Soviet Fronts strengths: Overview

[Yuri]

On June, 30th, 1941 in the State Committee of Defense of the USSR - GKO (Gosudarstveniy Kommitet Oborony) has been formed.
For the period of war GKO possessed the supreme legislative and executive authority in the country.
All decisions GKO were valid the law and were obligatory to execution for all without exception of persons and establishments - military and civil.
Below-mentioned the decision which was accepted GKO on September, 11th, 1941, gives representation about valid to number of Red Army in the autumn of 1941.
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(RGASPI, fund 644, the inventory 1, a file. 9, a sheet 50-51)

The decision of the State Committee of Defense GKO-660ss about an establishment of number of Red Army for September and IV quarter 1941 and about distribution of food rations for the National commissariat of defense.

On September, 11th 1941ã.

The State Committee of Defense decides:
1. To install delivery of food rations of Red Army for September and IV quarter 1941 on number in quantity 7 400 000 person.
2. To confirm distribution of rations on fronts and districts, proceeding from following number of armies:
The Karelian front … … … … … … … … … … 185 000 person
The Leningrad front … … … … … … … …. 452 000 person
Northwest front … ..… … … … … …. 252 000 person
The western front … … … … … … … … … …... 511 000 person
Bryansk front … … … … … … … … … ….. 294 000 person
Southwest front … … … … … … … …. 850 000 person
Southern front … … … … … … … … … … ….. 532 000 person
Reserve front … … … … … … … … … … 491 000 person
The Odessa group...................................... 51 000 person
51-st army … … … … … … … … … … … … … 101 000 person
52-nd army … … … … … … … … … … … … 170 000 person
54-th army … … … … … … … … … … … … … . 85 000 person
The Arkhangelsk military district … … … ….. 104 000 person
The Moscow military district … … … … …......... 392 000 person
The Oryol military district............................. 245 000 person
The Kharkov military district … … … … …. 356 000 person
The North-Caucasian military district … …... 228 000 person
The Transcaucasian military district … … … …390 000 person
The Ural military district … … … … … ….......... 221 000 person
At-Volga military district … … … …... 268 000 person
Central Asia military district...................... 170 000 person
The Siberian military district … … … … … … 176 000 person
Transbaikalian military district … … … ….. 320 000 person
Far East front … … … … … … …...................... 511 000 person
The Leningrad military district...................... 45 000 person

Total … … … … … … … … … … ….. … … ….. 7 400 000 person

3. Distribution of rations for new parts arriving on front and connections to make due to those districts, whence these parts of profit.
4. Holiday of rations for arriving to hospitals and sanatoria of wounded men to make due to reduction of rations of those fronts, whence wounded men have arrived.
5. Delivery of rations for mid-flight updatings to make on account of the installed number for fronts and districts.
6. To oblige the chief of the Joint Staff and the chief of Central administrative board of formation and completion of Red Army about everyone movings of military units or mid-flight updatings on front or in other district to inform the Main quartermaster of Red Army.
7. All the building battalions working for civil national commissariats and the Main military construction to reorganize in working columns, to take off from quartermaster supply and to contain their structure as building workers.
8. All parts and establishments of civil national commissariats (the National Commissariat of Means of communication, including and the special railway corps; the National Commissariat of communication; GUSOSDOR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs; the National commissariat of public health services of the USSR; the State bank; the National commissariat of agriculture of the USSR; the National commissariat of trade of the USSR) as generated under the plan of mobilization expansion, and during war to take off from all kinds of a quartermaster contentment.

Chairman of the State Committee of Defense … … … I.Stalin.
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RGASPI, fund 644, the inventory 1, a file. 9, ëècòû 50-51
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P. S.
51-st army was in Crimea
52-nd and 54-th armies operated against group of armies " North "
By fat font it is allocated for a field army

/
Yuri

[Qvist]

Since the discussion of German losses had moved well outside the topic of Soviet Fronts strength, I split it out as a separate thread, which can be found here: viewtopic.php?t=103453

cheers

[Yuri]

Hi

In operation "Uranium" 26 tank corps has distinguished.
On November, 23rd, 1942 this corps has grasped unexpectedly for Germans the bridge through the river Don near the Kalach
It has allowed to surround German-Romanian a grouping in area Stalingrad
For successful performance of a problem in this operation the corps has received a honorary title Guards.
Someone will be possible interestingly to learn about what force this Russian tank corps had before the beginning of operation "Uranium" .
At this time 26 TK entered into battle structure 5 TA

