Recently exchanged e-mails with NOTED WWII historian Max Hastings

[Sean Oliver]

Oh. O.K.
Thanks for straightening everybody out on WW2 Mediterranean strategy, ljadw. I don't know what we'd do without you.

[MarkF617]

Port capacity in the axis controlled North African ports is what limited axis supply the most. What was unloaded was then subjected to RAF bombing. Until the assault on Sicily Malta's main contribution was to make the Italians waste fuel escorting convoys.

[ljadw]

Oh. O.K.
Thanks for straightening everybody out on WW2 Mediterranean strategy, ljadw. I don't know what we'd do without you.

It has been proved in several threads that the possession of Malta was irrelevant for an axis success in NA .

The big problem was NOT to transport the supplies to NA (the losses were minimal : some 15 % ,and not all caused by Malta),but to transport the supplies from the Libyan ports to the frontline.This could not be done in the OTL,and could also not be done in the ATL.

[Boby]

15% of what month/year?

Boby

[stg 44]

Oh. O.K.
Thanks for straightening everybody out on WW2 Mediterranean strategy, ljadw. I don't know what we'd do without you.

It has been proved in several threads that the possession of Malta was irrelevant for an axis success in NA .

The big problem was NOT to transport the supplies to NA (the losses were minimal : some 15 % ,and not all caused by Malta),but to transport the supplies from the Libyan ports to the frontline.This could not be done in the OTL,and could also not be done in the ATL.

Nonsense Malta was sinking major tonnage or at least turning it back in such amounts that Axis logistics collapsed. Interdiction from July 1941 on put off Rommel's attack on Tobruk back to October and then prevented it entirely when sinkings were in excess of 2/3rds of shipped supplies. By the time of Crusader Rommel's supplies were less than 1/4th of needs.

http://www.amazon.com/British-Strategic ... 0415649862
This book really has excellent numbers and tables that highlight how critical Malta was for shutting down Axis supplies in the 2nd half of 1941 and then again starting in the 2nd half of 1942 and into 1943.

[Gorque]

Malta was an air and sea base that sat astride the axis supply line and it mattered little in the success and/or failure of the Axis forces in North Africa? Hmmm.....

[ljadw]

15% of what month/year?

Boby

15 % is a total : from all the supplies that were sent to NA from june 1940 to may 1943,some 15 % were lost .

[ljadw]

Oh. O.K.
Thanks for straightening everybody out on WW2 Mediterranean strategy, ljadw. I don't know what we'd do without you.

It has been proved in several threads that the possession of Malta was irrelevant for an axis success in NA .

The big problem was NOT to transport the supplies to NA (the losses were minimal : some 15 % ,and not all caused by Malta),but to transport the supplies from the Libyan ports to the frontline.This could not be done in the OTL,and could also not be done in the ATL.

Nonsense Malta was sinking major tonnage or at least turning it back in such amounts that Axis logistics collapsed. Interdiction from July 1941 on put off Rommel's attack on Tobruk back to October and then prevented it entirely when sinkings were in excess of 2/3rds of shipped supplies. By the time of Crusader Rommel's supplies were less than 1/4th of needs.

http://www.amazon.com/British-Strategic ... 0415649862
This book really has excellent numbers and tables that highlight how critical Malta was for shutting down Axis supplies in the 2nd half of 1941 and then again starting in the 2nd half of 1942 and into 1943.

No : this is not correct : the losses during july 1941 had no effect on the situation on the frontline in july 1941.

[stg 44]

Oh. O.K.
Thanks for straightening everybody out on WW2 Mediterranean strategy, ljadw. I don't know what we'd do without you.

It has been proved in several threads that the possession of Malta was irrelevant for an axis success in NA .

The big problem was NOT to transport the supplies to NA (the losses were minimal : some 15 % ,and not all caused by Malta),but to transport the supplies from the Libyan ports to the frontline.This could not be done in the OTL,and could also not be done in the ATL.

Nonsense Malta was sinking major tonnage or at least turning it back in such amounts that Axis logistics collapsed. Interdiction from July 1941 on put off Rommel's attack on Tobruk back to October and then prevented it entirely when sinkings were in excess of 2/3rds of shipped supplies. By the time of Crusader Rommel's supplies were less than 1/4th of needs.

http://www.amazon.com/British-Strategic ... 0415649862
This book really has excellent numbers and tables that highlight how critical Malta was for shutting down Axis supplies in the 2nd half of 1941 and then again starting in the 2nd half of 1942 and into 1943.

No : this is not correct : the losses during july 1941 had no effect on the situation on the frontline in july 1941.

