At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[ML59]

I would say by far the major difference between 1940-41 and 1944 was the almost total disappearance of the Luftwaffe from the battlefield. Especially in NWE the German Army fought basically without any air cover and any tactical air support. Troops movements were heavily hampered by the Allied air supremacy and re-supply the front line with ammunition and weapons became a nightmare. As a rule, movements were possible only at night, trains had to stop during daytime inside tunnels or deep gorges, where possible, and all vehicles had to be carefully camouflaged and strict marching discipline had to be respected (vehicles were widely spaced each other). There was nothing in the sky that could fight off the thousands of Allied fighter bombers and attack planes roaming at will all along the front and the rear areas. The only defense was the FLAK, very deadly until the very end of the war, but not a substitute for the air artillery role that the Luftwaffe played at large in the first half of the war.

[Cult Icon]

Only infantry can defend, take and hold ground. The more easily measurable: tanks, planes, guns, etc. are subsidiary.

The quality of german infantry units continuously dropped in the war and was compounded by improvements by their opponents. First, the reduction of battalions from 9 to 6, Stalingrad & the aftermath, then Kursk & post-Kursk. The escalation of the Italian front and the threat of landings in France helped turn the eastern front into an endless crisis-zone & series of retreats, with a thin, easily pierced front line. German infantry strengths dropped to around 2,000-1,000 trench strength per division in AGS by Sept . 1943. German armor strengths were bad, but not much worse than prior times.

There was an effort to increase infantry strength, but this came at a serious drop in quality. In Normandy 44' to the end of the war, many of the units were in the 'prisoners waiting to happen' category. The war was already lost long ago and allied 'material superiority' in the west just made it happen faster.

[hauptman]

I wish to add one point to your final comment. Material and manpower superiority in the east was also a major factor in the defeat of the Wehrmacht. The Red Army was very adept at keeping the Wehrmacht off balance and literally bled the Wehrmacht to death.

[ML59]

You are correct. What I was trying to highlight is that in 1944 the Heer had lost much of its offensive capability due to a total lack of air support, especially in the West, coupled, as you say, with ever decreasing quality and quantity of its infantry. It was still a very capable enemy in defense but not any more a serious foe in offensive operation, due to all the reason we know, including very limited availability of oil for its motorized/armoured forces and for its air force.

[Guaporense]

The biggest problem with the German army in 43' and 44' was not so much the 'tank superiority' but the lack of infantry & quality infantry units. This is more difficult to measure, go figure..

Indeed, it can be reasonably argued that the collapse of the German defenses in Normandy was a result of a lack of infantry and artillery rather than due to a lack of Panzer and StuG.

That's obvious. Tanks always were a tiny small fraction of the total firepower of the army.

@rich, that's operational, how about total? I was thinking of total when I said 4,200 tanks in the east. And the 1,800 number is given in Zetterling's book for Normandy only, and it doesn't include only operational at certain point in time. And yes, I am well aware that you know way more than I do in this specific field. I have learned a good deal from your posts.

You've been given the totals before and yet continue to use suspect figures. Here are the figures actually reported again.

On Hand Panzer/StuG as of 31 May 1944:

East - 1,479/1,507
Norway - 146/52
Southeast - 65/212
West - 1,466/345
Southwest - 548/452

Note that there is simply no way to correlate reality with your claim for "4,200 tanks in the east". The closest reports ever reached that figure was 14 April 1945, when there were 4,115 with 2,432 operational. Where is the figure Niklas gave of "1,800"? You may use his chart for German armor commitment to the battle in Normandy, but unfortunately his similar table for Allied commitments is based upon speculative figures derived from TO&E and so are off from reality.

I gave these numbers from memory. I was wrong. So we had 3,000 tanks in the East and 1,800 tanks in the West. There were many more tanks per soldier in the West and Southwest than in the East though.

Though I would like precise numbers of POWs claimed to have taken by the western allies by month, if you have the aggregate I would like the montly figures to compare with the casualties in Zetterling's book.

To "compare" to what in Niklas' book? On page 77 he gives the accounting of Ob.West, which is actually from an OKW study done in January 1945. If you would like to compare those MIA figures to the POW reports of the Allies they are (Ob.West MIA/Allied POW):

June - 15,848/29,700
July - 55,135/52,580
August - 127,633/149,243

The grand total reported POW to 31 December 1944 were 811,796.

