At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[steverodgers801]

It had no means to force the seperate peace.

[KDF33]

War is more than strategy and logistics-it is also a political activity.

Therefore? I really don't see the Russians suddenly giving up after the fall of Moscow and gladly surrendering en masse so as to facilitate their slaughter by the Germans. If you claim Moscow is important, demonstrate in a realistic manner how the fall of the capital would hurt the Soviet war effort. "Mass surrender hysteria" doesn't count.

Both Hitler and Stalin often defended or attacked cities not just for their strategic importance [and some did not have much importance] but their propaganda/national pride value. The prime example here is Stalingrad. Hitler ruined the whole balance of his strategy in the south by wasting huge resources trying to take Stalingrad, and we know the cost-the total loss of 6th Army, and the smashing of several allied armies. The loss of men and equipment during and after Stalingrad made the retreat from Asia manditory, and made the whole German campaign in the east a failure.

How did Hitler ruin the "whole balance" of Fall Blau by "wasting huge resources" trying to take Stalingrad? What resources were wasted? What would you rather have the Germans do, ditch the flanks and cram 1 million men in the Caucasus, with nobody to guard the Rostov bottleneck? The problem of Blau was not the focus on Stalingrad: the problem of Blau was that attacking with a single Army Group along two different axes, all the while massively extending the front was a very wrong thing to do if the Red Army still stood as an effective fighting force. Incidentally, Fall Blau was predicated on a decisive smashing of the Red Army in it's opening stage, something which never happened (although large-scale Soviet smashing there was!). Thus Blau did not fail because of Hitler's "obsession over Stalingrad", but because it rested on an erroneous reading of the true state and regenerative potential of the RKKA.

IF Hitler had let Manstein take Leningrad when the last defences were breached, then Moscow would have been much easier, for the left flank would have been secured, the link-up with the Finns achieved, any future threat from the Murmansk convoys averted, and the ability to supply at least part of Army group North via the Baltic sea/Leningrad would have relieved somepressure on the main supply lines for army groups North and centre. this would have made the Moscow push less hazardous, and easier to hold onto once it was captured. It was all win. But the opportunity passed quickly and so most of a whole army group [Nord] had to do "guard duty" for 900 days. Perhaps "guard duty" is the wrong term, because AG North were under severe pressure from the Russians nearly all the time, especially when strong assets were transferred south for the summer campaign in 1942.

When were Leningrad's "last defenses" breached? Why would Moscow be easier had Leningrad fallen? What about the threat from the Volkhov front? From the Northwestern Front? What has Leningrad to do with the Murmansk convoys? Why would taking Leningrad help the push on Moscow, hundreds of kilometers to the south?

[JU187]

Interesting question and these are all great points. There are so many ways he lost the war, going back as far as the moment he began persecuting Jews. Albert Einstein's fear of what was happening in Europe brought legitimacy to the almost science fiction notion of an atom bomb. Facts are the moment we possessed this weapon, there was no chance the Germans could ever conquer the World. It's beginning the War too soon before full militarization was complete, It's declaring war on the United States, It's invading Russia, It's committing to a fault at Stalingrad while not committing to a fault to finish of England, It's failed encryption using Enigma, it's over extending supply lines in Moscow, it's irrationally firing great military leaders and dictating and mitigating to a fault overriding generals. Germany was doomed to fail because Hitler was a mad man whose thirst for conquest would have never been satisfied and even if successful would seemingly be destined to eventually bite off more than his nation could chew. Nazi Germany was a failed empire from the start because it was predicated off propaganda and lies, not facts. Even if they did manage to conquer the World, the people of that nation are too smart to be ruled under the thumb. Eventually when burdened with the fact that they were lied to and distorted into committing mass genocide, the Third Reich would have been plagued by internal breakdown and rebellion.

[JU187]

We can have this debate all day, or we can instead choose to rely on what actually occurred. Hitler was a propagandist whose written colonial aspirations can't possibly be considered credible. His word meant nothing, as the breaking of the non-agression pact and total mocking of the Chamberlin agreement in Czechoslovakia clearly shows. Hitler and his vision of the Third Reich in terms of Global representation has many of the similar aspects of American manifest destiny in total land acquisition from Ocean to Ocean. Hitler was willing to create false flags which appeared to offer justification for conflict because he owned the media. In America, James Polk instigated a similar war with Mexico in order to fulfill the visions of acquiring all land to the Pacific Ocean. Hitler dictated the third reich with an ask for an inch and take a mile philosophy. His victories in the Sudetenland did not satisfy his desires for dominance and empire expansion, they only fueled his determination to get it. The easy victory in Poland and brilliant out flank of the French "powerful" Eastern front, only added fuel to this grandiose sense that it was fate. He only invaded Russia because he was certain he would conquer England. It was a snowball effect, where more success led to bigger and larger goals of dominance. I can't believe for a single moment that you or anyone could actually believe that if Hitler had defeated the British and Russians by 1943, that he simply would have gone home happy. That is laughable. He would have used that momentum to build an attack force of long range bombers and a Navy powerful enough to instigate more warfare in the Atlantic in order to begin his conquest of North America. The fact that a long range jet powered bomber was being planned or the fact he declared war on the United States without needing to only prove there was no power on Earth he felt he could not conquer or wouldn't have if he had been more successful. The entire World would be a dreadful place today unless you were German.

