Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#16

Post by redcoat » 14 Jan 2009, 00:01

It is true that the 10 minisub crewmen sent in to attack Pearl Harbor had collected hair and nail clippings for return to their families in Japan in case they didn't return
Wasn't this standard practice for all Japanese servicemen who went to combat zones, as it was a religious practise so if their son/husband was killed, they could honour his remains in a shrine.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#17

Post by robdab » 14 Jan 2009, 01:12

redcoat, you asked,

Just as a matter of interest, how weak/strong were these lock gates ? - NOT lock gates at all ! My ATL scenario targets the Gatun Dam's spillway gates instead which were 45' wide by 20' tall and made of only 1/2" thick plate steel. They were made lightweight enough to be lifted by an electric hoist and moved on a pin & roller system installed in metal track mounted to the concrete pier on both sides of each gate.

Could they be taken out with a torpedo ? - As far as I know, no one has ever hit one with an air dropped Japanese WW2 torpedo of the type used on Dec.7'41 so, I don't know for sure. However, I believe them to be very vulnerable to such a torpedo hit.

The best comparison that I could find was with an OTL Dec.7'41 similar torpedo hit on the light cruiser USS Raleigh at Pearl Harbor as described by point #12 on page #8 of http://www.researcheratlarge.com/Ships/ ... eport.html
Listed there is a small 15" diameter hole blown thru the cruiser's hull by the torpedo ALONG WITH fractured hull plating in a "dent" some 50' wide by 30' tall and 8' deep into the side of it's hull. And this in a 3/4" steel plate hull backed up by very thick steel vertical ribs installed every 4' which were NOT a part of the weaker Gatun Dam's spillway gate design.

There are also several photos of the various damages done by similar torpedo hits on the US battleships at Pearl harbor available on the www. These show LARGE torpedo holes blown thru those armoured BB hides.

I believe that a similar torpedo hit on any one of those spillway gates would have blown that entire gate right off of the two concrete piers that held each on top of that curved concrete spillway structure. I'll leave it to you to decide "Yea or Nay" for yourself.

Wasn't this standard practice for all Japanese servicemen who went to combat zones, as it was a religious practise so if their son/husband was killed, they could honour his remains in a shrine. - I have read of it several times in cases of upcoming high risk combat situations but I do not believe that it was standard practise in each and every case of pre-combat preparation. However, I make no claim at all to being an expert in the Japanese ways of war. Perhaps others here could provide further detail ?


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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#18

Post by Simon K » 14 Jan 2009, 05:49

Bit naughty not fully explaining the anti surface intruder defences in place in your initial post :lol: OK why not use a mini sub then? The same type that the IJN was currently using?

We can work out the subs means of delivery at leisure.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#19

Post by Alaric » 14 Jan 2009, 11:10

robdab,

A most well thought out, well researched and I dare say brilliant post. We're lucky the Japanese did not think of this or decide to try it. Such an audacious plan would have, I think, had a quite further detrimental effect on American public morale combined with the news results of the Pearl Harbor attack. Not to mention an even more widespread panic of attacks on the west coast.

A brilliant covering move, the trade mission to Argentina. I have one thought about discovery of the Chitose's submarine escorts. If she was transmitting radio messages to the subs, or they to her or to Japan, would not the electronic intercept stations in Seattle, San Francisco, Pearl Harbor and Corrigedor Island not pick them up and pass this along? Robert Stinnet in his book Day of Deceit http://www.amazon.com/Day-Deceit-Truth- ... 250&sr=1-1 mentions these stations and that they picked up and tracked transmissions from the Japanese Fleet on it's way to Pearl Harbor back to Japan. Unless Chitose only used flag and visual/light signal communication to her 3 submarine escorts she and they run the risk of electronic intercept detection. She alone sending messages back to Japan would not cause alarm, but the 3 subs talking to her or to Japan would raise suspicions.

