On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

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Qvist
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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#106

Post by Qvist » 24 Aug 2008, 21:05

According to Glantz the Red Army suffered 11,250,000 irrevocable losses during the Great Patriotic War. It began the war with 5.5 million men under arms, and ended it with about 5.25 million.
No. The starting point figure is the whole Red Army and Navy, with training establishments, administrative base and everything. The latter, if correct at all, can only refer to the Field forces in the fronts deployed against the Germans. The overall size of the Red Army was much, much larger than this.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#107

Post by RCW Mark » 25 Aug 2008, 08:10

Since Red Army doctrine did not call for the needless disposal of men
I don't care what the written doctrine said. You can write beautiful things on a piece of paper, but it does not make them true. Stalinist doctrine was that corn could be trained to grow in swamps -- Lysenko's theory. Sadly for the Soviets, doctrine does not dictate reality, and the corn died.

The actual practice of the Red Army was sometimes (sometimes) reckless with the lives of their men.
Now, this was not part of official Red Army doctrine which is what this thread is all about.
No it's not. This thread is about whether Russian tactics were responsible for high casualties in WWII. Only you seem to be worried about whether the tactics used were the ones written in the book.

You need to show that Soviet commanders actually took care to not waste their mens' lives. Quoting the regulations does not do that.


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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#108

Post by Art » 25 Aug 2008, 12:16

RCW Mark wrote:Iran sent untrained troops to their deaths in large numbers in their war with Iraq for no particular military gain, largely for political/religious reasons.
That is an example dealing with army development policy rather than with tactics. The others are not very succesful too.
I don't quite put the WWII Soviets in those categories, but I do believe that they (or, at least, Stalin) suffered from not caring enough about how many men would be killed or wounded
Stalin was hardly a person who had a primary influence on tactical matters. The cases when he touched tactics rather speak against your thesis. See:
"Those who want to wage war in a modern way and to win a modern war shouldn't say that it' s needed to spare bombs. It's nonsense, comrades, we need to drop more bombs on enemy in order to stun him, to turn his cities upside down, then we'll achieve victory. Give more bombs, more shells and less men will be lost. If you will spare cartridges and shells the losses will be higher. We need to chose. Either to give more cartridges and shells, save your army, spare your forces, have a mimimum of killed or to spare bombs an shells"
Source.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#109

Post by LWD » 25 Aug 2008, 13:31

Given the Soviet system and situation what else could they reasonably have done? Could it be that they found heavy losses and winning better than almost as heavy of losses and looseing? Many of the tactics that might have helped could have been considered antithetical to the Soviet system. Since that's what they were, at least in part, fighting to preserve it's hard to critize them for being a bit sceptical of such changes.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#110

Post by Igor Kurtukov » 25 Aug 2008, 21:38

LWD wrote:Given the Soviet system and situation what else could they reasonably have done?
Well, the soviet General staff officers asked themselves exactly the same question. To answer that, the special General staff department was created to gather and analyze the war experience. During the war, the department issued few dozens bulletins on that topic. Bulletins were distributed down to regiment level. Each included several case studies, demonstrating what have been done, what could've been done, and make some conclusions about what should be done.

They've found that A LOT could reasonably have done. And some of that was actually done during the rest of the war. While in 1941-42, typical soviet/german loss ratio was 10:1 to 8:1, then in the first half of 1944 it was about 2:1. In the second half of 1944 and in 1945 the ratio was about 0.75:1
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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#111

Post by Qvist » 26 Aug 2008, 11:59

They've found that A LOT could reasonably have done. And some of that was actually done during the rest of war. While in 1941-42, typical soviet/german loss ratio was 10:1 to 8:1, then in the first half of 1944 it was about 2:1. In the second half of 1944 and in 1945 the ratio was about 0.75:1
I am sorry, but what do you base this on? This is competely wrong. If one uses Krivosheev's totals for Soviet quarterly losses, the typical loss ratio was roughly 5:1 in 1941, 6:1 in 1942, 4.5 to 1 in 1943 and 3:1 in 1944. In the first 6 months of 1944, the Ostheer lost somewhat less than 800,000 killed, wounded and missing (which probably does not include the losses in the opening ten days of Bagration), while the Red Army lost some 2,850,000 men - or roughly 3.5 times the German losses.

In the second half of 1944 it was still roughly 2.5:1, and I'd like to see the German data that enables anyone to calculate a meaningful ratio in 1945.

