Intended FJ role in Sealion

[phylo_roadking]

I'll just limit myself to the observation that no one has so far come up with a halfway plausible explanation of why all three AT companies would be dropped at the "wrong end" of the battlefield, i.e. farthest away from the point(s) where enemy tanks were most likely to appear, and would in fact appear, according to the British plans.

Because the area to be held by Brauer Meindl's troops, is not the "wrong end" of the battlefield. It's the more important part of the FJ blocking zone; the area that Kampfgruppe Hoffmeister would move east through. The bit that HAS to be held to allow Hoffmeister to head to Dover.

The forces "in front" of Brauer - FJR 2 and 3 - are just "sponge"...holding up what can be held up, slowing down what can't...blunting any counter attack down from the direction of Maidstone and Ashford. They're not there to win the battle all by themselves!

[Knouterer]

Oh I'm sorry, NOW I understand ... so when you wrote:

"Their "poor comrades of FJR 2 and 3" would already have seen feldgrau uniforms moving through their positions from the south",

what you actually meant to write was:

"Their "poor comrades of FJR 2 and 3" would already have seen the Matilda tanks of 8th RTR moving through their positions from the west"?

[phylo_roadking]

There are two other factors that would make the eastern end of the FJ's blocking zone the strongest;

1/ It would prevent any attempt to reinforce Hythe from Shorncliffe or Folkestone behind the hills on the coast should the defenders decide to do so when it became evident that Folkestone was not being directly attacked;

2/ Look at the topographical map again; as I noted previously, the area where Brauer's force would have dropped is the narrowest part of the terrain between the coastal hills/cliffs and the edge of the Downs. It's the part of the block zone where not only are the anti-tank companies the most necessary...it's also the area where they can be most effective.

[Knouterer]

Everybody is free to indulge in his or her personal fantasies of course ... my (provisional) conclusion is that these AT companies were expected to fight as infantry, initially at least. Perhaps the idea was to airland their guns later at RAF Lympne, and use captured vehicles to tow them.

The idea was that the 37 mm Pak, when airdropped, would be towed by airdropped heavy motorcycles with sidecars and driven rear axles (making them 3x2 vehicles), the Zündapp KS 750 or BMW R75. But neither of these went into production before 1941. The only such motorcycles the Germans possessed in Sept. 1940 were captured Belgian and French ones.
Heavy beasts by the way - the Belgian FN M12 with sidecar weighed no less than 506 kg. The German garrisons on the Channel Islands used some later on I believe.

[phylo_roadking]

Everybody is free to indulge in his or her personal fantasies of course ... my (provisional) conclusion is that these AT companies were expected to fight as infantry, initially at least. Perhaps the idea was to airland their guns later at RAF Lympne, and use captured vehicles to tow them.

The idea was that the 37 mm Pak, when airdropped, would be towed by airdropped heavy motorcycles with sidecars and driven rear axles (making them 3x2 vehicles), the Zündapp KS 750 or BMW R75. But neither of these went into production before 1941. The only such motorcycles the Germans possessed in Sept. 1940 were captured Belgian and French ones.

If they need to tow them any long distance, that is. But if dropped in Kampfgruppe Brauer's drop zone...which is at its widest only 2-2.25 miles across...




What's German for "Shanks' Mare"?

The actual terrain shouldn't be too much problem either...

[Knouterer]

On closer inspection, this whole discussion is superfluous because regarding the plans of the 7 FD Golla bases himself exclusively on Schenk, according to footnote 456, page 313, and it seems he misread him, because Schenk writes in fact that KG Bräuer included the 14th, or Panzerjäger, company of FJR 1 – not the 14th companies of all three regiments.
So the composition of the assault forces would then look like this, following Schenk:

1st wave:
- KG Meindl : 2 reinforced battalions, presumably of the newly formed Luftlande-Sturm-Regiment (Meindl took command of it at some point in Sept.);
- KG Stentzler: “of equal strength”, according to Schenk, so let’s assume 2 battalions as well, presumably of FJR 1 (although it seems Maj. Stentzler was at this time commander of II./LSSR);

2nd wave, dropping about 1 hr later:
- KG Bräuer: 1 battalion, presumably of FJR1, 1 engineer battalion, AT company of FJR1, taking over command of KG Stentzler on landing (Col. Bräuer was commander of FJR1). Possibly the idea was that Stentzler would then take command of his own battalion again;
- FJR 2, complete;
- FJR 3, complete;
- 1 battalion, presumably the remaining battalion of the LLSR, as divisional reserve (Stentzler?).

That would at least add up, in that way all three FJRs and the LLSR are fully accounted for. There are of course some problems: taken together these units clearly exceed our (more or less …) agreed maximum of 5,000 trained paras; the assault engineer battalion was not operational yet; and it may also be doubted that the LLSR, which had only recently (August) expanded from Sturmabteilung Koch to a full regiment, was ready.

