At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[RichTO90]

You're right, I was thinking about Belgorod-Kharkov 1943. That's when the Tiger battalion came in. It was still a company at Citadel. PB-10 was split afterwards with one battalion staying with GD. From mid-1943- autumn1944, GD was holding 2 Panther battalions, one organic and one externally attached.

Actually, no, I./Pz.-Regt. Großdeutschland did not reequip with Panthers until the spring of 1944 and did not return to the division until 19 June. While in France, it was attached to 116. Pz.-Div., which was also forming.

Where did you get that information about Guderian's scheme? The Panther Brigade was overall too large and unwieldly, and un-integrated with the division IMO. This, among other factors, lead to sub-optimal use of PB-10 at Kursk and afterwards.

It is based largely on inference and also from the research and analysis of another whose opinion I value. I believe he intends to publish at some time though, so I hesitate to say much more.

You can consider the formation of Stab Panzer-Brigade 10. and 21. and Stab Pz.-Regt. 39 and 69 as the precursor of the idea. Stab Pz.-Regt. 39 was used at Kursk, along with the Stab Panzer-Brigade 10. to command the new units as what appears to be an operational test of the idea. It was attempted again in spring 1944 at Anzio when Stab Pz.-Regt. 69 was used for the same purpose. There are indications too that Guderian never believed the Allies would be able to successfully invade France and was using his power as General Inspektor to assemble a large reserve for commitment to "smash" the Soviet summer offensive.

GD was an unusual division in the way that they could take personnel from the panzerwaffe. Their panzer battalion GD in 1942, for instance, was sourced from the 1.Pz. The PB-10 sourced almost half of its personnel from 9.Pz/11.Pz regiment veterans. The Tiger battalion's personnel were a mixture from other formations. It and its spin-offs were only German divisions in WW2 that I know of, that was volunteer until the end of the war. Many of the leading commanders were soldiers proven from other formations. A division like this, which bases on volunteers and taking people from other formations (and weakening them)..there can only be very few.

Again, sorry, but no, the II. Abteilung was created 13 January 1943 from II./Pz.-Regt. 203. and the I. Abteilung on 1 March 1943 from Panzer-Abteilung Großdeutschland. Panzer-Brigade 10. was officially organized on 27 June 1943 from the Stab Pz.-Regt. 10. of 8. Pz.-Div. The Stab Pz.-Regt. 39. was originally part of 17. Pz.-Div., but was separated in late June to take command of the two Panther Abteilungen, 51. and 52. They were formed from the II./Pz.-Regt. 33. and I./Pz.-Regt. 15. respectively.

Also, I am not sure GD was an "all-volunteer" force until the end of the war? I believe the distinction is that it was recruited from the Reich as a whole rather than from a specific Wehrkreis?

[Cult Icon]

^^
I got all my information from the divisional history and history of PR-GD. Where did you get yours?

One of the PB-10 battalions stayed with GD. When GD lost I./PR-GD, it received I./26 (Panther) to replace it. These are two battalions of Panthers. After its stay with 116.Pz, I/PR-GD did not return to the division until very late in 1944, in which it was attached to another Pz. division first on the eastern front, then given back.

[RichTO90]

I got all my information from the divisional history and history of PR-GD. Where did you get yours?

Lexikon, Martin Block's Panther1944.de site, and about 27-odd years of going through the German microfilm records at NARA, including considerable work for both the Ardennes and Kursk databases.

I have never seen anything - that I can recall - that said Panzer-Brigade 10. got "almost half of its personnel from 9.Pz/11.Pz regiment veterans"? We know where the personnel for the brigade and regimental staffs and ofr the two battalions organized came from, but it is possible they sourced genesene from those units during their reformation, I just have never seen anything solid to show that?

One of the PB-10 battalions stayed with GD. When GD lost I./PR-GD, it received I./26 (Panther) to replace it. These are two battalions of Panthers. After its stay with 116.Pz, I/PR-GD did not return to the division until very late in 1944, in which it was attached to another Pz. division first on the eastern front, then given back.

