In that post i won't formulate the opinion. I am only making an abstract from book "Powstanie Warszawskie: zarys podloza politycznego i dyplomatycznego" by Jan M. Ciechanowski -Warsaw 1987, ISBN 83-06-01135-X. I would stress here that i am surprised by how well the book was treated by censorship - it was written by emigree historian, and reprinted in Communist Poland and it seems that only traces of it is the preface by communist historian and footnotes here and there explaining, why the author have taken something wrong.
1. Operation Tempest
2. The reasons
3. The Soviet "betrayal"
1. Operation Tempest
The Polish-goverment-in-exile prepared the operation "Tempest", whose main goals were to show the world and soviets that
a) the Soviet propaganda about AK cooperating with Nazis is false
b) AK, contrary to soviet propaganda, is not weak and unimportant organisation and had influecne in Polish society
c) Make it harder for Soviets to install it's own puppet government in Warsaw and annex Polish "Kresy"
Initially, large cities were to be excluded from "Tempest". But the experiences on Vohlyn convince Polish leaders to include Polish cities too.
In Vohlyn 27 Polish AK division, numbering some 7000 soldiers were first cooperating with soviets, but - partially due to unclear orders and different political manuevres - was disarmed by Soviets and it's soldiers were put between choice: enter army of Berling (Polish communist army) or Red Army. Polish leaders decided that only taking large ctiy could have proper propaganda function and could not be ignored as actions of partisan forces in countryside.
That were decisions which lead to uprising in Lviv and Vilno. In both cities AK, cooperating in Red Army was able to take the cities and most of the cities were in AK hands; however, although initial cooperation between Soviet Army commanders and AK was quite OK, the AK commanders were soon captured and soldiers again, put to choice either join Army of Berling or Red Army.
Initially Warsaw was to be spared - even few weeks before the uprising AK was sending weapons FROM Warsaw to the units fighting in operaiton Tempest in the east. What's more, most military leaders were against uprising in Warsaw. Sosnkowski, commander of Polish army in the west was against it and said that it would end in massacre. Bor-Komorowski was initially against it. It was probably Okulicki who convince him, at least that was Komorowski wrote after the war.
2. The reasons
a) AK commanders in Warsaw were convinced about very low morale of German army, since units which before 27 July were going through Warsaw iwre in very bad shape and only later German HQ ordered Gemrn units to behave "properly" (so not to encourage Poles to uprising). The recent tryings to kill Hitler by German army also convinced AK that the moment of collapse of Germany similar to 1918 is at hand.
b) AK commanders received reports about Soviet army which was very quickly advancing into Warsaw and were convinced, that Soviets will try to take Warsaw as basis for another offensive
c) AK was affraid that Soviets will take the Warsaw and AK would be just the viewers - the AK leaders thought that Warsaw was last opportunity to show the Polish society that AK, contrary to soviet propaganda, also is fighting the soviets is not weak organisation. Bor-Komorwski was affraid that the delay may cause the Soviets to take Warasw before the Uprising.
d) There were German orders to 100.000 Polish men to work for fortification of Warsaw. AK was affraid thsat this would effectively destroy AK structures, since most AK members were young men which would be forced to work at fortifications - so AK would lose it combat value without single shot.
e) AK was affraid that Germans would turn Warsaw into second Stalingrad and hoped that the uprising would help the soviets to quickly liberate the city. AK hoped that by uprising it would cut down the supplies for German armies east from Warsaw.
f) Ak leaders will hope, that when uprising will start then Mikolajczyk would negotiate the cooperation between Soviet army and AK, which in turn would lead to reopening the diplomatic relationshiops between Polish government-in-exile and Soviets.
g) It was just hours before the hour "W" when Bor-Komorowski received info, that initial reports about German panic and evacuation are untrue and the Soviet advance is stopped. Bor-Komorowski however didn't want to stop the uprising, since he believed that the order would nt reach in time all units and disorganisade action would turn into slaughter.
The author doesn't mention another reason: that AK leaders were affraid, that proximity of Soviet army, calls for uprising may cause the spontaneus outbreak which as disorganised would turn into slaughter.
decision of stage the uprising was by Mikolajczyk. Three generals: Okulicki, Bor-Komorowski and Pelczynski were all for it. The plk. Pelczynski, who was when the order was given to Komorowski, said that it would be improvisation, and order is impossible to fulfill. The answer was that he is defetist, and in war everything is improvisation.