I found, by the way, an interesting account of a Fallschirmjäger (http://www.erinnerungswerkstatt-norders ... php?page=2 ) who as a new recruit joined FJR1 in June and was assigned to the newly formed 13th (heavy weapons) company, which soon after was equipped with 9 x 105 mm “Nebelwerfer 35” heavy mortars (in three platoons). This company was preparing to move to France in Sept. and would presumably have been part of KG Stentzler - unless of course they were part of the units that would be flown in later after RAF Lympne was captured, not improbable considering the heavy weight of those mortars and especially the ammunition:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/10_cm_Nebelwerfer_35

[phylo_roadking]

On closer inspection, this whole discussion is superfluous because regarding the plans of the 7 FD Golla bases himself exclusively on Schenk, according to footnote 456, page 313, and it seems he misread him, because Schenk writes in fact that KG Bräuer included the 14th, or Panzerjäger, company of FJR 1 – not the 14th companies of all three regiments.

If that is indeed correct - all it does is put a panzerjäger company with each of FJR2 and FJR3....which are firmly in MILFORCE's way, whether for Plan B or Plan C. And increases the time it takes to reduce them - and thus increases their capability as a blocking force delaying the arrival of any British counterattack.

That would at least add up, in that way all three FJRs and the LLSR are fully accounted for. There are of course some problems: taken together these units clearly exceed our (more or less …) agreed maximum of 5,000 trained paras; the assault engineer battalion was not operational yet; and it may also be doubted that the LLSR, which had only recently (August) expanded from Sturmabteilung Koch to a full regiment, was ready.

It's not an insurmountable issue - in that the number of available Ju52s increases month on month with the arrival in service of new builds. Thus the LW's ability to deliver them increases in parallel with the numbers the LW are required to lift.

I found, by the way, an interesting account of a Fallschirmjäger (http://www.erinnerungswerkstatt-norders ... php?page=2 ) who as a new recruit joined FJR1 in June and was assigned to the newly formed 13th (heavy weapons) company, which soon after was equipped with 9 x 105 mm “Nebelwerfer 35” heavy mortars (in three platoons). This company was preparing to move to France in Sept. and would presumably have been part of KG Stentzler - unless of course they were part of the units that would be flown in later after RAF Lympne was captured, not improbable considering the heavy weight of those mortars and especially the ammunition:

I doubt weight would be an issue; IIRC not many months later, the FlaMGs of Meindl's 3rd FlaMG battalion, and the heavy weapons of 2nd Batt. were dropped by parachute at Maleme...and a mortar does break down into tube, bipod and baseplate.

[Knouterer]

If the above interpretation of the limited available information is correct, ie after the second wave lands "Kampfgruppe Stentzler" ceases to exist and its component units revert to "Kampfgruppe Bräuer", which is then the complete Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 1, the situation after a few hours would look something like this, assuming - just for the sake of argument - that everything went as planned for the Germans.

- FJR 3 faces west (and is attacked by advance elements of the NZ division), one bn. attacking RAF Lympne
- FJR 2 faces north (direction Canterbury)
- FJR 1 faces NE
- LLSR (ex-KG Meindl) around Hythe, linking up with 17th ID, less one bn as divisional reserve which has dropped just South of Postling (HQ of 2nd London Brigade)

The three FJ Regiment each have a front of roughly 6 km to cover.

Map is a 1941 "War Revision" map, where even Dymchurch Redoubt is regarded as sufficiently militarily significant to be deleted from it.

[phylo_roadking]

- FJR 3 faces west (and is attacked by advance elements of the NZ division), one bn. attacking RAF Lympne
- FJR 2 faces north (direction Canterbury)

...unless, based on reports received, MILFORCE/2NZ carries out "Plan C" rather than "Plan B"...and then the NZ division hits FJR2 first.

If we had any appropriate movement instructions for "Plan C" from "INSTRUCTION No.4" as we have for Plan B, we would be able to roughly trace the line of advance to the start line for Plan C....

- FJR 1 faces NE

I'm not sure this would be the case; look back at the pics and the topgraphical map....facing straight into the the Kentish Downs??? Nothing was coming down THAT way, except via the roads...which are in valleys. There's only two (2) roads across the Downs from the north east at that point - Oak Hill lane to/from Lydden, and Alkham Road via the hamlet of Alkham to/from Temple Ewell.

If anything they'll be facing north too - there are TWO "Canterbury Roads" to worry about - the Canterbury Road via Elham that FJR2 are covering...and the Canterbury Road that forks off the Dover Road just south of Barham, and comes almost directly south through the Downs towards Hawkinge, then Folkestone.

On Schenk's map of the drop zones it would be just beyond the FJR 1 perimeter to ther east...but that's the direction they'd be worried about any attack coming from.

The three FJ Regiment each have a front of roughly 6 km to cover.

Map is a 1941 "War Revision" map, where even Dymchurch Redoubt is regarded as sufficiently militarily significant to be deleted from it.

It reads like a lot - but scope out your map again. See the number of contour lines, bit of woodland etc. all through there? There's a lot of terrain no one will be coming at them through. A good coloured OS map would be good at this point...unless we can superimpose the road network on this view somehow...