Okay, yes, 51. and 52. were amalgamated together after the battle and remained with GD as effectively a single battalion attachment until late in the year. In August 1944, 52. became I./Pz.-Regt. 15. of 11. Pz.-Div. and in January 1944, 51. became II./Pz.-Regt. 33. of 9. Pz.-Div. Yes, in January 1944, I./Pz.-Regt. 26. was attached to GD, about the same time I./Pz.Regt. GD was detached from the division, but that battalion got its first Panther on or about 18 January 1944 at Mailly. So for most of the period from the end of Zitadelle into 1944 when its own I. Abteilung returned, there was a single Panther battalion attached to GD.

[Cult Icon]

That is interesting, you may be correct. This little detail regarding the exit of PB-51 and its replacement with I./26 escaped me, as they are mentioned in a single sentence. However, Manteuffeul states that his division had 2 Panther, 1 Stug, 1 Pz IV, and 1 Tiger battalion during the spring of 1944. That means that the 2 Panther battalions could be I./26, split in half then..?

pg. 114 of Jung's history:

PB-51: II./PR33, 9.Pz.
PB-52: I./PR15, 11.Pz

These, from 'panther vs T-34, ukraine' booklet :

[Cult Icon]

What was the purpose of this? A big 200-tank brigade to attach itself to various units as needed?

Something like this goes against principles of combined arms, and would lead to waste of armor.

You can consider the formation of Stab Panzer-Brigade 10. and 21. and Stab Pz.-Regt. 39 and 69 as the precursor of the idea. Stab Pz.-Regt. 39 was used at Kursk, along with the Stab Panzer-Brigade 10. to command the new units as what appears to be an operational test of the idea. It was attempted again in spring 1944 at Anzio when Stab Pz.-Regt. 69 was used for the same purpose. There are indications too that Guderian never believed the Allies would be able to successfully invade France and was using his power as General Inspektor to assemble a large reserve for commitment to "smash" the Soviet summer offensive.

[RichTO90]

That is interesting, you may be correct. This little detail regarding the exit of PB-51 and its replacement with I./26 escaped me, as they are mentioned in a single sentence. However, Manteuffeul states that his division had 2 Panther, 1 Stug, 1 Pz IV, and 1 Tiger battalion during the spring of 1944. That means that the 2 Panther battalions could be I./26, split in half then..?

Since M was writing long after the fact and with little access to archival information other than what was filed between his ears, I suspect he simply made a mistake. The to and fro is actually pretty well recorded, see especially Martin's site.

pg. 114 of Jung's history:

PB-51: II./PR33, 9.Pz.
PB-52: I./PR15, 11.Pz

Aaack! I see the confusion now. You originally wrote ""almost half of its personnel from 9.Pz/11.Pz regiment veterans", but you meant ""almost half of its personnel from 9.Pz/11.Pz Division veterans" or ""almost half of its personnel from II./Pz.Regt. 33 of 9. Pz.-Div. and I./Pz.-Regt. 15. of 11. Pz.-Div. veterans".

[RichTO90]

What was the purpose of this? A big 200-tank brigade to attach itself to various units as needed?

Something like this goes against principles of combined arms, and would lead to waste of armor.

It actually goes back to the aftermath of the French campaign. When the rumblings of reorganization in the Panzerwaffe began in mid-late 1940, Guderian had the staff of his XIX Armeekorps compose an extensive "lessons learned" analysis of the campaign, which, oddly enough, validated all of Guderian's belief's about the "proper" organization of the Panzer division, i.e., it should be comprised of at least two two-battalion regiments, preferably with a Panzer Brigade Stab, and the battalions should ideally muster 72 to 96 tanks each. What does that remind you of?

It is certainly tank heavy, but in theory at least it was still combined arms, it just wasn't a very balanced combined arms. Hey, in theory the old Heavy Division 1984 in the U.S. Army had something like 324 MBT and a grand total of about 1,000 riflemen. And that supposedly was a "balanced combined arms" organization.

The other interesting detail has to do with the whole discussion of the subordination of the Panzertruppen in Ob.West in spring 1944 and exactly why nobody wanted to give into Rommel's demands for operational control of the whole. Geyr was desperately worried about an Allied airborne descent on Paris that would cut off all forces west of the Seine, so wanted the bulk of the mechanized reserves on either side of the city, while Guderian pooh-poohed the idea the Allies would even succeed (I suspect he also thought Geyr was loopy) and was more interested in assembling the ten-division strategic reserve (plus the mass of Panthers, Tigers, s.Panzerjaeger, and Sturmpanzer) that would change the course of the war in the East. The argument got so heated that Hitler finally stepped in and cut the baby in half.

