#75
Post
by histan » 09 Nov 2016, 02:38
The German's certainly believed that the Russians were aware of the German preparations. see this entry from von Bock's diary:
"11.03.1941 Reports from spies in Lithuania speak of major Russian manoeuvres in the Baltic States and claim that these manoeuvres are part of a secret concentration of forces against Germany. Unbelievable! But it is certain that the Russians know of our buildup and are taking countermeasures."
Barbarossa is quoted in NATO planning doctrine as an example of poor strategic planning - a failure to match "Ends", "Ways", and "Means" The "ends" would be determined by the political leadership (Hitler) but I am not sure he gave a clear statement of the "end state" he wished the military to achieve. There was significant confusion and disagreement on the "ways" by which the "end state" would be achieved. Most importantly, the means provided were inadequate, whatever the chosen "ways".
German strategic planning was uncoordinated and incoherent throughout the war but particularly so from 1941 onward.
I am probably not the only person who experiences some form of "cognitive dissonance" when asked to believe that the Germans were "better" than the Western Allies in the Normandy Campaign.
The facts on the ground are clear - in early June 1944 the allies were in England, by early September the allies had crossed the channel, passed through France and were at the German border. Equally, in early June 1944 the Germans were on the channel coast in France and in early September they had retreated through France, were rushing troops to defend the German border, and expressing concern that way into Germany was wide open.
Yet at the same time I am expected to believe that the Germans were "better" (either as soldiers or in warfighting) than the allies.
Looking at the strategic level, it is clear that the allied invasion of Normandy was a classic example of excellent strategic planning - it matched ends, ways, and means, and in fact developed new means specifically so that certain ways could be used. The allies were much better than the Germans at the strategic level.
Similarly, at the operational level the allies developed an operational concept that took account of their strengths and weaknesses, particularly with regard to manpower (morale and casualties) that was remarkably successful. The Germans had two operational concepts that they attempted to use to defeat the landings - both failed. After that they seemed to just "give up" and wait to be defeated.
Nathan Bedford Forrest when asked how he achieved his success is reported to have replied 'M'am I got there first with the most men'. Given that the Germans were first on the battlefield in Normandy it is extremely difficult to understand why they could not produce "the most men". Particularly since all of the allied men, shells, bullets, etc had to supplied from England, moved across the Channel and landed on the beaches. A major German operational and logistical failure.
Which leaves only the tactical level. All of the German attempts at deliberate attacks by their panzer divisions failed to achieve their objectives. Some attacks by allied armoured divisions failed to achieve their objectives but some did achieve their objectives. Since none of the German deliberate attacks were successful they could not stop the invasion or drive the allies back into the sea. Enough of the allied deliberate attacks were successful to ensure that allied operational level objectives were achieved and so the allied campaign was successful.
The above is not an attempt to dismiss the analysis of individual battles and the much misunderstood modelling construct CEV. It is an attempt to place it in context. There is an interesting discussion to be had about the modelling work and areas of investigation relating to CEV - the impact of collective performance, collective training, combat experience, etc. Allied divisions with no combat experience against German divisions with combat experience. Poor collective training of allied formations. Skills fade experienced by US infantry replacements during their transit time from the US to joining units in Europe, etc, etc.
Regards
John
