Turkish Stormtroops

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PETER,

I KEEP USING CAPITAL LETTERS. IS THERE ANY OBJECTION ?
THANKS.

ALKAN KIZILDEL+

[Peter H]

Alkan,

Normally CAPS is not recommended--some view it as shouting.

We do make allowances though if someone has a visual problem or such.

Regards
Peter

[Chavusch]

Inspection by a German officer of Ottoman Assault troops 1918.Note grenade bags copying the German and Austrian example of such troops,and German supplied Ottoman style helmets.
(Source:Helmets of the First World War,Michael Haselgrove & Branislav Radovic)


My question is did such assault detachments serve in Palestine in 1918?My first impression is that these are members of the Ottoman Army Demonstration Battalion,never used in a fighting role in WW1.Kaiser Wilhelm reviewed such helmeted troops in November 1917 when he visited the Ottoman capital.

about living example of this Turkish type second pattern helmet and discussions , regards


http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... ht=turkish

[domster]

hi folks

I've been to Kew again trawling through intelligence summaries (took my digital camera this time and am still sorting 400 images!)
However some things stuck in my head and one was this about assault units


I also have a complete order of battle of the Yiderim army group translated from a captured document correct to July 1918 (this shows quite a few such assault battalions/companies). If anybody wants a copy I can send jpegs or pdf's (1 page is very wobbly as I was almost cross eyed and flaked out by then! but I'm hoping to get back and rephoto after crimbo.

All the best
Dominic

[Peter H]

Thanks Dominic.

Regards
Peter

[stevebecker]

Mate,

Can I thank you also.

I was trying to confirm that a part of the Storm Bn was with the 20th Div during the Bald Hill fighting between 27th Dec to 5 Dec 1917 around Mulebbis.

I can't read the entry but is that the 20th Div Attack Co or the 26th Div attack Co?

Cheers

S.B

[Helen Bachaus]

Dominic, Hi there. I'd be very interested myself as I gather information about these units.

God Bless

Helen

[domster]

Hi Folks

it is the 26th division attack company-there are others listed on the Yiderim OOB I have for July 1918 in anybody wants a copy (does not locate units but very detailed).

Cheers
Dominic

[infantry]

Dear All,
Once in a while I decided to write an academic article about Ottoman experiences with Storm Troops (Hücum Kitaati) and collected lots of material but due other issues up to now did not able to finish it. So some bits and pieces from my research

The first Ottoman Storm Troop unit was founded by XV Corps Command in 1917 in Galicia. Initially company size units within each division.

Enver Pasha ever fond of special or elite units immediately committed the idea to other Ottoman units. A company size Storm Troops founded in each division -most probably paper only in some units. As far as I could able to follow from the archive documents even battalions were founded.

Most of the storm companies founded during the collapse of the original unit structures especially units at Palestine-Syria front already short of everything. So in most of the cases this trial truned out to be a bad decision. Obviously collecting best and brightest was not a good idea by creating further shortage for the line infantry units.

During the last stage of Turkish Independence War (1919-1923) a battalion size Storm Troops was founded in each division and a company size within each infantry regiments. This time Strom troops did find ample opportunity and achieved good results.

After the end of Independence War several articles and at least one draft manuals were published on this issue. But somehow (I still could not able find the reason) the name and formation lost its glamour and instead of creating special units by using the men power of each unit it was decided to found totally separate special units. During the counterinsurgency operations of 1930s several experiment were practiced including foundation of mountain regiments.

Last but not least several other special/elite force experiments were practiced including ski qualified winter battalions.

Regards

[FOW1918]

I know they were continually under strength but does anyone have what it was suppost to be?

Thanks,
Chris

[Tosun Saral]

Some commanders of Assoult battalions:
Huseyin Avni (Lt. Col. Alparslan) (Trabzon 1876- Haymana near Ankara, August 30th 1921 )
Graduated from War School on Feb. 2nd 1901.
After fighting verious battles during Balkan and WW1 he was promoted to Major on Sept
14 1916. On Dec.14th 1916 he was made commander of Hucum taburu the Assault Battalion. He fought at Aşvanis, Melikköy, Güzeltepe. On June 1st 1917 we cwas made commander of Assoult Rgt of the 9th Div. at East Front.He fought the İkisivriler Battle.
During Turkish War of Liberation he commanded the famous 42nd Int.Rgt. KIA during Sakarya battle.

TS's Nota: My late father Maj. Gen. Ahmet Hulki Saral also commanded the 42nd Inf. Rgt. during the years 1950-52 at Kavak/Gallipoli.

Mehmet Şükrü Bey (Oğuz) commander of assoult battalion during WW1,

.

[Peter H]

Courtesy of Bill Woerlee.

Ed Erickson, Ottoman Army effectiveness in World War I: a comparative study , pp. 103-5:

Tactical innovations from the western front were also introduced on a routine basis in Palestine. On 25 October 1917, German Colonel Hergote, fresh from the western front, delivered a presentation to the 21st Infantry Regiment on the principles of assault and battle training, and also on reconnaissance training.

