you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

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OpanaPointer
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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#76

Post by OpanaPointer » 07 May 2016, 03:45

pugsville wrote:in the first 2 years of the war the allies made some large blunders and in may ways up util dec 1941 Germany had really had the war go as well as it could unreasonably be expected to go without depending into complete fantasy,
Ah, but then der Führer decided to show the generals how to win a war.
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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#77

Post by ljadw » 07 May 2016, 06:38

pugsville wrote:in the first 2 years of the war the allies made some large blunders


and in may ways up util dec 1941 Germany had really had the war go as well as it could unreasonably be expected to go without depending into complete fantasy,

1 ) What blunders ? :o


2) until december 1941 there were failures as : the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, failure of the U Boats, failure in North Africa, failure of Barbarossa and Typhoon . :wink:


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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#78

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 May 2016, 18:17

ljadw wrote:1 ) What blunders ? :o
Weseruebung
Plan D
Sonnenblum
Brevity
Battleaxe
Rodeos, Circuses, and Ramrods
...
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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#79

Post by pugsville » 08 May 2016, 01:43

ljadw wrote:
pugsville wrote:in the first 2 years of the war the allies made some large blunders


and in may ways up util dec 1941 Germany had really had the war go as well as it could unreasonably be expected to go without depending into complete fantasy,

1 ) What blunders ? :o


2) until december 1941 there were failures as : the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, failure of the U Boats, failure in North Africa, failure of Barbarossa and Typhoon . :wink:

the french 1940 campaign was inlay decided by the incredibly poor modified Dyle plan. without this piece of massive incompetence the defeat of france is not a given, and perhaps unlikely.

the 1941 Russian campaign the Russian forces were incredible badly deployed and refused to take any defensive measures this cost the Red army vast casualties and handed the opening phase with any real battle.

boats is the British updated the convoy system at the start. the U boat campaign would not even have started well.

if the British had not stopped the compass offensive the Italians wold have lost all of north Africa before Rommel even arrived.

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#80

Post by ljadw » 08 May 2016, 08:53

pugsville wrote:
ljadw wrote:
pugsville wrote:in the first 2 years of the war the allies made some large blunders


and in may ways up util dec 1941 Germany had really had the war go as well as it could unreasonably be expected to go without depending into complete fantasy,

1 ) What blunders ? :o


2) until december 1941 there were failures as : the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, failure of the U Boats, failure in North Africa, failure of Barbarossa and Typhoon . :wink:

the french 1940 campaign was inlay decided by the incredibly poor modified Dyle plan. without this piece of massive incompetence the defeat of france is not a given, and perhaps unlikely.

the 1941 Russian campaign the Russian forces were incredible badly deployed and refused to take any defensive measures this cost the Red army vast casualties and handed the opening phase with any real battle.

boats is the British updated the convoy system at the start. the U boat campaign would not even have started well.

if the British had not stopped the compass offensive the Italians wold have lost all of north Africa before Rommel even arrived.
1)I have an other opinion about the Dyle Plan, besides the question is not if the Dyle plan was incompetent,but if there was a better alternative

2) Idem : The soviet deployment was not that bad (most units were concentrated far away from the border) and was there a better alternative ?

3)There was not much that Britain could do MORE against the U Boats

4) The British did not stop Compass : Compass was stopped before the arrival of the Germans because of the distance AND of the Italian resistance :if the Italians had collapsed, O' Connor would have defeatedgeneral distance .

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#81

Post by ljadw » 08 May 2016, 09:00

Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:1 ) What blunders ? :o
Weseruebung
Plan D
Sonnenblum
Brevity
Battleaxe
Rodeos, Circuses, and Ramrods
...

I don't believe that one can explain British/German defeats by blunders;this is overlooking the fact that there was an opponent.

Was the German success of Weserübung caused by a British blunder ? This would be overlooking the quality of the German soldier and weapons AND his advantageous strategic situation .It is obvious that it would be almost impossible for Britain to remain in Norway ,given its long supply line by sea .

