Intended FJ role in Sealion

[sitalkes]

As for moving artillery around, how about some of these?

Air portable via JU52.

The LG 40 weighed 145 kg and could be disassembled into five parts so it could be carried by its crew. It seems likely it would have been used for the invasion of Britain. The 37mm PaK 36 weighed 450 kg (990 lb) (Travel) Combat: 327 kg (721 lb) and could be moved around by its crew - I've even seen film of them pushing it at the run. Obviously a tow vehicle would be preferred but maybe these weapons wouldn't have to move far before encountering some British soldiers. They might also find some British vehicle (or even a horse) to tow the gun, if the vehicle owner didn't follow orders to remove the distributor cap etc.

[Knouterer]

I'm sorry to be the spoilsport all the time, but again I doubt that the 75 mm LG40 was in service in the autumn of 1940. A few were used on Crete, partially air-dropped and partially landed by glider (according to Golla, Die deutsche Fallschirmtruppe 1936-1941) However, they were operated not by the heavy weapons companies but by the division's artillery battalion (FschArtAbt 7), which was formed after the campaign in Holland (on the basis of the one existing battery which had landed at Waalhaven). This battalion, assuming it was operational by September, was not part of the Sealion order of battle as detailed above, and would probably have been flown in later; in any case, its new 75 mm Model 1936 mountain guns were too heavy to be air-dropped.

Information about the equipment of the heavy weapons (13th) companies of the FJ regiments is a bit vague and contradictory. I provided a link before to the interesting account of a Fallschirmjäger (http://www.erinnerungswerkstatt-norders ... php?page=2 ) who as a new recruit joined FJR1 in June 1940, straight from school, and was assigned to the newly formed 13th company, which soon after was equipped with 9 x 105 mm “Nebelwerfer” heavy mortars (in three platoons). It's possible that some of these companies also had single-barrel 150 mm rocket launchers (Do-Gerät), the precursor of the six-barreled Nebelwerfer 41.

According to Golla, for the Crete landing the 13th coy of the Sturmregiment flew in with 12 Ju52, each holding 10 men and 1 x 105 mm mortar with 25 rounds (which latter would weigh 200+ kg with packaging).

[Knouterer]

What the above discussions do show is that - any way you want to cut it - the carrying capacity of the available transport aircraft was limited, and that if the plan was to drop as many as 5,000 men, it would not be possible to bring very much in the way of vehicles, heavy weapons or ammunition, even in the most wildly optimistic estimations.

Weapons like mortars or recoilless guns may not weigh very much by themselves, but the ammunition for them does.

Taking the 81 mm mortar (GrW 34, of which every FJ battalion had some) as an example, ammunition was packed in metal boxes holding three rounds and weighing 13,25 kg. That means that a modest supply of 60 rounds - which a mortar could fire off in a matter of minutes - weighed 265 kg, or about as much as three fully equipped Fallschirmjäger. Or to put it another way, bringing sufficient ammo for just this one type of weapon would take several Ju 52s.

(that being said, British infantry battalions at that time were very short of mortar ammo too and would have gone through their (initial) supply very quickly)

[Paul_G_Baker]

Looking on the Wiki for the HE 111, I noticed a fairly large number of versions that weren't approved for service - small, trials, batches. At least one of these batches became a Transport Detachment flying supplies into Stalingrad:-

He 111 F

The He 111 design quickly ran through a series of minor design revisions. One of the more obvious changes started with the He 111F models, which moved from the elliptical wing to one with straight leading and trailing edges, which could be manufactured more efficiently.[31] The dimensions of the new design had a wing span of 22.6m (74 ft 1¾in) and an area of 87.60m² (942.90 ft).[31]

Heinkel's industrial capacity was limited and production was delayed. Nevertheless, 24 machines of the F-1 series were exported to Turkey.[31] Another 20 of the F-2 variant were built.[36] The Turkish interest, prompted by the fact the tests of the next prototype, He 111 V8, was some way off, prompted the Ministry of Aviation to order 40 F-4s with Jumo 211 A-3 engines. These machines were built and entered service in early 1938.[28] This fleet was used as a transport group during the Demyansk Pocket and Battle of Stalingrad

Couldn't these have been used to bulk-up the FJ supply capacity for Sealion?

[sitalkes]

Well practically any German plane could be (and was)used to improve the supply capacity of various forces. For operation NIWI 200 Storch's were used like helicopters to transport some GD troops behind enemy lines (each could only carry a pilot and two men) - probably the mixed results of the operation caused it never to be tried again though. If the invasion had lasted until October 1940, there would then have been 40 Fw Condors available, each of which could carry 30 fully equipped men. In 1940 though I think every He 111 was needed as a bomber and for them to be used as transports it would have to mean that the air and land campaign was going very well indeed.

