Mark:
Thank you very much for the links.
OMK
Wehrmacht Basic Training WWII vs. WWI
Re Training
There is an oft quoted statement from a Brit officer who said, "The Germans contrived to get rather more out of their training"
In Normandy British Inf Divs which had trained for three or four years were often out classed by German troops in recently formed outfits.
The difference was doctrine - ie "The straightforward infantry bash" vs infiltration tactics. That, and the preponderance of combat experience among the German soldiers - it naturally filtered back to the training institutions. The Brits at least, of the Allies, seemed always to just keep doing what they'd always done. And paying a price.
The Americans negated their training, which in some cases was excellent and included exercises at div and corps level, but often cadre-ing out the men to use as replacements and then refilling the ranks with men just out of boot camp.
As to brutality - well, I was hit in the face once with my rifle for having dust on the peep site. Result - I never had dust on my peep site again.
Is this good or "right?" Don't know. But at a certain level that tough kind of training makes you feel like a tough soldier which is certainly helpful when going into combat. I may be dumb (many would say I am for sure) but I felt that be treating that way my instructor was showing respect for me. He wanted me to take my business seriously and to stay alive - and I thank him for that.
After WWII the US scaled back on the "toughness" of training - partly because old soldiers were all over the place in leadership positions and didn't want their kids to experience what they had gone through. The result was a near debacle in Korea.
Re German NCOs
They were often quite well trained and quite capable of commanding in place of the officers. The idea of "promoting" rather than "commisioning" is in my opinion a good one - born out by the example of the German Army in WWII. That it held together at all in the face of the huge defeats in 1944 is to me a sign that they must have been doing something right.
cheers
Reb1
There is an oft quoted statement from a Brit officer who said, "The Germans contrived to get rather more out of their training"
In Normandy British Inf Divs which had trained for three or four years were often out classed by German troops in recently formed outfits.
The difference was doctrine - ie "The straightforward infantry bash" vs infiltration tactics. That, and the preponderance of combat experience among the German soldiers - it naturally filtered back to the training institutions. The Brits at least, of the Allies, seemed always to just keep doing what they'd always done. And paying a price.
The Americans negated their training, which in some cases was excellent and included exercises at div and corps level, but often cadre-ing out the men to use as replacements and then refilling the ranks with men just out of boot camp.
As to brutality - well, I was hit in the face once with my rifle for having dust on the peep site. Result - I never had dust on my peep site again.
Is this good or "right?" Don't know. But at a certain level that tough kind of training makes you feel like a tough soldier which is certainly helpful when going into combat. I may be dumb (many would say I am for sure) but I felt that be treating that way my instructor was showing respect for me. He wanted me to take my business seriously and to stay alive - and I thank him for that.
After WWII the US scaled back on the "toughness" of training - partly because old soldiers were all over the place in leadership positions and didn't want their kids to experience what they had gone through. The result was a near debacle in Korea.
Re German NCOs
They were often quite well trained and quite capable of commanding in place of the officers. The idea of "promoting" rather than "commisioning" is in my opinion a good one - born out by the example of the German Army in WWII. That it held together at all in the face of the huge defeats in 1944 is to me a sign that they must have been doing something right.
cheers
Reb1
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Christoph Awender
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It is funny that people refuse to accept the fact that the german recruit training was not mystericaly superior although they don´t have any knowledge about the training itself. Probably this comes because of a weird admiration - I don´t know.
From Situation report of the commander 4.Pz.Div. 5.11.1943:
Angriffserfolge haben bewiesen, daß Kampfmoral unerschütterlich ist.
- Zahlenmässige Auffüllung in erfreulichem Umfang
- Ausbildungsstand des Ersatzes gering, viele Umgeschulte, daher Kampfkraft nicht positiv zu bewerten.
- Hoher Ausfall an Unterführern; Unterführerlehrgang seit 1.11. soll Besserung verschaffen.
........
Report from 4.12.1943
...... - Der Ersatz, hat sich, obwohl erhebliche Ausbildungsmängel bestehen, reibungslos in den Rahmen einschmelzen lassen....