One other thing I wanted to ask about was in your paragraph mentioning page 349 of this link http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... s/ch13.htm when I looked at the link I could not see any mention of B-17C's or AC-20's, but it did mention another fighter type:
There were no barrage balloons. The Caribbean Air Force, General Andrews continued, was totally lacking in night pursuit planes and in very-high-frequency radio equipment with which to direct pursuit in air. Only eight modern long-range bombers and twelve modern light bombers were available, and there were no 37-mm. cannons for the P-39's. "The situations in Puerto Rico and the Base Commands are so new, and their major deficiencies so well known," General Andrews wrote, "that no attempt has been made to enumerate them." 57
So apparently there are P-39D's (the first model mass produced and delivered to the Army in 1941) as well as P-36's in the Canal Zone? Or is this paragraph simply a condensing of info in a couple of paragraphs:
For example, page #349 of http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... s/ch13.htm summarizes the state of Dec.'41 US defences at Panama against a surprise air attack: "He did, however, call to the attention of the War Department certain deficiencies in the defenses of the Canal. In General Andrews' opinion, the commandant of the naval district did not have enough planes or vessels under his control to conduct an adequate reconnaissance. The Aircraft Warning Service in the theater, he reported, was totally inadequate in personnel to supervise the installation of detectors on hand as well as to man the equipment when installed. Only two radar detectors were installed and in operation in the Panama Canal Department. The harbor defenses had less than one complete manning detail available. The antiaircraft artillery had insufficient personnel to man the armament being installed in the Canal Zone and only enough ammunition for one minute of fire per gun for the 37-mm. guns. There were no barrage balloons. The Air Force,General Andrews continued, was totally lacking in night pursuit planes and in very-high-frequency radio equipment with which to direct pursuit in air. Only 8 modern long-range B-17C bombers and 12 modern AC-20 light bombers were available..."

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#20

Post by robdab » 14 Jan 2009, 19:02

Alaric, in response to your,

A most well thought out, well researched and I dare say brilliant post. - Kind words indeed yet somehow I still feel that I have missed some vital flaw ...

We're lucky the Japanese did not think of this or decide to try it. Such an audacious plan would have, I think, had a quite further detrimental effect on American public morale combined with the news results of the Pearl Harbor attack. Not to mention an even more widespread panic of attacks on the west coast. - I'd agree in both cases, ATL Japanese success or failure BUT would the American public have received an over-compensating morale boost if my ATL Chitose was then somehow sunk on her way back to Japanese waters ?

Certainly if the Japanese intent was to fight a short war with the Americans, I think that any blow to US morale, especially at such a small potential cost, would be considered a good idea ?

If she was transmitting radio messages to the subs, or they to her or to Japan, would not the electronic intercept stations in Seattle, San Francisco, Pearl Harbor and Corrigedor Island not pick them up and pass this along? Robert Stinnet in his book Day of Deceit http://www.amazon.com/Day-Deceit-Truth- ... 250&sr=1-1 mentions these stations and that they picked up and tracked transmissions from the Japanese Fleet on it's way to Pearl Harbor back to Japan. Unless Chitose only used flag and visual/light signal communication to her 3 submarine escorts she and they run the risk of electronic intercept detection. She alone sending messages back to Japan would not cause alarm, but the 3 subs talking to her or to Japan would raise suspicions. - Without a doubt yet in the OTL Nagumo (who also had 3 IJN submarines out in front as advance scouts) managed to herd the entire Kido Butai strike force to 200 miles north of Oahu, without being discovered. There is an endless debate wrt whether the KB used it's radios or not, which I do NOT wish to enter into now. Suffice it to say that my ATL Panama strike by Chitose and her 3 IJN submarine escorts would use the same communications techniques used by Nagumo previous to his attack on Pearl Harbor. And on her way home too lest the Allies somehow catch my ATL Chitose before she could return to Japanese controlled waters

I know that by the time of Guadalcanal the USN had a TBS (talk between ships) low powered, very short ranged, radio system in operation in many of it's warships but I do not know if the IJN had something similar installed before Dec.7'41 ?

Remember also that Chitose was catapult equipped and could launch single engined floatplanes to search for & drop message canisters to her 3 submarines if really necessary, such as in the case of a storm or nightfall resulting in the 4 IJN warships being seperated beyond visual ranges. Safely landing and picking up that floatplane's 2 man crew, if seas were rough, might be difficult but then low to the water's surface submarines would be good at such. A single floatplane being a small price to pay for maintaining Japan's strategic surprises at both ATL Panama and Pearl Harbor.

