AT Guns
AT Guns
why were the 50mm pak 38 developed from 1937 and the 75mm pak 40 developed from 1939 not introduced for armoured vehicles sooner than they were ?? I know that the carriage AT versions were in service by 40 and 41 respectively.... I assume there would have been a requirement for re-tooling at the manufacturers .. and that new runs with turrets to fit larger weapons would be needed .. weight requirements etc....but as they were encountering tanks btwn 39-40 which could easily withstand the smaller calibre AT guns why did they not replace these weapons quicker...
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Re: AT Guns
Probably because the main task of the tanks at the time, was not to take out heavy tanks, that would be done by the AT guns and panzerjaeger, if I understand your question correctly. It was only as the war progressed that German tanks took on a more AT capability.
Re: AT Guns
I suspect that the reason is quite simple - complacency and poor intelligence. They considered existing tank armament sufficient to defeat the armour of any enemy tank, and that the forthcoming war would be over quickly.
Re: AT Guns
surely from 1940 onwards after the battle of France there was realisation that the existing gun calibres were insufficient for tank on tank combat.
Re: AT Guns
One doubts, given historical developments that Wehrmacht honchos realized the magnitude of the problem, and/or that they adequately warned Adolf and the other Nazi heads to the severity of the issue.doogal wrote:surely from 1940 onwards after the battle of France there was realisation that the existing gun calibres were insufficient for tank on tank combat.
Puteaux produced an AT gun very close in performance to the Pak38, and the Bohler and French SA35 tank guns were very close to the 50L42 in performance, with the added bonus of availability of significant production capacity (for the SA35 French industry could even put a very decent tank around the gun, for the 41-42 timeframe, the SOMUA).
So very little action, at all levels to that end, in the June 1940 - June 1941, rather complacency that'll all work out until the longer 75 caliber and its carriers are ready in the 42-44 timeframe.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: AT Guns
Was this a military problem? Surely in 1940 there was enough evidence to convince anyone, why would the AGS and other Wehrmacht organisations not make everyone painfully aware as quickly as possible. I was always led to believe that the Wehrmacht (however disorganised it became) studied all aspects of its operations owing to its GS branches. Not that there interpretation of events was always correct, but the need for a heavy calibre weapon with sufficient muzzle velocity seems so obvious. Also the role of the Pzr in the tank vs tank role (if required) was established well before 1939.
Re: AT Guns
At some point any person studying the German actions of WWII, has to seriously question the myth of "It was all Schicklgruber's fault!". On the contrary, once one realizes that German nazi generals might've over promised, some of their more stupefying claims and actions - Guderian/Hoth on Moscow, '120 wristwatches' Manstein on Leningrad - become easier to understand.doogal wrote:Was this a military problem? Surely in 1940 there was enough evidence to convince anyone, why would the AGS and other Wehrmacht organisations not make everyone painfully aware as quickly as possible. I was always led to believe that the Wehrmacht (however disorganised it became) studied all aspects of its operations owing to its GS branches. Not that there interpretation of events was always correct, but the need for a heavy calibre weapon with sufficient muzzle velocity seems so obvious. Also the role of the Pzr in the tank vs tank role (if required) was established well before 1939.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: AT Guns
Arguably because the better training, leadership and moral of the Wehrmacht more than nullified any technical disadvantages until the end of 1941 so that until then there was simply no need for a drastic and immediate change in production.
Re: AT Guns
Not correct, as the loss figures show. Trading men for materiel is a fallacy with long history in the German and French military:NagaSadow wrote:Arguably because the better training, leadership and moral of the Wehrmacht more than nullified any technical disadvantages until the end of 1941 so that until then there was simply no need for a drastic and immediate change in production.
andThe reluctance to view a man as capital is especially ruinous of mankind in wartime; here capital is protected, but not man, and in time of war we have no hesitation in sacrificing one hundred men in the bloom of their years to save one cannon.
In a hundred men at least twenty times as much capital is lost as is lost in one cannon. But the production of the cannon is the cause of an expenditure of the state treasury, while human beings are again available for nothing by means of a simple conscription order…
- Johann Heinrich von Thunen
The women produce more [men] than I can use.