It OoB was such:
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19, 157, 216 TBr - tank brigades
14 MSBr - a motor-shooting brigade
56 McB a-motorcycle battalion
15 ORB - a separate prospecting battalion
26 ATR - motor transportation a company
146 and 147 PRB - mobile repair base
41 MNR - a mortar company
226 ZAP it-is antiaircraft-artillery shelfs
----------------------
note:
Offz: 229/228 = (Offz: 229 TO&E Strength / 228 Actual Strength)

============================
Archive MO of the Russian Federation
Fund 331 Inventory 5041 File 14 Page 226, 226 revers
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Operative report # 88
Staff 26 TK
Kobilinka
16.10.42 on 16.00

1). 26 TK is in an assembly area: Fedorovka, Razdol`e, Polnavskiy, Chernischevka, Ivanovskoe.
KP - Kobilinka. Parts and connections are engaged in combat training.

2). 157 TBr changes of a disposition of parts are not present. OoB:
Offz: 229/228
NCO: 411/347
Men: 426/476
Equipment of fighting machines ready to fight:
T-70 - 20 tanks; T-34 - 31 tank.
Under repair: T-70 - 1 tank, T-34 - 1 tank
Supply:
Ammunition - 1,3 b/k; the PETROLEUM PRODUCTS - 1,6 refuellings; the foodstuffs - for 1 day.

3). 19 TBr changes of a disposition are not present. OoB:
Offz: 235/227;
NCO: 410/405;
Men: 478/477
Condition of an equipment of fighting machines:
Ready to fight: T-70 - 21; T-34 - 32
Supply: an ammunition - 1,1 b/k; the PETROLEUM PRODUCTS - 2 refuellings; the foodstuffs - for 3 day.

4). 216 TBr changes of a disposition of parts are not present. OoB:
Offz: 223 / 212
NCO: 368/368
Men: 450/450
Ready to fight: KV - 23; T-70 - 26.
Under repair: KV - 1; T-70 - 1.
Supply: an ammunition - 1,4 b/k, the PETROLEUM PRODUCTS - 1,6 refuellings, the foodstuffs - for 2 day.

5). 14 MSBr changes of a disposition of parts are not present. OoB:
Offz: 364 / 361
NCO: 1123 / 990
Men: 1736/1860
Motor transport in Ready to fight:
Automobile machines - 5; cargo 196; special machines - 18; armored troop-carriers - 10; motorcycles - 5 machines.
Under repair: automobile machines - 2 machines, motorcycles - 5 machines.
Supply: an ammunition - 1,2 b/k, the PETROLEUM PRODUCTS - 1,8 refuellings, the foodstuffs - for 4 day.

6). 56 McB changes of a disposition are not present. OoB:
Offz: 32 / 31
NCO: 50 / 49
Men: 167 / 163
Equipment of fighting machines:
Ready to fight: 74 - motorcycles, armored car BA-64 - 10 machines
Under repair: motorcycles - 2 machines.
Supply: an ammunition - 1,5 b/k; the PETROLEUM PRODUCTS - 1,9 refuellings; the foodstuffs for 3 day.

7). 15 ORB changes of a disposition are not present. OoB:
Offz: 41 / 41
NCO: 149 / 146
Equipment in Ready to fight: armored troop-carriers - 20; armored cars BA-64 - 12; transport machines - 10; motorcycles - 5. Under repair 6 motorcycles - 2.
Supply: an ammunition - 2 b/k, the PETROLEUM PRODUCTS - 2 refuellings, the foodstuffs for 2 day.

8). 146 and 147 PRB, 26 ATR, 41 MNR changes of a disposition are not present. Presence of the foodstuffs, an ammunition, the PETROLEUM PRODUCTS and a condition of an equipment without changes.

9). 226 ZAP covers an assembly area of the case, item of item Tschtepkino, Ponamarevo.
The aircraft of the opponent above an assembly area of flights did not make.
10). Weather cloudy, roads are passed for all types of transport.
11). Communication with units and brigades by phone, officers of communication - worked continuously.