The loss ratio improved steadily and gradually from the Soviet point of view. So however did the relation of forces vis-a-vis the Germans, which in itself should affect that positively. There were also considerable relative improvements in equipment and organisation and refinements in operational techniques. All in all, there does not seem to me to be, at least, any very major improvement left in the performance that can be accounted for by better tactical performance.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#112

Post by Art » 26 Aug 2008, 13:09

Well, if we start to talk about the doctrine and doctrinal level of casualties, it interesting to note that in February 1941 the Soviet General Staff while preparing the current version of the mobilizational plan believed that the year of war will require 3 783 000 enlisted men alone in order to compensate for losses. This number doesn't include wounded and sick returning to service after recuperation. It was assumed that killed will constitute 25 % of the total losses, and wounded and sick - the remaining 75 %, of them a half will return to service. So uncompensated losses will be equal 62,5 % of the total, hence 3 783 thousands replacement means 6 053 thousands losses in enlisted personnel. In addition it was assumed that 467 950 commanding personnel replacements will be needed throughout a year. I would say that this estimate was close the losses really suffered in 1944 for example.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#113

Post by Igor Kurtukov » 26 Aug 2008, 16:35

Qvist wrote:I am sorry, but what do you base this on? This is competely wrong.
Well, I just forgot to mention, that I referred to irrevocable losses ratio. I.e. KIA+MIA. And I was not talking about average yearly ratio, but rather about peak quarter ratios.

Take III quarter of 1941. Official numbers (aka Krivosheev) for Red Army's irrevocable losses are around 2,1 mln., official numbers (aka Müller-Hillebrandt) for Heer + SS are 188.9 thousands on all fronts. Guessing the estimates for negative correction for losses on the other theaters, and positive correction for Luftwaffe/Kriegsmarine losses, we can say that irrevocable german Ostfront losses were around 200,000. Which gives us approximate ratio 10:1.

Respective numbers for IV quarter are 920,000:135,000 i.e. 7:1. For III quarter 1944 - 430,000 : 700,000, i.e. 0.6:1. Of course, these ratios are just rough estimates, and gives us more qualitative picture, then quantitative. But the picture is still clear.

So, I was not completely wrong, rather a bit obscure.

PS.
For 1945 we have Overmans' estimates (1,200,000 KIA and died in captivity) and can reasonably estimate, that 75% of those are Ostfront losses. Plus we have the figures for the german POW, captured before May 7, 1945.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#114

Post by Qvist » 26 Aug 2008, 17:35

Well, I just forgot to mention, that I referred to irrevocable losses ratio. I.e. KIA+MIA. And I was not talking about average yearly ratio, but rather about peak quarter ratios.
Well, to use KIA+MIA for a RATIO of losses is completely pointless from most perspectives, since this compares wildly varying sub-sections of the overall losses that tell us nothing reliable at all about things like performance.
For 1945 we have Overmans' estimates (1,200,000 KIA and died in captivity) and can reasonably estimate, that 75% of those are Ostfront losses. Plus we have the figures for the german POW, captured before May 7, 1945.
Which aren't vaguely comparable to any normal figures for combat losses of the kind used for the Soviet side of the equation. Overmans esimates are absolutely unsuited for this kind of exercise.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#115

Post by Igor Kurtukov » 26 Aug 2008, 19:31

Qvist wrote:Well, to use KIA+MIA for a RATIO of losses is completely pointless from most perspectives, since this compares wildly varying sub-sections of the overall losses that tell us nothing reliable at all about things like performance.
"Completely" again... :)

I could say, that using blood losses (KIA+MIA+Wounded) is pointless as well, since russians and germans had different criteria to count "wounded" in loss-reports, so we have incomparable sets of data here. On the other hand, irrevocable losses demonstrate us "attrition" performance, which is important in the war of attrition (which Ostfront-war certainly was). Again, that's the usual way to compare losses of weapons, e.g. tanks or aircrafts. Why not use it for personnel losses?

Yeah, I could say all that, but I will not.

My point was that combat performance of the Red Army, relative to Wehrmacht, dramatically increased during the war. Precise calculation of the loss ratio (whatever way you prefer to calculate it) was besides the point. Just a "big picture", an illustration, is enough at this level of discussion.