- Napoleon Bonaparte
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: AT Guns
Salve,doogal wrote:Was this a military problem? Surely in 1940 there was enough evidence to convince anyone, why would the AGS and other Wehrmacht organisations not make everyone painfully aware as quickly as possible. I was always led to believe that the Wehrmacht (however disorganised it became) studied all aspects of its operations owing to its GS branches. Not that there interpretation of events was always correct, but the need for a heavy calibre weapon with sufficient muzzle velocity seems so obvious. Also the role of the Pzr in the tank vs tank role (if required) was established well before 1939.
there are bunch of reasons why it happened, as it happened!
1. The first clash was at 1936 with the designing of the Panzer III. Also there is a memorandum at Freiburg to read about this clash.
One hand were more"traditionalists" mainly officers from the suplly services and supply main office (Generalquatiermeister, Heeresnachschub-Amtes etc.) and the Heereswaffenamt, which demanded to equip the Panzer III with the main Wehrmacht AT gun = 3,7cm, from logistics and supply, also the industry would be limited to produce other AT guns then the 3,7cm, because at 1936 the 3,7cm was in full mass production.
One the other hand were more "progressivly" officers who warned already 1936, that the main AT gun of the Heer and a KwK 3,7cm for the Panzer III were not anymore up to date, because they would have to less penetration power.
For the traditionalists a turret ring and turret, which could only equip the 3,7cm was enough, all other was a waste of ressouces. The progressive officers wanted a Panzer III from the beginning equiped with the 5cm KwK and the possibility to upgrade later to a 7,5cm KwK.
At the end there was a compromise, to design the Panzer III with a turret ring and turret, which had the possibility to be equiped later with a 5cm AT gun.
2. The introduction of the Panzer III to mass production took a long way unti 1939 (Ausf. E) and also the Panzer III was never produced from DB on assembly lines. He was produced from team work.
1939/1940 Ausf. E = 96 Panzer III = 3,7cm
1940 Ausf. F = 450 Panzer III/ 325 = 3,7cm; 125 = 5cm L42
1940/41 Ausf G = 600 Panzer III = 5cm L42
1940/41 Ausf H = 300 Panzer III = 5cm L42; stronger armoured version of the Audf.G
March 1941 until Juli 1942 Ausf. J = 2616 Panzer III; 1540 = 5cm L42; 1076 5cm L60
1942 Ausführung L = 650 Panzer III = 5cm L62
Losses: 1941 - 900; 1942 - 1400; 1943 - 2400
From Wolfgang Fleischer: Panzerkampfwagen III. Der Panzer der Blitzkriege. In: Waffen-Arsenal. Band 187, S. 7(a und b), S. 30(c).
The 5cm L60 was available since the Ausf. F and it was possible to mass produce and equip the Panzer III since the Audf. F with the 5cm L60, but it was decided from the Heereswaffenamt, that the 5cm L42 was the better compromise for mobility, mainly at built-up areas.
So if we look at the numbers and consider the development time line of the Panzer IV, we can see that the german Wehrmacht reacted "fast", to the surprise at Barbarossa. The first Panzer IV F2 (Langrohr L43) was produced December, January 1941/42, also the first Panzer III with the 5cm L60.
Also the numbers of 3,7cm Panzer III were much less then the numbers of the 5cm L42 and the Wehrmacht reacted directly after the Fall of France.
So the main argument from the real history is, that 2565 Panzer III with 5cm L42, could have been equiped with a 5cm L60.
Would be the difference realy essential?
Panzer IV
1938/39 Ausf. C = 140 Panzer IV = 7,5cm L24
1939/1940 Ausf. D = 229 Panzer IV = 7,5cm L24
1940/1941 Ausf. E = 223 Panzer IV = 7,5cm L24
1941/1942 Audf F = 637 Panzer IV; 437 = 7,5cm L24; 200 = 7,5cm L43
Mai 1942/March 1943 Ausf. G = 1687 = 7,5cm L 48
Losses: 1939 - 19; 1940 - 97; 1941 - 378; 1942 - 500; 1943 - 2350
With hindsight to me the question was earlier, as the design of the Panzer III and Panzer IV took place. Why the designing of TWO very equal tanks and not one, which could play all rolls? A Panzer IV from beginning with torsion bar suspension could have satisfied all roles with only one tank.
The advantages are very clear, because you have only one tank in mass production and to force this only mass production is much easier.
Also the Stug IV could have played all roless as the Stug III. The Krupp company was building from the beginning with assemly lines and had more know how to force the production through simplifications for examples, autogenous gas cutting and gas hardening of the armour.