[Knouterer]

40 Condors? AFAIK in August nine Condors were operating with the Luftwaffe (detachment of KG40) from Bordeaux-Mérignac, serviceability was usually only about 30%. Focke-Wulf delivered only 20 in all to the LW in the second half of 1940, and in case of invasion all those that could fly (rarely more than four at the same time, apparently) would have been badly needed in their role of long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft and bomber, considering that the Luftwaffe would need to know exactly what the Royal Navy was doing in order to counter it.

Presumably a few civilian Lufthansa Fw 200s could have been used as transports, if a suitable airfield could have been captured, but I have no info about the Condor ever being used to drop paras?

[sitalkes]

I'm assuming tht if Sealion had been delayed until May 1941, the transport squadrons and FJ units + 22 div units would be at full strength (plus the possibility of using new glider designs). Were any new fj regiments recruited before May 1941?

[sitalkes]

British wartime posters suggested that Condors could be used to drop parachutists but I think it would better have been used to fly them into an airfield. However during the Norwegian campaign it seems that pretty much any aircraft would do when it came to transporting troops and supplies. I don't know how difficult it was to setup a static line apparatus for parachutists, but unless the plane flew too fast I don't see why they wouldn't use it. 276 Condors were built, but I can't find out how many were built as transports.

[Knouterer]

I was just looking through Karl Klee's collection of German documents concerning Seelöwe (published 1959) again, and I notice that in its Preliminary Orders (Vorläufige Weisung) of 9.9.1940 16th Army (A.O.K.16), to which the four divisions on the right (landing zones B and C) belonged, was at that time counting on only a single regiment of paras:

"Zur Unterstützung des Angriffs gegen Dover wird ein Rgt. Fallschirmtruppen nordwestl. Dover eingesetzt und unterstellt."

(to support the attack against Dover a regiment of paras will land NW of Dover and will come under command.)

This, in combination with air landings near Brighton, was the plan until about mid-September, it seems, after which it was decided to abandon the Brighton landing and drop all available forces west of Folkestone.

[Knouterer]

Some info from Walter C. Ansel, Hitler confronts England (1960). Ansel, as a Rear-Admiral USN with much experience of planning and carrying out amphibious operations in WWII, was/is far and away the best qualified of all the Sealion authors to assess the chances of success of this operation; it’s a pity he devoted so much of his book on speculations as to what might have been going on in Hitler’s mind.
When he visited Germany for his research in 1953, he spoke with an impressive list of the senior commanders involved with Sealion in 1940, including Major General Herbert Loch, who commanded the 17th ID in 1940. Page 274:

“The 17th Division war diary evidenced a paucity of exact information on what the paratroop detachments of the 7th Fliegerdivision would contribute. (…) Not until 4 October did General Loch obtain sufficient Air information to round out his attack map and order. The interim saw frequent changes of paratroop strength and intentions and ended with the commitment of nearly the whole 7th Fliegerdivision, to insure the early capture of Folkestone and Dover.”

According to Ansel’s account, KG Bräuer was in fact the rest of FJR1 as I surmised above. The map is essentially the same as Schenk’s, as far as the FJ are concerned. However, there are some interesting differences concerning the tasks of the 17th ID, for example Schenk writes that the cyclist battalion would advance towards Canterbury.

[Knouterer]

For direct comparison, here is Schenk's map. One difference that meets the eye is that it looks as if the neighbouring 35th Division is advancing on Ashford, while on Ansel's map that town is in the 17th Division's sector. But according to Schenk the task of the 35th ID was to occupy the planned bridgehead perimeter from Ashford - High Halden - South of Biddenden - South of Sissinghurst, a front of about 15 miles/24 km. The 17th ID, plus whatever was left of the FJ after the initial fighting, would have to occupy an even wider front, 25 miles/40 km or so. After killing, capturing or driving away the 40,000+ British troops (plus Home Guard) in their sector, yet preferably before any of the counterattacking divisions appear on the scene. It seems a tall order.

[Knouterer]

In that context, the Preliminary Orders (Vorläufige Weisung) of 16th Army HQ (A.O.K. 16) concerning Operation Sealion of 9 September 1940 said (Klee, Dokumente, p. 380, my translation):

“The Army Corps (i.e. VII. A.K. with 1st Mountain and 7th Inf Div and XIII A.K. with the 17th and 35th ID) will establish a bridgehead Canterbury – Great Stour to Ashford (north side) – road Ashford, High Halden, Biddenden – south of Sissinghurst – Cranbrook – Flimwell – west of Burwash, and immediately prepare to defend it with every means available. (…) The Corps must be prepared to defend these positions for a minimum of eight days, without further support and without further supplies of ammunition, rations and fuel, against the expected counterattacks of the enemy’s operative reserves (including armoured forces). All possible preparations to be made in advance. The engineer battalions of the first wave divisions must carry a generous supply of AT mines …”

"without further supplies" means after the transports had been unloaded (turnaround time for those ship was about a week).

