Appraisals
Appraisals
After reading CG Hoepners appraisal of LG von Manstein which contrasted with FM von leebs but reached the same conclusion that of suitability for army command following his command of LVI Corps in the SU, it occurred to me that I had never considered the way Wehrmacht Generals were assessed and who decided vis a vis on commands which would follow. These reports I assume were submitted to the CGS or his deputy + C in C of the Heer with a view to futher employment or continuation demotion etc. When Hitler assumed (through OKW) appointments and promotions were these field reports of higher commanders still used in assessing competency??. Or did this change.... I
Re: Appraisals
Wasn't Manstein command of the korps somewhat troubled?
Re: Appraisals
Melvin saw his performance as
Hoepner quoted in Melvin " lively self willed personality" "intelligent, creative mind with a high standard of military education" but "still lacks sufficient experience in the practical command of a corps" declaring him suitable for command one up....
Leeb (in the same book)"passionate, commander with lots of ideas" again suitable for army command..
There was a small disagreement with Busch while under 16th army ??? but he was a good friend of von Manstein...and he also made comments which "were much more positive" although Melvin characterises these as "lacklustre assessments".
Melvin(Manstein) does not provide a clear link to where in his sources for these appraisals come from but he has the Personalkten 6/33 for Erich von Manstein which one would think should contain the above reports.
Also the Heersdienststellen RH 19-1 for AGS &\ RH 24-26 for LVI Corps
page 225 (Manstein) matter of opinion I would add.demonstrating clear ability to command well forwards, to motivate and manoeuvre his corps in difficult terrain against a tenacious enemy
Hoepner quoted in Melvin " lively self willed personality" "intelligent, creative mind with a high standard of military education" but "still lacks sufficient experience in the practical command of a corps" declaring him suitable for command one up....
Leeb (in the same book)"passionate, commander with lots of ideas" again suitable for army command..
There was a small disagreement with Busch while under 16th army ??? but he was a good friend of von Manstein...and he also made comments which "were much more positive" although Melvin characterises these as "lacklustre assessments".
Melvin(Manstein) does not provide a clear link to where in his sources for these appraisals come from but he has the Personalkten 6/33 for Erich von Manstein which one would think should contain the above reports.
Also the Heersdienststellen RH 19-1 for AGS &\ RH 24-26 for LVI Corps
Re: Appraisals
Kind of interesting that he was considered having good brains but lacking in practical korps command skills.
His korps on the road to Leningrad took a sharp defeat with significant losses by IIRC OP Vatutin (8.pz). There were also times when his armor got bogged down through faulty deployment orders.
His korps on the road to Leningrad took a sharp defeat with significant losses by IIRC OP Vatutin (8.pz). There were also times when his armor got bogged down through faulty deployment orders.
Re: Appraisals
All be it those are Hoepners comments about someone who openly criticised his handling of an Armoured group....
Re: Appraisals
doogal
The appointment process, other than for general staff officers, was the same throughout the war - it was handled by the HPA which reported to the Commander in Chief of the Army. Orders appointing Army commanders were signed by the Commander in Chief of the Army (Hitler after December 1941) and countersigned by the Head of the HPA.
With regard to von Manstein, I suspect that the important assessment was that of Strauss on 17.03.1941 who assessed him as - fully suitable for leading motorised formations and commanding an Army. I think Hoepner's assessment was simply too late to change anyone's mind. It would be interesting to know the date when it was produced, it might even have been after von Manstein had been appointed to command 11 Armee.
When von Brauchitsch was Commander in Chief, the assessments had some influence but since he knew all of the senior officers he had his own opinions - his view of Manstein in March 1941 was - somewhat ambitious and confident of his achievements. He agreed with Blaskowitz and von Witzleben (Feb 1941) that Reinhardt was suitable to lead a Pz Gruppe and sure enough he replaced Hoth when he became commander of 17 Armee.
I think you will find that all of the Army commanders appointed in late 1941 (Manstein, Hoth, Reinhardt, and Schmidt) had already been assessed as suitable for command at that level in February and March of that year.
Strange as it may seem, the assessments became perhaps more important as the war progressed. By late 1944 the HPA maintained a list, which it updated monthly, of generals suitable to command an Army. It would select from this list candidates to present to Hitler. At this stage of the war, generals were not necessarily as well known to Burgdorff or Maisel as they would have been to von Brauchitsch and Bodewin Keitel.