It should again stressed that in the moment of taking the decision, Germans were evacuating the Warsaw - they reinforced the defense later.
3) Soviet "betrayal"
a) 29 July Radio Moscow put in Polish the following call:
"Inhabitant of Warsaw. You are fighting against the Germans. Warsaw can hera without doubts the noise of battle which soon will liberate it. Those, who have not bend against Hitlerite terror will join again, just as in 1939, to fight against Germans, this time decisive.
[ .. cut slogans about polish army of Berling .. ]
To Warsaw, which have never surrender, it's the hour for acting. The Germans will trye to defend in Warsaw, destroying the city and causing thousands of victims. Our houses, parks, bridges and rail stations, our factories and public offices will be turned into fortresses. German will turn the city into ruins andthey will put the civilians into the slaughter. They will steal evertyhign valuable adn destroy anythign which they will have to left. That's why it's important to remember, that in flood of German destruction everything, which won't be saved by acting, will be lost, and by fighting in Warsaw streets, houses, factories, magazines not only we will make the liberation closer, but we will also save the national values and life of your brothers"
July the 30, communist raiod Kosciuszko made following call, several times on radio:
"Warsaw is trembling in noise of Soviet artillery, Soviet army is advancing quickly and is close to Prague. They are coming to bring you peace. Germans forced to leafve Prague will try to defend in Warsaw. They will want to destroy everythin. In Bialystok they were destroying everything for six days. They murdered thousands of our borthers. Let's do anythign to prevent that in Warsaw.
Warsaw people. To the arms! Let whole city population will stand around KRN and Underground army. Attack the Germans! Prevetn their plans to make fortresses. Help Red Army in crossing the Vistula. Let million of citizens of Warsaw became million of soldiers, who will repell German invaders and take the freedom!"
OTOH, Bor-Komorowski in his memories said, that the soviets were doing similar calls even when they were on Dnieper and that this calls have not influenced his decisions.
b) In one moment there was question from delegate from Government-in-exile: what will hapenned if Soviets will stop? The answer was: well, The Germans will slaughter us, but Russians won't stop because taking the Warsaw is for their own good.
c) The stop of soviet offensive.
Author quotes following people
The unknown author of memo from Okulicki HQ in 1944 said, that without doubt Soviets were stopped by German panzer divisions and not intentionally.
Okulicki in December 1944 said that Soviets stopped intentionally, which gave Germans time to reinforce the front with new divisions and made later attack much harder
Bor-Komorowski in 1965 wrote that it was Germans who stopped Soviet offensive
Pelczynski wrote that it was Germans who stopped initial offensive and Soviets simply lost battle at Prague, but about August 21st Soviets would be able to start offensive anew.
The author analyses several other documents and concluded that the Soviet advance was indeed stopped by German panzer divisions and so the failure to take Warsaw was caused by military, not political reasons. He however stressed, that the decision to not start another decision in second half of August was political one. He wrote that German divisions were exhausted, while Russians had wide reserves. He said that there is possibilit that Stalin decided that Balkany offensive was too important and Red Army could not made offensives in two areas simultanously.
Warsaw Uprising: - reasons, "soviet betrayal" etc
“The insurgent forces were conspicuously supported by air dropped supplies which commenced on the night of August 4 to 5, 1944. The RAF were to make a total 116 sorties, the Polish Air Force – 97. Losses during these missions were considerable: the RAF lost 19 aircraft, the Poles 15, which was just over 16% and 15% respectively. Plans of there-and-back flights by American Flying Fortresses with stopovers for refuelling and reloading at Soviet bases behind the Eastern Front, were torpedoed by the Soviets.
Up to September 10, 1944, the Soviet armies, which were massed barely a few kilometres outside Warsaw, remained completely impassive, giving the Luftwaffe freedom of the skies to destroy the city with impunity. Soviet propaganda described the uprising as a fracas obstructing Red Army operations.”
“After a long period of waiting for Soviet acquiescence, an air drop operation mounted by 107 American Flying Fortresses which then landed in the Ukraine, took place on September 18. Between September 16 and 19, 1st Polish Army detachments made landings in several points of left bank Warsaw (in Czerniaków, Powisle and Zoliborz) but due to inadequate Russian support, these bridgeheads were unsustainable.”