I didn't say it necessarily directly did, but it set back preparations for a major offensive against Tobruk until October, because supply build up dropped off heavily and supply entry into North African Axis ports went below needs and never rose to meet needs, let alone into surplus level, until 1942 after the retreat back to El Agheila. Malta crippled Rommel's planned operations from July on, forcing him on the defensive, while fatally impacting him from November on when supplies reached only 1/4th of needs due to sinkings from units based in Malta. British success fell off in early 1942 when the Luftwaffe came back, but rose again from July 1942 on.

[ljadw]

Fuel losses due to attacks from Malta had no influence on the fighting in NA.

Exemple :35850 ton of fuel arrived in NA in june 1941 and only 5568 ton in june 1942,but in june 1941 the Germans were stopped and in june 1942 they captured Tobruk,which was their biggest success .

There is no correlation between what was arriving in NA and the outcome of the fighting .

The worst months in 1942 (for all supplies) were june 12000 ton and december 2000 ton,the best month was april : 78000 ton

The worst month for 1941 was november : 5000 ton and the best month was june 54000 ton .

Here also there is no correlation .

What was decisive was the amount that arrived at the front and even this is questionable /


Other point : in 1941 and 1942 most supplies had as destination the Italians, not the Germans .


The figures are from Christos military and intelligence corner : Ultra intelligence and Rommel's convoys .

[Boby]

15% of what month/year?

Boby

15 % is a total : from all the supplies that were sent to NA from june 1940 to may 1943,some 15 % were lost .

Thanks

Do you have a monthly breakdown?

Boby

[ljadw]

15% of what month/year?

Boby

In 1941 1.016.441 ton was sent and 853.193 arrived = 83.4 %


In 1942 923979 ton was sent and 779135 ton arrived = 84.3 %

[ljadw]

15% of what month/year?

Boby

15 % is a total : from all the supplies that were sent to NA from june 1940 to may 1943,some 15 % were lost .

Thanks

Do you have a monthly breakdown?

Boby

See Christos military and intelligence corner : Ultra intelligence and Rommel's convoys .

[stg 44]

Fuel losses due to attacks from Malta had no influence on the fighting in NA.

Exemple :35850 ton of fuel arrived in NA in june 1941 and only 5568 ton in june 1942,but in june 1941 the Germans were stopped and in june 1942 they captured Tobruk,which was their biggest success .

There is no correlation between what was arriving in NA and the outcome of the fighting .

The worst months in 1942 (for all supplies) were june 12000 ton and december 2000 ton,the best month was april : 78000 ton

The worst month for 1941 was november : 5000 ton and the best month was june 54000 ton .

Here also there is no correlation .

What was decisive was the amount that arrived at the front and even this is questionable /


Other point : in 1941 and 1942 most supplies had as destination the Italians, not the Germans .


The figures are from Christos military and intelligence corner : Ultra intelligence and Rommel's convoys .

So you cherry pick figures and think that means something? In June 1941 that was the peak of imports with over 125k tons coming in (so much for port limits). In June 1942 they had months of build up and then the capture of Tobruk happened off the march and netted huge stockpiles of supplies, same with the Battle of Gazala.

According to the source I listed about British policy on Malta it has the Axis bringing in over 125k tons in June 1941, which was near their best month for the year. Christos' numbers are wrong. I suspect he just quotes the highly flawed van Creveld chapter on the subject. It would be nice if we had someone that would do an entire study on it in the German, Italian, and British archives.

[ljadw]

Malta was an air and sea base that sat astride the axis supply line and it mattered little in the success and/or failure of the Axis forces in North Africa? Hmmm.....

You fail to understand the build-up

What was sent was depending on what was available, on what could be transported to the Italian ports, on the storage and unloading capacity of these ports and on the merchant and escort shipping that was available .

BUT also on the unloading and storage capacities of the Libyan ports .

Exemple : month X : available 500 ,possible to be transported : 480, storage and unloading capacities of Italian ports : 450, possible to be transported to NA : 430

Unloading and storage capacities in NA : 380 ;possibility to be transported to the front : 250

How much could be sent to NA ? 250 + 15 % to replace the losses

What would be the influence of the losses which were on the average 15 % of 430 ? Answer : insignificant . The only thing the axis needed was that 250 arrived in NA which was the maximum that could be sent to the front .What remained in the ports was as useful as what was lost .


It is even so that the more was arriving in the ports of NA ,the less would arrive at the frontline .

Almost the same situation occurred when in september 1944 the port of Antwerp was liberated :what was finally decisive was not what arrived in the ports of NA/Antwerp,but what could leave these ports , and in NA this problem could not be solved, for Antwerp it took several months to be solved .