Why did the Soviets suffer so many casualties?

[KDF33]

Hello,

I'd like to hear some views about the reasons why the Soviets were suffering such an appalling loss rate during WWII. In particular, I'd be very interested if someone could share data about Soviet training. I'd assume that rushed training would account for a substantial part of the relatively low proficiency of the RKKA during the war.

As regards aerial warfare, I already have data indicating that pilot training was pretty dismal during the war, the low point being attained in 1943.

[igor_verh]

So, to my mind were many reasons:
-absence of experienced and brave commanders after repression in the Red Army (at 1937-41 were arrested more than 40,000 commanders, political workers, military engineers)
-low level of military training,
-by the summer of 1941 about 75% of officers and 70% of political workers were in their jobs less than one year,
-high military commanders often did not have a systematic military and general education
-technical equipment of the German was better than in Red Army. German planes and tanks had radio and were superior than most part of the Soviet planes and tanks in speed, armament and maneuverability
-german troops moved mainly by trucks and had a radio, while Soviet troops often move on foot or by horses
-most soldiers of the Red Army were armed with rifles, only some of them had smg
-German Army had two years' experience of modern warfare
-during the military campaigns in the Europe the germans invaded weapons, huge stocks of metal, strategic raw materials, metals and munitions factories. In their hands were arms of 92 French, 22 Belgian, 18 Dutch, 12 British, 6 Norwegian, 30 Czechoslovak divisions, only in France the germans took as booty 4930 tanks and armored cars, three thousand planes
-inability of USSR leaders to effectively use the huge resources: human, raw, material.
etc.

[paspartoo]

It’s without a doubt one of the most interesting questions of WWII history. I’m more interested in the ground casualties because in the air the advantage of better equipment, training and tactics was very lopsided in favor of the German side. Also aerial combat followed the 80-20 rule for all sides, as practically all kills were due to a very small number of pilots.

[Mr.No one]

I think the most intriguing aspect of this question, is why the Red Army CONTINUED to suffer heavy losses even to the end of the war(in Europe). By then the Red Army had had ample time to get experience, build up their industry and produce tanks(good tanks)at an enormous rate, get sound tactics, and sound operational princips.
The Wehrmacht, when compared, assembled more the 1941 Red Army, but still managed to inflict catastrophic losses upon the Red Army.

How Was This Possible?

Séan Hansen

[paspartoo]

By then the Red Army had had ample time to get experience, build up their industry and produce tanks(good tanks)at an enormous rate,

Did they? The T-34 that they produced in huge numbers had very serious shortcomings. The T-34/76 was a flawed vehicle and even the T-34/85 could only fix a few of the problems (3-man turret, 85mm gun).

[Jabberwocky]

I think a fundamental part of the difference in the exchange rate was the Soviet operational art and sensitivity to casualties in relation to achievement of objectives.

There are probably hundreds of reasons for the level of Soviet casualties, ranging from the physical to the organisational/operational to the psychological. We've already had listed the differences in both basic and officer training between the two forces, the comparative experience levels of officers and troops, general and specific education levels, technical inferiority of variosu types of Soviet equipment, deficiencies in strategic mobility and communications, disparities in basic firepower.

Did they? The T-34 that they produced in huge numbers had very serious shortcomings. The T-34/76 was a flawed vehicle and even the T-34/85 could only fix a few of the problems (3-man turret, 85mm gun).

Despite the "very serious shortcomings" von Kleist was willing to label the T-34 "the finest tank in the world" in 1941 and captured examples were still fighting in 1945. German tanks were hardly exempt from their own issues (armour/armament compared to opposition early in the war and transmission, final drives, suspension later in the war) that could easily be labelled equally serious.

[paspartoo]

Did they? The T-34 that they produced in huge numbers had very serious shortcomings. The T-34/76 was a flawed vehicle and even the T-34/85 could only fix a few of the problems (3-man turret, 85mm gun).

Despite the "very serious shortcomings" von Kleist was willing to label the T-34 "the finest tank in the world" in 1941 and captured examples were still fighting in 1945. German tanks were hardly exempt from their own issues (armour/armament compared to opposition early in the war and transmission, final drives, suspension later in the war) that could easily be labelled equally serious.

The poor performance of the T-34 was one of the reasons for the high Soviet losses. The main problems (limited internal space, two man turret, no turret basket) could not be fixed without designing a new tank (which the Soviets did, check the T-34M and T-43). They did however add a commander’s cupola in '43, a new gun with a three-man turret in '44 and some/most? got a radio.

Since the T-34 was built in huge numbers and served as the main tank its problems are a serious factor when assessing the difference in losses.

[RJ55]

A common theme in most communist armies during WW2 and Korea was their rigid attack patterns. This was mainly a function of the lack of two-way radios which ruled out a more flexible way of fighting. "The West" was more a consumer society, and so had large electronics/radio industries so they could manufacture a mass of good radios for their armed forces. For example, the Soviets only had two way radios at the level of battalion and above. Lower levels just had receivers. So a company commander could not inform his boss of a weak spot in the enemy's positions, or be able to ask quickly for reinforcements etc. Bad for the infantry, the situation is even more deadly for armoured warfare, where the situation can change in a heatbeat.

Good radios in every T-34 tank would have helped a lot IMHO, provided the crews were excellently trained, which in most cases they were not. Doing just one job under the pressure and terror is hard enough, but if one has to be tank commander, platton commander, gunner and radio operator and has had little training, one was bound to fail.

The German Panzer III's and IV's, although they had lousy design to defeat tank or anti-tank shells [no sloping armour] could react more quickly with 4 or 5 crew than a soviet or allied crew of only 2 or 3. The Panther addressed the armour shortcomings of the earlier models, but was rushed nad had its own problems in transmission, overheating, and catching fire etc.

