Russian self propelled artillery

[Kingfish]

During WW2 the Russians fielded a variety of self-propelled artillery pieces, such as the ISU-122 & 152s, but these were used exclusively in a direct fire role. AFAIK, only their Katyushas were both self propelled and capable of indirect fire. In contrast the Germans had their Wespe/Hummel, and the Western Allies put the M7 priests/Sextons to good use, while both also fielded their medium mortars on halftracks.

My question is why didn't the Russians feel the need to either adopt a Western design or build/modify their own SPAs to allow for mobile indirect fire capability?

[Simperator]

Hi,

You said: "...but these were used exclusively in a direct fire role." This is not true. They were usually used in both roles. We have to consider:

1) The self-propelled artillery was a very new concept;

2) The Soviets were re-organising their decimated industry during the war, mass production limited the variety of types;

3) They had never, until the war ended, any armored troop carrier like the German 250/251 (did they feel the need? probably, yes, but their industrial capacity postponed this project for after the war).

To return to my opening statement: if you examine the use of the 76mm Divisional Gun ZIS-3, you will see a very similar use: in both direct and indirect roles. This is also the case with some of the SP guns like the SU-76 or the ISU-152.

Regards,
Simon

[Manuferey]

Hi,

3) They had never, until the war ended, any armored troop carrier like the German 250/251 (did they feel the need? probably, yes, but their industrial capacity postponed this project for after the war).

Regards,
Simon

Didn't the Soviet Union receive and use US M3 half-tracks? These would later inspire their post-war 6 x 6 BTR 152 if I'm not mistaken.

Emmanuel

[Kingfish]

To return to my opening statement: if you examine the use of the 76mm Divisional Gun ZIS-3, you will see a very similar use: in both direct and indirect roles. This is also the case with some of the SP guns like the SU-76 or the ISU-152.

The towed gun I can see, as there were many examples on both sides of this dual use. The British 25 pdr and German 88s were two examples I can think of. But with regards to the Russian SPGs, were they being used as true indirect fire assets or were they merely adding their fire to the front?

[Art]

Didn't the Soviet Union receive and use US M3 half-tracks? These would later inspire their post-war 6 x 6 BTR 152 if I'm not mistaken.

Yep:
http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... neral1.htm

They had never, until the war ended, any armored troop carrier like the German 250/251 (did they feel the need? probably, yes, but their industrial capacity postponed this project for after the war).

The first works on APC were in 1930s:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9&t=183352
An yes, the need in suitable armored carrier is a recurrent theme in after-action reports. See also the experience of employing armored sledges in the Finnish War.

You said: "...but these were used exclusively in a direct fire role." This is not true.

I would rather agree with Kingfish. Theoretically it was possible to use SUs as "normal" artillery, practically it must be rare practice. Note that Soviet self-propelled guns organizationally belonged to the armored arm not to the artillery.

[Der Alte Fritz]

I think this is a case of comparing chalk and cheese.
The role taken by the SP Artillery such as Priests or the earlier Bishop in the British method which was providing impromptu support on a short time-scale for armoured troops.

This role was taken in the RKKA by the SAU with direct fire as it was more economic with regard to the number of shells used or by heavy mortars carried on lorries or rockets mounted on lorries. The armoured formations had a very different set up more geared to rapid exploitation than was found in British Army. Tank Corps in particular relied on the tank and SAU guns, mortars and rockets to provide the firepower whereas the British Armoured Divisions relied more on tank guns and artillery.

I think it may be also due to the idea of how you express Mobility".

The Soviet view was very different from that of the British and Americans. The RKKA was railway based and although it used trucks for carrying the supplies from the railhead to the front line and about half the equipment and stores carried by a Rifle Division were carried on lorries by the end of the war, the other half were carried on horse drawn limbers. The RKKA used around 3 million horses during the war and a front like the 1st Belorussian Front in 1945 would have 145,000 horses on its strength. But then the RKKA had a field army over 6 million strong and operated in a part of the world where paved roads were rare and dirt roads were not that common. The far smaller British Army when operating in this kind of terrain in Burma, also used railway and horses in addition to trucks albeit on a smaller scale.

The tendency when new technology is introduced to military forces is not to make those forces move quicker, but rather to make the armies larger, more complex and carry more equipment. This has been a common thread throughout history which is why the average rate of advance of armies has hardly changed since Napoleon. The Allied forces in Normandy was a totally mechanised force but used that vehicle power to carry a higher rate of supply and equipment not to gain speed. Of course there have always been instances when a force will load up with supplies, cut itself off from its supply line and charge off in pursuit at an impressive speed - for a while until it stops and has to wait for the supply train to catch up - Sherman's March to the Sea right through to Patton's Dash to Lorraine are similar examples.

