appleknocker wrote: Those victories in 1941 led directly to over extension and catastrophic losses that had a huge negative effect overall on Wehrmacht combat capability in 1942 and beyond
Most forces committed became over extended due to the tempo and length of operations continual combat losses and the optimistic planning when assigning achievable operational goals. There was also a lack of material support from supply to industrial capacity and the lack of vision to plan for substantial losses over extended periods of heavy combat.
The decision to mount a front wide offensive and accepting high casualties without considering the duration over which these would occur led directly to catastrophic casualties. The early successes come from the decision to mount a front wide offensive, these concepts are so interlinked you cannot deal with one, (the early victories) without (the decision to attack)
The losses in men and material without doubt effected German Strategy in 1942 but these were a result of months of defending against Soviet operations.Appleknocker wrote:Those losses due to over extension include qualitative losses that could never be recouped in the strategic dynamic that developed after 1941, therefore an argument can indeed be made for the OP (IMHO).