Report end of 1943:
.... - Ausbildungsstand: Es bestehen erhebliche Mängel
This is repeated in every monthly divisional report of pretty all divisions. I don´t know what is so inaceptable about this fact that the german recruits were equaly or even worse trained than their counterparts.
The only possibility was the training at the field-units behind the front on quiet days. This additional training by experienced frontline officers and NCo´s was an improvisation which worked well. But there is still the fact that the training was by far not as good as many people here desperately want to think.
\Christoph
From Situation report of the commander 4.Pz.Div. 5.11.1943:
Angriffserfolge haben bewiesen, daß Kampfmoral unerschütterlich ist.
- Zahlenmässige Auffüllung in erfreulichem Umfang
- Ausbildungsstand des Ersatzes gering, viele Umgeschulte, daher Kampfkraft nicht positiv zu bewerten.
- Hoher Ausfall an Unterführern; Unterführerlehrgang seit 1.11. soll Besserung verschaffen.
........
Report from 4.12.1943
...... - Der Ersatz, hat sich, obwohl erhebliche Ausbildungsmängel bestehen, reibungslos in den Rahmen einschmelzen lassen....
Report end of 1943:
.... - Ausbildungsstand: Es bestehen erhebliche Mängel
This is repeated in every monthly divisional report of pretty all divisions. I don´t know what is so inaceptable about this fact that the german recruits were equaly or even worse trained than their counterparts.
The only possibility was the training at the field-units behind the front on quiet days. This additional training by experienced frontline officers and NCo´s was an improvisation which worked well. But there is still the fact that the training was by far not as good as many people here desperately want to think.
\Christoph
Christoph
I have no agenda. I don't wish to think any particular way. I quoted a British officer who obviously had no agenda. Has it occured to you that the Germans did seem to routinely outclass their enemies at the squad and platoon level.
By the end of WWI the Germans had gotten to where infiltration tactics were routine. The shock troop stuff was very much a part of the subsquent panzer tactics. Allied countries such as Britain seem to have been mired in very old fashioned tactics while the Americans kept breaking up their trained units to form new ones, losing much of the benefit of their training. If this does not give the Germans an advantage in nuts in bolts training I don't know what does? If nothing else their ethos was based on a more modern concept than that of many of their adversaries.
Then of course we can look at 12 SS which, if you can believe Meyer, had very good and realistic training with no emphasis at all on parade ground nonsense. Was it superior to the British? I'd say so given their track record in Normandy. We can nitpick small actions were they messed up due to inexperience but ultimately the best judge of any unit is their enemy and the British / Cnds thought the 12 SS to be the best they encountered.
Did it remain superior? Obviously not - subsequent operations by HJ (Ardennes for instance) show us something much different. The Division had lost much of its original men and was filled up with untrained replacements from Lutfwaffe, Navy etc who lacked much in the fundamentals and it showed in action. It could have been corrected but the officer and nco cadre were simply not there.
The Ardennes shows us just how poor the quality of German training had gotten by late in the war - American and German accounts both stress bunched up troops getting hammered by the Americans - hardly the infiltration tactics of earlier times.
For much of the war the Germans had the seasoning of the pre war army which was very much leadership oriented with an emphasis on iniative. Battle experience helped keep the quality high and the ersatz battalions at div level were a good way to filter replacements into a division. The local recruiting also helped with unit cohesion. (Americans failed badly with their replacement system consistantly).
But as the war went on and casualties reached catastrophic levels it was simply no longer possible to keep up the standard. Because it is not about the book they use - it is about the men who teach from that book.
The seasoning was gone.
The Brits had the same trouble while training their divs for Normandy - all those long years. Their best combat men were in the Mediterranean and their unit training was based on the same tired principles that had initialy cost them so much in the Western Desert.
If a soldier (british) trains for four years in antiquated tactics that does not prepare him better than a man who trains for 4 weeks in modern tactics. Plus the quality of units on both sides varied widely depending upon the amount and quality of secondary training they received after reporting to their unit.
We have only to look at the poor record of the Pz Brigades in the west to see what the lack of large unit training can do.
cheers
Reb1
I have no agenda. I don't wish to think any particular way. I quoted a British officer who obviously had no agenda. Has it occured to you that the Germans did seem to routinely outclass their enemies at the squad and platoon level.