The Soviets idea of mobility was referred to by an American Officer in great military gobble-de-gook as "High mobility, with low motorability, low carry weight and low supply demand." What he meant was that the Soviet Infantry could move across country quickly, because they were on foot but did not carry much equipment and did not need much in way of supplies. Or to look at it another way a British unit, with lots of vehicles, carrying loads of stuff, relying on three hot meals a day and plenty of gasoline, could actually cover the same distance, once they had to wait for the food/supplies to catch up. That is not to say that the Soviet offensives did not move with speed. During the Vistula-Oder Operation in Feb 1945, the 1st Belorussian Front moved from the Vistula to the Oder a distance of 650km in 10 days - a pursuit cut off from supply lines - of course but carried out in some of the worst weather of the war, when the units with horses got forward when the trucks were stopped by icy roads . The Soviet Armies moved just as fast as the Allies even though they were railway supplied and partially horse drawn.

That is why the Rifle Divisions main artillery piece was a 76mm weapon and not a 105mm. The ZIS-3 could be pulled by men or horses or a jeep because it weighs just 1,200kg where as the German 10.5 cm leFH 18 weighs 2,000 and has to be pulled by 6 horses, a truck or a tractor and the British 25 pdr weighs 1,700kg. You could always get a ZIS-3 forward whatever the terrain or the traction power. Likewise the Soviet use of mortars gave you the best 'bang for your buck' because the piece was light, the ammunition had more explosive than propellant and it was pretty accurate albeit over short distances.

So to get back to your original question, the Soviets did not develop SP Artillery because they need a huge army to fight a large army, it needed simple, light weight equipment that could be produced in vast numbers and used with the minimum amount of supply and support. A tank/SAU or a mortar could do everything that a SP gun could for cheaper cost, less supply demand and less technical support. The SU-122 (the closest the Soviet Union got to SP artillery) was replaced by SU-76 (cheap and easy) and the ISU-152/122 (expensive and capable).

[Art]

Here are several relevant quotes from documents:

Self-propelled artillery performs all principal tasks as a rule using aimed fire (direct fire) of a single gun or a group of guns consisting of a battery or a regiment depending on situation.

Provisional instruction on combat employment of the self-propelled artillery, 5 January 1943

Heavy tanks and self-propelled guns open fire, as a rule using direct fire, on tanks from a distance up to 2 km, on large targets (groups of troops, artillery positions) - up to 3 km.

Instructions on combat employment of heavy tank and self-propelled artillery regiments, 12 June 1944
It is stated unequivocally that direct fire was the principal mode of operations. There was a mass of available 120-mm mortars, light and easily towed by a usual truck, that probably explains lack of interest in armored artillery in some part.

[Der Alte Fritz]

It s also about the 'structure' of armies.

As Art pointed out earlier, the SAU Regts were part of the "Armoured" Arm of the RKKA, not part of the Artillery Arm. Tank men like to see what they can hit and do not have complicated sights or the training to use them to do indirect fire. AT Guns were part of the Artillery and so were trained and could do indirect fire. So the Soviet Artillery is involved in both Direct and Indirect firing but it has a strong involvement in Direct fire.

Likewise in the German service, the StuG and StuH were part of the Artillery Arm not the Panzer Arm and could do both indirect and direct firing, having both the equipment and the training. The "Donkey's ears" stereoscopic periscope sight you often see sticking out of the top of a StuG is an artillery piece of kit.

In the British Regimental system the Royal Regiment of Artillery held the artillery, the AT guns and the SP AT guns and the SP Artillery, the Royal Armoured Corps held the tanks and the Infantry held their own weapons. So the British Army has a strong focus on INDIRECT fire because the the RRA is running the show. Infantry support by direct fire is not one of their missions and is done by the RAC using Infantry tanks such as the Churchill.
This set up has consequences - British AT guns are not pushed right forward because they are manned and commanded by the artillery. There is not the integration between tanks and AT guns that you see in the German service for the same reason. Likewise the British never produce an Assault Gun after much interest in captured StuGs early on because the Artillery Arm is not interested in Direct fire, the Tank men want tanks not some sort of half tank and Infantry (who actually wanted the things in the first place) do not have a say in the matter. Similarly the development of SP AT guns is slow as again this is an RAA area of responsibility which is only addressed when the AT guns get too big to tow easily with the introduction of the 17 pdr.

Armies are 'institutions' and how they address problems and challenges depends on how they divide up the various tasks and control these with their existing chain of command.

[DLI]

I'm sorry, but there are several things to take issue with in this post.

