How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

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Orwell1984
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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#271

Post by Orwell1984 » 23 Sep 2016, 20:05

stg 44 wrote: The 'heavy regiment' was an artillery unit. The 6th Battalion Green Howards of the Yorkshire regiment apparently was there as well, the only infantry unit attached. I thought they were added later, but apparently they were there from the 23rd on near Gravelines on Aa Canal with the French. Apparently they were a newly raised unit of reservists.
Yes I am quite aware of what the "heavy regiment" was.

As to the 6th Howards, here's a brief history of the battalion in the time period.
6th Battalion, The Green Howards (Alexandra, Princess of Wales’s Own Yorkshire Regiment) (T.A.)

69th Infantry Brigade – 11 September 1939 to 31 August 1945
The battalion was raised from the 4th Battalion at Middlesbrough and had its first officer commissioned on May 25th, 1939. The 6th Green Howards were initially to share the 4th Green Howards’ HQ in Middlesborough while it established itself. In June 1939, the 6th Green Howards was established and had its companies co-located with their counterparts in the 4th Battalion. ‘A’ Company at Richmond and Thirsk, ‘B’ Company at Guisborough, ‘C’ Company at Skelton and ‘D’ Company at Yarm, Northallerton and Stokesley. HQ Company would be located in Redcar and Skelton. The brigade and battalion were administered and embodied under the 50th Infantry Division from September 3rd, to October 2nd, 1939. After call-up the battalion served on guard duties at Middlesbrough, Redcar, Stockton and Hartlepool. In April 1940, it left Stockton railway station for Dover, embarking on April 24th, 1940. It landed at Calais on the 25th and moved to Irles, France to work on the RAF landing grounds. It moved to Sauchy Cauchy on May 17th, 1940 to prepare defences there. The battalion was moved to Canal du Nord and withdrew the next day to Saudimont. It was in positions on May 20th, on the River Scarpe at Roveux. After that it withdrew to Farbus and by nightfall was located at Vimy Ridge. The next day it moved to Gandecourt. The 23rd Division was now placed under the command of GHQ BEF and the battalion moved to Gravelines for defence for two days. After it withdrew to Dunkirk and to the coast there at Bray Dunes on May 29th.

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Guaporense
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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#272

Post by Guaporense » 18 Oct 2016, 02:59

David1819 wrote:How did they manage to last this long? or you could put the question as why did it take the Russians over three years to get to Berlin.

By early 1942 Germany was more or less overstretched exposed and battered by the Russian winter with no realistic chance of regaining the initiative.

What measures did Germany take in order to make this happen? The third Reich seems to have expanded extremely quickly but very very slowly eroded away yet Hitler was not keen on defensive strategy? With Hitler always preferring offensive methods you would have though the third Reich would collapse very quickly?
Well, it's more of a question of how the USSR managed to actually survive rather than how long they took to win. While they had a larger population than Germany it wasn't that much larger (after Barbarossa the USSR's territory was reduced to 130 million people vis 90 million for Greater Germany or only 1.45 times bigger) while they were losing 4-6 soldiers for each German casualty in 1942 and 1943. In proportion to demographics they were at a great disadvantage at these loss ratios.

And it's not like the other Allies did anything significant for ca. 20 months after the failure of Barbarossa either, in fact Germany's allies (Romania, Hungary) made greater contributions during the 1942-1943 period.

Overall, that's the interesting question: how the USSR survived. It also shows how strong Russia can be as they are always really hard to defeat.
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz


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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#273

Post by Stiltzkin » 18 Oct 2016, 09:19

in fact Germany's allies (Romania, Hungary) made greater contributions during the 1942-1943 period.
Wrong.
https://books.google.de/books?id=qdr9AQ ... e&q&f=true