[Knouterer]

This map (from Karl Klee, Das Unternehmen "Seelöwe") shows the plan as it stood at the beginning of September, with airborne attacks near Brighton and Dover. As indicated above, the Brighton landing was then scrapped, and so was the landing from the sea between Brighton and Worthing. At the insistence of the Kriegsmarine, landing beach "E" was shifted to the east of Brighton, a zone that until then had been considered unsuitable (cliffs, rocky beaches, etc.). The airborne landing near Dover was shifted to the NW of Folkestone.

[sitalkes]

B H Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, Pan, London, 1978 gives Student's account of how the paratroopers were to be used. He says there were 300 gliders carrying 3000 soldiers; also Student's crazy Irish plans are presented:

Page 220

“From what we learnt later about Britain’s situation it would seem that the war might have been won in July, 1940 if the German Intelligence service had been better; but most senior naval officers considered it lost on September 3rd 1939." In other words, from the day Britain entered. the war.

General Student gave me details of the part that the airborne forces were to have played in the invasion plan, as well as some more interesting comments on the way he would have wished them to be used. As Student himself was then in hospital, recovering from the head wound he had suffered at Rotterdam, the airborne forces were commanded by General Putzier: "Two divisions [1] were to be employed, as well as 300 gliders-each of these carried a pilot and nine other men, three thousand in all. The intention was to use the airborne force for securing a bridge-head near Folkestone, about twenty miles wide and twelve miles deep. The intended dropping zone was kept closely under air observation. It was seen that obstacles were being quickly prepared - that the suitable landing fields were being filled with upright stakes - and it was assumed that minefields were also ·being laid there. For these reasons Putzier reported, at the end of August, that an airborne invasion was now out of the question.

"If I had been still on the scene I should have urged the use of the parachute forces against England while your evacuation from Dunkirk was still in progress, to seize the ports where your troops were landing. It was known that most of them had left Dunkirk without any of their heavier weapons.

"Even if this project had been vetoed my plans for the airborne part of the invasion would have been different to what was actually decided. I should have used my force to capture airfields considerably deeper inland than the intended bridge-head. Having captured these, I should have transported infantry divisions over by air, without tanks or heavy artillery - some to turn outwards and attack

Page 221
the coast defences from the rear, and some to move on London. I reckoned that one infantry division could be brought over by air in a day and a half to two days, that this reinforcement could be kept up.” It seemed to me that Student’s plan was optimistic, taking account of the small force that could be carried in this way, and the time it would take to increase. "But the best time” Student again emphasized, “was immediately after Dunkirk- before your defensive measures were developed. We heard later that the people in Britain had a parachute psychosis. That amused us, but there is no doubt it was the best defensive precaution, properly directed." …

Page 228

It was the project of an occupation of Ireland – as a means to get a stranglehold of England's seaborne supplies - instead of a direct invasion of England, and may have been generated by Goering.

At a conference on December 3rd Hitler dealt with the subject, and said: "A landing in Ireland can be attempted only if Ireland requests help. For the present our envoy must ascertain whether De Valera desires support . . . Ireland is important to the Commander-in-Chief, Air, as a base for attacks on the north-west ports of Britain… The occupation of Ireland might lead to the end of the war. Investigations are to be made." But the Naval Staff made a very damping report on the prospects of any such move, especially if attempted by sea.

That caused Hitler's mind to revert to "Sea-Lion”, but with a difference. I had an account of what followed from Student - who, after recovering from the severe wound he had received on the opening day of the invasion of the West, returned to duty at the beginning of January, 1941, and was given command of the new 11th Air Corps composed of airborne troops. Shortly afterwards he received a summons to go along with Goering to see Hitler at Berchtesgaden - it was Student's first visit to that mountain fastness. He was told to come prepared with proposals for how the new corps might be employed in the near future.

"This conference with Hitler and Goering on the Obersalzberg took place in the second half of January, on a day between the 20th and the 25th- I think it was the 25th. At first Hitler developed in detail his general views, political and strategical, about how to continue the war ·against his principal enemy. Herein he also mentioned the issues in the Mediterranean. After that he turned to the question of invading England. Hitler said that during the previous year he could not afford to risk a possible failure; apart from that, he had not wished to provoke the British, as. he hoped to arrange peace talks. But as they were unwilling to discuss things, they must face the alternative.

