Like I said, it's like comparing apples with oranges. The big players should not be compared with the smaller players due to different possibilities of supllying and equiping their forces.
It is not a question of apples and oranges, I am simply making a different point from you - what this shows is simply that relative to the size of the rumanian forces present in the East, their involvement in the fighting, apart from a few exceptional cases, was on the whole fairly minor. Possible reasons for that certainly includes such things as very little of that strength being actually deployed in the frontline, which may again be due to problems of supply and equipment. But that goes towards explaining the phenomenon, not towards altering it.
IMO losses should be correlated to the strength of the formations involved. Many times Romanian units were subordianted to German Army commands, so it should be made clear that losses for AOK 17 or PzAOK 1 in late 1942, for example, only include German and not also Romanian losses.
I don't see how that impacts on the issue?
11.42 - figures obviously do not include the losses suffered in the 19 - 30.11 interval, when most of the Romanian casulties in Op. Uranus occured.
No, that is clear, but that can't be helped - and Uranus is one of the exceptions to the general picture. And I do not recall having used the 11.42 figures with regard to the point I made either.
10.43 - only one or two divisions were actually on the frontline, so it is rather inappropriate to compare them with full AOKs.
2.44 - again, only several divisions on the frontline
Which does not however change the fact that it shows that the Romanian participation in the fighting during these months was minor.
The point I am making is a quite precise one, and it goes towards what sort of impact the romanian army had on the fighting in the East. Given that we are speaking of an army of several hundred thousand men who with great consistency suffered the sort of losses you would normally associate with an army Corps, it seems clear that this was generally comparatively limited when that strength is borne in mind. There my point ends and yours begin, but your point does not disqualify mine. If the reason for that was generally that only a small portion of it could be actually fielded due to various problems, this simply makes the same point in a different way, by implying that the overall number of Romanian soldiers in the East in fact says little about the army's actual combat capabilities there.
You posted several examples, but which could be viewed also from different perspectives:
Of course, but hopefully I made it clear that what I was providing was more in the way of broad context than exhaustive analysis. And I do not think that a more detailed treatment of individual points in them could much affect their overall thrust.
cheers