By the end of WWI the Germans had gotten to where infiltration tactics were routine. The shock troop stuff was very much a part of the subsquent panzer tactics. Allied countries such as Britain seem to have been mired in very old fashioned tactics while the Americans kept breaking up their trained units to form new ones, losing much of the benefit of their training. If this does not give the Germans an advantage in nuts in bolts training I don't know what does? If nothing else their ethos was based on a more modern concept than that of many of their adversaries.
Then of course we can look at 12 SS which, if you can believe Meyer, had very good and realistic training with no emphasis at all on parade ground nonsense. Was it superior to the British? I'd say so given their track record in Normandy. We can nitpick small actions were they messed up due to inexperience but ultimately the best judge of any unit is their enemy and the British / Cnds thought the 12 SS to be the best they encountered.
Did it remain superior? Obviously not - subsequent operations by HJ (Ardennes for instance) show us something much different. The Division had lost much of its original men and was filled up with untrained replacements from Lutfwaffe, Navy etc who lacked much in the fundamentals and it showed in action. It could have been corrected but the officer and nco cadre were simply not there.
The Ardennes shows us just how poor the quality of German training had gotten by late in the war - American and German accounts both stress bunched up troops getting hammered by the Americans - hardly the infiltration tactics of earlier times.
For much of the war the Germans had the seasoning of the pre war army which was very much leadership oriented with an emphasis on iniative. Battle experience helped keep the quality high and the ersatz battalions at div level were a good way to filter replacements into a division. The local recruiting also helped with unit cohesion. (Americans failed badly with their replacement system consistantly).
But as the war went on and casualties reached catastrophic levels it was simply no longer possible to keep up the standard. Because it is not about the book they use - it is about the men who teach from that book.
The seasoning was gone.
The Brits had the same trouble while training their divs for Normandy - all those long years. Their best combat men were in the Mediterranean and their unit training was based on the same tired principles that had initialy cost them so much in the Western Desert.
If a soldier (british) trains for four years in antiquated tactics that does not prepare him better than a man who trains for 4 weeks in modern tactics. Plus the quality of units on both sides varied widely depending upon the amount and quality of secondary training they received after reporting to their unit.
We have only to look at the poor record of the Pz Brigades in the west to see what the lack of large unit training can do.
cheers
Reb1
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Christoph Awender
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The oppinion of the enemy is exactly what should always be taken with more than just a grain of salt.
The german documents, training schedules and situation reports give in my oppinion a better (more realistic) view of the situation.
The enemy will always report his opponent as excellent trained when they had problems with him
Again you bring up this stupid 12th SS HJ in Normandie story. I say it again - fighting until death and holding a position until death has absolutely nothing to do with well trained, effective soldiers!! This is just indoctrinated stupid behaviour which was done by such soldiers. Read one of my posts above what I consider as well trained effective soldiers. Exactly the way I described it in this recent thread the german army defined effective soldiers in every handbook and manual.
And once again!!!!! Tactics used in the field is NOT the topic here and has nothing to do with basic training of a soldier!!!! I don´t know why nobody reads what I write. These tactics have to do with the well trained and experienced NCO corps NOT the normal Schütze! A recruit had no tactical training that you mention was so superior!! Am I talking against a wall????
\Christoph
The german documents, training schedules and situation reports give in my oppinion a better (more realistic) view of the situation.
The enemy will always report his opponent as excellent trained when they had problems with him
Again you bring up this stupid 12th SS HJ in Normandie story. I say it again - fighting until death and holding a position until death has absolutely nothing to do with well trained, effective soldiers!! This is just indoctrinated stupid behaviour which was done by such soldiers. Read one of my posts above what I consider as well trained effective soldiers. Exactly the way I described it in this recent thread the german army defined effective soldiers in every handbook and manual.
And once again!!!!! Tactics used in the field is NOT the topic here and has nothing to do with basic training of a soldier!!!! I don´t know why nobody reads what I write. These tactics have to do with the well trained and experienced NCO corps NOT the normal Schütze! A recruit had no tactical training that you mention was so superior!! Am I talking against a wall????
