Reading Michael Citino's The German Way of War

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Felix C
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Reading Michael Citino's The German Way of War

#1

Post by Felix C » 19 Sep 2015, 20:07

There is the statement that German doctrine was to always attack in the flank to create confusion which leads to other opportunities. If the defender, Germans in this case, are too weak to attack an Army, then a Corps, if too weak, then a Division, etc. Always attack.

Reading the above and seeing how often Watch on the Rhine is criticized as squandering reserves better used to defend the Rhine, does the Ardeness attack make more sense in light of the above? An attack on a soft or weak sector to create confusion which can lead to opportunities is the German way of war and to sit on the defensive is not.

Your thoughts?

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Re: Reading Michael Citino's The German Way of War

#2

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Sep 2015, 20:30

I don't see how that statement is applicable.

I think it's better to look at the german actions on the eastern front 1941-mid 1944. It is very telling.

They defend most of the time (with a fluid front, and then counterattack, counterstrike, or counteroffensive to restore it). Generally speaking most of the counteroffensives were much weaker after 1942.

It is actually the soviets that are attacking most of the time while the germans bide their time for a counterstrike or counteroffensive. The germans counterattack frequently as a means of defense, though.


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Re: Reading Michael Citino's The German Way of War

#3

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Sep 2015, 21:32

In the offensive, the mentality from the leadership perspective was to get the pockets, and to keep on making the pursuit. Blitzkrieg is about taking advantage of the opponent's disorder and stopping them from reforming. During this time, the low hanging fruit can be obtained. If they reform/solidify, then the gig is up.

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Re: Reading Michael Citino's The German Way of War

#4

Post by Graeme Sydney » 16 Oct 2015, 00:56

Cult Icon wrote:\ The germans counterattack frequently as a means of defense, though.
If think you would find that in any trained up established army that is the doctrine down to squad level - part of any defence is to have a counter attack planned and, given time, rehearsed.

Having said that the Germans may have a particular emphasis but that would be more likely to training and leadership rather than doctrine. Many armies have good doctrine, knowledge, SOP's and tactics but that doesn't say they are carried out.

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Re: Reading Michael Citino's The German Way of War

#5

Post by Graeme Sydney » 16 Oct 2015, 01:00

Felix C wrote:
Reading the above and seeing how often Watch on the Rhine is criticized as squandering reserves better used to defend the Rhine, does the Ardeness attack make more sense in light of the above?
I thought the attack in the Ardenes was a better example of Hitler's optimism, military/national gambling and interference rather than an example of German doctrine.

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Re: Reading Michael Citino's The German Way of War

#6

Post by Felix C » 16 Oct 2015, 11:03

von Rundstedt did recommend the small solution vs. Hitler's larger offensive.

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Re: Reading Michael Citino's The German Way of War

#7

Post by doogal » 04 Nov 2015, 14:42

German defensive doctrine was hampered across all fronts by many things but all variations included the use of local counterattacks. They keep the enemy off balance could maintain moral ( but not over extended periods ) and regained lost ground... It also keeps men tactically aware and ready for the inevitable enemy offensive.
Watcht on Rhine was a hail mary style of operation rather than a local counter attack, it wasn't intended to disrupt but to rupture. For this style of theatre level operation (as it was imagined by Hitler) Larger resources which Germany did not possess were needed. I don't think this can be linked to German tactical defensive doctrine.
And the "small solution" made no sense in light of the overall position in the west.
Felix c wrote: An attack on a soft or weak sector to create confusion which can lead to opportunities is the German way of war and to sit on the defensive is not.
Germany since Moltke have emphasised mobile warfare, but the attacking of a weak sector and any resulting confusion is just a by product of good military practice and not particularly a German way of war. Germany looked for a balanced offensive /defensive tactical solution to her geography which is reflected in the doctrinal nature of her ground forces.

And if they had attacked the Ardennes over several days caused damage taken prisoners etc halted and then continued on a tactical level with other limited operations along the western fronts I would consider this an expression of an active defensive.....

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