One other thing I wanted to ask about was in your paragraph mentioning page 349 of this link http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... s/ch13.htm when I looked at the link I could not see any mention of B-17C's or AC-20's, but it did mention another fighter type:
There were no barrage balloons. The Caribbean Air Force, General Andrews continued, was totally lacking in night pursuit planes and in very-high-frequency radio equipment with which to direct pursuit in air. Only eight modern long-range bombers and twelve modern light bombers were available, and there were no 37-mm. cannons for the P-39's. "The situations in Puerto Rico and the Base Commands are so new, and their major deficiencies so well known," General Andrews wrote, "that no attempt has been made to enumerate them." 57
As far as I can tell the B-17s and AC-20s were kept as quick reaction bombers rather than being parcelled out as individual searchplanes on either the Pacific or Caribbean fronts.

So apparently there are P-39D's (the first model mass produced and delivered to the Army in 1941) as well as P-36's in the Canal Zone? Or is this paragraph simply a condensing of info in a couple of paragraphs: - The first detailed mention of P-39s in Panama (vs P-39s operating from other island bases in the Caribbean area) was the Jan.2'42 transfer of 3 squadrons direct from the US as detailed at http://paul.rutgers.edu/~mcgrew/wwii/us ... an.42.html

As for the obsolete P-26 "Peashooter" type, "Following Pearl Harbor, only nine P-26s remained airworthy in the Panama Canal Zone" comes from http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/P-26_Peashooter . I'd point out that "airworthy" is not the same as being air combat worthy.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#21

Post by robdab » 14 Jan 2009, 20:45

Simon K,

I'm sorry for the delay in responding to your last post. I had thought that I had already done so but it appears that I composed and typed a reply but then signed off without actually posting it here ... the lesson being, don't try to post when you are tired !

Bit naughty not fully explaining the anti surface intruder defences in place in your initial post - Sorry but I had to leave somethings for discussion here, didn't I ? The WW2 defence of Panama is a BIG topic so what details do I include and which do I leave to others interested enough to explore further ? To cover everything Panama in an initial posting would require a 300+ page book, I'd estimate.

OK why not use a mini sub then? The same type that the IJN was currently using ? - Several reasons as follow:

Even two torpedoes might not destroy a much larger & stronger Panama Canal lock gate and at least 4-6 floating spares were always on hand at Panama in case of accidental collision damage by vessel impacts. Wrecking a downstream lock gate would prevent minisub access to the next upstream lock gate which, in any case, were double pairs of gates to prevent accidental water drainage.

Torpedoing a ship in the lowest lock chamber might block one half of the Canal for a few weeks but would not stop operations as USN vessels would receive priority transit thru the other half of the twinned Canal locks. I'd still think this unlikely as any such torpedo hits thru a lock gate could only be fully bow or stern hits. Leaving a vessel more easily made watertight again and then refloated, if it were to even sink at all ?

The 5 type "A" minisubs used by the IJN at Pearl Harbor did not carry generators with which to recharge their batteries. Ditto for compressed air used for breathing and blowing ballast tanks. What they left their motherships with, was all that they could get. If more were released 5 miles off of the western end of the Canal they would have to travel some 50 (out of a maximum of 80 miles slow range) twisting and turning miles, thru several sets of locks, in order to reach the Gatun Dam's spillway gates. Avoiding collisions in the only 45' deep Canal navigation channel (each minisub was 21' tall from keel to the top of it's retracted periscope so they would have to get out of the way rather than trying to slip below most transiting vessels) the whole way.

The Japanese minis had to navigate underwater by use of a gyroscope and via regular "peaks" thru their periscopes in order to follow another vessel into a lock chamber. In the daylight (at that time the Canal did not operate at night) and at periscope depth in a narrow lock chamber such an intruder could never even hope to avoid being visually spotted by ship's crews or Canal Authority workers handling ship lines etc. No vessel was allowed to use it's own engine(s) for movement from lock chamber to lock chamber in order to minimize any chance of damages to the Canal. Electric locomotives called "mules", running on rails beside each lock were used to pull each vessel and in order for a Japanese minisub to also move to the next lock chamber, numerous "periscope peaks" would have to be done in order to co-ordinate with that silent vessel's movement.

Reports of 5 periscopes travelling nearly the length of the Canal would be sure to bring American PBYs, B-17s and B-18s carrying depth charges, long before the minisubs could reach Gatun Dam. A similar but smaller dam did exist at Miraflores, closer to the western end of the Canal but due to the geography of the Canal, blowing it's spillway gates would not drain Gatun Lake at all. Another complete lock complex stood between Gatun Lake and Miraflores Lake.