Tadeusz Kondracki, Warsaw
Translated from Polish by Antoni Bohdanowicz
Dr Tadeuz Kondracki
Born in 1956.
Graduate of the University of Warsaw, Department of History.
MA in 1979. Subject of dissertation: Propaganda Marynarki Wojennej w Polsce w latach 1930-1939 (Navy Propaganda in Poland 1930-1939).
PhD in 1989 on the basis of his dissertation Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne w latach 1919-1939 (The Polish Historical Society 1919-1939)
Currently employed as a senior assistant and lecturer at the Totalitarian Systems and WW2 History Department of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw (PAN).
His main field of interest is the history of the Polish Armed Forces (PSZ) in the West 1939-1947 as well as the history of Polish ex-servicemen organisations in Great Britain after 1945.
Author of many publications. Among them also books:
* Niszczyciel ORP "Orkan" 1942-1943 (The destroyer ORP "Orkan", 1942-1943), Warsaw 1994
* Historia Stowarzyszenia Polskich Kombatantów w Wielkiej Brytanii 1946-1996 (History of the Polish Ex-combatants Association in Great Britain 1946-1996), London 1996
He has also the author of the map Powstanie Warszawskie 1944 (Warsaw Uprising 1944), Warsaw 1994. The same year he took part (as a co-author) in the realisation of the 63-part TV documentary series under the title: Powstanie Warszawskie (Warsaw Uprising)
http://www.polishresistance-ak.org/4%20Article.htm
So were they really stopped or was it a ruse.
If we are looking for Russian intent here, perhaps it would be good to recall they invaded Poland in September 1939. The Katyn Forrest might also be considered.
Martin P, Granica
Up to September 10, 1944, the Soviet armies, which were massed barely a few kilometres outside Warsaw, remained completely impassive, giving the Luftwaffe freedom of the skies to destroy the city with impunity. Soviet propaganda described the uprising as a fracas obstructing Red Army operations.”
“After a long period of waiting for Soviet acquiescence, an air drop operation mounted by 107 American Flying Fortresses which then landed in the Ukraine, took place on September 18. Between September 16 and 19, 1st Polish Army detachments made landings in several points of left bank Warsaw (in Czerniaków, Powisle and Zoliborz) but due to inadequate Russian support, these bridgeheads were unsustainable.”
Tadeusz Kondracki, Warsaw
Translated from Polish by Antoni Bohdanowicz
Dr Tadeuz Kondracki
Born in 1956.
Graduate of the University of Warsaw, Department of History.
MA in 1979. Subject of dissertation: Propaganda Marynarki Wojennej w Polsce w latach 1930-1939 (Navy Propaganda in Poland 1930-1939).
PhD in 1989 on the basis of his dissertation Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne w latach 1919-1939 (The Polish Historical Society 1919-1939)
Currently employed as a senior assistant and lecturer at the Totalitarian Systems and WW2 History Department of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw (PAN).
His main field of interest is the history of the Polish Armed Forces (PSZ) in the West 1939-1947 as well as the history of Polish ex-servicemen organisations in Great Britain after 1945.
Author of many publications. Among them also books:
* Niszczyciel ORP "Orkan" 1942-1943 (The destroyer ORP "Orkan", 1942-1943), Warsaw 1994
* Historia Stowarzyszenia Polskich Kombatantów w Wielkiej Brytanii 1946-1996 (History of the Polish Ex-combatants Association in Great Britain 1946-1996), London 1996
He has also the author of the map Powstanie Warszawskie 1944 (Warsaw Uprising 1944), Warsaw 1994. The same year he took part (as a co-author) in the realisation of the 63-part TV documentary series under the title: Powstanie Warszawskie (Warsaw Uprising)
http://www.polishresistance-ak.org/4%20Article.htm
So were they really stopped or was it a ruse.
If we are looking for Russian intent here, perhaps it would be good to recall they invaded Poland in September 1939. The Katyn Forrest might also be considered.