\Christoph
Christoph
Me? A wall? Perhaps.
1) Basic training - I accept your point - most armies do the same things because it is after all about the basics. I just have trouble divorcing one element of training from the overall battle performance. Probably a flaw in my character.
I did read a quote once from a German soldier (in Mckee's Caen book) who referring to his basic training noted the emphasis on always doing a little more than expected. McKee noted this as signicant in the context of a British outfit breaking a line and then stopping - contrasting it with how aggressive their counterparts were.
2) HJ - I reject your point of view on that one. Anybody can fight to the death and they did on occassion - Carpriquet comes to mind. But it takes effective fighters to cause all the grief HJ caused - disrupting Allied advances and throwing things out of kilter like they did speaks well of them. Mere indoctrination imparts no soldierly qualities.
3) Enemy opinions with a grain of salt. One takes everything with a grain of salt - but I submit the example of Patton. The allied deception plan for Normandy was based primarily upon the known fact that the Germans considered Patton our best general. Battle plans routinely take into account intelligence estimates of enemy unit capabilities and quality.
Your point about ascribing qualities to the enemy to sweeten a victory or make a defeat more palatable is well taken though.
4) And just to muddy the training water a bit more - the strangest thing to me about the post Normandy compaigns was the performance of the Fallschirmjager - many of whom had next to no training at all. And that performance is noted by their enemies over and over again. Based on all you've said I doubt their basic training (which is all most of 'em had) was anything special.
Cheers
Reb1
Me? A wall? Perhaps.
1) Basic training - I accept your point - most armies do the same things because it is after all about the basics. I just have trouble divorcing one element of training from the overall battle performance. Probably a flaw in my character.
I did read a quote once from a German soldier (in Mckee's Caen book) who referring to his basic training noted the emphasis on always doing a little more than expected. McKee noted this as signicant in the context of a British outfit breaking a line and then stopping - contrasting it with how aggressive their counterparts were.
2) HJ - I reject your point of view on that one. Anybody can fight to the death and they did on occassion - Carpriquet comes to mind. But it takes effective fighters to cause all the grief HJ caused - disrupting Allied advances and throwing things out of kilter like they did speaks well of them. Mere indoctrination imparts no soldierly qualities.
3) Enemy opinions with a grain of salt. One takes everything with a grain of salt - but I submit the example of Patton. The allied deception plan for Normandy was based primarily upon the known fact that the Germans considered Patton our best general. Battle plans routinely take into account intelligence estimates of enemy unit capabilities and quality.
Your point about ascribing qualities to the enemy to sweeten a victory or make a defeat more palatable is well taken though.
4) And just to muddy the training water a bit more - the strangest thing to me about the post Normandy compaigns was the performance of the Fallschirmjager - many of whom had next to no training at all. And that performance is noted by their enemies over and over again. Based on all you've said I doubt their basic training (which is all most of 'em had) was anything special.
Cheers
Reb1
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Christoph Awender
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1)
2) Defending in such a terrain that Normandie and the area of the 12th SS was is not a military masterpiece.
From The Defeat of the 12th SS 7-10 June 1944 (From: Canadian Military History, Spring 1996) Oliver Haller
4) I fail to see what you want to say with this???? I say it now for the 900th time.... I don´t say that the german army performed bad in the field. I say that the recruit training was not as superior, mysterious and elite like all you say. How these recruits performed within their units, with experienced NCO´s, experienced officers, after additional divisional combat training is a total different story!
\Christoph
Basic training was basic training. Plesse show me any hard evidence which supports your view that the Wehrmacht and W-SS did more, other, superior, better training than other armies. What should kind of training should this be??? The quote from the german soldier underlines the good fighting morale (which I never denied) not a superior training. Please give me just one training method the german recruits did and the allies not. Please I just want to have at least a faint idea of what kind of training you have in mind.Basic training - I accept your point - most armies do the same things because it is after all about the basics. I just have trouble divorcing one element of training from the overall battle performance. Probably a flaw in my character.
I did read a quote once from a German soldier (in Mckee's Caen book) who referring to his basic training noted the emphasis on always doing a little more than expected. McKee noted this as signicant in the context of a British outfit breaking a line and then stopping - contrasting it with how aggressive their counterparts were.
