Soviet Far East

Discussions on all aspects of the USSR, from the Russian Civil War till the end of the Great Patriotic War and the war against Japan. Hosted by Art.
Brady
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Soviet Far East

#1

Post by Brady » 03 Feb 2009, 07:52

Given that I know very little about the Soviet OOB in the far east in 1941 and 1942, I have beem looking around.

Thier seams to be two schools of thought, one sates that the Soviet forces facing the Japanese were very well equiped and very strong, the other states they were totaly striped down and their was very little to stop the Japanese if they had decided to invade.

This quote by a forum member named Subchaser (A Russian fellow, noted for his acurcery), states the later case:

Several months ago I was trying to convince the team that there is something wrong with Soviet OB for 41/42, if Red army can easily beat Japanese so early in war. I’ve tried to find hard data to back up my claims and create real Soviet early war OB, but I failed. Every source with OB on this subject uses old data which was heavily edited in soviet times and thus have no real value, although there are several sources, on particular divisions, which contain quite interesting information from recently opened archives, and this info have little in common with info published previously. Divisions of Far East front were paper tigers during ’41-’43, they were used as reinforcement source, their real combat value was close to light regiment equipped with obsolete weapons and very poorly trained men. With such forces, the very idea of advance into Manchuria in 1941-42 was a pure nonsense, the lack or resources made even defense of Primorie region quite problematic. Truth can also be found in various memoirs of former commanding officers of Far East front, unfortunately, as I said, these do not provide any certain numbers.

The camp on the side of the theory the Soviets were very strong and well equiped, would seam to be using the old data, but I dont know.

Does anyone have anything on this subject one way or the other?

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Peter H
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Re: Soviet Far East

#2

Post by Peter H » 04 Feb 2009, 04:05

Something on the Red Banner Army deployed against the Japanese:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1st_Red_Banner_Army

It would be interesting to see Japanese Intelligence estimates of Soviet strength in the area,1942-1944.

Attitude also played its part,1943,from Blossoms in the Wind,M.G.Sheftall:
Even when the army took on extensive commitments in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific with the outbreak of hostilities with America and Britain,the IMA facualty looked on this conflict with condescension--almost resentment--referring to it as a "southern" or "oceangoing" matter that was better left to the navy (who started it after all) while the army faced down the real threat to the empire that lay in wait to the west and north.


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Lawrence
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Re: Soviet Far East

#3

Post by Lawrence » 04 Feb 2009, 20:06

Also, I'm curious regarding the strength of the Red Army and Red Air Force in the early 1930s. Did the Soviets have an airfield at Vladivostok during the early 1930s that could actually bomb Tokyo? If so, what was this airfield's name?

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Re: Soviet Far East

#4

Post by Art » 05 Feb 2009, 15:42

Brady wrote: This quote by a forum member named Subchaser (A Russian fellow, noted for his acurcery), states the later case:

Every source with OB on this subject uses old data which was heavily edited in soviet times and thus have no real value, although there are several sources, on particular divisions, which contain quite interesting information from recently opened archives, and this info have little in common with info published previously.
Did he back up this statement with definite facts? IMO it looks somewhat consiporologic.

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Re: Soviet Far East

#5

Post by Brady » 07 Feb 2009, 07:12

Art wrote:
Brady wrote: This quote by a forum member named Subchaser (A Russian fellow, noted for his acurcery), states the later case:

Every source with OB on this subject uses old data which was heavily edited in soviet times and thus have no real value, although there are several sources, on particular divisions, which contain quite interesting information from recently opened archives, and this info have little in common with info published previously.
Did he back up this statement with definite facts? IMO it looks somewhat consiporologic.
He sent me this, the folowing by Subchaser:

Hi Brady

It's not easy to discuss competently what the Red Army had in the Far
East during the first two years of the war. Most of the old soviet
sources provide data that is obviously wrong, post-soviet era authors
give more realistic view but they often contradict each other. So do
not expect from me any complete, hard figures on early Soviet OOB.
It's amazing that this is still a very poorly researched subject.