We can work out the subs means of delivery at leisure. - As far as I can see in the explanation above, there is no need to do so. I just can't see a minisub attack on the Canal as being any more than a minor annoyance to the American war effort. I suppose that the same initial shock might be delivered to the American public but that would fade quickly once newspaper photos showed ship traffic thru 1/2 of the Canal still continuing. With wartime censorship efforts, the American public might not even know that the Canal was only operating at a reduced 50% until long after it was repaired and back to 100% ?

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#22

Post by Simon K » 14 Jan 2009, 20:55

Robdab. Thanks for your detailed reply.

Do you have a 1941 chart of the canal, any inserts detailing the gate (s) ?

Simon

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#23

Post by Alaric » 14 Jan 2009, 21:30

robdab wrote:Alaric, in response to your,

A most well thought out, well researched and I dare say brilliant post. - Kind words indeed yet somehow I still feel that I have missed some vital flaw ...

If you have it is beyond my ability to see it.

We're lucky the Japanese did not think of this or decide to try it. Such an audacious plan would have, I think, had a quite further detrimental effect on American public morale combined with the news results of the Pearl Harbor attack. Not to mention an even more widespread panic of attacks on the west coast. - I'd agree in both cases, ATL Japanese success or failure BUT would the American public have received an over-compensating morale boost if my ATL Chitose was then somehow sunk on her way back to Japanese waters ?

Certainly if the Japanese intent was to fight a short war with the Americans, I think that any blow to US morale, especially at such a small potential cost, would be considered a good idea ?

The news of the sinking of the ship responsible for the Canal attacks might be something of the morale boost, and cetainly the War Department would put as big a spin on it as they could, but you're quite right that it's a small cost for an action that impedes the movement of US warships, however long or short a time, and adds to the (Japanese) homefront's patriotic fervor and morale.

If she was transmitting radio messages to the subs, or they to her or to Japan, would not the electronic intercept stations in Seattle, San Francisco, Pearl Harbor and Corrigedor Island not pick them up and pass this along? Robert Stinnet in his book Day of Deceit http://www.amazon.com/Day-Deceit-Truth- ... 250&sr=1-1 mentions these stations and that they picked up and tracked transmissions from the Japanese Fleet on it's way to Pearl Harbor back to Japan. Unless Chitose only used flag and visual/light signal communication to her 3 submarine escorts she and they run the risk of electronic intercept detection. She alone sending messages back to Japan would not cause alarm, but the 3 subs talking to her or to Japan would raise suspicions. - Without a doubt yet in the OTL Nagumo (who also had 3 IJN submarines out in front as advance scouts) managed to herd the entire Kido Butai strike force to 200 miles north of Oahu, without being discovered. There is an endless debate wrt whether the KB used it's radios or not, which I do NOT wish to enter into now. Suffice it to say that my ATL Panama strike by Chitose and her 3 IJN submarine escorts would use the same communications techniques used by Nagumo previous to his attack on Pearl Harbor. And on her way home too lest the Allies somehow catch my ATL Chitose before she could return to Japanese controlled waters.

Absolutely agree about not getting into a debate about the knowledge or lack thereof regarding Japanese fleet movements headed to attack Pearl Harbor. Wasn't my intention either and I hesitated in the mentioning it, but after the possibilty of radio incercepts occured to me I thought I should cite a source that provides evidence of such intercepts.

I know that by the time of Guadalcanal the USN had a TBS (talk between ships) low powered, very short ranged, radio system in operation in many of it's warships but I do not know if the IJN had something similar installed before Dec.7'41 ?

I have no information on this either.

Remember also that Chitose was catapult equipped and could launch single engined floatplanes to search for & drop message canisters to her 3 submarines if really necessary, such as in the case of a storm or nightfall resulting in the 4 IJN warships being seperated beyond visual ranges. Safely landing and picking up that floatplane's 2 man crew, if seas were rough, might be difficult but then low to the water's surface submarines would be good at such. A single floatplane being a small price to pay for maintaining Japan's strategic surprises at both ATL Panama and Pearl Harbor.

One other thing I wanted to ask about was in your paragraph mentioning page 349 of this link http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/ ... s/ch13.htm when I looked at the link I could not see any mention of B-17C's or AC-20's, but it did mention another fighter type:
There were no barrage balloons. The Caribbean Air Force, General Andrews continued, was totally lacking in night pursuit planes and in very-high-frequency radio equipment with which to direct pursuit in air. Only eight modern long-range bombers and twelve modern light bombers were available, and there were no 37-mm. cannons for the P-39's. "The situations in Puerto Rico and the Base Commands are so new, and their major deficiencies so well known," General Andrews wrote, "that no attempt has been made to enumerate them." 57
As far as I can tell the B-17s and AC-20s were kept as quick reaction bombers rather than being parcelled out as individual searchplanes on either the Pacific or Caribbean fronts.