So they all had their own purposes.

[Cult Icon]

In this case I tend to trust Mantueffuel over the documents. (my default tendency, nothing to do with your research). He was the commander, and frequently lead the panzer regiment personally throughout these months. He wrote an account about GD in Targos Frumos II.

He says that they had 2 battalions with 80 panthers in total. I looked at I./26's numbers during early May and it is nowhere near that..it's 35 panthers.

Could you link me to that website?

Since M was writing long after the fact and with little access to archival information other than what was filed between his ears, I suspect he simply made a mistake. The to and fro is actually pretty well recorded, see especially Martin's site.

[RichTO90]

In this case I tend to trust Mantueffuel over the documents. (my default tendency, nothing to do with your research). He was the commander, and frequently lead the panzer regiment personally throughout these months. He wrote an account about GD in Targos Frumos II.

Er, sorry, but HUH? Manteuffel wrote most of his accounts of the war ten to twenty years after the fact, usually without recourse to consulting archival records. He was going by memory, but we have the actual records of the period available.

He says that they had 2 battalions with 80 panthers in total. I looked at I./26's numbers during early May and it is nowhere near that..it's 35 panthers.

I./Pz.-Regt. 26. reported 53 Panther on hand as of 1 June 1944, three of which were in short-term repair. On 1 May they reported 27 on hand, eight of which were in short-term repair. They were allocated 32 as replacements during May. The inference is that they had between 27 to 59 on hand during May and ended the month with 53, losing another six.

During this entire period I./Pz.-Regt. GD was at Mailly, receiving Panthers, organizing, and training. By 1 May they had been allocated 78 Panthers...and were still in France. Who else was there?

Could you link me to that website?

Which one? Martin's? http://www.panther1944.de/index.php

[Alixanther]

On August 31st German casualties in the East were around 94k KIA alone let alone the injured (Halder via Glantz from Barbarossa Derailed). All German reserves were used by mid-July and the character of a difficult campaign was an established fact by then. To say German losses in the east were insignificant in early Barbarossa is completely unfounded.

According to official stats the Red Army mobilised 8 million men in 1941 after Barbarossa was started (Also Glantz) in addition to the 5.5 million already mobilised by June 22nd. The Red Army raised dozens of DNO divisions (People's militias) and dozens of NKVD divisions (both types were used as sacrificial lambs while Active Red Army divisions were saved for a future fight) and had something like 600 divisions over all by the end of the year. All this was not "hidden" and the Germans had a pretty good idea about the Soviet capabilities before the campaign started. And German casualties did go up as the number of frontline divisions increased since in August and September casualties (when 2nd and 3rd echelon armies which included many surviving divisions of the 1st echelon armies joined battle) were much more than July and the June campaign casualties.

With the exception of a brief period between Mid Oct. and early Dec. I have yet to see a serious writer dispute the superiority in numbers and equipment of the Red army over the German one. Nor have I read anything in serious literature about such a miracle.

The Germans failed to complete preparations for a winter campaign despite orders from OKW been issued in July of 41 to that effect and they would have definitely not have had the time to prepare for a campaign in the winter of 40-41 especially that they still have to recover from the lull in production and the casualties they suffered in the French Campaign.

August 31st is more to the end of Barbarossa, not "the early stages of it". If you ask me what was "the early stage", well, it was when Halder commented "I think we practically won this battle in two weeks. The Russian are still clinging to battle but it's over."

I would not put much faith into official Soviet anything. The Red Army began mobilization much sooner than it claimed and Glantz sings a tune which does not feel real at all. You may say "it was not hidden" for the Red Army officials but it was hidden for any foreign eyes. In retrospect, the Wehrmacht attacked a Red Army at full combat readiness. That's why they had the biggest losses after all, duh.

Your third point has no ties to the assertion I made, so I'll pass.

The Germans would have pretty much the same losses, winter or no winter. Practically, the "not ready for winter" is Goebbels' official explanation for winter setbacks, which practically became EVERYBODY's explanation after the war. If you ask me, it's kinda fishy.
I'm willing to bet the Russian counterattack would deal the same heavy blow to German defenses even if launched in a different timeframe. Bottom line, Russian reserves were not seen (and not expected) by Wehrmacht.