To my understanding the lack of mass production possibilities for tanks was much more essential then the not optimal equipment with less powerfull Kwk's (AT guns).
A real game changer would be the possibility to produce 2000-3000 MBT every year (next to all other mainly Stug''s) at September 1939 from the beginning of the war.
Re: AT Guns
I don't disagree with that but i would argue that any radical change requieres a perceived need or motivation or desperation or whatever for that change to happen. Until Mid-November 1941 Pz.A.O.K. 2 for example maintained roughly a 9:1 kill/losses ratio (3.059 kills vs 345 tank losses) vs the Red Army. Given those numbers hardly any bureaucrat would see a need for extreme measures especially if those changes were on the way anyway.BDV wrote:Not correct, as the loss figures show. Trading men for materiel is a fallacy with long history in the German and French military:NagaSadow wrote:Arguably because the better training, leadership and moral of the Wehrmacht more than nullified any technical disadvantages until the end of 1941 so that until then there was simply no need for a drastic and immediate change in production.
andThe reluctance to view a man as capital is especially ruinous of mankind in wartime; here capital is protected, but not man, and in time of war we have no hesitation in sacrificing one hundred men in the bloom of their years to save one cannon.
In a hundred men at least twenty times as much capital is lost as is lost in one cannon. But the production of the cannon is the cause of an expenditure of the state treasury, while human beings are again available for nothing by means of a simple conscription order…
- Johann Heinrich von Thunen
The women produce more [men] than I can use.
- Napoleon Bonaparte
Re: AT Guns
I would like to see examples, orders or anything else which support this sentence for the german military.Not correct, as the loss figures show. Trading men for materiel is a fallacy with long history in the German and French military:
The german material to equip their men was always more quality then quantity. The absence of quantity was the problem.
It is correct that the near perfect development and training of combined arms doctrine, compensate a lot at 1940, 41 till 1942 mainly through the Flak Abteilungen and the Artillery, but their was no trading men for materiel at the Wehrmacht, especially if you look at the frontline divisions.
Re: AT Guns
You misunderstood. The quote means to establish the pattern of conduct. The conclusion that the Wehrmacht/Nazi Germany did that was mine; I was forced into it by considering the losses resulting from the first 4 months of fighting in Bolshevik Russia.Don71 wrote:I would like to see examples, orders or anything else which support this sentence for the german military.Not correct, as the loss figures show. Trading men for materiel is a fallacy with long history in the German and French military:
The german material to equip their men was always more quality then quantity. The absence of quantity was the problem.
It is correct that the near perfect development and training of combined arms doctrine, compensate a lot at 1940, 41 till 1942 mainly through the Flak Abteilungen and the Artillery, but their was no trading men for materiel at the Wehrmacht, especially if you look at the frontline divisions.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: AT Guns
very true and I wouldn't hold schicklgruber responsible (as such) for the development since the early 30`s of AT weapons. I may blame him for not understanding the need to fabricate simply and not create multiplicity.bdv wrote-At some point any person studying the German actions of WWII, has to seriously question the myth of "It was all Schicklgruber's fault!".
Not essential to early tactical successes it would seem as the German armoured forces managed very well with what it had.... But its combat capability would have increased significantly I would imagine... If they had introduced larger AT weapons earlier there could be a range of knock on effects, i.e. lower tank crew losses over the first 2 and at the beginning of Barbarossa years may have significantly impacted the durability of the Panzer divisions as they fought in that theatre....Don 71 wrote -that 2565 Panzer III with 5cm L42, could have been equiped with a 5cm L60.
Would be the difference realy essential?
That's going a bit far ??? Although they were definitely ahead in that regard and there reliance on the application of tactical capability did compensate for the eschewing of the usual ratios btwn attack and defence.don 71 wrote - It is correct that the near perfect development and training of combined arms doctrine, compensate a lot at 1940, 41 till 1942
But far from perfect.!!! plus after 41 a hint of lacking development and a reliance on what became formulaic tactics...
Re: AT Guns
Likely brought on by the severe losses of mid-level commanders (who were the ones who could come up with/develop new tactics) and the over-promotion of the survivors brought about by said losses and by the enormous expansion of Wehrmacht in response to the strategic blunders of 1939-1941; Peter Principle in Action.doogal wrote:... plus after 41 a hint of lacking development and a reliance on what became formulaic tactics...
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion