#179
Post
by Kunikov » 14 Oct 2005, 18:48
Since I've started to do some research into this, mainly from the first two chapters of the book I'm reading now "From Peace to War" I'll make a post here addressing a few issues already brought up, etc.
First of all I don't agree with the remark that "...Hitler sought to use this standstill agreement with the USSR to clear the way for a war against Poland without the danger of war on two fronts." The agreement of course being the non-aggression pact. But, in retrospect, we see that when Hitler invaded Poland, he was already within a few days in a fight on two fronts. His army against Poland was one front, and the fact that France and England declared war on him signifies another front. Whether France and England would attack or wouldn't is a moot point, the danger was now clear. If Hitler wanted to avoid a 'two front' war he should have made a deal with France if attacking Poland, and with Poland if attacking France, making a deal with the Soviet Union does not guarantee one front, it simply guaranteed that the Soviet Union wouldn't go against Germany and join her forces with Polands on the one and same Front Germany was already engaged.
Now, moving on to motivations on the part of the Soviet Union, mainly this revolves around Chapter 2 in the above mentioned book entitled "Soviet Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Hitler-Stalin Pact" by Ingeborg Fleischhauer. I'll be quoting various passages:
"After the power balance in Eastern Europe had been tipped by the German-Polish nonaggression pact (26 January 1934), Stalin, via initiatives by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. M. Litvinov, first of all tried to persuade Germany not to commit herself on the Baltic states issue by means of bilateral treaties, and then attempted to persuade the group of states to commit themselves using the multilateral vision of an 'Eastern Locarno'. This effort failed. Soviet foreign policy drew the necessary conclusions from this and, in 1935, changed tact and aimed for an alliance system with the Western Powers, including any neighbouring states."
As one can see, since 1935 the Soviet Union was trying to come to terms with the Western Powers about how Germany should be controlled.
"Following the sobering experience of the German Wehrmacht's unopposed advance to the east (the Anschluss of Austria) and the weakness of the existing alliance system with France and Czechoslovakia (the Sudetenland crisis), Stalin's main concern switched to the Ukraine and the Baltic region. The actions of France and Britain at the Munich Conference, as well as in their bilateral relations with Germany in the coming months, were a series of deep disappointments for both the Soviet government and Soviet diplomacy, and Russia's suspicious anti-imperialist attitude intensified accordingly." The four options at this point left for the Soviet Union were as follows:
"(a) continuing their efforts to create a fremework of collective security with the WEstern Powers using the League of Nations, in spite of their negative experiences with both;
(b) a policy of self-isolation and of building up the country's power in anticipation of war;
(c) a policy of alliances with the neighbouring states; or
(d) an arrangement with the enemy.
All four options were insufficient for an effective defensive policy at that time. Whereas option (a) was difficult to realise owing to Britain's appeasement policy, and thus offered the necessary security only in the longer term, the other three options for various reasons had to seem only temporary solutions. Option (b) seemed to offer only limited chances of success, if only because of the double weight of the Janapese activities and the constantly growing danger of a two-front war under the ausieces of the anti-Comintern pact. Option (c), in the short term, was meeting with resistance from most of the countries in question. Finally, option (d) seemed to the Soviet government to be highly unthinkable, not only for ideological and political reasons 0 the Russians were also aware of the fact that the aggressor would only enter into such an arrangement for short-term tactical reasons. Hence this option could only be used under certain conditions, i.e. as a last resport."
As will be seen, all options aside from the last would be exhausted and Stalin would make a choice he thought was best for his country's security and interests.
"The Western reaction to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, including the British guarnatee for Poland, increased the USSR's importance at a stroke - the Western Powers turned to Stalin as a matter of course for the first time. In itself this did not mean an increase in security - Stalin (here again doubtless a greater realist than his British counterparts) did not think negotiations alon woul dhave a deterrent effect on Hitler, all the less so since his war plan for Poland ('Plan White') had been fixed between 3 April and 11 April 1939." Thus the pact had no affect on the German invasion plans.
"In Warsaw Potemkin's proposal for a Polish-Soviet assitance pact was rejected (10 May 1939). The Polish ambassador in Msocow, W. Grzybowski, explicity confirmed this a day later in a conversation with the newly appointed Foreign Affairs Commissar, V. Molotov. Thus the third option of the Soviet security concept failed due to the most important neighbouring state."