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#82

Post by pugsville » 08 May 2016, 12:31

ljadw wrote:
pugsville wrote:
ljadw wrote:
pugsville wrote:in the first 2 years of the war the allies made some large blunders


and in may ways up util dec 1941 Germany had really had the war go as well as it could unreasonably be expected to go without depending into complete fantasy,

1 ) What blunders ? :o


2) until december 1941 there were failures as : the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, failure of the U Boats, failure in North Africa, failure of Barbarossa and Typhoon . :wink:

the french 1940 campaign was inlay decided by the incredibly poor modified Dyle plan. without this piece of massive incompetence the defeat of france is not a given, and perhaps unlikely.

the 1941 Russian campaign the Russian forces were incredible badly deployed and refused to take any defensive measures this cost the Red army vast casualties and handed the opening phase with any real battle.

boats is the British updated the convoy system at the start. the U boat campaign would not even have started well.

if the British had not stopped the compass offensive the Italians wold have lost all of north Africa before Rommel even arrived.
1)I have an other opinion about the Dyle Plan, besides the question is not if the Dyle plan was incompetent,but if there was a better alternative

2) Idem : The soviet deployment was not that bad (most units were concentrated far away from the border) and was there a better alternative ?

3)There was not much that Britain could do MORE against the U Boats

4) The British did not stop Compass : Compass was stopped before the arrival of the Germans because of the distance AND of the Italian resistance :if the Italians had collapsed, O' Connor would have defeatedgeneral distance .
1/ The Dyle plan
a number of alternatives eg
"Gamelin initially proposed the less risky "E (Escaut) Plan", which called for a defense (except for the extreme west in Flanders) based upon a series of fortifications along much of the actual Belgian-French border rather than in Belgium proper"

the revised dale plan committed the entire mobile strategic reserve which fundamentally prevented any real chance to react to unforeseen events.

"The Dyle Plan was a fundamental flaw in the Allied strategy and one of the decisive factors contributing to the Allied defeat in the Battle of France. According to British historian Julian Jackson, the fall of France can be greatly attributed to the choice by Gamelin to send the French strategic reserve, the 7th army, far from the main German thrust, which made him unable to react to the German plans."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dyle_Plan

2/ incorrect muchos the Russian strength was deployed very close to the border with almost no reassemble precautions taken, despite al the warning signs. bridges intact, planes grouped in large clusters.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
"In early 1941 Stalin authorized the State Defense Plan 1941 (DP-41), which along with the Mobilization Plan 1941 (MP-41), called for the deployment of 186 divisions, as the first strategic echelon, in the four military districts[a] of the western Soviet Union that faced the Axis territories; and the deployment of another 51 divisions along the Dvina and Dnieper rivers as the second strategic echelon under Stavka control, which in the case of a German invasion was tasked to spearhead a Soviet counteroffensive along with the remaining forces of the first echelon.[93] But on 22 June 1941 the first echelon only contained 171 divisions, numbering 2.6–2.9 million;[2][94][95] and the second strategic echelon contained 57 divisions that were still mobilizing, most of which were still seriously understrength.[96] The second echelon was undetected by German intelligence until days after the invasion commenced, in most cases only when the German ground forces bumped into them.[96]

At the start of the invasion, the manpower of the Soviet military force that had been mobilized was 5.3–5.5 million,[2][97] and it was still increasing as the Soviet reserve force of 14 million, with at least basic military training, continued to mobilize.[98][99] The Red Army was dispersed and still preparing when the invasion commenced. Their units were often separated and lacked adequate transportation.[100]"

3/ U boats V convoys, the introduction of full convoy system and focus on escorts rather than hunter groups had a dramatic effect on the U boat campaign. the early German success was mainly due to the british not applying the lesson of ww1 as far as convoys went.

4/ operation compass.
operation commas was ca;;ed off manly to send troops to Greece, compass was called off to the despite the feelings on o'conner who bitterly retreated followed orders, and the intervention in Greece went forward despite military analysis would lead to the complete lose of the force sent.

note operations in the desert were also greatly hampered by two intelligence failures, the us consul reports being sent to Washington and intercepted and the code broken and read by Rommel and poor battle radio doctrine leading to pretty much Rommel being able to read much of British tactical radio.

