The logic of trained Panzer crews getting blown to bits in training tanks while significantly stronger machines are rusting in the depots is questionable when looked from the military operations POV.Appleknocker27 wrote:Factory support of parts and ammunition played a very prominent role. The financial aspect of investing time and money into an obsolete foreign tank with no ability to upgrade it played a large role as well. The thought process behind the use of French equipment was sound IMHO, looking at it purely from a logistical/financial standpoint.
That's why Romanians insisted on 47 mm guns for tanks at a minimum, and when Germans failed to provide, they went for their own improvisations, putting captured soviet guns on surviving Renault R35 and Skoda R2 chassis; more dramatically when they put captured soviet guns on captured soviet chassis (TACAM T60).The Romanians also had R35's, but their 37mm gun fared no better against T34's, so what's the point?
That would require that the production lines continue to some extent, obviously. Given that the production line was French one can see the method; given the outcome was defeat the method was method to madness, unfortunately.The only tank that would have been able to help the Romanians was the S35, of which the Germans captured around 300. The idea that the Romanians could have benefitted from a handful of these is not very viable. How many would the Germans give up? How in the world would Romania be able to keep them running (lack of spare parts, service parts, etc.)? The odds against effective use are huge...
First of all, if these were so unreliable, why did the "competent" German military send 90 of them to the most difficult terrain (mountainous tundra) of the Barbarossa operation? Also, the modifications to make repairs easier had already been implemented by Armistice, and new builds had had these changes built in. The rest of the quoted paragraph is little than a minimally substantiated and almost meaningless ad-hominem."The operational flaw was its poor mechanical reliability. The suspension units were too weak and too complicated, demanding enormous maintenance efforts, especially since the cast armour modules did not allow an easy access to the suspension and engine.[4] Repairing broken tracks in the field was well-nigh impossible.[12] This had been caused by the fact that there was no central institution regulating French tank development.[citation needed] The Army branches issued very vague specifications, leaving it to private enterprise to come up with precise proposals. The French machine tool national stock was relatively outdated and tank designs reflected the limited existing production facilities.
Building SOMUAS beyond 1942 would have required a major turret redesign, sure; but that's another discussion. For 1941-42 OstFront they were quite OK.
To require a solution there should be a problem. Somuas operated in the Arctic tundra, the Sahara desert and everywhere in between. Furthermore, the same style of suspension was used by Italians for the P26 tank.To introduce a Christie suspension — the obvious solution — demanded a thorough industrial modernization and the raising of quality standards."
So I stand by my critique of German use of French industrial base in the 1940-1941 timeframe.