Official OOB indicates that on 22 june 1941 Far East Front and
Zabaikalsky Military District (actually another front) had 719228 men
in total. According to official sources the following troops had been
transferred from two soviet Far East fronts to the west armies during
july 1941 - july 1942 period: 28 rifle and cavalry divisions, 5 tank
divisions, 1 mechanized division, 5 rifle brigades, 14 artillery
brigades and 8 independent regiments (344676 men in total), during
almost the same period (august 1941 - october 1942) from the remaining
units in the Far East 235518 men more had been sent to the west as
"marching reinforcements".

So overall, from the outbreak of the war till october '42 Far East
Command transferred 580194 men to the west. These troops took almost
2/3 of Far East arsenal with them - 247382 rifles, 38921
submachine-guns, 2824 heavy machine-guns, 1210 AA guns, 4928 artillery
pieces, 4425 mortars, 2822 tanks, 13101 motor vehicles, 2563 artillery
tractors and 77929 horses, 65% of ammunition and supplies was taken
from the Far East Command warehouses and send in the same direction.
Most of the Far East competent commanders were also transferred to the
west armies, and very average men came to replace them.

It's easy to figure out what has been left in the Far East by summer
'42 - 139034 men with 2420 artillery (only 88 152mm howitzers left,
almost all others were 76mm field guns and 45mm AT guns), with just
428 light tanks (exclusively t-26) , very limited transport abilities
, ridiculously low on supplies and ammunition.

Officially, on 1 september 1942 soviet ground forces in the Far East
contained 1446800 personnel. However, it is well-known fact that not a
single man drafted in the european regions in 41-42 has been sent to
the Far East during that period. Thus one should suppose that Far East
Command under Josef Apanasenko had managed to locally recruit 1308966
men in just 13 months (and send almost 45 divisions to the west in the
same time), this just cannot be true. Wartime mobilization in the Far
East gave only 682515 recruits by late 1944 (Russian Far East is still
barely inhabited compared to european areas), there was also another
manpower source - prison camps, but again, out of 320000 or so gulag
inhabitants in the Far East in january '42 only ~80000 could have been
drafted theoretically.

There are some sources that describe in detail what General Apanasenko
did to maintain his forces during first two years of the war and how
difficult it was. For example "Sickle and Hammer Against Samurai
Sword" by К.Е. Cherevko and "Final in the Far East" by A.B.Shirokorad,
those are in russian obviously. Both authors are skeptical about
official figures for 1941-42 period they try to analyze how Apanasenko
had managed to double his forces during such a short period of time
with almost no manpower in the area while his armies had been used as
reinforcement source and what NKGB and GRU with their numerous agents
in Manchuria, China and even in Japan (Richard Sorge for instance) did
to convince Japanese of the presence of a large fully-equipped force
guarding soviet Far East during entire 1941-1942 period.

http://www.infanata.org/2007/04/29/serp ... mecha.html
http://v3883.vps.masterhost.ru/catalog/ ... 89/313107/

Far East Command ordered total mobilization in September '41, but it
brought too few recruits to replace those who had already left ,
during the second mobilization round in late november Apanasenko
called up even 40-55 aged men, so actually all who were able to carry
a weapon. In january '42 personnel bureau officers were inspecting the
camps of Kolyma and the whole Far East in order to seek out military
officers and soldiers who had fallen victim to the purges and tried to
put them back in service. How many men had they managed to draft that
way is unknown, since all these activities were barely legal and thus
undocumented, Stalin was unwilling to interfere and was determined to
protect Apanasenko from NKVD bosses. It just shows how dramatic
situation was.
Apanasenko really did an excellent job by keeping strong cover forces
at manchurian borders, but their numbers never exceeded 365000 men
during 1942. He really tried to replace leaving divisions with the new
formations, but none of these had full complement before late 1943.
Circumstantial evidences of this can be found in the open sources.

Monthly allowance directives of the Far East and Zabaikalsky Fronts
HQs in august-october 1942 are referring to "regular allowance order
#4/120", this means that all but one Far East rifle divisions were
"reduced formations" and did not contain more than 5800 men, 9 rifle
companies instead of 21 in full division (regular allowance directive
#4/100 - full rifle division with 14483 men).