Note that the Ob.West figures for the period total 288,695, which almost certainly is a gross undercount, by 45,542 according to a November OKW report, which reconciled some MIA as KIA and WIA, while also increasing the total number of MIA. Unfortunately the January figure may have included those Wehrmacht forces engaged in ground combat only, thus excluding losses of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe troops not dedicated to ground combat, Organization Todt, and RAD personnel that had formerly been included.

Do you think 600,000 casualties is a gross undercount? German number of reported Soviet POWs was also higher than Soviet reported MIA. I think many POWs taken by the allies were not classified as frontline personel. They had 9.5 million men to take as prisioners.

[RichTO90]

That's obvious. Tanks always were a tiny small fraction of the total firepower of the army.

I'm glad its obvious...since you seemed so fixated on the numbers of armored vehicles.

I gave these numbers from memory. I was wrong. So we had 3,000 tanks in the East and 1,800 tanks in the West. There were many more tanks per soldier in the West and Southwest than in the East though.

Okay fair enough, but then in future perhaps it would behoove you to precede your statement of fact with "as I remember it", "IIRC", "I think it was, but need to check", or some variant. And cease trying to bluff your way out when you are called on it.

So do tell, how many more "tanks per soldier" were there in the West and Southwest than there were in the East?

[Guaporense]

I would say by far the major difference between 1940-41 and 1944 was the almost total disappearance of the Luftwaffe from the battlefield. Especially in NWE the German Army fought basically without any air cover and any tactical air support. Troops movements were heavily hampered by the Allied air supremacy and re-supply the front line with ammunition and weapons became a nightmare. As a rule, movements were possible only at night, trains had to stop during daytime inside tunnels or deep gorges, where possible, and all vehicles had to be carefully camouflaged and strict marching discipline had to be respected (vehicles were widely spaced each other). There was nothing in the sky that could fight off the thousands of Allied fighter bombers and attack planes roaming at will all along the front and the rear areas. The only defense was the FLAK, very deadly until the very end of the war, but not a substitute for the air artillery role that the Luftwaffe played at large in the first half of the war.

No. Allied airpower inflicted a very small proportion of German losses, main contribution was disrupting German movements. And the luftwaffe actually flew a very sizable number of sorties in 1944, I think around 500,000 sorties. The western allies, alone, however, flew 1.8 million sorties.

And the obvious main difference between 1940-1941 and 1944 was the correlation of forces:

May 1940 was 3 million Germans versus 3.5-4 million Allies (around 1.2 to 1)
June 1941 was 3.3 million Germans versus 2.8 million Soviets (0.8 to 1)
July 1944 was 500,000 German soldiers in Normandy up to July 22 versus 1.4 million Allies (2.8 to 1)
June 1944 was 2.5 million German soldiers in the west versus 6.7 million Soviet soldiers (2.6 to 1)
(numbers from memory)

In Normandy the Americans had 3-4 times the ammunition supply as well. The Allies won thanks to simply brute force of numbers, huge hordes of manpower overwhelming the German army in both the East and the West, which was on a per-man basis vastly superior until the end of the war.

Germans were mostly on the defensive because they lacked the manpower to lauch strategic offensives. On the defensive you minimize our casualties compared to offense. Zetterling used data from Kursk, ratio of inflicted casualties on enemy per size of our force was much more favorable for defense. German strategy in 1943-1945 was to defend, defend, defend, and hope the Allies would exhaust their forces. However, the USSR lost 18 million men in those 28 months but never stopped attacking, and the western allies used their economic superiority to compensate for their relatively limited manpower compared to the Red Army.

German chances of survival would be probably increased if they increased supply of ammunition, to compensate for manpower inferiority with superiority of firepower, as German industry operated with plenty of spare capacity, I think it would be easy to increase supply of ammunition though the main bottleneck were chemicals. If Germany had twice as much as ammunition in 1943-1944 and 50% more manpower, I think they could have held the allies.

In May 1940, the Allies had to deal with 85% of the Heer in the western front (ca. 145 divisions out of ca. 160 mobilized), in June 1944, it was 22.5% of the Heer in the western front (65 divisions out of 290). If the western Allies had to deal with the same proportion of the German army in the western front in 1944 as in 1940, they would obviously never be able to invade Europe.