Martin P, Granica
One problem for the Soviets was that if the AK aquired large numbers of weapons from either the western allies or the Soviets and the Soviets were able to take Warsaw in August they would then have the problem of disarming them. Clearly Stalin would not allow the AK to control Warsaw with possibly elements of the London Poles trying to establish their authority while his men sat in Lublin.
Coronel Beck is reported to have accepted Britains offer of a guarantee to Poland in 1939 because he thought it would be a slap in the face for Hitler and agreed between "two flicks of the ash" on his cigarette with no analysis of what it would mean. The impression given with the command of the AK is that this type of thinking was still the norm. There was no possability of an uprising succeeding because if the Germans did not crush it the Soviets would have to. To stage an uprising with no consultation or communications between you and the people who are going to pull your chestnuts out of the fire is strange but even stranger is the people you are counting on to help you are your enemies though they may hide behind a mask.
I can understand the reasons for the uprising and the leadership was in what the Germans call a zugswang that is they had to do something but all options were bad. That they staged an uprising without seemingly thinking through the options available to Stalin and what his likely response would be well before August 1st seems stupid. The leadership of the AK has escaped responsibility for the bloodbath that occured but I believe they have a responsibility for what occured. I do not accept Stalins description of them for they were honest patriots but you cannot push a car downhill and then say I never thought it would veer of track and kill someone so I am not responsible for what happened that defence would not be accepted.
Coronel Beck is reported to have accepted Britains offer of a guarantee to Poland in 1939 because he thought it would be a slap in the face for Hitler and agreed between "two flicks of the ash" on his cigarette with no analysis of what it would mean. The impression given with the command of the AK is that this type of thinking was still the norm. There was no possability of an uprising succeeding because if the Germans did not crush it the Soviets would have to. To stage an uprising with no consultation or communications between you and the people who are going to pull your chestnuts out of the fire is strange but even stranger is the people you are counting on to help you are your enemies though they may hide behind a mask.
I can understand the reasons for the uprising and the leadership was in what the Germans call a zugswang that is they had to do something but all options were bad. That they staged an uprising without seemingly thinking through the options available to Stalin and what his likely response would be well before August 1st seems stupid. The leadership of the AK has escaped responsibility for the bloodbath that occured but I believe they have a responsibility for what occured. I do not accept Stalins description of them for they were honest patriots but you cannot push a car downhill and then say I never thought it would veer of track and kill someone so I am not responsible for what happened that defence would not be accepted.
The following post from another thread succinctly encapsulates the matter:Steve wrote:I can understand the reasons for the uprising and the leadership was in what the Germans call a zugswang that is they had to do something but all options were bad. That they staged an uprising without seemingly thinking through the options available to Stalin and what his likely response would be well before August 1st seems stupid... (emphasis mine)
.
Ogorek wrote:
As events transpired, the rising was inevitable, Germans in retreat, threats of deportation of the civilian population, 5 years of terror and murder... approaching Soviet Armies with radio broadcasts calling for an Uprising....
This is all historic Monday morning quarter backing....
Judging by the track record of the two occupants, who would have won the murder and destruction derby is a toss-up, and had not the AK risen, and retreated to the forests we would have had another debate....
There was loss and destruction, there was bravery that counted for little, but I repeat, given the circumstances, the Uprising was inevitable.
And that's why he wanted to receive western guarantees for quite a long time, and in personal converstaion said that if POland would be attacked, it's very important to have alliance with at least both France and England, so to turn eventual campaign into general war.Steve wrote: Coronel Beck is reported to have accepted Britains offer of a guarantee to Poland in 1939 because he thought it would be a slap in the face for Hitler and agreed between "two flicks of the ash" on his cigarette with no analysis of what it would mean.
Recently came across an interesting article by Alexander Werth the Guardian newspaper correspondent in the USSR during the war and undoubtedly a communist sympthiser. He was in Lublin at the end of August 1944 and had several conversations with General Rola-Zymierski of the Lublin Poles. Zymierski said he met Mikolajczyk on August 6 and at this meeting were two AK officers Colonel Rawicz and Colonel Tarnawa who had left Warsaw on July 29 on behalf of a "strong minority" their mission had been to get to Lublin and contact Mikolajczyk who left London for Moscow July 26. They wanted Mikolajczyk to contact London and get the uprising called off as it was clear the insurgents could not possibly hold Warsaw unless they rose at the last minute when the Russians were practically inside the city. These two officers were later accused of being deserters by the London Poles.