2) Defending in such a terrain that Normandie and the area of the 12th SS was is not a military masterpiece.
From The Defeat of the 12th SS 7-10 June 1944 (From: Canadian Military History, Spring 1996) Oliver Haller
3) Yes oppinions have always be taken with a grain of salt but not original training schedules and reports which say that the recruits arrived badly trained. Do you think the reports I quoted above are fictional?? And why do you always talk about Normandie and the 12th SS?? There was a war going on beside these actions there.This study has shown the need for re-evaluating the traditional arguments about the military effectiveness of 12th SS and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions. If the true nature of the Normandy campaign is to be understood the historian must avoid a simplistic approach. The strengths and weaknesses of specific military operations must be evaluated without relying on broad generalizations. Only then can the myths be swept away. The initial Normandy battles were significantly influenced by the relationship of heavy weaponry to terrain, as well as by command and control problems. It became evident that offensive operations had become dangerous undertakings " a reality that would plague the Allies for the remainder of the Normandy campaign, and give rise to the myth of German military superiority.
4) I fail to see what you want to say with this???? I say it now for the 900th time.... I don´t say that the german army performed bad in the field. I say that the recruit training was not as superior, mysterious and elite like all you say. How these recruits performed within their units, with experienced NCO´s, experienced officers, after additional divisional combat training is a total different story!
\Christoph
Hmmm - Christoph you mentioned walls?
I just noted specifically that recruit training (basic) is hardly going to be all that dis-similar given that certain fundamentals are shared by all armies - you have to be fit, use the fundamental equipment and understand the jargon.
As to 12 ss - it is especially germane to this discussion not because I am one of "All of you" but because the specifics of the training varied from the norm and the results were displayed on the battlefield. Sending tank crews to work in the Mann factory was hardly traditional and I noted HJ as a diversion from the norm.
Note that I have no groupie like devotion to 12 SS. (or any other unit except perhaps my own) I'm going on the results as proven in battle. The boys did good - all the carping and critiquing in the world don't change that.
As to Normandy and other fronts? I noted Normandy because it is familiar to English speakers and included many nationalities plus it supported my premise of HJ as a deviation from the norm. It was also very near the last big battle where the German Army fielded much more than hasty improvisiations. I also noted Bagration which last I heard was ocurred on the OstFront.
I wonder if you have determined me to be some straw man to kick around since you have accumulated much annoyance for this reason or that? The "All of you" certainly suggests that. But I assure you, I'm a community of one. And annoying you is not part of my agenda.
cheers
Reb1
I just noted specifically that recruit training (basic) is hardly going to be all that dis-similar given that certain fundamentals are shared by all armies - you have to be fit, use the fundamental equipment and understand the jargon.
As to 12 ss - it is especially germane to this discussion not because I am one of "All of you" but because the specifics of the training varied from the norm and the results were displayed on the battlefield. Sending tank crews to work in the Mann factory was hardly traditional and I noted HJ as a diversion from the norm.
Note that I have no groupie like devotion to 12 SS. (or any other unit except perhaps my own) I'm going on the results as proven in battle. The boys did good - all the carping and critiquing in the world don't change that.
As to Normandy and other fronts? I noted Normandy because it is familiar to English speakers and included many nationalities plus it supported my premise of HJ as a deviation from the norm. It was also very near the last big battle where the German Army fielded much more than hasty improvisiations. I also noted Bagration which last I heard was ocurred on the OstFront.
I wonder if you have determined me to be some straw man to kick around since you have accumulated much annoyance for this reason or that? The "All of you" certainly suggests that. But I assure you, I'm a community of one. And annoying you is not part of my agenda.
cheers
Reb1
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Christoph Awender
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Well this is exactly what the thread is about - basic training. So at least we finally agree on this.I just noted specifically that recruit training (basic) is hardly going to be all that dis-similar given that certain fundamentals are shared by all armies - you have to be fit, use the fundamental equipment and understand the jargon.