The chief of a staff 26 TK
The colonel /Zinov'ev/
The chief of an operations section
The lieutenant colonel /Belousov/
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/

Yuri

P.S.
This document is published for the first time.
It is my personal find in archive.

Yuri

[Qvist]

Thank you, Yuri. This is a very welcome type of addition.

cheers

[konev]

Yuri,

Please add the following units to the 26 Tank Corps for 16 October 1942:

26 Independent Field Auto-Transport Company GSM
146 Field Maintenance Base
174 Field Tank Maintenance Base
2135 Military-Postal Station

konev

[Victor]

Yuri, thank you very much for this post. I was looking for a long while for a detailed composition of the 26th Tank Corps in November 1942. Do you by any chance have anything regarding the losses it suffered during 19 - 24 November 1942 and the losses it inflicted on the German and Romanian forces in the area? There was an armored battle on 20 November in which I am very interested.

[Yuri]

Yuri,

Please add the following units to the 26 Tank Corps for 16 October 1942:

26 Independent Field Auto-Transport Company GSM
146 Field Maintenance Base
174 Field Tank Maintenance Base
2135 Military-Postal Station

konev

Hi, konev!

Comrade Marshal Konev! I ask you to pay attention to item eight " Operative report # 88 ".
There units which you have specified are mentioned all:
26 Independent Field Auto-Transport Company GSM = on-Russian 26 ATR (Avto Transportnaja Rota)
146 Field Maintenance Base = in Russian - 146 PRB (Peredviznaja Remontnaja Baza)
174 Field Tank Maintenance Base = in Russian - 174 PRB (Peredviznaja Remontnaja Baza)

Now about 2135 Military-Postal Station or
2135 PPS (field post station) - PPS - Polevaja Pochtovaja Stancija. In documents of operative character Field Post Stations were not specified. Number of the personnel of post station did not exceed 10-20 person. And it was, mainly, the civil personnel.
It was not mentioned as still and Field Cash department of the State Bank. In which there were 3 persons, from them two civil.

/

udachi / Good luck!!

Yuri

[Yuri]

Yuri, thank you very much for this post. I was looking for a long while for a detailed composition of the 26th Tank Corps in November 1942. Do you by any chance have anything regarding the losses it suffered during 19 - 24 November 1942 and the losses it inflicted on the German and Romanian forces in the area? There was an armored battle on 20 November in which I am very interested.

Hi, Victor!

Yes, I have an opportunity to you to help.
I have good archival finds on that theme in which you are interested.
However, I in the ugliest image understand in English. Also should prepare for each answer long.
Now I spend a lot of time on a branch:
Axis History Forum Index> Heer, Waffen-SS and Volkssturm> German Kampfgruppen of WW2;

As soon as I shall finish work on that branch I shall try to help you.

/

udachi / Good luck!!

Yuri

[konev]

Yuri,

Please forgive me. Too much vodka to think straight!

I must be more careful otherwise I will go before field court and they will send me to count trees.

Contact me off-forum (private e-mail). I have something that may be of interest to you.

divisionbattleorder@yahoo.com

konev

[Doppleganger]

Upon reading some of the data compiled by Krivosheev I am astonished at his reported extent of Soviet losses on the Eastern Front in WW2. Especially astonishing are the losses in 1944, when the Red Army was in the ascendancy.

How accurate is the data in his book? Did the Red Army & Navy really lose 6,878,641 men and 13,800 medium tanks in 1944, as the following link and table would suggest?

http://www.magweb.com/sample/sgmbn/sgm80soj.htm

These figures are truly staggering.

Probably you have no good knowledge of scales of military actions which were conducted by Red Army against forces of the Axis.
For example, in 1942 the general number the soldier and officers of armies of the countries of the Axis who conducted operations against Red Army, made 6,2 million men.
Including Wermacht - 5,3 million men.
About scales of war which was conducted by Red Army, it is possible to judge on following figures.
In total for four years GPW against Red Army it has been exposed 21,5 million soldier and officers of the countries of the Axis. Including 17,5 million Germans.
In total in Red Army it has been called 34,5 million person, including 450,0 thousand women.
From these 34,5 million to forces of armies of the Axis resisted 25,5 million soldier and officers of Red Army.
In total irrevocable losses of Red Army (the victims who have died of wound, taken prisoner, missing persons) have made almost 12,0 million.
Irrevocable losses of armies of the Axis have made more than 9,0 million.