He also records a conversation with AK Coronel Ravich (seems to have joined the Lublin Poles) who said his unit had orders to rise when the Russians were 30k from Warsaw. Ravich and other officers felt this was folly and they should wait untill the Russians reached the bridges which they did not think would be before August 15 though the people of Warsaw thought this would be by the 2nd.
For the uprising to succeed it had to have Soviet help the only way that help would reach the major part of the city was across the bridges at Praga or through the control of both river banks. The AKs own estimate was they could hold out for a week so the key to success was timing and bridge seizure. Clearly the Poles would not be able to hold the bridges long so the Russians had to be on the edge of or in Praga before the uprising could start with the number one objective for the Poles being the bridges. The charge of military incompedence should be levelled against the command of the AK in Warsaw as the uprising started when the Soviets were to far away and they never controlled the crossing points.
He also records a conversation with AK Coronel Ravich (seems to have joined the Lublin Poles) who said his unit had orders to rise when the Russians were 30k from Warsaw. Ravich and other officers felt this was folly and they should wait untill the Russians reached the bridges which they did not think would be before August 15 though the people of Warsaw thought this would be by the 2nd.
For the uprising to succeed it had to have Soviet help the only way that help would reach the major part of the city was across the bridges at Praga or through the control of both river banks. The AKs own estimate was they could hold out for a week so the key to success was timing and bridge seizure. Clearly the Poles would not be able to hold the bridges long so the Russians had to be on the edge of or in Praga before the uprising could start with the number one objective for the Poles being the bridges. The charge of military incompedence should be levelled against the command of the AK in Warsaw as the uprising started when the Soviets were to far away and they never controlled the crossing points.
Re: Warsaw Uprising: - reasons, "soviet betrayal" etc
A bit of info on notorious radio message. As I understand that is the result of intenal investigation made after statements from the Polish side that the Moscow radio called to uprising in Warsaw:szopen wrote:a) 29 July Radio Moscow put in Polish the following call:
"Inhabitant of Warsaw. You are fighting against the Germans. Warsaw can hera without doubts the noise of battle which soon will liberate it. Those, who have not bend against Hitlerite terror will join again, just as in 1939, to fight against Germans, this time decisive.
[ .. cut slogans about polish army of Berling .. ]
To Warsaw, which have never surrender, it's the hour for acting. The Germans will trye to defend in Warsaw, destroying the city and causing thousands of victims. Our houses, parks, bridges and rail stations, our factories and public offices will be turned into fortresses. German will turn the city into ruins andthey will put the civilians into the slaughter. They will steal evertyhign valuable adn destroy anythign which they will have to left. That's why it's important to remember, that in flood of German destruction everything, which won't be saved by acting, will be lost, and by fighting in Warsaw streets, houses, factories, magazines not only we will make the liberation closer, but we will also save the national values and life of your brothers"
Nice to see the direct coincidence between the two variants of the 29 July message.23 September 1944
To comrade A.S. Scherbakov
Materials for Poland were broadcasted through three sources: the All-Union Radio Committee, the Union of Polish Patriots via the Radio Committee and the Kosciuszko radio station.
In materials of the All-Union Radio Committee no broadcasts calling directly or indirectly to armed uprising in Warsaw were found.
The Union of Polish Patriots broadcasted articles calling to armed uprising. In the broadcast of 29 July they said about Soviet and Polish forces advancing to Warsaw and that the moment was coming for Warsaw defenders to fight against enemy. “Warsaw’s sons tomorrow will join” allied forces in order not only to precepitate the moment of victory “with direct struggle against occupants on Warsaw streets, in houses, factories, storehouses” but also to save the national property and life of their brothers. Several broadcasts by the Union of Polish Patriots were blocked by the Press Department of the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The deputy chief of the Press Department com. Petrov have sent a written report to com. V. M. Molotov on that subject.
A number of broadcasts that called to armed uprising in Warsaw and said that the help to the risen Warsaw citizens was close were transmitted by the Kosciuszko radio station.
The translations of these broadcasts are attached [not published].
G. Alexandrov
Source: "Russkiy arkhiv', Vol.14/3(2), TERRA, 2000