So apparently there are P-39D's (the first model mass produced and delivered to the Army in 1941) as well as P-36's in the Canal Zone? Or is this paragraph simply a condensing of info in a couple of paragraphs: - The first detailed mention of P-39s in Panama (vs P-39s operating from other island bases in the Caribbean area) was the Jan.2'42 transfer of 3 squadrons direct from the US as detailed at http://paul.rutgers.edu/~mcgrew/wwii/us ... an.42.html

Ah, then that explains the reference in the link about "The Caribbean Air Force". I was confused as to whether they were including Panama in that and thus whether P-39's were in Panama. Real shame what the NACA people did to the Airacobra in forcing Bell to take the turbosuperchargers off after they said the air scoop created too much drag and forced other modifications that turned the plane from a bull to a steer.

As for the obsolete P-26 "Peashooter" type, "Following Pearl Harbor, only nine P-26s remained airworthy in the Panama Canal Zone" comes from http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/P-26_Peashooter . I'd point out that "airworthy" is not the same as being air combat worthy.


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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#25

Post by Simon K » 14 Jan 2009, 21:33

Cheers for them

Simon

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#26

Post by Visionist » 14 Jan 2009, 22:22

I like this. The beauty lies in the simplicity. If anything goes wrong, all the Japanese lose is a tender and a few flying boats.
How will the Chitose know at the last minute that the attack should go ahead, vis a vis the Kido Butai attack? What local time should she launch her planes so that they achieve parity with the Hawaii raid?

There is a very interesting study on here about the feasability of an outright invasion of Oahu on Dec 7th, just something to chew on: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... hilit=oahu

The seaplane crews will need extensive training versus a spillway size target, under flak, and their gunners extensive training with fighters. Each aircraft will also be required to know exactly which gates to aim for.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#27

Post by robdab » 15 Jan 2009, 00:29

Visionist, my ego can't take much more of this praise.

I like this. The beauty lies in the simplicity. If anything goes wrong, all the Japanese lose is a tender and a few flying boats. - Actually, I'd hope only the 3 Mavis might be lost. With Chitose being in the Galapagos, some 850 miles from Gatun and leaving westward from there just as soon as her 3 Mavis have launched, I'd hope that she would already be about 1,000 miles west of Panama before the 135 mph Mavis would drop their torpedoes about 6.5 hours later. One of her three escort submarines might have been sent well ahead towards some secluded Panama bay for aircrew pick-ups just after dark ? Or for that matter another could just remain hidden near their Galapagos take-off and landing point for the return of the Mavis aircrews, at dusk. I know that the Mavis had a range of 3,700 miles but I do not know at this moment if that was with carrying the weight of two torpedoes, or not. It seems likely that any ATL Mavis managing to elude the angry American fighters over Panama could fly further west than the Galapagos to meet with my ATL Chitose for ocean pick-up but the feasibility of that success would depend entire on the state of wind and waves at the time.

How will the Chitose know at the last minute that the attack should go ahead, vis a vis the Kido Butai attack? - My 3 ATL Mavis will attack unless stopped by a pre-arranged coded radio signal from Tokyo.

What local time should she launch her planes so that they achieve parity with the Hawaii raid? - Panama and Oahu are 5 hours apart in timezones so to match an 0800 Dec.7'41 attack at Pearl Harbor my 3 ATL Mavis would drop their torpedoes at 1300+/- hours in Panama, having taken off from the Galapagos Islands near dawn some 6.5 hours prior.

There is a very interesting study on here about the feasability of an outright invasion of Oahu on Dec 7th, just something to chew on: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... hilit=oahu - Indeed. It was researched and proposed by Glenn239 (who still posts here btw) and you will find my name frequently in the later pages of that long discussion. I though it a fabulous AH effort although Glenn239 and I never did agree on the timing of his ATL Oahu landings. For several very good reasons he believed that some of the outer Hawaiian Islands should be taken and garrisoned first, before Oahu was tackled while I have always favoured a dawn Dec.7'41 "blitz" style high risk invasion attempt over (hopefully) undefended Oahu beaches.