Regards
John
The appointment process, other than for general staff officers, was the same throughout the war - it was handled by the HPA which reported to the Commander in Chief of the Army. Orders appointing Army commanders were signed by the Commander in Chief of the Army (Hitler after December 1941) and countersigned by the Head of the HPA.
With regard to von Manstein, I suspect that the important assessment was that of Strauss on 17.03.1941 who assessed him as - fully suitable for leading motorised formations and commanding an Army. I think Hoepner's assessment was simply too late to change anyone's mind. It would be interesting to know the date when it was produced, it might even have been after von Manstein had been appointed to command 11 Armee.
When von Brauchitsch was Commander in Chief, the assessments had some influence but since he knew all of the senior officers he had his own opinions - his view of Manstein in March 1941 was - somewhat ambitious and confident of his achievements. He agreed with Blaskowitz and von Witzleben (Feb 1941) that Reinhardt was suitable to lead a Pz Gruppe and sure enough he replaced Hoth when he became commander of 17 Armee.
I think you will find that all of the Army commanders appointed in late 1941 (Manstein, Hoth, Reinhardt, and Schmidt) had already been assessed as suitable for command at that level in February and March of that year.
Strange as it may seem, the assessments became perhaps more important as the war progressed. By late 1944 the HPA maintained a list, which it updated monthly, of generals suitable to command an Army. It would select from this list candidates to present to Hitler. At this stage of the war, generals were not necessarily as well known to Burgdorff or Maisel as they would have been to von Brauchitsch and Bodewin Keitel.
Regards
John
Re: Appraisals
Strauss as commander of 9th Army with Manstein his subordinate with 38th Corps preparing for Sea-lion ...prior to the move east.....?? this report was quite a while before he would become an army commander..
Re: Appraisals
That's why its more important.
After the round of assessments in February and March of 1941 it was clear to von Brauchitsch, Halder, and Bodewin Keitel who the next Army commanders would be:
In terms of seniority they were Hoth, von Manstein, Schmidt, and Reinhardt. But von Manstein was assessed as fully suitable to command an Army while Hoth had been assessed by von Leeb as needing some more time commanding a Pz Gruppe. So the first Army command that became available would be given to von Manstein and the second to Hoth. I don't have any assessments for Schmidt but Reinhardt was suitable to command a Pz Gruppe and got the first one that became available. It must have been close between Schmidt and Reinhardt because von Brauchitsch wrote to Schmidt saying that he knew that Schmidt was senior to Reinhardt but that Schmidt was not be be upset because he would get the next Army command that became available (which he did).
I have just checked the notes in Melvin's biography and it is as I suspected. The assessments quoted by Melvin (from Hoepner, Busch, and von Leeb) are dated September 1941 and were an assessment of von Manstein as KG LVI AK after he had been selected to command 11 Armee.
Regards
John
After the round of assessments in February and March of 1941 it was clear to von Brauchitsch, Halder, and Bodewin Keitel who the next Army commanders would be:
In terms of seniority they were Hoth, von Manstein, Schmidt, and Reinhardt. But von Manstein was assessed as fully suitable to command an Army while Hoth had been assessed by von Leeb as needing some more time commanding a Pz Gruppe. So the first Army command that became available would be given to von Manstein and the second to Hoth. I don't have any assessments for Schmidt but Reinhardt was suitable to command a Pz Gruppe and got the first one that became available. It must have been close between Schmidt and Reinhardt because von Brauchitsch wrote to Schmidt saying that he knew that Schmidt was senior to Reinhardt but that Schmidt was not be be upset because he would get the next Army command that became available (which he did).
I have just checked the notes in Melvin's biography and it is as I suspected. The assessments quoted by Melvin (from Hoepner, Busch, and von Leeb) are dated September 1941 and were an assessment of von Manstein as KG LVI AK after he had been selected to command 11 Armee.
Regards
John
Re: Appraisals
Ok .... I see the note (65) p558...
Was Guderian assessed as suitable for an army command ??? He had been called "a difficult subordinate" by Kluge ..Was he assessed in 1940 or in 1941.
His Panzer Gruppe was re-designated a Panzer Army which led me to believe he must have been.
Was Guderian assessed as suitable for an army command ??? He had been called "a difficult subordinate" by Kluge ..Was he assessed in 1940 or in 1941.
His Panzer Gruppe was re-designated a Panzer Army which led me to believe he must have been.