[AJFFM]

Well I will leave the reply on what the German knew or did not know to people who know the German army better than me.

What I would like to say is two points:

1- The Red Army did some form of mobilisation before Barbarossa started but that was not enough as the casualties in the initial campaign (1st month) as well as divisional and corps record show. Remember of the 30 Mechanised corps on paper only 4 had the full complement of men and equipment (+1000 tanks and roughly 36k troops) with much of the rest having half their paper strength and their equipment in Front depots far away fron the battlefield frontline. The status of frontline divisions was just as pathetic having on average 2/3rds of their actually paper strength and in many cases without much of the standard equipment. The Germans did face exactly what they expected in terms of numbers of divisions but the equipment of those divisions was still not in the front and was saved for the newly mobilised divisions of the 2nd echelon armies. The haphazard and crude way the Red army conducted its counter-strokes and counter-offensives if anything proves the Red Army was from combat ready on June 22nd.

2- With respect to a German Winter campaign, I think the history of German planning and campaign conduct proves that the Germans were very slow in deployment of troops due to massive logistical problems. I do agree with you that a Soviet counter-offensive after 5 months of continuous campaigning that killed 250k troops and reduced divisions to battalions would have been successful regardless of weather (although how successful we might disagree since I think the harsh winter was a force multiplier for the Red Army). A German Winter campaign in 40-41 would have been impossible because the Germans didn't have time. 7 months of preparations weren't enough for Barbarossa I doubt 3 would be enough for a bloodied Wehrmacht (The Germans took nearly 200k casualties in France and their air force was woefully understrength by the time of Barbarossa let alone the winter of 40-41) in 40-41.

[Globalization41]

Did Hitler realize the Wehrmacht was overextended and undersupplied before or after Pearl Harbor? It would seem like, if he realized he had underestimated the difficulty in defeating the Soviet Union, he would be less likely to take on the U.S., unless he was in a grouchy mood due to stress from monitoring the stalling blitzkrieg before Moscow. ... Suppose Japan had launched Pearl Harbor in February. Would Hitler at that time have declared war on America? After a couple of months of stalemate on the Eastern Front, Hitler might have reassessed the strategic and logistical situation and not have declared war on the U.S. This would have put Roosevelt in a bind because his priority was war with Hitler while Congress's priority would have been war with Japan. ... Without the U.S., the Soviet-German War would have stalemated. Neither side could have affected a collapse of the other. The only question is, where would the demarcation line have been drawn? Hitler might have ended up with the Ukraine and some oil fields further east. The Germans also might have ended up with Smolensk and Leningrad. (The Finns might not have wanted Leningrad.) Stalin might have agreed to an armistice, but he would have supported insurgencies in the German-occupied regions.

Globalization41.

[randwick]

.
The Winter issue can be debated like forever ,
certainly the weather and very limited winter daylight time , plus the temperature was very seriously hampering the Luftwaffe
since it was one of the ace card of the German
for other influences , the near collapse of logistics and the losses in horses power left the front divisions in precarious position

[Cult Icon]

Thanks. Offhand, I don't expect someone to make such an elementary error with one of the proudest actions of their career. Something may have occurred off the books. I need to check later..

Do you know of armor write-offs during the first week of May, 1944? (2-8)?

Er, sorry, but HUH? Manteuffel wrote most of his accounts of the war ten to twenty years after the fact, usually without recourse to consulting archival records. He was going by memory, but we have the actual records of the period available.

I./Pz.-Regt. 26. reported 53 Panther on hand as of 1 June 1944, three of which were in short-term repair. On 1 May they reported 27 on hand, eight of which were in short-term repair. They were allocated 32 as replacements during May. The inference is that they had between 27 to 59 on hand during May and ended the month with 53, losing another six.

During this entire period I./Pz.-Regt. GD was at Mailly, receiving Panthers, organizing, and training. By 1 May they had been allocated 78 Panthers...and were still in France. Who else was there?

[RichTO90]

Thanks. Offhand, I don't expect someone to make such an elementary error with one of the proudest actions of their career. Something may have occurred off the books. I need to check later..

It's called confabulation and is actually a graduate-level error that we are all subject to. Dates, events, and other factual data we "remember" gets mashed together as our internal hard drive recalls information and then re-writes over the old data.