Discrepancy on the Dnepr July 1941

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Operation Barbarossa was going according to plan, whose plan was another story

Delays were unwelcome inconveniences , that were better left off the record until absolutely necessary to inform Hitler of

Hitler advised caution and short advances to insure no trapped Russian Formations escaped

German Generals agreed but saw no need for leapfrogging when one Giant encirclement could be had, in the current situation

Stalin was not convinced there was an actual attack until July 7th, 1941, prior to this Stalin viewed any reports as panic mongering because only infiltrators and locals working with the German SD Security Ops (Heydrich) were up to their old tricks
This was not unreasonable considering prior actions in Poland and Holland and elsewhere

Prewar disposition placed NKVD Border Guards on the Border Frontiers, with Rifle Divisions some distance from the Border, Mechanized Corps were then placed in a 3rd echeclon.
Prewar orders directed that in the event of War, the perspective Rifle and Mechanized Corps would move laterally across the front line N-S or S -N to their assigned sectors. The main drawback to this instruction would have these formations advancing in March/Column order with their flanks open to attack forces moving W- E

July 15, 1941, German Successes were beyond belief, Stalin was now convinced there was a problem, but was still skeptical about the reports that the Germans were already near Smolensk. This same Lethargic Command process was first seen in Poland, then on down the list, of a Command Bureaucracy that measured Military operations in Large Scale but Minimal Activity

July 15, 1941 The Giant German Encirclement began to take Shape , Nevel to the North, Smolensk in the Center, Mogilev to the South

To clear the way to Smolensk from the South the German 3rd Panzer Division attempted a Raid to take Mogilev and the Bridge to the east across the Dnepr, to facilitate this, Special Operations of 70 Fallschirmjager Commando s were air dropped to secure the Bridge

The Russian 13th Army 172 Rifle Division was in the area and having had time to prepare was not taken by complete surprise, the main defect of not having timely information or the ability to keep in contact with anyone even in near proximity made command and control impossible
to effectively operate

The German 3rd Panzer Division brazenly approached the outskirts of Mogilev running into a minefield , crisscrossing the are were trenches, where Russian Anti Tank Guns , and Teams armed with Anti Tank Rifles waited. Taking unacceptable losses the 3rd Panzer Division was redirected South. The German Commandos were now in something of a fix and had to hole up in a nearby building

To remedy this problem an entire German Infantry Corps was summoned, 4 Reinforced German Infantry Divisions with Sturm Artillery Brigade in Support to quickly reduce Mogilev before Soviet Marshal Timoshenko could turn in into a insurmountable barrier

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July 13-15 German Gerneral Guderian was fighting several different battle simultaneously, to accomplish this German Forces were split into task Groups. Mogilev was one of Guderians objectives, 3rd Panzer divided down ar Group of approx Battalion Strength, (establishments varied per Panzer Battalion 60 Panzers per Battalion up to 120) at this time approx 50 Panzers participated, splitting into two groups , Group 1 13 Tanks Groups 2 25-30 Tanks
Group 1 German Motorized Infantry became bogged in Sand Traps, the Panzers continued on

A previous attempt to take Mogilev by German 197 ID revealed any frontal attack as suicide, when the area was reported as clear of Russian Units earlier. Orders were to not waste time and bypass Russian Strong Points as Smolensk was the Priority
Exact information was fleeting as both German and Russian Forces were constantly shifting,

3rd Panzer, taking a chance to see if no one was home, Task Group 1 and 2 attempted something of a feint and circuitous approach, to avoid direct attack from West where main Russian line was fixed. Task Group 1 and 2 came under heavy Anti Tank Fire, Group 1 losing 11 out of 13 Panzers, Group 2 losing 21 of its Panzers

