itself would have succeeded in '40

A Germany with hundreds of servceable UBoats in 1940?

Also, let's not get carried away. Soldiers also need weapons. Ammo. Food. Medical supplies. Delivering 10,000 soldiers to a friendly port, at least 3 orders of orders of magnitude easier than delivering a fighting force of same numeric strength to an hostile shore.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

How many U boats do you think were operational in the Atlantic / Channel / North sea area in the later part of 1944 / early 45? FYI 231 U Boats were lost in '44 + 18 more decommissioned due to crippling damage + some more were scuttled at ports.

[Prosper Vandenbroucke]

Hello,
In 1944 the Kriegsmarine suffered the losses of 249 U-Boote and in 1945 (january to the 8th of may) they suffered the losses of +/-120 U-Boote.
http://uboat.net/fates/losses/
Regards
Prosper

[ML59]

Back to the topic, why we don't try to make a list of all the isolated fortresses and their personnel in 1944-1945?

[Gilles de Rais]

That was the original point of my post, but apparently the disscussion drifted in a wrong way. I was not trying to make an alternative scenario for evecuation of German troops in France by submarines, but to find out how much of Wehrmacht troops were lost in such isolated places in the closing months of the war in proportion to to its total strenght.

[Prosper Vandenbroucke]

Back to the topic, why we don't try to make a list of all the isolated fortresses and their personnel in 1944-1945?

That's the reason why I put a post online on the 10th of march at 17:58 concerning all the german pockets in France and when I was talking about U-Boote, I was just responding to "sandeepmukherjee196 "

[Niklas68]

By late 1944 I don't think germany had the logistics/ naval surface units needed to evacuate the number of troops deployed in Norway. Kurland pocket is a different thing, the troops there got cut off, but still occupied large Red army forces and inflicted high casualties on them, had they somehow been able to withdraw these troops to protect germany the same RA forces would be set free to be used on germany directly, doesnt seem to make much difference for the overall picture, in my eyes.

[BDV]

The point pertaining to the original posting is that fortress pockets are not necessarily bad, per se. Is just that the methodology and tools for evacuating stragglers and key personnel once the fortress outlives its military usefulness should, ideally, be in place.

[doogal]

When a designated festung ties down enough enemy troops to curtail or effect its forward momentum, effect enemy build up or by launching limited counter attacks in the enemy rear has a disproportionate effect tactically against the enemy then it could be said to have " a limited military value", but this isn't something you should be setting out to do on purpose when facing mobile troops with massive air support, or using as a supposed defensive tactic on a fluid front. You also need your field force to stay in touch with a fortress area to sustain the possibility of a link up at some future point. There is a case that those in the west owing to geography and the limited front areas could put a brake on Allied forward momentum. But its a bankrupt policy when you are by necessity forced further away form these areas.

[Gilles de Rais]

By late 1944 I don't think germany had the logistics/ naval surface units needed to evacuate the number of troops deployed in Norway. Kurland pocket is a different thing, the troops there got cut off, but still occupied large Red army forces and inflicted high casualties on them, had they somehow been able to withdraw these troops to protect germany the same RA forces would be set free to be used on germany directly, doesnt seem to make much difference for the overall picture, in my eyes.

German navy was able to evacuate millions of civilians from eastern areas of Germany without any problem. I don't see why it would be impossible to evacuate significantly smaller numbers of soldiers. As to the Courland pocket, yes it was tying up some Soviet forces, but it was never more than a screening force (if it was really much larger, it would have overrun pocket without problem) composed of weak 1 Baltic Front. On the other hand, Germans had two whole armies, 16. and 18; lost to any meaningfull action, defending some Baltic wasteland while industrial heartland of Silesia was overrun and Berlin itself was threatened. The idea that those Red Army units blockading the Germans in Courland would be available for offensive on Berlin is not really plausible considering the huge logistic problems Soviets had even supplying those men they already had in front of Berlin, not to mention yet another Front they would have to support. If Germans really wanted to use the Festung concept effectively, the best strategy would have been to retreat forces from Courland pocket before the Soviet January offensive and to use them for building fortified places in key railroad junctions in Poland; like Posnan, Lodz, Breslau and others (Breslau and Posnan have indeed been turned into Festungs, though hastily and without any planning, so they were not really effective), which would prevent the Red Army from advancing deeper into German territory even if they had pierced the German front, because of logistic problems in supplying their huge forces that have gone to far from their nearest railheads. Also, such reinforced garrisons, if properly defended and supported by counter-attacks by German forces on the main front, might really tie great number of Soviet troops that would be required to reduce them and in doing so give breething time to reorganise German defences.

[Niklas68]

Some of the best troops from Norway were indeed evacuated, the 6th ss division and the 25th tank division, I believe much of the rest of those troops were garrison troops / occupation forces and not fit for frontline combat. Plus by far not all troops in norway were deployed in the extreme south, ready to be evacuated, the country has an extension of 1500 miles to the north, quite a few of these troops were in Finnmark after fighting a retreating war vs the Fins and the soviets. Plus the original idea was to keep hold of norway as a safeguard for iron ore supplies and hindrance to a possible allied invasion (at least until D Day that seemed a possibility). Plus the North Sea would be very risky waters to conduct a massive evacuational operation what with Allied air and seaforces controlling the sea.

Kurland: Germans didnt have the bliss of hindsight knowledge. Had they known how the soviet advance was paning out they d evacuated all civilians from that area long before the red army arrived there. The fact thea didnt do that shows you they were caught by surprise. I believe Hitler was hoping to regain the initiative and use Kurland as a bridgehead. PLus there were discussion about this with donitz and it was concluded the possession of Baltic ports as submarine basis was vital as they hoped the new type of submarines might bring about a turn of tide in the naval war.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

]

Some of the best troops from Norway were indeed evacuated, the 6th ss division and the 25th tank division, I believe much of the rest of those troops were garrison troops / occupation forces and not fit for frontline combat. Plus by far not all troops in norway were deployed in the extreme south, ready to be evacuated, the country has an extension of 1500 miles to the north, quite a few of these troops were in Finnmark after fighting a retreating war vs the Fins and the soviets. Plus the original idea was to keep hold of norway as a safeguard for iron ore supplies and hindrance to a possible allied invasion (at least until D Day that seemed a possibility). Plus the North Sea would be very risky waters to conduct a massive evacuational operation what with Allied air and seaforces controlling the sea.

Kurland: Germans didnt have the bliss of hindsight knowledge. Had they known how the soviet advance was paning out they d evacuated all civilians from that area long before the red army arrived there. The fact thea didnt do that shows you they were caught by surprise. I believe Hitler was hoping to regain the initiative and use Kurland as a bridgehead. PLus there were discussion about this with donitz and it was concluded the possession of Baltic ports as submarine basis was vital as they hoped the new type of submarines might bring about a turn of tide in the naval war.

You are right Niklas68. Norway needed to be garrisoned not just because of the Iron Ore supplies but also to protect the U Boot bases. Admiral Doenitz had taken a policy of an active and vigorous U Boot campaign from the Norwegian bases even if Germany was overrun. Till 3 / 4 May '45 this policy remained in force.

Where Kurland is concerned, Hitler never lost his penchant for grand strategy or his Pan European dreams and aspirations till the last day. He kept forces away from the German heartland to serve his concept of strategy and to feed this dream...sometimes it was " he who rules Prague rules Europe " ....sometimes it was the strategic angle at Kurland ..or the Latvian question..


Ciao
Sandeep