The Point of OKW?

[Heydrich Sterner]

I was curious on the whole concept of the Chiefs of Staff for the German Military during the periods of 1939-1945. Hitler didn't even listen to his Chief's of Staff so what was the whole point of having one? Just so someone would give him a nice pat on the back, or some nice critism?

Also, why weren't some of Germany's greatest generals such as, Von Manstein, even Rommel, (excluding Guderian since he was one) become the Chiefs of Staff? Possibly Hitler would have given a second thought to them. Most of the occupants of the OKW such as Ludwig Beck and Franz Halder are much like the US Chiefs of Staff now-a-days... old, 'know it alls', intelligent, but have one thing very much incommon, they always said "Yes" because they didn't want to lose their jobs.

[Miha Grcar]

Well, it isn't really all that simple. You are refering to the OKW, but at the same time refer also to the sub-organisations such as the OKH.

http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=236

It isn't just a thing of military decisions, it is also a thing of coordination of different branches of service, supply, replacement training, intelligence, planning...many things which need to be done to ensure the running of a war, regardless of who decides and the quality of those decisions.

best,
Miha

[schjertzer]

There are some mix-ups in your question!

OKW - Oberkommando der Wehrmacht was created as (ideally and theoretically) as a Surpreme Command, coordinating the Army, Navy and Airforce. An idea fostered by Blomberg when he was War Minister - and also eagerly pursued by the Chief of the OKW during the entire war, Wilhelm Keitel. This concept was never accepted by the Army - traditionally the Army general Staff was the surpreme director of all military campaigns. And before the war the C-in-C of the Army (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres) von Fritsch and the Chief of General Staff of the OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) Ludwig Beck were both strong in their opposition. To say that Ludwig Beck was just a "yes-man" is very wrong! He was plainly against Hitler's plans to invade Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland. After he was replaced by Halder, he participated more or less actively in conspiracies against Hitler and he was eventually executed for being one of the central persons in the 20 July 1944 assasination attempt on Hitler.

After Blomberg's forced resignation due to the discovery that he had married a woman with a record with the Vice Police, Hitler assumed the Position himself being thus the Surpreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The OKW did not work independently as the coordinator of the 3 arms as originally planned for - but rather as Hitler's personal secretariat. Keitel was the real "yes-man" here. He was never in charge of anything strategic! He was just required to sign all orders issued by Hitler - and then take care of all the administrative functions that Huitler did not bother about. Together with the OKW Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl, they never exercised any strategic direction of any campaigns - except Operation Weserubung, the invasion of Denmark and Norway, which was completely planned and executed by the OKW without the involvement of OKH. It was difficult from the start for the OKW to exercise its executive powers over the army beacuse of the resistance throughout the Army to be directed from anywhere else but the OKH. The difficulty was even larger with the executive powers over the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe which was Herman Goering, who as Reichminister superceded Keitel in rank. Hitler never intervened to clarify the command structure - on the contrary he encouraged this internal fighting and unclarity which made it easier for hime to interfere and stay in control of everything!

After von Fritsch was relieved as C-in-C of the army due to allegations by Gestapo of homosexuality and the resignation by Ludwig Beck, the team in charge of OKH at the outbreak of the war was: C-in-C: Walther von Brauchitsch and Chief of OKH Staff: Franz Halder.

Manstein was several times proposed for positions in charge of OKW and OKH - but he was constantly rejected. Probably due to his strong will - which meant that he would not act merely as a rubber stamp for decisions made by Hitler. Manstein was Chief of Staff for von Rundstedt's Army Group South in preparation and execution of the Polish campaign and the same for von Rundstedt's Army Group A in preparation for the French campaign, until the OKH had him transferred as a Corps Commander in occupied Poland, probably as a penalty for intervening in the OKH's planning for execution of the campaign against France - introducing the so-called "Sichelschnit" Plan.

This also being a correction of you mentioning that Franz Halder was in OKW - which he never was!

Brian

[schjertzer]

Sorry! Correction!! Beck was not executed! He committed suicide by taking poison, knowing that the coup against Hitler had failed! Had the coup succeeded, Beck was supposed to be heading the leader of the country! So, my argument of Beck not being a "yes-man" still stands!

[Qvist]

If Beck was a yes-man, it'd be hard to find anyone who wasn't.


cheers

[schjertzer]

Qvist - exactly my point!!!

[Qvist]

Yes - I know!!!

cheers

[mjölnir]

Hello Schjertzer!
I have never heared about this version of Beck's death! He was shot in the Bendlerblock on July 20th, 1944, after he failed by committing suicide. His old "friend" General Fromm gave him this possibility. After the failes attempts Fromm ordered a Feldwebel to "help" the General.
There was never poison!
mjölnir

[schjertzer]

Mjolnir - Yes, I checked - it was not poison, he shot himself! So, suicide it was!

My sources for Becks suicide is "Hitlers Genrals" by Correlli Barnett.

...and from a quick google-search, I immediately found this link:

http://www.geocities.com/~orion47/WEHRM ... UDWIG.html

The dramatic event implicating Fromm as you state can also be read from here:

http://209.157.64.200/focus/news/720304/posts:

In that moment, general Beck drew his revolver: Beck: I have a gun.

Fromm: Give it to me. Beck: Remember that I was your commander. I will find my way out of this situation. Fromm: Very well, turn your gun to yourself. Beck: Now I remember the old days... Fromm: We have no time for that now! Do what you have to do!

In that moment, a single shot was heard... the leader of the German resistance movement was gone forever.