1) German Sturmartillerie units, whether solely equipped with the StuG III or equipped with a combination of StuG III and StuH 42, very rarely used indirect fire; their role was close support of the infantry, whether firing HE or AP ammunition. Those 'donkey ear' sights you refer to were of course aids to direct fire, at superior magnification to anything available to the Panzer Troops.

2) I'm not sure that the British Army did show 'much interest in captured StuGs early on' - they didn't get their hands on an assault gun till the spring of 1942 (Gazala) and it was another 18 months before they produced a detailed technical report.

3) I'm not clear that the Soviet Armoured Troops were structured as a separate arm of service from the traditional arms as in Germany? Perhaps they were to an extent, but certainly the SUs took their initial inspiration from captured StuG IIIs and SU regiments continued to be organised in batteries till the end of the war. For example, the SU-152 was used by the Independent Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiments (OTSAP, ОТСАП, from Otdel'niy Tyazheliy Samokhodno-Artilleriyskiy Polk, Отдельный Тяжелый Самоходно-Артиллерийский Полк).

[Paul_Atreides]

My question is why didn't the Russians feel the need to either adopt a Western design or build/modify their own SPAs to allow for mobile indirect fire capability?

Tank army's commanders (Katukov, Lelyushenko, Bogdanov) regularly request simply a large caliber artillery ("Give an artillery division for a tank army" © Lelyushenko).

Though Fedorenko was interested to buy 155-mm GMC M12 http://yuripasholok.livejournal.com/1861557.html

[Der Alte Fritz]

Hello
No need to apologise for raising issues - none of us are infallible.

1) You're perfectly right - the point I was trying to make was that the crews of StuGs were artillerymen and were trained in indirect as well as direct fire - of course the StuGs were only used for direct fire.

2) There are a couple of mentions of British influence by captured StuGs:

Churchill Mark VIII, fitted with a 95mm (3.74 inch) Mark I howitzer. These tanks, designated close support vehicles, were conceived when the British encountered the Sturmgeschutz III (StuG III) assault gun. The original version, the Churchill Mark V, mounted the 95mm howitzer in a new turret on a Mark IV chassis. Only 200 were made, and they mostly supplanted Mark I and II Churchills on home defense. When the Mark VI variant was accepted for mass production, a 95mm version was requested from manufacturer Vauxhall, resulting in the Mark VIII. http://www.worldwar2database.com/galler ... p/wwii0055

I think these were the versions used by the Royal Marines during the Normandy Landings.

3) The Soviet Armoured Forces were definitely a complete "Arm of Service" similar to the Panzerwaffen. They had their own Armoured Forces, commanders, staff, depots, orders, regulations, etc, just as the Artillery Forces did. I think Art's point was that the SP Guns were run by the Armoured Forces and not the Artillery, on that the basis that one's Arm of Service determines one's thinking and attitudes.
From 7th May 1940 the Arms of Service for the RKKA were:
Combined Arms Infantry
Combined Arms Cavalry
Armoured Troops
Artillery Service
Engineers Technical Service
Signals
Technical Troops (inc Railway Troops etc)
Rear Area Services
Political Office

[DLI]

Thanks for this information.

Is there any reason then why Artillery terminology was retained for the SU basic unit (Battery)?

[Art]

To describe the full story first SP guns were a part of the Soviet Army's artillery but after initial experience of combat employment were transferred under control of the commander of tank in mechanized forces in April 1943.

[DLI]

Thank you Art. I have one further question -

Did the change of command after April 1943 mean that from that date on training of tank and SP units was undertaken by the same body, or did the Artillery branch still have a hand in the training of recruits to the self-propelled gun units?

[Der Alte Fritz]

It is pretty clear:
Number 0291 23 April 1943

1. Self-propelled artillery handed over to the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army.
2. The commander of the artillery of the Red Army to transfer, and the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army to take:
a) self-propelled artillery regiments, which are at the front and in the provision of Supreme High Command,
b) self-propelled artillery training center with all the personnel and all of the educational material part, warehouses and formed artillery regiments;
c) 18, 19, 21 minutes of self-propelled artillery training regiments with all personnel and all training facilities;
g) 2nd Kiev and Rostov 2nd Artillery School self-propelled artillery of all personnel and all training facilities;
d) the personnel of the department of self-propelled artillery control the formation of artillery units and the third of the combat training department in charge of self-propelled artillery, combat training, only 13 people and 4 civilian personnel.

All the training facilities went over to the Armoured Directorate in their entirety. The Self Propelled Artillery was a "service within a service" so probably kept its own methods and techniques for a while. The difference was the the new recruits & new officers now came from the Armoured Depots not from the Artillery Depots so gradually you saw a change.