How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

[steverodgers801]

While they were of some use, the French tanks were not really suited for the Germans. Most were slow infantry support weapons not designed for speed. They also were not equipped with radios and had at most 4 men which meant that the commander had to divide his time between two duties. These two weaknesses were a major weakness which contributed to the French defeat.

[BDV]

I'm not sure how your accounting works, but how exactly do the Germans use the masses of French equipment? In 6 months?; a year?

It would be next to impossible to assimilate huge numbers of French equipment into the German supply, maintenance and training branches in that time frame, let alone begin producing new equipment. The Wehrmacht lacked the training capacity to produce the personnel required to handle this equipment (supply techs, maintenance personnel, etc.). This equipment requires support shops for routine maintenance, calibration, repairs, etc.
To be clear, a piece of equipment requires a minimum number of man hours of maintenance per month/quarter/year, etc. All of those separate pieces of equipment require qualified personnel to perform the work. That all rolls up into man hours and man days that = a given number of personnel. Those personnel require pay, food, training, a barracks and a shop with adequate square footage to handle the equipment density. The shop requires power, general tool sets, SPARE PARTS, specific equipment for its main purpose (automotive, artillery, electronics, etc) which ends up costing more than a good portion of the equipment.
The easy answer is just take it from the French army, but the reality is no where near that easy. If you think 6-12 months is workable, then please direct me to the relevant Wehrmacht office that had the personnel and experience to handle the job of assimilating the French army's equipment en masse and turning it out into the field in competent German hands in that time frame. The whole idea is way off the mark...

They had exactly 12 months from the Armistice with the French to the opening salvo of Barbarossa.

Funny how the Finns could do it (expanding greatly their heavy artillery park between winter war and the continuation war; using a hodge-podge of foreign equipment - French, British, German, and American; and trophy sovjet guns to boot).

Well, Germans too, deploying 177 Czech tanks to frontline troops in less than 6 months. But somehow they develop an acute case of stupid (Victory Disease?) in the wake of the victory in France.

Which brings us to the 3-man tank business ("germans had no use for such flimsily-crewed devices"). Which argument falls aside when you realize that the Germans deployed no less than 750 three men tanks in Barbarossa (PzII); without counting PzAbt 211 which deployed 90 (ninety) S35!

[Boby]

What do you think explains this huge failure? Lack of interest? Incompetence? Resource problems?

[ljadw]

The Germans ha not 12 months to the opening salvo of Barbarossa,because the Barbarossa preparations started only later= after the decision to attack the SU .

Besides, why would they need the French tanks ? They had enough tanks for Barbarossa : 3332 + 250 SG .To bring in French (why not British ) tanks would only complicate the logistical situation which was already complicated enough .

[ChristopherPerrien]

Tanks or not, the German Army of WWII was horse drawn.

[ljadw]

As was the Red Army .

[stg 44]

As was the Red Army .

Yeah as IIRC the Soviets had fewer motorized vehicles in 1944-45 than the Germans did in 1941

[BDV]

What do you think explains this huge failure? Lack of interest? Incompetence? Resource problems?

A little bit of everything, I think. In no particular order:

Underestimation of the fighting spirit of the enemy,
Underestimation of the material preparedness of the enemy,
Distrust of the Auxiliaries,
Overconfidence on the fighting effectiveness of own infantry,
Not propping up the armament industry and the military of a (momentarily defeated) hated rival
Alternative use of the material and human resources
Use of trophy weapons to secure the Atlantic coast
Lack of wisdom, foresight, flexibility, spine, and competence on military planners'. Fall Weiss, Fall Gelb, Fall Rot were (mostly) the result of pre-Nazi generalship; Unternehmen Barbarossa was the mental effluvium of Schicklgruber's bootlickers.

Also some posters (Alixanter, LJADW) continuously bring forth the dire strategic situation of the pre-Barbarossa timeframe (that's why Barbarossa had to work as a 3 month affair or the 3rdReich had just jumped from frying pan into fire). This was complicated by the ongoing bungling of foreign affairs through the Nazi insistence on the "Do as I tell you or I'll invade you" MO.

If Germany throws EVERYTHING to the OstFront, the Invasion of France likely happens in 1942.

[ChristopherPerrien]

As was the Red Army .

Yeah as IIRC the Soviets had fewer motorized vehicles in 1944-45 than the Germans did in 1941

I don't think so . US Lend Lease "motor vehicles" to the USSR alone during WWII, prolly far outweighed all German auto production for the whole war. It was this lend lease , that enabled the USSR to concentrate on building "tanks and other AFV's" as the US sent them something like 400,000 vehicles ,(200,000 truck alone) IIRC. They didn't need anymore trucks.

[ljadw]

No : till 1944 was the Soviet truck production bigger than what they received from LL .

[doogal]

Lots of reasons:

The gap in military proficiency, while the Germans were capable of great mistakes they were able to learn on battlefields of there choosing ahead of there opponents. At the tactical level there opponents lagged behind in implementation rather than in ideas but with such a large theatre of war and the need for immediate manpower time was needed to train effective forces under competent and then imaginative commanders.
The acceptance of high casualty rates in obtaining or defending objectives and the acceptance of high attrition of army equipment.
Soviet organisational mistakes and there premature multiple front offensives, caused by Stalins lack of patience in the 1941-1942-early 43.
The depth of the initial German advance the Soviet Unions Geography and the need of Stalin to consider military economic and political matters concurrently.
Also the ability of the German economy to sustain a war of attrition on multiple fronts.

[ljadw]

As was the Red Army .

Yeah as IIRC the Soviets had fewer motorized vehicles in 1944-45 than the Germans did in 1941

I don't think so . US Lend Lease "motor vehicles" to the USSR alone during WWII, prolly far outweighed all German auto production for the whole war. It was this lend lease , that enabled the USSR to concentrate on building "tanks and other AFV's" as the US sent them something like 400,000 vehicles ,(200,000 truck alone) IIRC. They didn't need anymore trucks.

You make a connection that is not proved:before the first LL goods arrived in 1942,the Soviets made tanks and trucks .Without the LL aid,they also would have made tanks and trucks :that they received 200000 LL trucks does not mean that they could not made these trucks themselves,without hindering the tank production .The plants that produced trucks could not make tanks and vice versa .

The Soviets accepted LL trucks,because there was no alternative : if they refused the LL trucks,they would not have more LL aircraft,or LL tanks, or LL artillery,etc ...The Soviets accepted what they could have .

[ljadw]

Other point : it is not so that LL motor vehicles to the SU outweighed German car production : German automobile production was 163000,trucks :316000,half-tracks : 43000 Total = 522000 (Source : USSBS )

[ChristopherPerrien]

My contention was only the Soviet army was not "horse-drawn" like the German Army army. Also that the 41 figure used as a claim is wrong too.

[doogal]

They lasted as long as Adolf Hitler lived. If he had lived longer they would have fought longer.