The amount of Firepower coming from Mogilevs defenders indicated they were well armed and not giving up
The Russian 61 Rifle Corps , part of 13th Army was to some degree cutoff, in Mogilev and now under Command of General Bakunin
61st Rifle Corps
110th Rifle Div
172nd Rifle Div
DNO MIlitial Div
20th Mechanized Corp with 40 T 26 Tanks divided into 2 Regiments still incomplete manning levels throughout
both Tank Division with 1 Motorized Battalion each light Artillery each
The 172 Rifle Division was reported as well equipped from German reports
April 5 1941 Shtat/Tables Rifle Division
14, 454 Men Total 11, 194 Rank and File
1204 Sub Machine Guns 392 Light Machine Guns 166 Heavy Machine Guns 24 Quad Maxim AA or 12. 7 DSK
210 Rifle Grenade Launchers 30 Flamethrowers 84 50 mm Mortars 54 82 mm Mortars 12 120 mm Mortars
18 76mm Howitzers 16 76 mm Cannon 32 122mm Howitzer 12 152 mm Guns 54 45 mm Anti Tank Guns
8 37 mm AA 4 76mm Air Defence Guns Model 1938 similar in appearance to German 88
16 T 38 Tankettes 13 Armd cars 447 Trucks 117 Special Trucks 99 Tractors 792 wagons 16 Motorcycle 27 BIcycle
3039 Horses
Rifle Division breakdown
Division
3 Regiments each Regiment 3 Battalions each Battalion 3 Company each Company 3 Platoons each Platoon 4 Squads

Rifle Platoon HQ 4 Squads 10 men 1 Light Machine Gun 1 Sniper 1 Rifle Grenade Launcher 1 Mortar 50 mm 3 men
Company assets Mortar Company 6 82 mm Machine Gun Company 12 Heavy Machine guns Anti Tank 2 45 mm AT Guns

Divisional assets Anti Tank Battalion 163 men 11 submachine gunners 18 45 mm AT Guns 18 Trucks
AA Battalion 1 Quad Maxim AA 8 37 mm Guns 4 76 mm Air Defence Guns Model 1938 or equivalent
30 Trucks
172 Rifle Division
3 Regiments
1 light Artillery Reg
1 Howitzer Reg
1 Anti Tank Battalion
1 AA Battalion

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Mogilev was just another place on the map, that was now part of the Stalin Line and a highly prized thruway for Mechanized/Motorized German Forces composed of vast armadas of vehicles and Tanks.
Directly North of Mogilev along the Dnepr, Shklov then Kopys then Orshas and the Wooded ared
DIrectly West Minsk
South of Mogilev , Rogachev where the Marsh area began
NW of Mogilev Senno , Vitebsk, and Dvisna River
SW Mogilev Bobuiisk
SE Mogilev Gomel
NE Smolensk
As part of the Stalin Line, Defensive Bulwark works were to be placed ON BOTH SIDES of the Dnepr River that would require greater effort to reduce
both sides Mogilev astride the Dnepr

Germans advance elements reported Russian Reaction to sudden German Panzer Groups as delaying actions expected this same reaction at Mogilev

July 12-16 1941 German Infantry Division 31- 34 conducted probing attacks along NW Side Mogilev
July 12-16 1941 3rd Panzer Div 10th Motorized Div, to the Sourth of Mogilev were across the Dnepr, drove North in a Strike on South Part Mogilev on the East side Dnepr RIver

Jul;y 17 another German Attack Group from Bobruisk direction attacked SW side Mogilev with disconcerting reports that the Russians were
in there in strength
61 Russian Rifle Corps 172 Rifle Div 110 Rifle Div 20th Mech Corps remnants of 4 Rifle Divisions
DNO Militia Division over 35,000 Troops 250 Guns
Armed with Lee En Field Rifles Molotov Gas Bottles
July 22, 1941 Entire German Infantry Corps 4 Reinforced Infantry Divisions were tasked with reducing the problem

7th and 23 Infantry attacked from West , with a 3rd Infantry Division crossing Dnepr South of Mogilev to attack from SE
German Tactical Practice selected points of attack along the Russian Perimeter, placing the entire perimeter under fire, particular emphasis was directed at the point of attack
German Storm Groups moved out toward the point of attack, under cover of supporting fire, upon close approach, potato masher had grenades were flung with abandon, storm squads advanced thru the destruction , to clear the way for follow up elements, casualties were more than anticipated, as Russians to some degree managed to contain Heavily Armed German Fire Groups with their own reaction Teams, taking frightful losses also

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Timoshenkos one two punch July 1941 remains as a Failure briefly mentioned in Historical studies that overlook the accomplishment that it took place at all. With Mogilev under siege by entire German Infantry Army, and German Motorized Forces wildly driving to the East, the opportunity to step to the side and kick them in the behind seemed entirely possible.

Timoshenko plan, based on saving Mogilev while cutting off German Center Army Group with 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps driving South from Senno area NW of Mogilev, South of Mogilev from Gomel, approx 20 "Divisions" would also participate

A number of factors would disrupt Timoshenkos Plan, Command and Control , Communications was nonexistent, as a result attacks were conducted separately ,or in some cases, differing elements would act independently , according to each Commander or lack there of, in some instances, Russian Rifle elements would dig in upon close approach, Germans, while other elements conducted Bayonet charges
The 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps large compliment of Tanks was difficult to organize for direct,attack in the rough terrain, wooded and swampy ( with no wireless equipment at the time,) leaving large portions of Mechanized Corps standing idle
German Battle Order planned for just such contingency s put a further snag into the works, with German Followup elements, well equipped with 88 Flak Gun or Heavy other Heavy Firepower following in traces of lead elements

, Timoshenkos plan had possibilities, at the time that had to be tried , however small the chance of success

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German l observation noted that Mogilev appeared , from the air like some kind of WWI Strongpoint of Trenches and Gun Emplacements,being heavily fortified in the Short amount of time when work to fortify Mogilev began back in June

Army General Zhukov, reportedly countermanded orders to move any Guns from Baltic or Western Military District placements, to the New Positions along the Western Frontier Fortified Line.

Fortified Regions of the Western Special Military District- Special indicated more Fortification was planeed-
Army Region
3rd Army 68th Fortified Region Grodno

4th Army 62nd Fortified Region Brest Litovsk

10th Army 66th Fortified Region Osovets

GKO Stavka Assets / Control
58th FR Sebezh
61st FR Polotsk
63rd FR Minsk Slutsk Composed of 8th Anti Tank Brigade, several Artillery /Howitzer Regiments/ Anti Air Craft Battalion
64th FR Zambrov
65th FR Mozyr
According to GERMAN observation, Mogilev was being prepared by Russian special engineer units and local s living in Mogilev

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German Storm operations were not producing the desired result of timely reduction of defenses, a 4th German Storm Division was committed to swing the balance of battle in Germans favor, this 4th German Division would be concentrated between the 2 German Divisions already engaged along the West approaches to Mogilev ,and to further the German Division(crossed the Dnepr ) attempting to advance into Mogilev from the South East , to secure THAT BRIDGE iNTACT, were the orders. The gist of the German West side attack appeared to be a feint to draw Russian Defenders toward the West

The Impressive amount of Russian Firepower made any German Approach in Force Tricky , resulting in General Siege Operations, (repeated direct assaults -following the WW1 German Strosstruppen model infiltration)while avail German Motorized Units (Das Reich)- (Gross Deutschland ) 10th Motorized- attempted to interdict any reinforcements or supply missions to Mogilev
These type of GKO Stavka Reserves did not appear on German Inventory intelligence lists

The Russian Measured fortification plan at Mogiliv was by the block, along Commanding Approaches(Gun emplacements, MGS), Mogilev DNO MIlitia , would be assigned a building or a block to defend, and prepare trenchworks in and around the structures along with making loophole fireports from cellar or constructing brick type breastworks with fire ports, Mogilev being an Industrital Center, materials varied

German Reports complained of booby traps negating hard won fighting to take buildings

The German operations to cutoff Mogilev was complete by July 26, 1941, Regular Army Formations opted to Break Out, while Garrison chose to fight on