Almost 38000 soviet soldiers, captured by germans in august 1942 in
Stalingrad area, were supposed be in the Far East according to their
papers, but instead were "temporary assigned" to the 62nd army units.
Take it as an educated guess - there were up to 200000 such "temporary
assigned" men, if 38000 such soldiers became POW.

In many personal accounts of the war written by far-easterners
interesting stories can be found, during 1942-early 1943 Far East
command practiced "false reinforcement" tactics, several temporary
formations of 1000-5000 men each were constantly moving from one
fortified region to another, imitating serious military activity in
those sectors. They were usually moving into positions visible by
japanese during the daylight with their "flags high" only to leave
them secretly by night.

In november '42 Apanasenko did a little sabre-rattling when he staged
in Kharbarovsk on the anniversary of the revolution "the largest
military parade that has been held in Russia since the outbreak of the
war". The Far East Command quietly allowed the Japanese to hear of
this force demonstration by publishing a short story of the mechanized
equipment that took part in the parade. In reality only one regiment
took part in this parade with heaviest armament in form of manually
towed Maxim MG.

Stavka directives #170149 and #170150 issued 16 march 1942 for the Far
East fronts clearly show what kind of war Soviet Command expected in
the case of Japanese attack. Far East troops should do their best to
wear down Japanese in fortified regions during first 7-10 days of war,
"defend at all costs" several key positions deep in the soviet
territory until reinforcements arrive.

All such facts do not correspond well with proclaimed soviet military
superiority over japanese. 1,5m battle-ready force simply did not
exist in the Far East in 1942. Officially recorded OOBs and some Far
East Front documents are just residual artifacts of brilliantly
executed by GRU disinformation campaign, which was never officially
announced. With japanese absolutely sure that there is numerically
superior force in front of them in 1941-1942, Soviet General Command
was able to freely move larger part of Far East forces to the West and
had a luxury to do nothing to rebuild that force until mid-1943. After
the war, Soviet historiography used false numbers to claim that USSR
was never on the verge of collapse during the war, since it was
capable to maintain such a big force in the Far East during crucial
period of war and kept "larger part" of Japanese army at bay. Abwher
advised IJA that there were no battle-worthy soviet troops in spring
'42 trying to persuade Japan to join the war, but they strongly
believed in soviet myth, they could not see beyond the soviet
trenches, had no abilities to collect data on Soviet territory
themselves and were unwilling to risk.

Even if there were only 365000 soviet troops maximum, they still could
be, theoretically, a force to be reckoned with. But in reality only
40th Rifle Division was adequately trained unit (almost untouched by
autumn '41 troops requisition), others being understrength, poorly
equipped, barely trained formations capable of only stationary defense
against equally weak opponent. As I've already mentioned, Far East
Front lost most of its heavy artillery, almost all tanks and transport
to the west armies, and received very little to replace that loss
before 1943. Apanasenko organized small arms production in major
cities, but that was never enough. In fact the need for armament was
so sheer that Apanasenko ordered to put back into full working order
thousands of training rifles in late 1941. Supplies situation was also
critical during first two years of war. There is one well-known
wartime letter written by certain Nikolay Soloviev, sergeant 1148 AT
battalion, he said that in 1942-43 soldiers at the front were
virtually starving, and some of them were so weak that they could not
hold rifle for more than 10 minutes, those in critical conditions were
usually sent to the regional collective farms or the "military state
farms" to recuperate.

So here is the picture - 360000+ poorly trained men, some 50+ aged
some former prisoners already exhausted by gulag, with refitted
training riffles with very limited supplies, guarded soviet Far East
for almost two years. That was a blueprint for disaster. Of course
situation has changed dramatically in 1943, and even before the
"autumn storm" armies arrived in summer 1945, Apanesenko already had
far more capable forces. But the fact is, in 1942 Japanese had a clear
cut chance to grab soviet Far East, Kwantung army was more than
adequate force to do the job.