Oh but I do have good general knowledge about the Eastern Front. Even so, the scale of casualties stated by Krivosheev are still staggering. Furthermore, it gives credence to the argument that the Red Army was in a rush to get rid of the Nazi invader. It seems to me that the Red Army suffered more casualties than was necessary going by the huge advantage in force relations they enjoyed after 1942.

[Huck]

On September, 11th 1941ã.

The State Committee of Defense decides:
1. To install delivery of food rations of Red Army for September and IV quarter 1941 on number in quantity 7 400 000 person.
2. To confirm distribution of rations on fronts and districts, proceeding from following number of armies:
The Karelian front … … … … … … … … … … 185 000 person
The Leningrad front … … … … … … … …. 452 000 person
Northwest front … ..… … … … … …. 252 000 person
The western front … … … … … … … … … …... 511 000 person
Bryansk front … … … … … … … … … ….. 294 000 person
Southwest front … … … … … … … …. 850 000 person
Southern front … … … … … … … … … … ….. 532 000 person
Reserve front … … … … … … … … … … 491 000 person
The Odessa group...................................... 51 000 person
51-st army … … … … … … … … … … … … … 101 000 person
52-nd army … … … … … … … … … … … … 170 000 person
54-th army … … … … … … … … … … … … … . 85 000 person
The Arkhangelsk military district … … … ….. 104 000 person
The Moscow military district … … … … …......... 392 000 person
The Oryol military district............................. 245 000 person
The Kharkov military district … … … … …. 356 000 person
The North-Caucasian military district … …... 228 000 person
The Transcaucasian military district … … … …390 000 person
The Ural military district … … … … … ….......... 221 000 person
At-Volga military district … … … …... 268 000 person
Central Asia military district...................... 170 000 person
The Siberian military district … … … … … … 176 000 person
Transbaikalian military district … … … ….. 320 000 person
Far East front … … … … … … …...................... 511 000 person
The Leningrad military district...................... 45 000 person

Total … … … … … … … … … … ….. … … ….. 7 400 000 person

Thanks Yuri, very interesting figures.
Do you happen to have a similar distribution chart per geographical regions for Soviet combat airplanes and/or tanks, and at different times, say for instance in 1943?

[Gen. Bradley]

Oh but I do have good general knowledge about the Eastern Front. Even so, the scale of casualties stated by Krivosheev are still staggering. Furthermore, it gives credence to the argument that the Red Army was in a rush to get rid of the Nazi invader. It seems to me that the Red Army suffered more casualties than was necessary going by the huge advantage in force relations they enjoyed after 1942.

On the offensive against a well fortified opponent without any massive tactical advantages you generally take more casualties than you inflict. But you make up for this by hopefully getting the enemy to surrender by means of overruning defensive lines and encirclement. The Germans however, had high mobility and good tactical sense and were rarely encircled. The few times they were wer great strategic blunders by Hitler (Stalingrad and North Africa) where the advice of the Generals was ignored. Also late in the the Germans were fighting much more desperately against the SU than they were agains the West.

[Gen. Bradley]

Oh but I do have good general knowledge about the Eastern Front. Even so, the scale of casualties stated by Krivosheev are still staggering. Furthermore, it gives credence to the argument that the Red Army was in a rush to get rid of the Nazi invader. It seems to me that the Red Army suffered more casualties than was necessary going by the huge advantage in force relations they enjoyed after 1942.

On the offensive against a well fortified opponent without any massive tactical advantages you generally take more casualties than you inflict. But you make up for this by hopefully getting the enemy to surrender by means of overruning defensive lines and encirclement. The Germans however, had high mobility and good tactical sense and were rarely encircled. The few times they were wer great strategic blunders by Hitler (Stalingrad and North Africa) where the advice of the Generals was ignored. Also late in the war Germans were fighting much more desperately against the SU than they were against the West.

[Qvist]

On the offensive against a well fortified opponent without any massive tactical advantages you generally take more casualties than you inflict.

No - at least, that was not the case in this campaign. The disparity of losses was a constant, and cannot be accounted for by such easy generalisations. You won't find much to support it in other campaigns or wars either.

cheers

[Art]

I suppose the key words are "without massive tactical advantage".