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Ref Sources
Das Reich Vol III 1941 Otto Weidinger
Before Stalingrad David Glantz
Barbarossa Derailed David Glantz
Hitler Moves East Paul Carrell
Thunder Dnepr Fugate Vol 2 with Lev
Initial Period War David Glantz

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Re Source
Fortress Durope J E Kaufmann

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Unforeseen or Surprises of War, that were consistently overlooked, the important contribution of RAILROADS, as it happened, "Barbarossa", Russian Rail Traffic carried Military Shipments also, that had to transit thru Rail Centers such as Mogilev.
GERMAN reports, aerial observation confirmed heavy Russian Rail Traffic, at the time, German Panzer Groups also reported on Train Traffic

Train service interrupted or delayed at Rail Points such as Mogilev , had their Military Shipments put into service on the Spot, that provided the impressive amount of Firepower that every Russian Strong point seemed to have no shortage of

To reduce a strong point was a time consuming process, the lower or cellar basement represented the bricked up fighting compartment, the trenches surrounding a strong point in some instances had at interval hidden dugouts occupied until actual German Infantry assault, Rifle elements/Militia would then deploy from dugouts to man trenches, firing and then recover.
Certain points of Strong point would be kept under fire and Smoke shells, to allow German Attack Groups to move up, MG Teams would setup for flanking fire, Infantry Guns would blast away at the Structure itself, mortars and artillery placing blocking fire as planned.
The entire strong point area would appear to be visibly shifting and rocking, the interconnecting trenches allowed defenders to switch positions as situation demanded

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Ref Source: SturmArtillerie Speahead Infantry Thomas Anderson
Sturmgeschutz Vor Franz Kurowski


SturmAbt 201 worked with the German VII Corps in the Mogilev Fight July 12-26 1941

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Reported Tactics of Germans Sturm Artillerie Self Propelled Gun /Sturmgeschutz

vs MG Bunker - Special Ammunition Smoke Shells /Point blank Fire HE Shell ( High Explosive) with or without close support Infantry with Flame
throwers or Demolition Charges
vs Trenchline- deploying into separate assault formation(Columns) each advance at full speed until past the Trenchline, then veering left or right
driving parallel behind the Trenchline, commencing fire, driving into the trench was not advised

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German General Guderian appeared unconcerned over Soviet Marshal Timoshenkos Counterattacks receiving brief mention in His Account Panzer Leader.
The developing situation at the time was far from certain, as indicated by events, the German Bridging Column following SS Das Reich was destroyed by a Russian Air Strike, the Russian 172 Rifle Division managed to demolish the Bridge North of Mogilev at Shklov, making the intact Bridge at Mogilev
a key objective.

Other factors the difficult terrain/Fighting North or Mogilev and the presence of Russian 1st Moscow Motorized Div, 5th and 7th Mechanized Corps
convinced German to try Rogachev area Sourth of Mogilev, at the same time the Russian 21st Army also appeared Rogachev, forcing the Germans to attempt a holding action at Rogachev with a further diminishing of avail German Panzer Motorized Units formed into detachments to hold the Bridgehead on the East Bank Dnepr River at Rogachev while remainder turned abruptly North to secure the Bridge at Mogilev to then seal the Smolensk Pocket. If the 21st Army at Rogachev linked up with the Mogilev Group, the Germans would be in the bag

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Initial German Battle formations of concentrated force, were arrayed in column order, as opposed to the usual Infantry type Line abreast parade ground type advance in Ranks, dating back to 1700 s

German Stacked Battle order would simulate the considerable driving force of a wedge or battering ram

At the time this type of attack formation was not expected and difficult to counter by static linear positional defenses

German formations had Artillery/Flying Artillery in direct support, that greatly improved combat effectiveness

Russian Rifle /Mechanized Forces counterattacks were conducted in the WW 1 style Infantry Charge without enough Artillery Support or Ammunition

compounding difficulties of attack