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Re: Soviet Far East

#6

Post by Art » 09 Feb 2009, 17:02

Thank you for the quote. Several comments:
Brady wrote: Official OOB indicates that on 22 june 1941 Far East Front and
Zabaikalsky Military District (actually another front) had 719228 men
in total.
I'm not syre what is the official OOB in this case. There is a table in the 11th volume of the Soviet official history of WW2 showing personnel and equipment strength of Soviet forces in the Far East (the term "Soviet forces" stands for Army, Navy and NKVD troops):
Image
50-mm mortars are not included.
Just for comparison - according to the known BChSA handbook on 1 June 1941 the Far Eastern Front had 431 581 men, Transbaikal military district (except units in transfer to the west ) - 164 423, Pacific Fleet - 117 258, Amur Flotilla - 9 857, total - 723 119 men.
According to official sources the following troops had been
transferred from two soviet Far East fronts to the west armies during
july 1941 - july 1942 period: 28 rifle and cavalry divisions, 5 tank
divisions, 1 mechanized division, 5 rifle brigades, 14 artillery
brigades and 8 independent regiments (344676 men in total)

There are indeed such figures in Cherevko, but they stand for the total number of units transferred from 22 June 1941 to 9 May 1945. Up to January 1941 17 divisions were transferred to the west, see:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 52&start=0
in January 1942 - 2 division (97 and 116 Rifle), in July 1942 - 10 (87, 96, 98, 126, 204, 205, 208, 321, 399, 422 Rifle) and 4 brigades (229, 248, 250, 253 Rifle). So in all 29 divisions were transferred by August 1942. According to the same official history units transferred in 1941 had 122 thousands men (too low figure IMO), more than 2 thousands guns and mortars, 2 209 tanks, >12 thousands automobiles, 1 500 tractors; from 1 May to 19 November 1942 - 150 thousands men, >1600 guns and mortars.
Almost 38000 soviet soldiers, captured by germans in august 1942 in
Stalingrad area, were supposed be in the Far East according to their
papers, but instead were "temporary assigned" to the 62nd army units.
10 divisions were sent to the Stalingrad area in July 1942 (see above), If Germans took some prisoners most likely they were from these units. I can't imagine anything like "temporary assigned" records in soldier books.
So overall, from the outbreak of the war till october '42 Far East
Command transferred 580194 men to the west. These troops took almost
2/3 of Far East arsenal with them - 247382 rifles, 38921
submachine-guns, 2824 heavy machine-guns, 1210 AA guns, 4928 artillery
pieces, 4425 mortars, 2822 tanks, 13101 motor vehicles, 2563 artillery
tractors and 77929 horses

Cherevko has the following figures for equipment taken by units leaving the Far East from 6.41 to 9.45:
207 382 rifles, 12 633 submachineguns, 2 824 light and heavy MGs, 104 AA guns, 1 829 mortars, 4 757 guns&mortars, 2 286 tanks, 11 903 automobiles, 2 563 tractors and 77 929 horses. Some items are very different. For comparison in June 1941 there was the following number of equipment in the Far East:
1 089 352 rifles
13 369 submachineguns
43 853 machineguns
871 AA machineguns
60 091 automobiles
11 968 tractors
Far Eastern front had 10 183 guns and mortars (including 3 077 50-mm mortars), Transbaikal Fornt - 5 318 guns&mortars (including 1 398 50-mm mortars). As far as I can see the numbers quoted above are far from 2/3 of pre-war stocks of small-arms, artillery pieces and motor vehicles.
However, it is well-known fact that not a
single man drafted in the european regions in 41-42 has been sent to
the Far East during that period.
Where is it known from? As the allready mentioned official history says: "For example, only from the Moscow military district 125 thousands recruits arrived to the Far Eastern and Transbaikal Fronts in 1942 and 175 thousands - in 1943". One can expect that the Far East recieved recruits from other regions also during the mobilization of 1941. That fact makes the quoted calcualtions based on "in-out" balance somewhat questionable.
Monthly allowance directives of the Far East and Zabaikalsky Fronts
HQs in august-october 1942 are referring to "regular allowance order
#4/120",
I'm afraid, I don't understnd what "monthly allowance directive" is. Shtat 4/120 is the TO&E of the peace-time rifle division and not an allowance order.
regular allowance directive
#4/100 - full rifle division with 14483 men).
4/100 is a peace-time TO&E. It can be recognized very easily, all numbers of war-time TO&Es begin with 0. 14 483 is the strenght of the rifle divisions according to the TO&E 04/400, see:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... staff1.htm
More comments will follow.