IIRC we never did get around to discussing the use of the 250,000 WW1 75mm gas shells that the US Army had stored on Oahu. Yet another reason that I thought it better to land with all possible haste, rather than giving the Americans three or so weeks to prepare their civilian population for gas warfare on that Island.

In fact, this ATL Panama scenario had it's beginnings in my thoughts on how best to slow the inevitable American Atlantic Fleet counter-attack that would follow on the heels of a Japanese siege/conquest of Oahu. Then and only then would the time taken for the USN replacement fleet to sail an additional 8,000 miles around Cape Horn really hurt the Americans.

The seaplane crews will need extensive training versus a spillway size target, under flak, and their gunners extensive training with fighters. Each aircraft will also be required to know exactly which gates to aim for. - Agreed except that if challenged by any "extra-alert" US fighter pilot somewhere over Panama, each lone Mavis pilot would be trained to follow Pan-Am "broken radio" procedures for an on-water landing as and where directed by that US fighter pilot, while stalling for as much time as possible. I think it unlikely that a civilian airliner, even one that doesn't somehow look quite "right" would be shot down in peacetime as long as it appeared to follow USAAF directions to land. One submissive Mavis seeming to be readying for an on-water landing means 2 more still heading unknown and unmolested for an unsuspecting Gatun Dam, with 4 torpedoes. Only at the last moment would the Mavis gunners mount their weapons and fire on the (hopefully surprised) US fighter since if they fail, its multiple machine guns will likely flame their Mavis's unarmored fuel tanks.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#28

Post by Alaric » 15 Jan 2009, 01:35

The seaplane crews will need extensive training versus a spillway size target, under flak, and their gunners extensive training with fighters. Each aircraft will also be required to know exactly which gates to aim for. - Agreed except that if challenged by any "extra-alert" US fighter pilot somewhere over Panama, each lone Mavis pilot would be trained to follow Pan-Am "broken radio" procedures for an on-water landing as and where directed by that US fighter pilot, while stalling for as much time as possible. I think it unlikely that a civilian airliner, even one that doesn't somehow look quite "right" would be shot down in peacetime as long as it appeared to follow USAAF directions to land. One submissive Mavis seeming to be readying for an on-water landing means 2 more still heading unknown and unmolested for an unsuspecting Gatun Dam, with 4 torpedoes. Only at the last moment would the Mavis gunners mount their weapons and fire on the (hopefully surprised) US fighter since if they fail, its multiple machine guns will likely flame their Mavis's unarmored fuel tanks.
Would not said "extra-alert" US fighter pilot immediatly recognize the torpedoes for what they were, Pan Am markings or not?

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#29

Post by robdab » 15 Jan 2009, 05:36

Alaric, you asked,

Would not said "extra-alert" US fighter pilot immediatly recognize the torpedoes for what they were, Pan Am markings or not ? - Not if disguised properly. I wouldn't expect a United States Army Air Force (USAAF) fighter pilot to be all that familiar with how a torpedo might appear as it hungs under the wing of a Pan-Am flyingboat. Neither would normally be included in his regular training.

If you'd go back to my initial posting for this thread you will be reminded that I typed, "Each Mavis could carry a pair of torpedoes as per http://www.warbirdphotographs.com/NavyJB&W/H6K-1.jpg with the "shallow water" wooden tail fins giving a framework for the attachment of a rounded breakaway "fuel tank" end cap added over the torpedo propellers to help with their appearance as long ranged PanAm China Clippers." Pictures of those "shallow water drop" wooden tail fins can be seen at http://groups.msn.com/japanesemodelairc ... otoID=2566 and http://groups.msn.com/japanesemodelairc ... otoID=1818

Once the OTL shallow drop depth problem had been solved I believe it to be not too difficult a task for IJN design engineers to then also fabricate an ATL breakaway rounded "end cap" style sheet metal cover that could be slipped over top of those OTL wooden fins so as to give the torpedo the front & rear rounded end appearance of a cylindrical long range fuel tank. As long as the rear torpedo fins and propellers are out of sight, I wouldn't expect a US fighter pilot to give such underwing "tanks" even a second glance.

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Re: Dec.7'41: A Day That Nobody Bombed Panama !

#30

Post by Simon K » 15 Jan 2009, 06:09

A minor point. Were the wings of a Mavis strong enough to carry two Long Lance? There was no bomb bay?

Simon

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