Note all numbers are from memory, from books I read 5 years ago, so of course there will be lots of mistakes, so don't try to correct each number (Rich).

[Guaporense]

That's obvious. Tanks always were a tiny small fraction of the total firepower of the army.

I'm glad its obvious...since you seemed so fixated on the numbers of armored vehicles.

No. That's M kenny. I am fixated on ammunition and manpower numbers, the most relevant ones for the ground war of attrition that was essentially the last 3 years of WW2 after Germany invaded the USSR.

[Michael Kenny]

Where does the original (primary data in KIA,MIA,WIA,POW come from) why is there always an argument over figures, is there no definitive primary source for this.....

There is no such thing as 'deinitve numbers'. There are a number of ways of counting German losses. Do you include/ignore all or some of the SS/Luftwaffe/Navy/Todt/Police/Uncle Tom Cobley et al?
Do you use German provisional numbers from June to October or the later corrected one done in Jan 1945?
Do you use German MIA numbers or the Allied actual count of POWs?
Does the Allied bag include everyone in uniform and not just soldiers?
German paperwork for the summer losses is incomplete and combined with all the previous hurdles you can always find a set of number that best suits any argument you wish to advance. Hence our Brazilian friend always picks the numbers that best reflect his admiration for the German military. Note that when he introduces German casualties for Normandy he never ever wants to include the 300000-400000 German MIA total!

[doogal]

Guo wrote

No. Allied airpower inflicted a very small proportion of German losses, main contribution was disrupting German movements.

Allied air power inflicted large scale losses on the Luftwaffe prior to June 44, it did not need to inflict heavy ground losses its presence added pressure an weight to the build up of forces in the Normandy bridgehead interdicting the Heers ability to do the same.

German chances of survival would be probably increased if they increased supply of ammunition,

ammunition levels were not going to decide the Normandy battle

Again

huge hordes of manpower overwhelming the German army in both the East and the West,

and the western allies used their economic superiority to compensate for their relatively limited manpower compared to the Red Army.

So the German army had tactical and operational skill, the Red Army had manpower the Allies economic weight... If it was all so simply explained we wouldn't need to study it......

[RichTO90]

No. That's M kenny. I am fixated on ammunition and manpower numbers, the most relevant ones for the ground war of attrition that was essentially the last 3 years of WW2 after Germany invaded the USSR.

Except you keep bollixing those up too, as in your penultimate post. And yes, if you give incorrect figures from memory or by pulling them from your ass I will still correct them. I will stop giving corrections when you stop repeating the same errors, whether deliberately or through ignorance.

July 1944 was 500,000 German soldiers in Normandy up to July 22 versus 1.4 million Allies (2.8 to 1)
June 1944 was 2.5 million German soldiers in the west versus 6.7 million Soviet soldiers (2.6 to 1)
(numbers from memory)

Then you need to scrap your memory and start keeping track of the figures you have been corrected on numerous times, like these. And stop deliberately mixing apples with grapes.

As of 1 June 1944 there were roughly 1.6-million Wehrmacht troops in Ob.West. As of 31 May there were 620,504 U.S. Army Ground Forces troops in England, along with 426,819 Army Air Forces, 459,511 Army Service Forces, and 20,131 assigned to ETOUSA and SHAEF Headquarters. By 31 July, 563,638 AGF, 88,251 AAF, 181,548 ASF ashore on the continent, along with 27,212 casuals (mostly hospital patients). So roughly 65.5% of the American forces landed were ground combat troops. The British proportions were similar. So we may compare Zetterling's figure of 490,000 German ground combat forces committed to roughly 1,452,000 X 0.655 = 951,060 Allied ground combat troops. Very roughly 1.94-to-1.

As of 1 June 1944 there were roughly 2.620-million Wehrmacht troops in the East versus 6.714-million Soviet soldiers, not including STAVKA reserves. However, the German figure also does not include the Hungarians, Romanians, Finns and other minor Axis contingents.

[Cult Icon]

You are correct. What I was trying to highlight is that in 1944 the Heer had lost much of its offensive capability due to a total lack of air support, especially in the West, coupled, as you say, with ever decreasing quality and quantity of its infantry. It was still a very capable enemy in defense but not any more a serious foe in offensive operation, due to all the reason we know, including very limited availability of oil for its motorized/armoured forces and for its air force.