I am sorry that you are the "target" now but it indeed annoys me when people always bring up this 12th SS Normandie story. And why is that so? Because there are many (most not worth the paper) books about this "heroic battle" which are available for americans or better "not german speakers". People come here with all these myths and misinformations frequently and repeat all the same nonsense. That is also why the 12th SS in Normandy seems to be the favorite topic for them because they don´t know anything else.
What was so special about the training compared to the other divisions stationed before D-Day in France? And note again.. this is again not about basic training at the replacement units.
The analyzes by historians and military experts which are based on facts of this battle all draw the same conclusion... Given the terrain, circumstances of this defense battle the 12th SS was not this elite superduper unit like many people say. The initial attacks failed poorly and as I said again.. defending such a terrain against battle inexperienced troops is not such a miracle. Also fighting to the last man and being anihilated as a unit is also not professional or effective.
\Christoph
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Christoph Awender
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Probably another interesting analysis from Haller about this "outstanding well trained" division. At the moment this is the only serious english analyzis I have. I have no time to translate those from the austrian army and german historians. Why can´t it be excepted that the division was in summary not better than the hard rest of the german forces?
\ChristophOn the other hand, the Canadians were less than impressed with German offensive capabilities, though they did not question their enemy's spirit. Brigadier Harry Foster, commander of 7th Brigade, pointed out that the 12th SS did not attempt to take advantage of the open flanks of the Regina Rifles, and the "enemy flung himself straight against the strongest points and utterly failed to exploit the undoubted weakness of his opponent's position."81 Even C.P. Stacey argues that the Hitlerjugend assaults "leave the impression of rather hasty and ineffective improvisation. The attacks were pressed with courage and determination but with no particular skill . . . the operations seem to have been locally conceived and control on the divisional level was ineffective."82 The disjointed timing of the assaults, with Kurt Meyer's Kampfgruppe advancing on Bretteville hours after the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment had been repulsed from Putot and Norrey, suggests that the regiments were not communicating effectively, if at all. That Meyer and Wuensche were forced to drive towards the 1st Battalion, in order to scrape up support for their failing assault, was indicative of a general lack of communication, command and control. Clearly, the Hitler jugend efforts were not those of an exceptional division.
Christoph
Wether we attribute that to terrain, training, indoctrination, or blind luck, HJ was there when things were going bad for the Allies. To my mind it has a lot to do with their secondary training and the experienced officers and NCOs that cadre-ed in from the original SS Pz K.
I'm referring primarily to the fighting in front of Caen, at Epsom and the subsequent delaying actions in front of Falaise.
As I've said - they did not perform up to that standard subsequently.
cheers
Reb
For my part - I don't accept that because after thirty years or more of looking at this stuff I don't any div that accomplished more in that particular compaign as far as frustrating the aims of their enemies.Why can´t it be excepted that the division was in summary not better than the hard rest of the german forces?
Wether we attribute that to terrain, training, indoctrination, or blind luck, HJ was there when things were going bad for the Allies. To my mind it has a lot to do with their secondary training and the experienced officers and NCOs that cadre-ed in from the original SS Pz K.
I'm referring primarily to the fighting in front of Caen, at Epsom and the subsequent delaying actions in front of Falaise.
As I've said - they did not perform up to that standard subsequently.
cheers
Reb
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Christoph Awender
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Kamen Nevenkin
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Christoph Awender
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Kamen Nevenkin wrote:Generalinspector der Panzertruppen ,den 10.5.1944
013/44 g.Kdos
Führervortrag am 10.5.1944
Bemerkungen zum Besuch des Bereichs O.B.West vom 28.4. - 9.5.1944:
..............................................
2.) 12. SS Panzer-Division "Hitler-Jugend"
Bedarf in der Verbandausbildung noch weiterer Förderung. Bei ausgezeichnetem, jungem und schwungvollem Menschen- und Führermaterial fehlt es noch überall an Erfahrung in der Verbandausbildung.
..............................................
Hope this helps
"Report about the inspection at O.B.West 28.4. - 9.5.1944:
2.) 12. SS Panzer-Division "Hitler-Jugend"
Needs further collective unit training. Despite excellent, young and spirited human- and leader-material there is a lack of collective-unit training everywhere.