The Tiger was the best, all-rounder, but there was not enough of them and they were too slow in some scenarios. I do not know why the Germans simply gave the Mark IV a sloping glacis plate, but I suppose if it were that simple they would have done it.

[paspartoo]

The German Panzer III's and IV's, although they had lousy design to defeat tank or anti-tank shells [no sloping armour] could react more quickly with 4 or 5 crew than a soviet or allied crew of only 2 or 3. The Panther addressed the armour shortcomings of the earlier models, but was rushed nad had its own problems in transmission, overheating, and catching fire etc.

The Tiger was the best, all-rounder, but there was not enough of them and they were too slow in some scenarios. I do not know why the Germans simply gave the Mark IV a sloping glacis plate, but I suppose if it were that simple they would have done it.

Both Pz III and IV received more armor in the period 1941-43 (basic and bolted on).

[jednastka]

Hello,

I'd like to hear some views about the reasons why the Soviets were suffering such an appalling loss rate during WWII. In particular, I'd be very interested if someone could share data about Soviet training. I'd assume that rushed training would account for a substantial part of the relatively low proficiency of the RKKA during the war.

As regards aerial warfare, I already have data indicating that pilot training was pretty dismal during the war, the low point being attained in 1943.

Both my parents fought with the AK in Poland. In 1942, my father moved to the AK partisans foghting in eastern Poland. He told me of coming upon numerous battle sites in 1944 where there were a number of German machine gun nests that had been overrun by Soviet troops. He said the carnage was staggering. Hundreds of dead Soviet troops piled up in front of a machine gun nest with a half-dozen dead Germans. The machine gun was either jammed, or out of ammo. He said it appeared the Soviets just used the force of manpower to advance. He passed on in 1971.

This concept is shown well in the opening scenes of "Enemy At The Gates", a movie my mother watched, and told me it was the most realisitic depiction of the Soviet tactics she had ever seen.

Vic

[RJ55]

The German Panzer III's and IV's, although they had lousy design to defeat tank or anti-tank shells [no sloping armour] could react more quickly with 4 or 5 crew than a soviet or allied crew of only 2 or 3. The Panther addressed the armour shortcomings of the earlier models, but was rushed nad had its own problems in transmission, overheating, and catching fire etc.

The Tiger was the best, all-rounder, but there was not enough of them and they were too slow in some scenarios. I do not know why the Germans simply gave the Mark IV a sloping glacis plate, but I suppose if it were that simple they would have done it.

Both Pz III and IV received more armor in the period 1941-43 (basic and bolted on).

Yeah, I know, but sloping armour is more efficient. [Except of course for the track/wheel skirts]. Less weight for the same protection.

[paspartoo]

The German Panzer III's and IV's, although they had lousy design to defeat tank or anti-tank shells [no sloping armour] could react more quickly with 4 or 5 crew than a soviet or allied crew of only 2 or 3. The Panther addressed the armour shortcomings of the earlier models, but was rushed nad had its own problems in transmission, overheating, and catching fire etc.

The Tiger was the best, all-rounder, but there was not enough of them and they were too slow in some scenarios. I do not know why the Germans simply gave the Mark IV a sloping glacis plate, but I suppose if it were that simple they would have done it.

Both Pz III and IV received more armor in the period 1941-43 (basic and bolted on).

Yeah, I know, but sloping armour is more efficient. [Except of course for the track/wheel skirts]. Less weight for the same protection.

Well it also decreases the internal space so there are tradeofs. My point was that both the Pz III and Pz IV got more armor in 1942 and 1943 and if you compare their frontal armor (plus bolted on parts) vs the F-34 penetration they pretty much negated the firepower of the T-34. At the same time there were the 'soft' factors which you mentioned earlier (better ergonomics, three man turret etc).

[1st Cavalry]

For example, the Soviets only had two way radios at the level of battalion and above. Lower levels just had receivers. So a company commander could not inform his boss of a weak spot in the enemy's positions, or be able to ask quickly for reinforcements etc. Bad for the infantry, the situation is even more deadly for armoured warfare, where the situation can change in a heatbeat.

source please :
afaiik soviet company radios were similar to SCR 300.
http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/arhprint/1181010

Albeit i am left to wonder what a infantry battalion commander could do to help his subordinates in case of a armored attack since he only got 2 AT guns himself .

[ChristopherPerrien]

There have been MANY topics on this issue.

As per most accounts, the Soviets would attack again and again in the same place in the same manner.

Which points towards "inflexibility" and a top down command structure that brooked no exceptions from any orders to any sub-ordinate below Uncle Joe. And this attitude and fear of the same carried on down to lowest levels of the Soviet military heiarchy.

Any commander who did not win the battle as per following his orders to the letter, or not lose ALL his men following orders to the letter, was looked upon with suspicion in the Soviet Army. A suspicion that could easily lead to execution by the Commissar of the assigned unit.

Win our way , or die, no exceptions.

[wilsonn]

Hello,

I'd like to hear some views about the reasons why the Soviets were suffering such an appalling loss rate during WWII. In particular, I'd be very interested if someone could share data about Soviet training. I'd assume that rushed training would account for a substantial part of the relatively low proficiency of the RKKA during the war.

As regards aerial warfare, I already have data indicating that pilot training was pretty dismal during the war, the low point being attained in 1943.

I think this is a very complex question and it would help if you gave some examples. If I may say so, you make a very bold claim about proficiency without including any analysis, especially given the dynamic nature of the conflict which involved millions of men over a period of four years in constantly changing circumstances involving belligerents with varying motivations, goals, and perspectives. Training, loss rate, and proficiency should be looked at in the context of the overarching goals and circumstances of each party. You have not provided any of these things.