The RKKA is literally a different army in 1944 with different capabilities and operating method compared to 1942.

Yeah, with the German army in 43-44 their tactical units could still inflict high losses in the defense provided if they had adequate mobile reserves but the chief problem was counteroperations, offensive capability & the ability to hold, take and consolidate ground. Their shortage of quality infantry, skilled in attack techniques, hit them hardest here as they could not generate much combat power without attacking with weak flank protection. This was, compounded by the weak LW presence in both offense and defense.

The lack of armor also hurt them, as did the improved ability of RKKA rifle units to defeat armored attacks. A mech. corps in the defense could stop an attack by the equivalent of a full strength panzer division.

KDF33 mk2

You may be correct. The posts from that other site and this one are similar. So KDF33 is mk2, and the other is in fact mk1

[RichTO90]

However, the USSR lost 18 million men in those 28 months but never stopped attacking, and the western allies used their economic superiority to compensate for their relatively limited manpower compared to the Red Army.

You just keep spinning off these gems and still expect they will get accepted?

In 1943 Soviet irrevocable losses were 2,312,426, in 1944 they were 1,763,891, and in 1945 were 788,786 for a total in those 28 months of 4,865,103. Are you indulging the the legerdemain of adding in the wounded and sick? But that is only 7,857,089. So where do your extra 6 million come from?

German chances of survival would be probably increased if they increased supply of ammunition, to compensate for manpower inferiority with superiority of firepower, as German industry operated with plenty of spare capacity, I think it would be easy to increase supply of ammunition though the main bottleneck were chemicals. If Germany had twice as much as ammunition in 1943-1944 and 50% more manpower, I think they could have held the allies.

And, yet again, if pigs... :roll:

In May 1940, the Allies had to deal with 85% of the Heer in the western front (ca. 145 divisions out of ca. 160 mobilized), in June 1944, it was 22.5% of the Heer in the western front (65 divisions out of 290). If the western Allies had to deal with the same proportion of the German army in the western front in 1944 as in 1940, they would obviously never be able to invade Europe.

In June 1944, of the 294 German divisions that can be counted, 66 were in the West, 27 were in Italy, 24 were in Southeast (arguably disposed more versus the Western Allies than the Soviets), 12 were in Norway (ditto), for a total of 129. There were also 7 in the Reich, 8 in Finland, and 150 in the East. I make that either 158 of 287 (55.1%) or 158 of 251 (62.9%).

Note all numbers are from memory, from books I read 5 years ago, so of course there will be lots of mistakes, so don't try to correct each number (Rich).

Perhaps it would help if you re-read those books, read some of the new sources you have been given, took a few notes, incorporated the corrections you were given five years ago that we are now forced to repeat again, and then get back to us?

[randwick]

.
On the subject of troops manning the western front , quite a lot of the Germans taken prisoner were non-Germans drafted or volunteered
they were ok but wouldn't fight to the death ,
compare it with the German troops at Dieppe ,
rated as second class , they fought with vigor and aggression way down to NCO organizing local counter attacks
the British Marines and Commandos were quite impressed and a bit surprized , what does the first class troops are like ?
the 302 division ultimately was destroyed in the Summer of 1944 , on the Eastern front

[Cult Icon]

Interesting question, and something I had questioned and researched as well (in 1944). The ability of the german division would need to correlated with the rapid development of the opposition, so naturally '1941' ish tactical results would not happen in 1944.

Probably an infantry division, with 9 battalions, some motorized elements, and otherwise outfitted similar to a scaled up 1.FJ or 78.Sturm-division was ideal for 43-44. 8-9 infantry battalion Panzer divisions- the W-SS Pz. org structure was good and division GD's was the best. So fewer divisions, but individually larger and led by the best commanders.

The bulk of the Wehrmacht's units by 43 were no longer adequate in the tactical sense, both horse-drawn and motorized.

.
On the subject of troops manning the western front , quite a lot of the Germans taken prisoner were non-Germans drafted or volunteered
they were ok but wouldn't fight to the death ,
compare it with the German troops at Dieppe ,
rated as second class , they fought with vigor and aggression way down to NCO organizing local counter attacks
the British Marines and Commandos were quite impressed and a bit surprized , what does the first class troops are like ?
the 302 division ultimately was destroyed in the Summer of 1944 , on the Eastern front