Page 229

“Then a discussion followed about the use of the 11th Air Corps in an invasion of Great Britain. In this respect I expressed my doubts about using the Corps directly on the South Coast, to form a bridgehead for the Army - the area immediately behind the coast was now covered with obstacles. These doubts were accepted by Hitler. I then proposed that, if it proved absolutely necessary to use the 11th Air Corps on the south coast, then airfields in the hinterland (25 to 35 miles distant from the coast) should be captured, and infantry divisions landed on them.

"Suddenly Hitler pointed to the waist of the Cornwall- Devon Peninsula, and drew a big circle on his map round Taunton and the Blackdown Hills, saying: ‘Your airborne troops could be used here as flank protection. This is a strong sector and, besides, this important defile must be opened.’ He then pointed to Plymouth and dwelt on the importance of this great harbour for the Germans and for the English. Now I could no longer follow his thought, and I asked at what points in the south coast the landing was to take place. But Hitler kept strictly to his order that operations were to be kept secret, and said: ‘I cannot tell you yet.’"

Student then put forward the project he himself favoured and had worked out- a surprise descent on Northern Ireland. His idea was that it should be a diversion in aid of, and coincident with, the invasion of southern England. He argued that it would be “not nearly as difficult as if we were to drop on the south coast of England, and would also appeal to the taste of my parachute troops.” His aim would be first to secure and then to expand a firm operational base what he called the "ink on blotting paper” method. Starting from the airfields in Brittany, the drop would be made in a triangular area between Divis Mountain, west of Belfast, and Lough Neagh capturing the three airfields in that area. A subsidiary drop was to be made at Lisburn, to block that road and rail centre. Large numbers of dummy parachutists were

Page 230

to be dropped in various inaccessible places, such as the Mourne Mountains and Sperrin Mountains, to distract the defending forces. Glider troops could not be used in this operation because of the distance to be covered, but fighter squadrons were to follow in daylight and operate from the captured airfields. In case of failure Student reckoned that his forces would be able to push into Eire, and thus be interned instead of being captured or killed.

Hitler listened attentively to the scheme, but "following his ‘wait and see’ method, said he must think it over. He then discussed possible operations in the Mediterranean- at Gibraltar, Malta, and against the Suez Canal." After that Student withdrew, while Goering continued to confer with Hitler. They travelled back.to Berlin the following night, and on parting Goering said: "Don’t trouble yourself needlessly about Ulster. The Fuhrer does not wish to invade. Britain. From now on Gibraltar will be the main task for you.”

Student ended by giving me his personal impression and reflections on Hitler’s attitude to the problem of invasion. "Hitler hesitated to attack even with the most superior forces a strong enemy in a prepared position across the sea. Such undertakings seemed sinister to him. This was particularly shown in the later cases of Crete and Malta; also in the reverse sense, in the case of “Fortress Europe", which he for a long time considered impregnable. He underestimated the power of the attack against defended coastlines, and overrated the possibilities of defence behind a water barrier. (Norway was only a. "inferior enemy”. In that case it was only a question of seizure- which, however, was carried through with great daring.) The problem of supply and communications came first with him, and ruled all his deliberations. In all airborne and other detached operations his greatest anxiety was that secure land or water communications should be established as quickly as possible. This principle is quite right, but Hitler carried it too far- anyhow in the days of his success.

Page 231

In those days all undertakings seemed too great a risk him when it was not possible to lay down exact and absolutely reliable routes of communication. Thus in 1940 he wanted to give up Narvik when the first major crisis occurred.

Student went on to say. "For a possible attack on Great Britain he chose the shortest distances for these reasons. The probability is that he never had a plan for landings beyond the coastal stretch Dover- Land’s End. At the conference in January, 1941, I had a definite impression that he was determined to carry out an eventual landing on a wide front, not merely on the;Dover- Portsmouth sector, and to launch the main attack further west, i.e. Bournemouth- Bridport. The 11th Air Corps was to be used accordingly at the narrowest part of the Cornwall- Devon Peninsula for flank protection and forcing access to the Peninsula. But perhaps he wanted to land as far down as Land’s End- and the corps was intended for the establishment of communications- or wanted to confine the landing to the Peninsula.

“Moreover it is quite clear to me that, in January 1941, Hitler had not given up the ‘Sea-Lion’ plan but had only postponed it. Hitler wavered between ‘Sea-Lion’- Gibraltar- Russia. Goering wanted ‘Sea-Lion’ and Gibraltar, but not Russia."


[1] The Parachute Division and the 22nd Air-Landing Division, forming the XI Air Corps.

[dgfred]

Good stuff here guys. Thanks for the maps and discussion.