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#83

Post by ljadw » 08 May 2016, 14:04

About the Dyle/Escaut question : going to the Escaut only was politically impossible,as it would result in the abandonment of Brussels and the industrial heart of Belgium, besides it was more than dubious if the Belgians could retreat to the Escaut .other point is that the Escaut line would not help the French : Gamelin was faced with the impossible problem to defend a longer front line with less manpower.

To have more men,he needed to go to the north,to link with the 22 Belgian divisions;to have a shorter front, he also needed to go to the north= to the Dyle,not to the Escaut:if he went to the Escaut ,he still would have to protect a frontline from Roubaix to Luxemburg,for which he had no forces,and this frontline was not fortified.

If he went to the Dyle,his frontline would be shortened to Namur /Luxemburg, and he hoped(expected ?) that in Belgium,the frontline would be fortified . Besides, the Escaut could not be held .

Thus,he took the logical choice ;the result was bad, but there was no better alternative;thus one can not claim that it was a blunder .


About the 7th army:I am still amazed that after 70 years historians are still parotting each other (by laziness),without looking if what they claim is correct and although the informations are available .

The 7th army was NOT the French mobile reserve :it consisted of ONE armoured ,2 motorised and 3 infantry divisions and its supplies were moving by railway ;these units were considered as the fastest French units (which was meaningless) and had as mission to go to Breda to protect Antwerp,and,if they were very lucky,to link with the Dutch;reality was that when they approached Breda, the Germans were already there ,and they had to retreat(which indicates their weakness).

if the 7th Army was concentrated in the south (Sedan) ,the Germans would break through north of Sedan,which they did;the German schwerpunkt was north of Sedan :between Brussels and Monthermé .

Gamelin had no strategic reserve ,a strategic reseve was a luxury he could not afford .

He was faced by the choice between Scylla and Charibdis ;the Dyle line was the weakenest and most threatened;thus it was logical that everything that was available was going to the north .Sedan just had to make do with it .

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#84

Post by ljadw » 08 May 2016, 14:33

About the Soviet placing : the Western Military Districts are not the border:exemple Minsk is far away, so was Bialystok ,the First strategic staffel was placed immediately before the Stalin line, the second behind the Stalin line .This was done mainly for logistical reasons .
About the preparations :

first, there was no need for more security,as there were no indications of a nearing attack .

second : more security would not have helped, because generally the situation of the Red Army was that bad that it could not stop a German attack:it would take months(or years) before the Soviet Army of june 1941 had a chance against the Wehrmacht .And my guess /conviction is that the Stavka knew the truth and that they could only hope that there would be no attack in 1941 and that meanwhile, they did as the ostrich :if you don't think about it, it will not happen .

third :the evening before the attack, Moscow gave the order to be prepared for war .

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#85

Post by pugsville » 08 May 2016, 14:58

1/ france 1940

reserves are not a luxury but a necessity, to have no reserves is to totally make any failure possibly total.it was not the logical choice but one in that was against basic strategic principles.

One armoured divisions was all 100% of their armoured divisions. and th performance of the 7th army was capable of fighting the germans to a stand still. they were forced to retreat by events in the south.

"The Battle of Hannut, from 12–13 May, was the largest tank battle yet fought, with about 1,500 armoured fighting vehicles involved.[110] The French disabled about 160 German tanks for 91 Hotchkiss H35 and 30 Somua S35 tanks destroyed or captured.[111][112] (The Germans controlled the battlefield after a French withdrawal and recovered many of their knocked-out tanks, the German net loss amounting to 20 tanks of the 3rd Panzer Division and 29 of the 4th Panzer Division).[113][114] Prioux had achieved his mission in stalling the Panzers and allowing the First Army to settle, was a strategic victory for the French.[115][116] Hoepner had succeeded in diverting the First Army from Sedan, which was his most important mission but failed to destroy or forestall it. The French escaped encirclement and gave invaluable support to the BEF in Dunkirk two weeks later.[117] On 14 May, having been stalled at Hannut, Hoepner tried to break the French line again, against orders, leading to The Battle of the Gembloux Gap.[118] This was the only time in the campaign when German armour frontally attacked a strongly held fortified position. The attempt was repelled by the 1st Moroccan Infantry Division, costing the 4th Panzer Division another 42 tanks, 26 of which were irreparable but the French defensive success was made irrelevant by events further south"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... d_Gembloux


2/ Barbarossa

there were a vast numbers of warnings and information ignored in the lead up to Barbarossa there were a vast number of indications and warnings of an impeding attacks.