"There is reason to believe that the original list of four foreign policy options for the Soviet government had been reduced to option (d) under the preconditions determining its political and strategic thinking by about mid-August, i.e. eleven days prior to the intended start of the German attack on Poland (26 August!). Following the failure of the People's Commissar for Defence, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, acting head of the Soviet military mission, to achieve the resolution of the 'principal question' (14 August), the right to send his troops through Poland and Romania, there was only one course left open - to take the bull by the horns."
"A new situation arose during the last third of July 1939 - the Three-Power tanks had got bogged down, and Britain seemed to want conciliatory negotations with Germany; thus option (a) seemed to disappear once more. On the Mongolian-Manchurian front the border skirmishes between Soviet and Japanese troops soon became outright war; Britain seemed to make it worse by rendering assistance to Japan in the Arita-Craigie Agreement. Hence not only option (b) was endangered - there was even the suspicion that the Germans, British, and Japanese were forming a community of interests against the USSR. The danger signs of 'imperialist encirclement' started to light up. In addition, Germany had drawn some of Russia's neighbours closer to herself (nonaggression pacts with Estonia and Latvia on June 7, visits by Halder and Canaris to Estonia and Finland), while Britain refused to put any pressure upon other neighbouring countries (Poland and Romania) to persuade them to comply with future Soviet wishes or demands. Thus option (c) threatened to disappear for good."
"Therefore the second, positive directive Molotov send to Astachov on behalf of Stalin on August 11 1939 planned a formal rather than a substantial acceptance of the German offers of talks. It admitted that the Soviets were interested in an exchange of views, but wanted to make the necessary arrangements beforehand Stalin, had however, brought the Politburo's attention to the possibility, on this same 11 August (the very same day on which Berlin finally thought it had failed in its quest for the 'Russian green light' for good), of taking up political negotiations with Germany. But it was not until the Soviet government's 'princeipal question' asked of the British and French governments (14 August 1939) had gone unanswered that Stalin really utilised this possibility. On 15 August Molotov expressly accepted the German proposals for the first time during his conversation with Ambassador Schulenburg."
This passage was something that I found very interesting:
"However (as proof of the Soviet struggle for legality), we should nto overlook the fact that the additional 'special protocol', according to the Soviet draft of the nonaggression treaty of August 19, was at least to be mentioned in the postscript of the published text and described as an integral part of the treaty, in which specific foreign policy matters of mutual interest were to be dealt with. At the same time Molotov requested a German version of the postscript. He described the contents as a 'most serious matter' and the Soviet government's attitude to the treaties as 'very serious' - 'it keeps the promises it makes and it expects the same of its treaty partners'. These words made it very clear how worried the Soviets were about the imponderables of a secret additional agreement. The condition that this postscript be included in the nonaggression treaty (an attempt by the Soviets to meet the Germans haflway) did not comply with German wishes, and so it was dropped during the negotiations in the Kremlin (on the night of 23/24 August), possibly as a result of seeing the German draft protocol, which had only just arrived."
In conclusion:
"The outer framework for this decision is sufficiently clear:
(I) the final refusal of Poland (and thus the final failure of option [c] as the formal reason, with undoubtedly strong emotiona side-effects;
(II) insufficient commitment on the part of the French and especially the British, including their lack of pressure upon Poland and Romania (and hence the failure of option [a]_ as the material reason; and
(III) increased military planning requirements for the first Soviet major offensive against Japan (20 August) together with the need for goods and technology (in the sense of option ) as well as for temporary lessening of pressure upon the western borders by means of the German nonaggression agreement."
This last quote I liked as well:
"In the words of the knowledgeable French ambassador in Moscow (and, from November 1938, in Berlin), RObert Coulondre, they had 'pushed Stalin towards Hitler' from the spring of 1939 'after they had pushed Hitler towards Stalin in Munich'."
So, what conclusions can be drawn? Well, the options open to the Soviet Union were TRIED by the Soviet Union with no success, mainly no thanks to England and France. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was a last resort by a dictator who could forsee no other means of securing his frontiers and countries security. It did not influence Hitler's decision to go to war with Poland, nor did it eliminate a 'two front war.'