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Re: Soviet Far East

#7

Post by Art » 13 Feb 2009, 19:07

Art wrote: One can expect that the Far East recieved recruits from other regions also during the mobilization of 1941.
I've checked some sources and it seems that it was the case. For example, on 7th July 1941 the General Staff ordered to call up reservist from the Ural Military District assigned to the units of the Transbaikal district and concentate them for training in rifle divisions of the latter district (65th, 93rd, 94th, 114th) - 1000 NCOs and 5250 privates in each division. Reserve officers from the Ural district were also to be called up. As an editorial comment says the similar directive was sent to the Far Eastern Front. The full scale covert mobilzation in the Far East began on 22 July 1941 when the GKO decree #234 was issued (the the text in Russianhere. The decree explicitly stated that resources of the Ural, Siberian and Middle-Asia districts were to be used for mobilization of troops of the Far Eastern Front and Transbaikal Military Districts. In simple words Far Eastern troops did recieve reservist from other districts. It must be said that although mobilization was declared on all the territory of the USSR except Far Eastern Front, Transbaikal and Middle Asia Districts on 22 June 1941, those reservist assigned to these three districts were not called up. As one can see their turn came later. At the same time reservist from Far East assigned to the troops in the West were called up in a covert order.
There is a table in the 11th volume of the Soviet official history of WW2 showing personnel and equipment strength of Soviet forces in the Far East (the term "Soviet forces" stands for Army, Navy and NKVD troops):
In fact the number of tank on 22 June 1941 is somewhat low. In fact on 1 June 1941 Far Eastern Front had 3 201 tank and Transbaikal Military District - 2 496, total 5 686, plus they had some number of tankettes and special AFVs, see:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... e01_41.htm
These numbers, however include 6 divisions of the 16th Army which were in process of transfer to the West. According to the offical history 5 divisions of the army whcih arrived to the Europe by 22 June 1941 had about 1070 tanks, that means that about 4 600 tank remained in the Far East. In addition one tank divison (57th) was in the process of transfer, so the real number was smaller by several hundreds. Between 22 June and 1 December additional 2209 tank were transferred from the Far East, that must include allready mentioned 57th Tank Division. In all from 1 June to 1st December some 3 300 tank left the Far East, that means that about 2 400 remained, that number is more or less close to the data provided by the official history (2 124 tanks). The difference can be due to tanks in repair.

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Re: Soviet Far East

#8

Post by magicdragon » 15 Feb 2009, 23:30

Are the "official" figures accurate? Well if they are it proves that Stravka where not only mad but stupid.

Why would they have 1.3m men still deployed in the Far East in Dec 1941 for a non existent threat a) they know the Japanese had no plans for attack in the short term b) who is going to attack Siberia in December anyway?

I there think it is perfectly plausible that the Divisions in the Far East had nowhere near their full compliment of troops maybe, the artillery guns had limited ammunition etc.

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KASHANKA
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Re: Soviet Far East

#9

Post by KASHANKA » 21 Mar 2009, 16:08

According to my info:

In june 1941 the Transbaikal MD had 2602 tanks, whilke the Far East Front had 2969 tanks. All were ligth tanks, mostly BT and T-26. No T-34 or KV tanks were ever present there.

From spring to autumn 1942, the Far eastern Front had 14 Tank brigades, while the Transbaikal MD had 5 Tank Brigades and 2 Tank Divisions. So... that would add up to ~1602 tanks if they were all at full strenght (assuming that the divisions had their flame tanks) which is rather doubtfull.
We can further assume that the 3 soiet cavalry divisions all had their 64 BT tanks (again, this is doubtfull). So that would be another 192 tanks bringing the total to ~1794 tanks max.

Therefore I reason that any sources stating that there were significantly more than ~1800 tanks in the far east in 1942 must be either very mistaken, or deliberate disinformation/propaganda.
Art wrote:Image
So the table posted by Art doesn't seem to add up (no offence to Art, rather to the russian sources he quotes). I have no idea where did that additional 780+ "tanks&SP guns" in mid 1942 came from since there were not enough armored formations to keep them and I fail to believe that far east Tank brigades had significanlty larger TOEs than the ones in European USSR. Looks very suspicious to me.