I agree that there were other factors, contributed to this performance rise. Well, you listed them:
Qvist wrote:... So however did the relation of forces vis-a-vis the Germans, which in itself should affect that positively. There were also considerable relative improvements in equipment and organisation and refinements in operational techniques.
But the soviet tactical doctrine had also changed a lot. And the competence of the tactical-level commanders as well.

It's hard to calculate the relative weights of these factors, of course. One need to became Ostfront-Dupuy to be able to say something quantitative about the dynamic of the relative german-soviet tactical performance. But qualitative picture is clear.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#116

Post by GaryD » 26 Aug 2008, 19:42

Igor Kurtukov wrote:... russians and germans had different criteria to count "wounded" in loss-reports...
That's interesting. What was the difference?

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#117

Post by Qvist » 26 Aug 2008, 21:31

I could say, that using blood losses (KIA+MIA+Wounded) is pointless as well, since russians and germans had different criteria to count "wounded" in loss-reports, so we have incomparable sets of data here.
Really, how?
On the other hand, irrevocable losses demonstrate us "attrition" performance, which is important in the war of attrition (which Ostfront-war certainly was). Again, that's the usual way to compare losses of weapons, e.g. tanks or aircrafts. Why not use it for personnel losses?
Well, if it's attrition performance you're after there is certainly no reason to omit the wounded, since dead of wounds and discharged wounded frequently outnumbered those killed in action. Also, a soldier need not be permanently lost in order to have an attritional impact. As far as performance is concerned, the logic is that the amount of combat damage a force inflicts on its opponent is a useful marker for its level of efficiency. In this regard, there is no meaningful distinction between a killed and a wounded enemy. If any category of losses is of questionable use relative to performance it is Missing in Action, since this normally reflects primarily the overall outcome of the operation rather than the combat performance of the units engaged in it - one gets very large numbers in the case of successful encirclement operations, otherwise not. These take place or fail to take place largely for other reasons than developments in tactical performance. Hence, to base such comparisons on "irrecoverable losses" is plainly arbitrary, misleading and yes, completely pointless.
My point was that combat performance of the Red Army, relative to Wehrmacht, dramatically increased during the war.
I would very strongly question that there was a more than marginal increase. There was on the other hand a dramatic improvement in the force relation, which seems to me the most obvious factor in the development.

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Precise calculation of the loss ratio (whatever way you prefer to calculate it) was besides the point. Just a "big picture", an illustration, is enough at this level of discussion.
I agree. But the big picture indicates, at most, a marginal improvement.
It's hard to calculate the relative weights of these factors, of course. One need to became Ostfront-Dupuy to be able to say something quantitative about the dynamic of the relative german-soviet tactical performance. But qualitative picture is clear.
Yes, and it indicates a continuing wide margin of German qualitative superiority.

Art: Very interesting information on Soviet force planning!

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#118

Post by RCW Mark » 27 Aug 2008, 12:29

I could say, that using blood losses (KIA+MIA+Wounded) is pointless as well, since russians and germans had different criteria to count "wounded" in loss-reports, so we have incomparable sets of data here.
As long as the German system was consistent throughout the war, and the Soviet system also consistent, then one can use their data to make a comparative contrast. Yes, absolute comparisons are difficult, but one should be able to compare the 1941 to 1945 ratios usefully. (It's a different story if either side changed their system of recording during the war of course).

One also has to consider that towards the end of the war Stalin took some strategic/political decisions that had a severe impact. He chose to push on towards Berlin -- at the cost of many lives -- as fast as possible. While I believe that the Soviets remained tactically behind the Germans, the large casualty figures for the later campaigns were often unrelated to tactical issues.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#119

Post by Igor Kurtukov » 27 Aug 2008, 22:28

Qvist wrote:If one uses Krivosheev's totals for Soviet quarterly losses, the typical loss ratio was roughly 5:1 in 1941, 6:1 in 1942, 4.5 to 1 in 1943 and 3:1 in 1944. In the first 6 months of 1944, the Ostheer lost somewhat less than 800,000 killed, wounded and missing (which probably does not include the losses in the opening ten days of Bagration), while the Red Army lost some 2,850,000 men - or roughly 3.5 times the German losses. In the second half of 1944 it was still roughly 2.5:1
Let's check that. Here are the numbers of KIA+MIA+wounded:

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         Red Army       Heer      Ratio

1941     4,059,284     819,910   4.95:1
1942     6,364,558   1,133,880   5.61:1
1943     6,550,362   1,512,980   4.33:1
1944     5,355,806   2,030,074   2.64:1
and 1944 breakdown:

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Jan-Jun   2,677,898    720,150   3.72:1
Jul-Dec   2,677,908  1,309,924   2.04:1
So, your ratios for 1941-43 are pretty accurate, while 1944s are a bit off. Then, let's recall, that Krivosheev miss about 3 mln. of KIA and MIA, most likely lost in 1941 and 1942. This brings 1941-42 ratios close to 6-7:1. Roughly threefold improvement from 1941 to the second half of 1944.
Qvist wrote:The loss ratio improved steadily and gradually from the Soviet point of view. So however did the relation of forces vis-a-vis the Germans, which in itself should affect that positively.
Let's try to eliminate this factor. Let's calculate hit-ratio. How many german casualties accounted to an individual soviet serviceman a year?

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       Average Red     German      Hit
      Army strength  casualties   ratio

1942    5,313,600     1,133,880    0.21
1943    6,389,200     1,512,980    0.24
1944    6,550,000     2,030,074    0.31
and breakdown for 1944

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Jan-Jun 6,357,800       720,150    0.23
Jul-Dec 6,742,200     1,309,924    0.39
So, from 1942 to the end of 1944 the "individual" performance increased almost twofold. Of course, there are other factors:
Qvist wrote:...considerable relative improvements in equipment and organisation and refinements in operational techniques
But two of them (equipment and organization) are tactical-level improvements and contribute mostly to tactical performance of troops.

DISCLOSURE:
All figures here do not reflect actual loss ratio on Ostfront, and used only for the demonstration of general trends. They include neither losses of axis troops other then Wehrmacht, nor Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine losses.

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Re: On Russian tactics being responsible for high casualties

#120

Post by Qvist » 27 Aug 2008, 23:39

Hello Igor,

Okay, I see that you've got your figures in order. :) Sorry if I came off as a bit impatient, it's just that this is the king of all repeat discussions and your level of expectation and patience gets worn down over the years.

There are however three problems with your logic here, as far as I can see.

One, it is well accepted that a significantly improved force relation should in itself provide a more favorable ratio of losses. Hence, the sort of improvement your figures show is to be expected as a result of that, quite apart from any improvements in performance.

Two, When you are comparing average strength to losses, you cannot compare periods of different duration. Therefore you cannot compare the resulting figure for the second half of 1944 to the figure for 1942 as a whole and conclude that there was an improvement of 100%.

Three, how much improvement is there really? The development looks a good deal less significant if you put it in the context of relative casualty infliction:

Year.....German avg strength.....Soviet casualties.....Ratio
1942.......2,600,000................6,364,558.............2,45
1943.......2,750,000................6,550,362.............2,38
1944.......2,250,000................5,355,806.............2,38

Comparison:
2.45:0.21........11.7 times better
2,38: 0.24........9,9 times better
2,38: 0.31........7,7 times better

Is this a dramatic improvement? To focus on the Soviet per-man ratio improving from a measly 0,21 to a still measly 0,39 is to miss the wood for trees. What these figures indicate is that the Germans had an enormous margin of superiority in 1942 and that they still had an enormous margin of superiority in 1944. If the Soviet improvement is large from an internal point of view, that is because it starts from such a startlingly low base.

All this of course with the same caveat that you made: No allies included, general trends, broad outlines.

Some lesser points:
So, your ratios for 1941-43 are pretty accurate, while 1944s are a bit off.
I used Krivosheev's figures from Table 69, with Sick and Frostbites subtracted. Yours is a bit lower (where do they come from?), but for the sake of argument I'm happy to use yours - it does not much matter at the level of precision we are operating with here.

Let's try to eliminate this factor. Let's calculate hit-ratio. How many german casualties accounted to an individual soviet serviceman a year?
As mentioned, doing so does not eliminate this factor. Better force relation, better ratio of losses, all other things being equal.
Of course, there are other factors:

Qvist wrote:...considerable relative improvements in equipment and organisation and refinements in operational techniques

But two of them (equipment and organization) are tactical-level improvements and contribute mostly to tactical performance of troops.
¨

Yes - actually, we should separate performance and tactics, which are not strictly speaking the same thing.
Then, let's recall, that Krivosheev miss about 3 mln. of KIA and MIA, most likely lost in 1941 and 1942.
This is news to me - I would be extremely grateful if you could enlighten me further about this?

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