[KDF33]

Hitler declared war on the United States for a variety of reasons, little (or none) of which included a desire to conquer the Americas. The United States at the end of December 1941 was already a belligerent in the Atlantic and an important supplier to both Britain and the USSR. If I am not mistaken, Roosevelt had by then already directed that American-flagged cargoes could enter European war zones, so unless Hitler was willing to suspend submarine warfare he was going to have to fight the U.S.

Regarding Barbarossa, again the motivations were varied, and included the ideological vision of Lebensraum as well as the more practical realization that if Germany adopted a strategic defensive, it would be boxed in an Europe that was far from self-sufficient in resources and in a long-term unsustainable position, barring perpetual acquiescence both by the United States and the Soviet Union. It is quite possible that Hitler underestimated the USSR - this doesn't mean that invading wasn't the right decision.

If anything, the decision to risk war with France and Britain over Poland was probably the moment where a case could be made that "hubris" played the major role, but then again the mechanics of the arms race meant that Hitler didn't have much of a choice but to risk it or renounce his project. So it all comes down to the fact that at it's core, Nazi expansionism and the reactions it provoked meant that the Third Reich was doomed to face an ever-expanding war - there is no "discrete" moment or decision where Hitler goes from "risk-taking" to "hubris".

Regarding an invasion of the United States, that's a pipe dream. It couldn't happen and the Germans didn't plan for it.

[JU187]

"pipe dream"

According to Albert Speer's book, Spandau: The Secret Diaries, Hitler was fascinated with the idea of New York City in flames

Plans began for this, 3 years before they declared war on the United States.....

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amerika_Bomber

[bruchmuller]

War is more than strategy and logistics-it is also a political activity.

How did Hitler ruin the "whole balance" of Fall Blau by "wasting huge resources" trying to take Stalingrad? What resources were wasted? What would you rather have the Germans do, ditch the flanks and cram 1 million men in the Caucasus, with nobody to guard the Rostov bottleneck? The problem of Blau was not the focus on Stalingrad: the problem of Blau was that attacking with a single Army Group along two different axes, all the while massively extending the front was a very wrong thing to do if the Red Army still stood as an effective fighting force. Incidentally, Fall Blau was predicated on a decisive smashing of the Red Army in it's opening stage, something which never happened (although large-scale Soviet smashing there was!). Thus Blau did not fail because of Hitler's "obsession over Stalingrad", but because it rested on an erroneous reading of the true state and regenerative potential of the RKKA.

But it was Hitler who decided to go on with the second phase while the red army was not yet smashed , which was the precondition for this. And , in addition he did try too much to take Stalingrad which soaked up too many resources.

[JU187]

Hitler wanted to take Stalingrad because of it's symbolic name affiliated with the Russian leader. There were far more strategic areas which were ignored. The resources he wasted were millions of men who were either killed in this flawed thought process, or were sacrificed by his inability to admit defeat and allow retreat. Everything he did was over zealous. They clearly outpaced their supply lines which stalled their progress and kept them bogged down unprepared for the brutal winter. That in itself is an example of his over zealousness. The fact that the majority of transport and supply lines were still operating via horse and World War I technology. As I stated above, the Third Reich was never fully mechanized economically for mass production of warfare supplies needed to properly wage a war on two fronts. Everything he did was rushed, and the easy victories over France and Poland only gave his ego more fuel that somehow fate would lead them to victory no matter what battle they waged. He made so many head scratching tactical errors, it's almost the classic tragedy of involuntarily seeking your own demise.

[Marcus]

Several off-topic posts were moved to the "Was Soviet Union preparing to attack the Germany?" thread.

Several off-topic posts discussing "What did Germany do which the Brits had not done before?" were moved to a new thread.

/Marcus

[Old_Fossil]

Germany lost the war on the eve of its greatest victory, May 10th, 1940. Up till then it had been "Sitzkrieg", with the notable exception of Norway. Sitzkrieg was unpopular in France and England. There was little fighting, no bombing of cities. If Hitler shown more patience one of the governments of England or France might have fallen and been replaced with one more ammenable to a negotiated peace. After the victory over France there is no chance for Germany to win the war militarily. Even if Hitler doesn't attack Russia, Russia will eventually attack from the east. Germany cannot stand against the whole world.

[Old_Fossil]

But of course, Britain's government did fall on May 10th. Only to be replaced by the more militaristic Churchill. But that was because of Norway. France's government is another story.

[ljadw]

The OP is very questionable :it is not so that one can that that Germany was losing the war at day X,11.11.11 PM,not at day X-1 at 10.10.10 AM

[Old_Fossil]

The idea was that by committing to a military solution to the stalemate on the western front, Hitler lost all future opportunity to end the war politically. France was the weak link. The French did not want war. The French army was already demoralized by 9 months of sitzkrieg. What would another year bring about? Germany was not seriously threatened by the Allied blockade. Hitler could have waited a whole year. Is there any doubt that the whermacht of june 1941 couldn't sweep through France just as readily as May 1940?

[KDF33]

Yes, there is. The Allies were growing stronger.

[merdiolu]

Hitler's main reasoning to attack and invade France was to knock Britain and France out of war before his crusade against Soviet Union started which he always dreamed. His main ultimate target was and had always been Russia to gain Lebensraum in East. For Hitler Western campaign in 1940 just aimed to avoid a two front war initially in strategic sense.