I'm not much of a red airforce expert, does anyone have any info on the number of planes in the far east in 1942? This could prove to be another valuable aspect to analize when assessing the real strenght of the soviet Far East Forces.

My sources:
I.Drogozov, "Czerwona nawałnica vol. I - Droga ku wojnie" ("Red Storm vol.1 - The road to war)
I.Drogozov, "Czerwona nawałnica vol. II - Wojna" ("Red Storm vol.2 - War)
V.Panov, J Solarz - "Czołgi Sowieckie 1939-1945" (Soviet tanks 1939-1945)
http://niehorster.orbat.com/012_ussr/41 ... ka_41.html
http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/Arm ... talion.htm

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Re: Soviet Far East

#10

Post by KASHANKA » 22 Mar 2009, 00:23

P.S
Does anyone have info about the USSR forces on Sakhalin in 1941-1942?

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Re: Soviet Far East

#11

Post by Kunikov » 22 Mar 2009, 09:34

magicdragon wrote:Are the "official" figures accurate? Well if they are it proves that Stravka where not only mad but stupid.

Why would they have 1.3m men still deployed in the Far East in Dec 1941 for a non existent threat a) they know the Japanese had no plans for attack in the short term b) who is going to attack Siberia in December anyway?

I there think it is perfectly plausible that the Divisions in the Far East had nowhere near their full compliment of troops maybe, the artillery guns had limited ammunition etc.
A threat existed, check on the size of the Kwantung army in 1941.
"Opinions founded on prejudice are always sustained with the greatest violence." Jewish proverb
"This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad

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Re: Soviet Far East

#12

Post by Art » 23 Mar 2009, 12:02

KASHANKA wrote: So... that would add up to ~1602 tanks if they were all at full strenght (assuming that the divisions had their flame tanks) which is rather doubtfull.
I would be interested to know the method of calculations, especially what you mean by "full strength". As a small note: there were several different TO&Es of the tank brigade, consequently there were several variants of the full strength.
Regarding the tank units, there were 7 separate tank battalions in the Transbaikal and Far Eastern Front on 1st July 1942. Probably there were tanks in cavalry divisions and rifle units, though I'm not sure at this point. Then training units, depots etc. In general I think that we need more info on organizational history of the Far Easten forces to make certain conclusions.
In june 1941 the Transbaikal MD had 2602 tanks, whilke the Far East Front had 2969 tanks
According to the handbook 'Combat and numerical composition of USSR armed forces' in the period of the GPW". Issue 1, on 1 June 1941 the Far Eastern Front had 3201 tanks and SP guns, and Transbaikal District - 2496. I don't know what accounts for a difference. By 22 June 1059 tanks left the theatre with units of the 16 Army, so the number of thank remaining in the Tranabaikal District was 1437. That is however a "formal" number for it includes 57th Tank Division which was in process of transfer to the west.
The further issues of the same handbook ("Combat and numerical composition" aka BChS) contain cross sections of equipment status of the Soviet Army on later dates, for example, 1 May and 1 November 1945, but I don't have them, I've seen only summary tables from these issues:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4#p1186604

If somone is interested the number of old model tanks remaining in the Far East on 30 September 1945 was as follows:
BT-7 1030
T-26 1461
BT-5 190
T-37 52
T-38 325
http://mechcorps.rkka.ru/files/spravoch ... 300945.htm
In all 3 058 old tanks.

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Re: Soviet Far East

#13

Post by KASHANKA » 27 Mar 2009, 14:56

Art wrote: I would be interested to know the method of calculations, especially what you mean by "full strength". As a small note: there were several different TO&Es of the tank brigade, consequently there were several variants of the full strength.
Since there were no medium or heavy tank battalions then ity gets more simple. I was assuming the more optimistic variant of a Brigade composed of two light tank battalions of 31 tanks each, with a Tank Division having 186 light tanks and 26 flame tanks.
The more pessimistic variant would be to assume that the Far east in July would already be using the modified 1942 light tank battalion TOE, bringing the number of tanks in a battalion down to 21, which in turn would mean that the total amount of tanks was far lower.
This is still assuming that no units were understrnght, which is very theorethical since in mid 1942 even Tank units in central Russia had problems with competing their numbers.