''in all Moscow received more than 100 reports of impeding german invasion'
" the Luftwaffe conducted frequent overflights of soviet territory in some 500 violations of soviet air space before the invasion"
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=Ht ... re&f=false

".. called for the forward deployment of 237 of the 303 divisions.. '
'.. first echelon (6-30 miles deep) 57 divisions; second echelon (30-60 miles) 52 divisions ; third echelon (60-240 miles) - 62 divisions..'
'this positioning of so much of the Red Army in forward areas played into the German forces's hands"

https://books.google.com.au/books?id=9J ... ct&f=false

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#86

Post by ljadw » 08 May 2016, 16:40

None of these warnings were reliable.only the presence of the German mobile divisions on the border with the SU would indicate that something serious was happening,and these mobile divisions arrived at the border only at the last moment,they were dedected,but it was to late to do something .

23 april : 56 German divisions on the border

1 may : 60

14 may : 72

5 june : 93

most of the mobile divisions arrived only after 14 june ;on 5 june there were only 5 Pz and 2 mot divisions near the border with the SU,which means that the WM was at that moment not capable to start an attack .

Staffel IVb started on 3 june and finished on 23 june only and transported 12 PzD and 12 Mot divisions to east Germany .

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#87

Post by pugsville » 09 May 2016, 02:46

pugsville wrote: 2/ Barbarossa

there were a vast numbers of warnings and information ignored in the lead up to Barbarossa there were a vast number of indications and warnings of an impeding attacks.

''in all Moscow received more than 100 reports of impeding german invasion'
" the Luftwaffe conducted frequent overflights of soviet territory in some 500 violations of soviet air space before the invasion"
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=Ht ... re&f=false
I refer you to my previous answer. there were a very large number of warnings, a very large number of signs about the German buildup. the massive amounts airspace violations and overflights for starters.

read almost any book the generally accepted view is that there was plenty of signs and that stalin was pig headed and incredibly stupid not to face facts and the unreadiness and poor deployment of the red army cost the soviet union much greater losses than it would have suffered otherwise.

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#88

Post by Erwinn » 31 May 2016, 11:24

pugsville wrote:
pugsville wrote: 2/ Barbarossa

there were a vast numbers of warnings and information ignored in the lead up to Barbarossa there were a vast number of indications and warnings of an impeding attacks.

''in all Moscow received more than 100 reports of impeding german invasion'
" the Luftwaffe conducted frequent overflights of soviet territory in some 500 violations of soviet air space before the invasion"
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=Ht ... re&f=false
I refer you to my previous answer. there were a very large number of warnings, a very large number of signs about the German buildup. the massive amounts airspace violations and overflights for starters.

read almost any book the generally accepted view is that there was plenty of signs and that stalin was pig headed and incredibly stupid not to face facts and the unreadiness and poor deployment of the red army cost the soviet union much greater losses than it would have suffered otherwise.
Well perhaps one can say - Soviets were also thinking of attacking the Germany(Likewise) and they decided it's better that the war started by Germans. That's maybe why Stalin ignored all those reports and airspace violations. :milwink:

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#89

Post by ljadw » 31 May 2016, 13:03

Soviets were not thinking of attacking Germany,and air space violations are not proving that an enemy attack is nearing : the U2 airspace violations did not indicate a US attack on the SU .

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Re: you will never convince me that Germany could not have won this war

#90

Post by Erwinn » 01 Jun 2016, 10:59

Yes you can violate airspace for a few times, that would be OK but doing that 500 times... That's something else.

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