The 7th Infantry Division was simultaneously engaged in a major restructuring of its tactical organisational architecture. After its arrival in Beersheba, the division inactivated the 4th Company of each infantry battalion on 28 June. On 10 August reflecting the most current tactical thinking, the division activated a machine-gun company, armed with light machine guns, in every infantry battalion.' This reorganisation was repeated in every Ottoman infantry division in Palestine. Thus as the 7th Infantry Division lost a quarter of its rifle strength it gained offensive and defensive capability by the addition of light machine guns within infantry battalions.`"

On 17 July 1917, the division activated an assault detachment (hücüm müfrezesi) of fifty men. (This was the Turkish version of German Stosstruppen.) This was a local initiative implemented by von Kressenstein, who wanted to introduce the most current western front tactical innovations into his army. He assigned Major Kiehl to supervise the training of the Ottoman assault troops 'with good results' . Kress inspected the companies in September 1917 and mentioned, `it is evident that proper training and grooming would bring out the best in these brave, obedient, and humble Anatolian soldiers' . In the absence of written doctrinal information, an unofficial manual on assault troop tactics was written and distributed by the 19th Infantry Division commander, which was based on the experiences of that division in Galicia.

The fact that the Ottoman Army raised, trained, equipped, and employed stone troops has escaped general notice in the English language historiography of World War 1. However, in 1994, Dr. David Nicolle published a clear photograph of a platoon of Ottoman Army storm troops in Palestine in the summer of 1918. The men are outfitted in well fitting uniforms, German-style steel helmets, have under-arm grenade bags with stick grenades, German Mauser rifles, and puttee leggings. This unique photograph is important because the men look confident and fit, well fed, and arc thoroughly equipped - indeed, a picture that is at odds with our historical perception of the Ottoman Army in Palestine. Although it is dangerous to draw a generalised conclusion from Nicolle's photograph, it is obvious that the Turks, at least in one locality, gave a high priority to the selection of men for, and to the maintenance of, its assault troop formations.

On I September 1917, Enver Pasha ordered the general activation of assault troops within the Ottoman Army. Enver directed the XV Corps, the First Army, and the Fourth Army to activate the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Assault Battalions respectively. Additionally, he ordered each infantry division in the Yildirim Army Group and in the Fourth Army to activate assault detachments. Enver was very specific that only the best officers, NCOs, and men (`from the best units in the division, who were intelligent, healthy and hardy, and not more than twentyseven years of age') were selected for these elite units. Additionally, the assault units received better rations, a distinctive badge (an embroidered hand grenade), and conducted a one-month assault course. Later the divisional assault detachments matured into assault battalions. Initially, the Ottoman armies in Mesopotamia, western Anatolia, and Caucasia were excluded from the requirement to activate assault troops.

In the creation of assault battalions the Ottoman Army returned to an organisational architecture that it had abandoned in 1913. One of the Ottoman General Staff's organisational changes in 1914 was the abolition of the organic rifle regiment at army corps level and the organic rifle battalion at infantry division level. These highly specialised regiments and battalions were the Ottoman Army's equivalent of German Jäger or French chusseurs. The reason for this action was the inability of the army during the Balkan Wars to utilise effectively the rifle regiments and battalions in their proper doctrinal role. In fact, during the First Balkan War, Ottoman commanders tended to misuse their rifle battalions as immediate reserves or as a nucleus for ad hoc provisional formations. They were almost never used properly in reconnaissance, screening, or flank guard missions. Consequently, the Ottoman General Staff deactivated the rifle units in the spring of 1914 because the misuse of concentrations of hand-picked men degraded the overall quality of the regular infantry regiments. It should be noted that after World War 2 the US Army deactivated its Ranger battalions for the same reason - the concentration of elite soldiers in specialised units weakened the army's regular infantry establishment and there did not seem to be an appropriate tactical return on such an investment.

The activation of the assault battalion (hücüm tahur) essentially returned the Ottoman Army to the elitist organisational architecture of 1910-14. Each infantry division had three infantry regiments (of three infantry battalions) and one assault battalion, within which there was a high concentration of aggressive and fit officers and men. Unlike the German Army, the Turks formed no specialised assault or storm troop divisions.

By the end of 1917 the strategic and operational initiative in Palestine had passed to the British. Consequently, both the practical and technical need of the Ottoman Army to possess assault troops also passed. Nevertheless, the assault troop battalions of the Ottoman Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Armies were retained, possibly with a view to future offensive operations of the Yildirim Army Group. It should be remembered that until the failure of the Ludendorff offensives in the spring of 1918, the strategic posture of the Central Powers appeared favourable.

[domster]

Hi Folks

Just been on the Great War forum and looked at the Library of Congress photos Johan has posted there. I have looked at these before but only noticed the helmets on this burial party photo now. Taken at Tel el Ful around the around 27th December 1917. Other photos of the same action show the bodies of Turks armed with copious grenades>

Dominic

[Peter H]

Thanks Dominic.

The fallen there.

GRAPHIC

http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y195/v ... 00047r.jpg

http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y195/v ... 00048r.jpg

http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y195/v ... 00049r.jpg

[Dan E. Moe]

Any info on the distinctive badge? (embroided handgrenade)