I didn't have any info on the 7 separate tank battalions, do you know anything about them?
I.Drogozov in his book mentions only tanks that were officially in combat units, thus for example he ommits all the T-18 or T-27 tankette units. Maybe these 7 separate tank battalions were training/reserve units equiped with the T-27 tankette? Just guessing really.

Also were there any SP guns in the far east in 1941-1942? I doubt there was anything more than maybe 76mm ATGs on lorries.
Art wrote:In general I think that we need more info on organizational history of the Far Easten forces to make certain conclusions.
Agreed, data is scarce and often conflicting or not very detailed.
Art wrote:
In june 1941 the Transbaikal MD had 2602 tanks, whilke the Far East Front had 2969 tanks
According to the handbook 'Combat and numerical composition of USSR armed forces' in the period of the GPW". Issue 1, on 1 June 1941 the Far Eastern Front had 3201 tanks and SP guns, and Transbaikal District - 2496. I don't know what accounts for a difference. By 22 June 1059 tanks left the theatre with units of the 16 Army, so the number of thank remaining in the Tranabaikal District was 1437. That is however a "formal" number for it includes 57th Tank Division which was in process of transfer to the west..
I know what you mean. Drogozov also quotes the numbers you give in another table. The difference is probably caused by:
- Small time difference, the "pure tanks" version I'm quoting is from "mid June", while the "Tanks and SP guns" version is from june the 1st.
- The movement of the 57th, and 59th Tank Divisions to the west may play a role here.
- Probably the tanks in repair and reconditioning depots are counted differently in each of these tables.
Art wrote: If somone is interested the number of old model tanks remaining in the Far East on 30 September 1945 was as follows:
BT-7 1030
T-26 1461
BT-5 190
T-37 52
T-38 325
Interesting, as far as I know no sources indicate any T-38 or T-37 tanks in the Far East in 1941. Can anyone confirm this?

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Re: Soviet Far East

#14

Post by Art » 27 Mar 2009, 17:33

KASHANKA wrote:P.S
Does anyone have info about the USSR forces on Sakhalin in 1941-1942?
When the war started - 79 Rifle Division of the Special Rifle Corps (another division of the corps - 101 Mountain Rifle was at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka. Then the Sakhalin rifle brigade was formed in July 1941 (renamed 5th Rifle Brigade in late 1942) After July 1942 2nd Rifle Brigade was transferred to the island from Magadan. It seems that the 214 Tank brigade was in the Sakhalin after being formed (at least it was there in the campaign of 1945). Then there was a number of smaller units, for example on 1 January 1943 the Special Corps included 302 and 540 Separate Rifle regiments, 5, 6 and 26 Separate Rifle Battalions, but I don't know which ones were on the island and which elsehwere. As concerns air units - 255 Aviation Division was most likely there in the second half of 1942 judging on its dislocation in 1945.

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KASHANKA
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Re: Soviet Far East

#15

Post by KASHANKA » 27 Mar 2009, 23:19

Art wrote:
KASHANKA wrote:P.S
Does anyone have info about the USSR forces on Sakhalin in 1941-1942?
When the war started - 79 Rifle Division of the Special Rifle Corps (another division of the corps - 101 Mountain Rifle was at Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka. Then the Sakhalin rifle brigade was formed in July 1941 (renamed 5th Rifle Brigade in late 1942) After July 1942 2nd Rifle Brigade was transferred to the island from Magadan. It seems that the 214 Tank brigade was in the Sakhalin after being formed (at least it was there in the campaign of 1945). Then there was a number of smaller units, for example on 1 January 1943 the Special Corps included 302 and 540 Separate Rifle regiments, 5, 6 and 26 Separate Rifle Battalions, but I don't know which ones were on the island and which elsehwere. As concerns air units - 255 Aviation Division was most likely there in the second half of 1942 judging on its dislocation in 1945.
Thanks, very helpfull info.

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