Lets take Romania as an example (the largest input):
Net mobilisation for each month was about 100-160,000 men.
Initially they fielded 585,000 troops, 472,000 in Fall Blau, replacing half of the Barbarossa total.
In 43 they drop by more than 65%, 648,000 to 225,000. The biggest contribution besides 41, was 44, there is a last major flow into the forces, later they are forced to switch sides, paying dearly in the subsequent operations (1/3 of their KIA was against the Axis in less than 9 months).
This was the problem, Germany could not field more men, relative to the Soviet build up. The Axis Allies contributions were never enough in the first place. Unwillingness to participate in such a campaign until their borders were endangered, having different interests, is what can be derived from these figures.
It also shows how strong Russia can be as they are always really hard to defeat.
In a defensive posture with the right alliances perhaps, or being part of a big coalition. In the offensive they never managed to get quite far in Europe, (without any alliance - on the other side Siberias climate posed a bigger threat than any opposing forces), except fighting much smaller nations with less manpower (sustaining very high casualties). Their offensive capabilites are always overrated (while their historical defensive ratings were underestimated): From Austerlitz, Friedland, to the Crimea, or Finland, Poland in the 20s, Sweden in the 18th, repelled everytime. Also USSR does not equate to Russia.
They possess political and diplomatic finesse and espionage.
reduced to 130 million people vis 90 million
Accumulating these numbers is useless and very artificial, qvist made a good post about this. http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8&start=30

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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#274

Post by antwony » 18 Oct 2016, 10:13

Stiltzkin wrote:Their offensive capabilites are always overrated ... Sweden in the 18th, repelled everytime.
Russia/ Novgorod did lose a lot of wars with Sweden. But they won that one.

The Czar considered himself the rightful successor to title of Caeser of the (Eastern) Roman Empire and that Constantinople was there's. Russia spent over a 1,000 years trying to defeat the Ottomans.

Russians aren't all that.

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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#275

Post by Art » 18 Oct 2016, 22:06

Probably not a subject of this topic, but of all Russo-Swedish wars in XVIII-XIX centuries
- Sweden lost the Great Northern War of 1700-1721
- also the war of 1741-1743
- the war of 1788-1790 was a draw
- finally Sweden lost the war of 1808-1809

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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#276

Post by Stiltzkin » 19 Oct 2016, 05:38

Sweden lost the Great Northern War of 1700-1721
Again coalitions. No territorial gains inside their heartland. I am talking about successful individual advances into any territory besides that of smaller belligerents. The other listed conflicts were won by dragging the Swedes deep into their land.
In central Europe, whenever someone is trying to expand, counter-alliances are formed and prohibit such expansionist behaviour. 1815 is an example of land distribution between 3 factions. WW2 a Stalin - Hitler pact enabled the annexation of territory. I do not think that there is even one example of a brilliant victory comparable to Austerlitz, their victories were usually costly.

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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#277

Post by Art » 19 Oct 2016, 08:33

Stiltzkin wrote:
Sweden lost the Great Northern War of 1700-1721
Again coalitions. No territorial gains inside their heartland.
That's a very restrictive condition. Practically all major European wars of the modern era were coalition war for reasons that you described in your message. Napoleon and Bismark also waged war as a part of coalition. In general military-wise you can find little difference between Imperial Russia and other European powers
The other listed conflicts were won by dragging the Swedes deep into their land.
You must be confusing something.

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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#278

Post by Entschuldigung » 05 Dec 2016, 12:27

What I find interesting about the many discussions, facts and figures given by many historians, commentator's and the like is the glaring paradox between the narrative re. the state of the Wehrmacht and Panzer forces after the winter thaw in early 42.

Most proclaim that the Wehrmacht was on it's knees, everything from there being only 30 operational tanks, to one million casualties, the sacking of Von Braustich, etc.

Then there is a leap to the Fall blau period and the subsequent campaign, whereby miraculously The Axis forces had to split the former Armee Gruppe Sud into A and B, because of the sheer size of the overall forces.

And yes I know that other sections of the front were stripped of at least 50% of their men and materiel, but if I'm correct, Germany was still NOT entirely on a war footing (although after the failure at Moscow some action was taken by NSDAP and OKW, etc heads to garner more resources.

Even with the supposed lull during March - May, I cannot see how the Wehrmacht and other arms were able to muster enough resources to launch such an massive offensive as was Fall Blau.

And please, I'm no newbie, I've been studying the Eastern Front for 20 years, so spare the usual anecdotal and common narratives that have been floating around, I've heard them all.

The Problem lies with the historians I believe, in this case, keeping in mind the difficulty in getting reliable figures in this area.

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BDV
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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#279

Post by BDV » 29 Dec 2016, 13:46

Entschuldigung wrote:
Even with the supposed lull during March - May, I cannot see how the Wehrmacht and other arms were able to muster enough resources to launch such an massive offensive as was Fall Blau.
Well AGS was squirreling away supplies since December (see the Railway on Ice at Kiev). Outside Feodosiya Landings there was little activity until Bustard Hunt.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#280

Post by doogal » 31 Dec 2016, 22:38

What I find interesting about the many discussions, facts and figures given by many historians, commentator's and the like is the glaring paradox between the narrative re. the state of the Wehrmacht and Panzer forces after the winter thaw in early 42.