[Knouterer]

This c. 1920 map gives a better impression of the terrain than the one of 1941. By the latter date the area was a bit more built up but not that much. As I said, the main adversary (initially) would be the 2nd London Brigade, the HQ of which was in Postling and would have the FJs dropping right on top of them.

Of the three battalions of this brigade, as far as I can make out HQ Coy and B Coy of the 1st Bn London Rifle Brigade were at Lyminge. The CO and Adjutant were (very) comfortably billeted in a stately home nearby, Sibton Park (NW of the village). C Coy was in Arpinge (just west of Hawkinge), and A and D Coys in Sub-Area A4 (Shorncliffe).

The 1st Bn London Scottish was further north, HQ at Bridge near Canterbury, A Coy at Barham, etc.

The 1st Queen’s Westminsters were around Shepherdswell, also off the map to the north.

The 64th Field Regt in support of the brigade was around Acrise Place (circled on map, just north of the dropping zone)
HQ 253 Bty Acrise Place (minus 1 Tp) 4 x 25 pdr 4 x 75mm
HQ 254 Bty Acrise Place 8 x 4.5”

The missing troop with 4 x 75 mm guns was detached to Shorncliffe Garrison.

Of course, there were various other units in the area as well, for ex. an AA site at Arpinge manned by Royal Marines.

(the above is based on various war diaries of the units in question,, local histories (about Elham, Folkestone) , and the Monthly Return of the Strength of the British Army for the end of Sept.)

[Gooner1]

2nd wave, dropping about 1 hr later:

1 hour? Must be a misprint.
The transport aircraft after dropping the first wave have to turn around, fly back to their airfields, land, taxi to their dispersal area, load their new cargoes (check for damage and refuel if needed), taxi to runway, take-off, organize themselves into formation, then fly back to their drop zones.

[Knouterer]

No, it's not the same aircraft; with an estimated 450 (operational) Ju 52s available, it would be let's say about 200 for the first wave, which on the face of it seems smaller, and 250 for the second. Sending them all in at once would probably cause too much congestion in the airspace above the dropping zones, and it might also be a problem at the airfields getting so many aircarft airborne in a short time.

According to Golla, a FJ battalion at the time was 560-580 strong, but he also states that actual jump strength over Crete was only about 450, so if we take 500 men as a rough approximation, a first wave of 4 (reinforced) battalions would fit into 200 Jus.

Of course it's also possible that the Germans would have decided to use (some) gliders after all.

[Knouterer]

To quote Newbold (page 260):

“… only 1st London Division, which had received the addition of 198th Brigade from 66th (Lancs. and Border) Division at the end of June, and 35th Brigade from 12th (Eastern) Division on 10th July, and thus now consisted of four brigades, was lucky enough to be able to hold a reasonably sized local reserve. This consisted of no less than two infantry brigades, 1st London Brigade just east of Canterbury and 2nd London Brigade to the north of Folkestone and Hythe, both having been made fully mobile for a counter-attacking role, mainly by the use of requisitioned civilian lorries, vans and coaches.”

By the end of Sept. transport for these two brigades was provided by the 5th and 6th Troop Carrying Companies, to be distinguished from “Motor Coach Companies” (of which the 45th Division further along the coast, in keeping with its more static character, had 1). However, from reading War Diaries I have the impression that contrary to what the caption to the picture below suggests they were not fully equipped with military (WD) 3-ton lorries but still had some coaches and perhaps other civilian vehicles as well.

IWM Photograph COL 77. The caption says: “2nd Lieutenant Leonard "Pip" Perry, Commander of B Platoon, No 5 Troop Carrying Company RASC poses with his car at Waldershare Park, near Eythorne, Kent during the Battle of Britain in 1940. The Platoon, which was equipped with 30 Bedford three ton lorries, was attached to the Queen's Westminster Regiment with orders to convey troops into action against any German landings in the Dover - Folkestone area.”

[Gooner1]

No, it's not the same aircraft; with an estimated 450 (operational) Ju 52s available, it would be let's say about 200 for the first wave, which on the face of it seems smaller, and 250 for the second. Sending them all in at once would probably cause too much congestion in the airspace above the dropping zones, and it might also be a problem at the airfields getting so many aircarft airborne in a short time.

According to Golla, a FJ battalion at the time was 560-580 strong, but he also states that actual jump strength over Crete was only about 450, so if we take 500 men as a rough approximation, a first wave of 4 (reinforced) battalions would fit into 200 Jus.

Of course it's also possible that the Germans would have decided to use (some) gliders after all.

According to http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... I.html#fn1 and with figures "derived from the records of the German Air Ministry (Quartermaster-General's Department)."

Total German air strength including transport aircraft was 4,393 on 28th September 1940 and 4,028 excluding transport aircraft on the same date. So I make that 365 transport aircraft total.
Taking away those transports assigned to other essential tasks and minus the 20-30% that would be unserviceable at any one time, I think the most that would be available for Sealion would be about 250.

[Knouterer]

One thing the FJs could not have counted on was the element of surprise, the defenders had ample time to consider various possible scenarios and think them through. As an example, here's a document concerning an exercise held at the end of August. It includes airborne landings NW of Folkestone and an attempt to take RAF Lympne.