Maybe you confuse the failed suicide attempt with that of Beck's co-conspirator, von Stulpnagel (quoted from same source above):

When he was really drunk, he was arrested and escorted to a command car, that was supposed to take him to his trail in Germany. In the long way at night, he asked his guard to stop the car near the French city Warden, where he fought in W.W.I. "Wait a moment", he said to the guard. "I want to take a look in a place I know well.". He marched to the field and entered the river. There, completely drunk, general Karl Heinrich von Stulpnagel drew his gun, pointed it to his head, and shot. Because he was drunk, he missed his head and the bullet destroyed his eyes. He was found floating in the river unconscious, bleeding and completely blind. He was taken to Berlin to be executed.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; just my tw cents..................................

Military leadership under AH.

Prior to 4 February 1938, the command of the German armies was organized as follows: Field Marshal von Blomberg, who was at the same time Minister of War and Chief of Staff, was commander-in-chief. As assistants, he had General Keitel with a special staff; General von Fritsch, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Raeder, Minister and Chief of Staff of the Navy; and General Göring, Minister and Chief of Staff of the Air Forces.

The Minister of National Economy, Doctor Schacht, depended directly from the Chancellor. However, in case of war, this department automatically came under General von Blomberg.

After the 4 February, the new reorganization differs materially from the one described above. Hitler decided that von Brauchitsch, Göring, and Raeder as the three service Commanders in Chief would take their orders from a new supreme command authority, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), with Wilhelm Keitel as its chief of staff. Hitler himself would be Supreme Commander, with the new OKW as his military secretariat.

This OKW would also exercise Blomberg’s former ministerial functions. His old National Defence division, the Abteilung Landesverteidigung, would transfer to the OKW as an operations staff, commanded by Colonel Max von Viebahn, a staff officer of the older generation. Thus Keitel himself became Hitler’s principal military secretary.

Hitler changed his foreign minister and minister of economics; inconvenient diplomats like Ambassador Ulrich von Hassell in Rome were forcibly retired; Göring was promoted to a field marshal, while three score army and Luftwaffe generals who were too old, conservative, or obstinate were axed or transferred.

Sources: RML. Vol XIX. Nro 72. March 1939.
Hitler’s War and The War Path. David Irving.
http://www.delcampe.net/page/item/id,31 ... age,G.html

Interesting the Minister of Economy under HG. Cheers. Raúl M .

[doogal]

Becks memorandum Jan 15 1934 says " Bringing the three services together under one commander in chief was a necessity"(1), "Naturally the commander in chief would need a staff to work out his orders"(1). " However that Wehrmacht staff would have no influence over operations"(1). In his mind the CGS and the army commander in chief would sit astride the strategic decision making process, this a response to Reichenau and Blombergs attempts to move control away from the GStaff to the war ministry.
Little did either know that in Becks proposal would be the blueprint for the Command relations adopted by Adolf Hitler as in 1934 they would have not been fully aware of the depth of Hitlers ambition.
What is fascinating is that 10 years later in 1944 Manstein was still trying to press Hitler for a unified command on the Eastern front, and even that quite rational decision even from a simple work point of view was always resisted.

(1) p25. Inside Hitler High Command (Megargee)

[tigre]

Thanks for that tip doogal . Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more..................................

The Political Theory of the Two Columns.

Werner von Blomberg, was Minister of Defense (1933-1935) and then of War (1935-1938) and also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht), while Werner von Fritsch was Commander-in-Chief of the Army (Heer). Both were syndicated as the brains in the restoration of the Wehrmacht. Werner von Blomberg had also reached an agreement with the Fuehrer on the Political Theory of the Two Columns, that is to say the State would henceforth rely on the Heer and the Party as the two strong formations. In this configuration the Heer should not be faced with the Party, but be a parallel of it. However at some point along the way this reached a deadlock and in early 1938, AH had got rid of both guarantors ..........

Sources: El asunto Blomberg-Fritsch. Walter Görlitz. El III Reich. ANESA 1975.
http://www.gettyimages.com/photos/third ... f%20hitler
http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=514

Cheers. Raúl M .

[doogal]

In relation to von Fritsch and von Blomberg (and there collaboration with Hitler concerning the structure and position of the Heer vis a vis the party and the state). I am suprised to find the following statement in Rauls post,

Both were syndicated as the brains in the restoration of the Wehrmacht.

. I assume that Gorlitz made this statement ?????

I think this exhibits the same misunderstanding which befell von Fritsh and von Blomberg and all other Heer Generals who were not transferred to other service arms. That being that there was to be no restoration of the pre-weimar armed forces. While the new wehrmacht undoubtedly drew upon the traditions of the pre-weimar armed forces it was to be a new creation, hence its allegiance directly to Hitler, and the removal of all strategic decision making from the General Staff. I believe that v F & v B saw themselves in such a light but fundamentally misjudged the prevailing forces at work and Hitlers intentions. So that when

Deadlock came about

it was not deadlock but rather Hitler in 1938 was assured of his untouchable position and could now simply remove anyone who stood in the way of his vision of his Wehrmacht. I know that most books tell us of Himmler and Goring pushing for his dismissal due to his wife but Hitler had no problem removing him when he refused to anul his marriage.

As such the OKW can be seen as the war progressed as the blueprint of what Hitler expected from a military staff, quite simply they were there to act as a functional unit which disseminated his orders. And taking to mind Hitlers distrust (stemming from WW1) of higher commanders, being re-inforced by the GS not happily subordinating themselves fully to his wishes. It is hardly suprising that he would try to limit there influence by creating a competing higher staff command structure.

[tigre]

Hello doogal ; thank you for your interesting point of view, sadly by the time being I'm out of reach of my books, I've the German General Staff by Walter Görlitz so I'll be back when I can take a look on them. Cheers. Raúl M .