Most proclaim that the Wehrmacht was on it's knees, everything from there being only 30 operational tanks, to one million casualties, the sacking of Von Braustich, etc.

Then there is a leap to the Fall blau period and the subsequent campaign, whereby miraculously The Axis forces had to split the former Armee Gruppe Sud into A and B, because of the sheer size of the overall forces.

And yes I know that other sections of the front were stripped of at least 50% of their men and materiel, but if I'm correct, Germany was still NOT entirely on a war footing (although after the failure at Moscow some action was taken by NSDAP and OKW, etc heads to garner more resources.

Even with the supposed lull during March - May, I cannot see how the Wehrmacht and other arms were able to muster enough resources to launch such an massive offensive as was Fall Blau.

And please, I'm no newbie, I've been studying the Eastern Front for 20 years, so spare the usual anecdotal and common narratives that have been floating around, I've heard them all.

The Problem lies with the historians I believe, in this case, keeping in mind the difficulty in getting reliable figures in this area.
1.There is no paradox between on one hand parts of an army group and its subordinate armies having been depleted and fought to a stand still from 1941 to early 1942 and then there subsequent recovery. In any narrative the time frame in between is the same

2.No one leaps from January of 42 to June of 42 there are 4 intervening months where large scale combat slackens.
3.While the fighting continues centrally other areas are quieter.
4, There is a large country supplying the forces in the field throughout these periods.
5, Perhaps you are identifying certain authors use of dramatisation.
6.Even if the German economy was not on a total war footing and certain meausres were taken they would take far to much time to have a real time impact from Dec 1941 - June 1942.
7.If you have heard all the "common narratives" i fail to see the point of the question.
8, All armies practice the conservation of forces ...... while in and out of combat......
The Axis forces had to split the former Armee Gruppe Sud into A and B, because of the sheer size of the overall forces.
thats just not true ....

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Re: How did the Germans last over three years once Barbarossa failed?

#281

Post by steevh » 02 Jan 2017, 21:23

Entschuldigung wrote:What I find interesting about the many discussions, facts and figures given by many historians, commentator's and the like is the glaring paradox between the narrative re. the state of the Wehrmacht and Panzer forces after the winter thaw in early 42.

Most proclaim that the Wehrmacht was on it's knees, everything from there being only 30 operational tanks, to one million casualties, the sacking of Von Braustich, etc.

Then there is a leap to the Fall blau period and the subsequent campaign, whereby miraculously The Axis forces had to split the former Armee Gruppe Sud into A and B, because of the sheer size of the overall forces.

And yes I know that other sections of the front were stripped of at least 50% of their men and materiel, but if I'm correct, Germany was still NOT entirely on a war footing (although after the failure at Moscow some action was taken by NSDAP and OKW, etc heads to garner more resources.

Even with the supposed lull during March - May, I cannot see how the Wehrmacht and other arms were able to muster enough resources to launch such an massive offensive as was Fall Blau.

And please, I'm no newbie, I've been studying the Eastern Front for 20 years, so spare the usual anecdotal and common narratives that have been floating around, I've heard them all.

The Problem lies with the historians I believe, in this case, keeping in mind the difficulty in getting reliable figures in this area.
I think the major factor that is overlooked in the standard histories is the strength of the German Panzer arm, and its strategic superiority.

Even though the Germans had taken a beating overall, and the Russians had made great strides, overall, the destruction of the Russian 1942 Kharkov offensive and the subsequent push to Stalingrad showed the Germans could wreak havoc by achieving Panzer superiority on a limited front.

What then happened was strategic hubris on Hitler's part, where he failed to understand that the Fall Blau victories did not herald a return to the halcyon days of 1941, so he got involved in a battle of attrition at Stalingrad, which could only to be to the Soviet advantage, even though the Russians were taking higher casualties.

In 1943 the Germans delayed Kursk, allowing the Russians to prepare their defences, negating the tactical advantage of the German armor. After that, Russian numerical superiority in all arms meant the Germans would never be able to exploit any kind of strategic surprise. They could have had a Battle of the Bulge scenario in the east, but it would have been quite pointless. A 100 km breakthrough in Russia was not really going to change anything.

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